ADA Tejas (LCA) News and Discussions

[Zebra]

HAL/ADA should reveal these information by now. IMO.

 

[ersakthivel]

3000kms range which was told by Janes, The ferry range was disclosed by PIB only that was 1700kms so does 500km combat radius ..

Their are no other official documentation i have right now, Only Little disclosed by official reports ..

Ofcourse Kunal. combat range is often 3 times the combat radius , because combat radius is calculated with few minutes of close combat , few minutes of after burner thrust , some time over the target plus the two way distance. So if combat radius is 500 Km then combat range ahould be around 1500 Km plus. then it automatically follows that full ferry range with internal and external fuel tanks will be much more higher than 1700 Kms mentioned.

you have advised us all not to discuss MMRCA vs tejas in this thread but sadly higher IAf officials backing MMRCA have not stopped mudslinging on tejas in any available opportunity,

I am copying my comments , I posted for the article and posting it below.

MMRCA an Absolute Necessity - The New Indian Express

1 and mk2 are by no means legacy platforms.The present CAS has said that tejas is a welcome addition to IAF's fighting capacity. I dont remember any airchief calling it a legacy platform. Even PV Naik said that once tejas finishes FOC it will be a true multi role 4.5th gen fighter in the gripen class .

Upgraded mirage-2000s will have a far lower range BVR missile than both tejas mk1 and mk2 along with 10 and 30 percent lower Thrust to weight ratio compared to tejas mk1 and mk2 respectively.So how come it become a non legaacy platform while tejas which has better Thrust to Weight ratio and lower wing loading than Mirage-2000 become legacy fighter?

the IAF group captain and most experienced international award winning test pilot of tejas Suneeth krishna has said that tejas mk1 is "at least equal to upgraded mirage-2000". So which is a legacy platform?Grouping tejas with useless hawk and jag shows the article is not reflecting the true ground reality.It is surprising to see high IAF officials routinely indulging in this hate mongering on tejas, whether the recently held Vayu stratpost conference or this article they never fail to mention that tejas is just a mig-21 replacement or it should be closed down or it is a legacy platform!!!!But test pilot accounts are so different from their views!!!!


So it is quiet surprising to hear that while 5 decades old Mig-29s and Mirage-2000s are supposed to be cutting edge frontline fighters tejas is called a legacy platform.Tejas has a bigger radome dia than rafale to fit any future higher powered ASEA radars.

Legacy means older designs.In that case it is the rafale which is older in design than both Tejas mk1 and mk2.And once china inducts J-20 and J-31 the 20 billion dollar rafale will be a true legacy platform designed in the 1980s with no stealth 5th gen airframe concepts in mind.

People are free to support any fighter of their choice for MMRCA, but that doesn't mean one has to stick a legacy label on tejas, mk2 of which is yet to fly.how come a fighter that hasn't even flown become a legacy platform?

I thought ASRs were issued with certain capability aims. It is the first time I hear that MMRCA was selected for coercive capability to affect the mind of adversary!!!!

Including the Eurofighter is no canard by kanard. Airmarshal should remember that IAF has shortlisted both rafale and eurofighter for their MMRCA shortlist.In case eurofighter was offered at a lower price , it would have won the MMRCA bid.Even now if some problem arose in negotiations with Dassault Eurofighter is still the L2 choice.

 

[abhi_the _gr8_maratha]

Happiest person would be ER sakthivel.he was single handedly fought on this issue which others termed it as a joke. if you observe latest happenings most of things ER sakthivel mentioned is comming true.

kunal sir and me also fought with him just nowadays has been very little presence here....

 

[abhi_the _gr8_maratha]

Happiest person would be ER sakthivel.he was single handedly fought on this issue which others termed it as a joke. if you observe latest happenings most of things ER sakthivel mentioned is comming true.

kunal sir and me also fought with him just nowadays has been very little presence here....
.
but ersakthivel had upper hand.

 

[Austinjimson]

Is India developing indigenous jamming pods for LCA Tejas??

 

[Kunal Biswas]

This thread is not for fighting but knowledge about given topic, Their are plenty of people visit this thread not just members and one should put what is right so the knowledge they get is right !

kunal sir and me also fought with him just nowadays has been very little presence here....

kunal sir and me also fought with him just nowadays has been very little presence here....
.
but ersakthivel had upper hand.

 

[abhi_the _gr8_maratha]

This thread is not for fighting but knowledge about given topic, Their are plenty of people visit this thread not just members and one should put what is right so the knowledge they get is right !

ironically many people come here to fight...

 

[ersakthivel]

The comment I made in post-5227 in this page was the copy of the comment I made on the indian Express website, but the comment is not showing in the comment section of the column!!!!
Is this what we call free media??

 

[Zebra]

self delete.

 

[ersakthivel]

welcome sayareakd sir, long time , no see,,,,,

 

[ersakthivel]

http://bharatkarnad.com/2013/11/10/...amaniams-response-to-wasteful-military-deals/

SOme more rebuttals for AVM srjun Subramanium's call as tejas being a legacy fighter,

I want to know what type of brainstorming went on between IAF and HAL for decades which could not solve the fuel pump issues of HPT-32? And Why with base repair depots good enough to design and make a MMRCA class fighter and assemble a Pliatus level trainer , IAF cpuld not rectify the fuel pump issues of HPT-32 And why did Arjun Subramanium failed to mention about the HPT-35 which too was developed at the behest of IAf by HAL was not pursued with interest by IAF for close to a decade ? it was shelved because IAF did not show any interest. It was this decade long delay by IAF which did not approve the HPT-35 proposal from HAL which led to this sorry state pf importing Pilatus while designing tejas!!!!!!!!!! Ajai Shukla and many other writers have pointed this out in many blogs. It is not Bharat Karnad alone.

The fuel fraction (percentage of weight of fuel divided by eight of the fully loaded fighter)is what determines the range of the fighter. The ferry range of all fighters like Mig-29, RAFALE Mirage-Tejas which all have varying weights is more or less the same.So for normal combat loads with normal fuel config they will all have normal ranges. Also a fully indigenous produced Su-30 MKI is already available for long range bombing. Then what is the need for medium range RAFALE which will have 10 or twenty percentage range advantage over tejas mk-2 at a huge forex outgo of 20 billion dollars? Also FGFA is slated to come in in a decade. Then what role will RAFALE do which can not be performed by combination of tejas mk-2, SU-30 MKI(upgraded to super sukhoi status) and tejas mk-2? So this medium class is totally unnecessary classification designed to fool the inexperienced political leadership and aviation enthusiasts.


If more weapon weight is needed we can use two tejas mk-2s in place of one RAFALE if both have the same range .The real question is what does IAF gain by inducting so called 20 ton class RAFALE as a meium weight fighter ?The french are standardizing on on all RAFALE fighter force with twin engined 20 ton RAFALEs Meanwhile russians are standardizing on 30n ton twin engined PAKFA and Su-35, The US is inducting single engined F-35 in large scale. Unlike IAF the above mentioned airforces need to fly long distances to fight the enemy. It is not the case with IAF.Where most of the targets are well with in short range. And when it comes to air defence of Indian airspace tejas mk-2 will have no shortfalls compared to RAFALE on account of range or weapon load. Also work is already going on ASEA radar miniaturization and LRDE has fair experience in it.

And we are no longer under crippling western sanctions so we will find partners on that count with no restrictions. Even RAFALE has just put on ASEA radar for trials. We don't how fully developed it really is PAF is going for 120 light class Jf-17, are all these airforces buy any light medium or heavy fighter that is missing from their fleet from any third country? Certainly they won't do such a stupid thing . Fuel fraction (weight of fuel/loaded weight for normal combat sorties in design weapon loads)determines the range not the fighter being named light or heavy. if tejas mk-2 has same fuel fraction as RAFALE it will also have th same range. Most probably it will end up ten to twenty percent shortage in range nothing big, Also we can employ three tejas mk-2 with 15 ton weapon loads with same radar diameter and long range BVR missiles of RAFALE for the cost of one RAFALE.


So no shortage when it comes to weapon load. Infact tejas mk-2s will deliver double the weapon load with three times more sensor capability if costs are taken into account MMRCA contract originated as a proposal to buy 126 Mirage -2000 in the late 90s. To avoid the single vendor situation GOI asked it to be a global tender in 2004. Before that there was no long felt need in IAF for so called 20 ton medium weight fighter. tejas mk-2 will have at the most a twenty percent shortage when it comes to weapon load and range requirements over RAFALE. But ordering a few more squadrons of very low priced(because of the 100 percent indigenization) Su-30 MKIs in super Sukhoi versions or increasing the numbers of FGFA to by a few squadrons will be equal to having RAFALEs. Certainly there is no such thing that Su-30 MKi, Tejas mk-2 and FGFA combine can't do that RAFALE can!!!


If you spend the same 20 to 30 billion (considering high maintanece cost)in the two coming decades on such tejas mk-2 and and a few extra squads of FGFA or Su-30 MKI IAF can improve its attcaking capability in a substantial manner. We can have more than 300 fighters in such combo compared to just 126 RAFALEs for the same cost. Also the MMRCA contract was changed form life cycle cost based buy to per unit fly away cost mid way. And the winner Dassault which entered the competition knowing well that the HAL is to be its local partner is saying HAL is unfit for the job. if a a no experience private sector firm gets chosen by dassault as local partners then all the TOT norms go for a toss. The MMRCA was not an original need . It was born from the 126 Mirage-2000 buy proposal which was shot down because of single vendor situation by MOD in 2004 , thus it became MMRCA. If MOD promptly accepted the 126 mirage-2000 buy from IAF there would be no MMRCA.

 

[Punya Pratap]

Re: ADA LCA Tejas Mark-II

ANALYSISOctober 30, 2014
IAF fighter strength to dip further

After spending USD 30 billion on the FGFA and USD 20 billion on the MMRCA, the Indian Air Force will be left with a serious shortfall of at least 14 squadrons in 2032, going by the 'best-case scenario'.

Download this article in PDF format


IAF fighters during the IronFist live-fire demonstration in February 2013 | StratPost
IAF fighters during the IronFist live-fire demonstration in February 2013 | StratPost
The IAF's shortage of fighter aircraft is expected to get progressively worse even after the expenditure of around USD 60 billion on new acquisitions and upgrades, by 2032.

The head of the Indian Air Force (IAF), Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha, admitted concerns about the continuing delays in the acquisition of fighter aircraft earlier this month, which have left the air force with an increasingly ageing fleet. But the IAF is staring at an inevitable long-term shortage of fighter aircraft even with its current plans for acquisition, with at least 10 squadrons expected to go out of service by the year 2032, leading to a shortage of around 200 fighter aircraft.

This assessment is what has emerged from the discussions at the Vayu-StratPost Air Power Roundtable held in July.

The IAF plans to acquire 126 Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) at a cost estimated to be around USD 20 billion, for which it is negotiating with the French Dassault for its Rafale aircraft.

India is also partnering with Russia to acquire Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) for which, it has spent USD 295 million and committed a further USD 5.5 billion. The project is estimated to ultimately cost India close to USD 30 billion.

During discussions at the roundtable, which comprised defense journalists and recently retired senior officers, who have had much to do with the IAF's fighter procurement programs, numbers and timelines emerged which have been put together from the IAF's current procurement plans and incontrovertibly point to a fighter aircraft shortage crisis, as well as, a financially unsustainable fighter fleet.

The current projections of force accretion for the Indian Air Force assume a 'best-case scenario' in which the production rate of the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk I is at least eight aircraft per year, the MMRCA contract is concluded in the 2014-2015 period and the FGFA development faces no further delays.

Given these assumptions, the MiG-21M, MiG-21bis and the MiG-27M/UPG are expected to be phased out by 2017 and the Indian Air Force fighter fleet will begin inducting the FGFA and MMRCA the same year and will consist of these two aircraft, in addition to the LCA and the Sukhoi-30MKI, by the year 2032, by when the upgraded Mirage-2000H/I, the MiG-29B/UPG and the Jaguar IS/IM are expected to retire.

But the problem is that the Indian Air Force will continue to be vulnerable to shortfalls right through 2032, going by current 'best-case scenario' projections.

In 2017, with the virtually inescapable retirement of the four squadrons of MiG-21M, five squadrons of MiG-27M/UPG and one squadron of MiG-21bis aircraft, the shortfall in fighter squadron strength will go up to 10, leaving the Indian Air Force with only 32 squadrons, given assumptions under the 'best-case scenario' of the induction of one squadron of LCA Mk I.

Squadron numbers will be alleviated in 2022 with the induction of one squadron of Sukhoi-30MKI, four squadrons of the MMRCA, and one squadron each of the LCA and FGFA. But the Indian Air Force will still see the retirement of two squadrons of the MiG-21 Bison, leaving it with 37 squadrons and a shortfall of five squadrons.

2027 will see the retirement of the remaining four MiG-21 Bison squadrons, the induction of two MMRCA squadrons and three squadrons of FGFA, bringing the total number up to 38 squadrons, with a shortfall of only four squadrons.

But in 2032, with all new inductions into the Indian Air Force having already been completed, and with the retirement of six Jaguar IS/IM squadrons, three squadrons of the Mirage 2000 H/I and three squadrons of the MiG-29 B/UPG, it will see face an even higher shortfall of 14 squadrons and be left with only 28 squadrons.

If projections of the likely required total squadron number of 45 at that point are correct, this shortfall will go up to 17 squadrons.

After spending USD 30 billion on the FGFA, USD 20 billion on the MMRCA, the Indian Air Force will be left with a serious shortfall of at least 14 squadrons in 2032, assuming what plays out is the 'best-case scenario'.

This is in addition to the cost of the upgrade programs on the Mirage-2000 H/I, the Jaguar IS/IM and the MiG-29 B/UPG. While the upgrade of the Mirage-2000 H/I will cost USD 2.2 billion, the Jaguar IS/IM upgrade will cost USD 514 million and the MiG-29B/UPG upgrade, USD 946 million, with planned completion in 2021, 2017 and 2016, respectively.

It is also important to note that this shortfall is on the basis of the assumption that the requirement for squadron numbers in 2032 will remain what it is today. But there is no reason to suppose this to be a correct assumption, even despite the multi-role nature of the newer aircraft being inducted.

Indeed, the requirement of squadrons, including the shortfall and required force accretion could go over 20 squadrons or 400 aircraft.

Part of the reason for this shortfall is the lack of success of the LCA development program. It is no secret that the IAF has been unhappy with the capability of the LCA as it stands and has had to be cajoled into ordering two squadrons of the aircraft, with a promise from the development agencies to produce a more powerful Mk II. This variant is also imperative for the Indian Navy, as the Mk I is under-powered for carrier operations.

When the IAF was considering its future requirements in the nineties, it was given assurances of the time-frame in which deliveries of the LAC would take place. On the basis of these assurances, the IAF decided to upgrade 125 MiG-21 aircraft to the Bison variant. But with continues delays in the LCA program, the IAF has since had to place orders for additional Sukhoi-30MKI aircraft, as well as look to the MMRCA program as a necessity, rather than a measure for force accretion.

But the fact remains that the Sukhoi-30 MKI, the Rafale (selected as the MMRCA) and the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) are all heavy aircraft with a high cost of ownership and operation. Attempting to place any of these in the role meant to be carried out by the LCA would be too expensive to be practical.

Much depends of the fate of the development of the LCA Mk II and the promise for all the shortcomings of the Mk I.

It will be noted that the 'best case scenario' outlined above does not include the LCA Mk II. This is because the aircraft remains on paper today, and with no real accountability or the discipline of deadlines, the IAF has no faith in the production of a Mk II in a usable and time-sensitive configuration.

While the exact shortcomings of the Mk I and the specific challenges in the development of the Mk II were beyond the scope of the roundtable and this report, there is no great secret here.

If it does not succeed within a much shorter time-frame than the 30-year span of the Mk I development, the problem has to be acknowledged by the highest quarters in government, which will then have to look for urgent alternatives to the LCA, for the role initially envisaged for it.

Unless either the LCA Mk II far exceeds current expectations or the government looks for alternatives for it, the shortfall described above in the 'best case scenario' will remain at a minimum at the numbers mentioned above.

But, in any case, if the IAF is going to be short of at least 200 aircraft after spending USD 60 billion in the year 2032, there could be a case to review the fighter fleet mix and structure being proposed to be acquired under current plans.

For the sake of context, the RFP for the MMRCA program was issued almost exactly seven years back. Even if the order were placed today, it would still take three years for delivery of the first aircraft. That's ten years already, without the order being placed. The LCA development program was initiated in 1983. It is thirty years past, and the aircraft is still not in service.

While a problem eighteen years away might seem distant, the long timelines required for defense acquisition and production in India make it a matter of importance and urgency

 

[Punya Pratap]

ANALYSISOctober 30, 2014
IAF fighter strength to dip further

After spending USD 30 billion on the FGFA and USD 20 billion on the MMRCA, the Indian Air Force will be left with a serious shortfall of at least 14 squadrons in 2032, going by the 'best-case scenario'.

Download this article in PDF format


IAF fighters during the IronFist live-fire demonstration in February 2013 | StratPost
IAF fighters during the IronFist live-fire demonstration in February 2013 | StratPost
The IAF's shortage of fighter aircraft is expected to get progressively worse even after the expenditure of around USD 60 billion on new acquisitions and upgrades, by 2032.

The head of the Indian Air Force (IAF), Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha, admitted concerns about the continuing delays in the acquisition of fighter aircraft earlier this month, which have left the air force with an increasingly ageing fleet. But the IAF is staring at an inevitable long-term shortage of fighter aircraft even with its current plans for acquisition, with at least 10 squadrons expected to go out of service by the year 2032, leading to a shortage of around 200 fighter aircraft.

This assessment is what has emerged from the discussions at the Vayu-StratPost Air Power Roundtable held in July.

The IAF plans to acquire 126 Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) at a cost estimated to be around USD 20 billion, for which it is negotiating with the French Dassault for its Rafale aircraft.

India is also partnering with Russia to acquire Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) for which, it has spent USD 295 million and committed a further USD 5.5 billion. The project is estimated to ultimately cost India close to USD 30 billion.

During discussions at the roundtable, which comprised defense journalists and recently retired senior officers, who have had much to do with the IAF's fighter procurement programs, numbers and timelines emerged which have been put together from the IAF's current procurement plans and incontrovertibly point to a fighter aircraft shortage crisis, as well as, a financially unsustainable fighter fleet.

The current projections of force accretion for the Indian Air Force assume a 'best-case scenario' in which the production rate of the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk I is at least eight aircraft per year, the MMRCA contract is concluded in the 2014-2015 period and the FGFA development faces no further delays.

Given these assumptions, the MiG-21M, MiG-21bis and the MiG-27M/UPG are expected to be phased out by 2017 and the Indian Air Force fighter fleet will begin inducting the FGFA and MMRCA the same year and will consist of these two aircraft, in addition to the LCA and the Sukhoi-30MKI, by the year 2032, by when the upgraded Mirage-2000H/I, the MiG-29B/UPG and the Jaguar IS/IM are expected to retire.

But the problem is that the Indian Air Force will continue to be vulnerable to shortfalls right through 2032, going by current 'best-case scenario' projections.

In 2017, with the virtually inescapable retirement of the four squadrons of MiG-21M, five squadrons of MiG-27M/UPG and one squadron of MiG-21bis aircraft, the shortfall in fighter squadron strength will go up to 10, leaving the Indian Air Force with only 32 squadrons, given assumptions under the 'best-case scenario' of the induction of one squadron of LCA Mk I.

Squadron numbers will be alleviated in 2022 with the induction of one squadron of Sukhoi-30MKI, four squadrons of the MMRCA, and one squadron each of the LCA and FGFA. But the Indian Air Force will still see the retirement of two squadrons of the MiG-21 Bison, leaving it with 37 squadrons and a shortfall of five squadrons.

2027 will see the retirement of the remaining four MiG-21 Bison squadrons, the induction of two MMRCA squadrons and three squadrons of FGFA, bringing the total number up to 38 squadrons, with a shortfall of only four squadrons.

But in 2032, with all new inductions into the Indian Air Force having already been completed, and with the retirement of six Jaguar IS/IM squadrons, three squadrons of the Mirage 2000 H/I and three squadrons of the MiG-29 B/UPG, it will see face an even higher shortfall of 14 squadrons and be left with only 28 squadrons.

If projections of the likely required total squadron number of 45 at that point are correct, this shortfall will go up to 17 squadrons.

After spending USD 30 billion on the FGFA, USD 20 billion on the MMRCA, the Indian Air Force will be left with a serious shortfall of at least 14 squadrons in 2032, assuming what plays out is the 'best-case scenario'.

This is in addition to the cost of the upgrade programs on the Mirage-2000 H/I, the Jaguar IS/IM and the MiG-29 B/UPG. While the upgrade of the Mirage-2000 H/I will cost USD 2.2 billion, the Jaguar IS/IM upgrade will cost USD 514 million and the MiG-29B/UPG upgrade, USD 946 million, with planned completion in 2021, 2017 and 2016, respectively.

It is also important to note that this shortfall is on the basis of the assumption that the requirement for squadron numbers in 2032 will remain what it is today. But there is no reason to suppose this to be a correct assumption, even despite the multi-role nature of the newer aircraft being inducted.

Indeed, the requirement of squadrons, including the shortfall and required force accretion could go over 20 squadrons or 400 aircraft.

Part of the reason for this shortfall is the lack of success of the LCA development program. It is no secret that the IAF has been unhappy with the capability of the LCA as it stands and has had to be cajoled into ordering two squadrons of the aircraft, with a promise from the development agencies to produce a more powerful Mk II. This variant is also imperative for the Indian Navy, as the Mk I is under-powered for carrier operations.

When the IAF was considering its future requirements in the nineties, it was given assurances of the time-frame in which deliveries of the LAC would take place. On the basis of these assurances, the IAF decided to upgrade 125 MiG-21 aircraft to the Bison variant. But with continues delays in the LCA program, the IAF has since had to place orders for additional Sukhoi-30MKI aircraft, as well as look to the MMRCA program as a necessity, rather than a measure for force accretion.

But the fact remains that the Sukhoi-30 MKI, the Rafale (selected as the MMRCA) and the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) are all heavy aircraft with a high cost of ownership and operation. Attempting to place any of these in the role meant to be carried out by the LCA would be too expensive to be practical.

Much depends of the fate of the development of the LCA Mk II and the promise for all the shortcomings of the Mk I.

It will be noted that the 'best case scenario' outlined above does not include the LCA Mk II. This is because the aircraft remains on paper today, and with no real accountability or the discipline of deadlines, the IAF has no faith in the production of a Mk II in a usable and time-sensitive configuration.

While the exact shortcomings of the Mk I and the specific challenges in the development of the Mk II were beyond the scope of the roundtable and this report, there is no great secret here.

If it does not succeed within a much shorter time-frame than the 30-year span of the Mk I development, the problem has to be acknowledged by the highest quarters in government, which will then have to look for urgent alternatives to the LCA, for the role initially envisaged for it.

Unless either the LCA Mk II far exceeds current expectations or the government looks for alternatives for it, the shortfall described above in the 'best case scenario' will remain at a minimum at the numbers mentioned above.

But, in any case, if the IAF is going to be short of at least 200 aircraft after spending USD 60 billion in the year 2032, there could be a case to review the fighter fleet mix and structure being proposed to be acquired under current plans.

For the sake of context, the RFP for the MMRCA program was issued almost exactly seven years back. Even if the order were placed today, it would still take three years for delivery of the first aircraft. That's ten years already, without the order being placed. The LCA development program was initiated in 1983. It is thirty years past, and the aircraft is still not in service.

While a problem eighteen years away might seem distant, the long timelines required for defense acquisition and production in India make it a matter of importance and urgency

 

[Punya Pratap]

This Stratpost article shows the Import Mentality of IAF when the "recently retired IAF brass" have shown displeasure at Tejas Mk 1 and the last half of this article raises concerns over the ability of Mk2!!

Even though they agree that MKI / Rafale are very expensive and impractical due to their operational costs and there will definitely be a shortage of at least 200 fighters by 2032 in the Light category these retired IAF brass want to force the GoI's hand by casting aspirations on Mk 2 's capability so that India again IMPORTS a fighter in LCA category !!

I think the commission system has seeped in so much that they dont realise that SELF RELIANCE is the real and indisputable proof of Military might!!

 

[ersakthivel]

Sorry for that



I think Su 30 is a Air Dominance/Superiority Fighter and LCA is a Trainer/Light Attack/Point Interceptor

What you need to do is to learn, not think!!!!!
If su-30 is a air dominance fighter in russian airforce , then what was the role of Mig-29 recon fighter or CAS fighter.
You dont even know the basic fact that heavy weight high load carrying long distance flying fighters are like Su-30 series are mainly used for strike and light weight , lesser range lower pay load carrying fighters like Mig-29 are used primarily for air defence.

Russia Has Air Superiority Fighters Like Su 35 , Su 27 ,Su 30 SM along with MiG 29 . For Interception they Use the MIG 31 Fox Hound , for Ground Attack and CAS Su 25 Frogfoot . And Penetration and Heavy Strike for Su 24 Fencer . for heavy Bombing Role They use the Su 34 . these are all fall in the Fighter category . they don't have a Multi role Aircraft . MiG is trying to Modernize MiG 35 as a Multirole But it's not Met the Requirements

the high wing loading flanker airframe started out as strike fighters not air dominance fighters. It was the failure of the MIG and the addition of thrust vectoring that has made them usable for air to air role also. Even then their elephant sized RCS when fully loaded means they have the disadvantage of being detected earlier than smaller RCS loaded fighters like mig-29 and tejas.

Their Threat is nothing They don't want to Go for Again ..their Mission is Intercepting and Escorting Civilian Planes and Bombing Terrorists Hideout in Somewhere in the Middle East or Africa




Both are different like Desktop and Laptop

tejas was designed as multi role from word go.
LCA never started off as point defence fighter. It is the import lobby planted media news carrying jounos who repeatedly parrot this disgusting lie. From the TD-1 to LSP-8 and SP-1 the fuel capacity of tejas has not increased by a liter. IOC-2 release document states that tejas can fly to distances over 1750 Km in combat. So when did tejas start off as point defence fighter?

tejas fuel fraction(weight of the fuel/empty weight of the fighter ) is comparable to any other modern fighter. In mk2 it is set to improve further. This was achieved by using significant amount of composites which weighs less for the volume they occupy compared to metal alloys, and they also give longer airframe life.

Please go to ADA tejas website and read Air marshal MSD Woolen's aeroindia 2001 article which clearly states that tejas was designed as multi role fighter with a naval version from the word go.

for more than two years you and a few friends of yours are repeating this soiled lie that tejas is a point defence /trainer /interceptor.
First list the fuel fraction, wing loading, radome dia , longer range BVr missiles, and thrust to weight ratio of all modern fighters in a neat tablet column and see how tejas scores.

Then you can see where tejas stands.

tejas has a combat radius of 500 Km even without the certification of central fuel tank in hot indian conditions where high ambient temp can sap 10 percent of engine thrust and 10 percent of wing lift.

It can fly 1750 km non stop in combat as per IOC-2 release without the certification of center line fuel tank.

It can carry all LGBs in IAF inventory and all long range BVr missiles with a radome dia bigger than even rafale.

Surely when brahmos mini is going to be developed tejas mk2 should be able to carry it, making it as potent as any strkie fighter in the world for long range stand off strikes.

With a couple of ASM two rafale s in their high temp high altitude indian ocean reunoin island flight took six total fuel loads and 10.5 hours to cross the 1000 Km.
Please calculate the range and endurance for this flight and post.

So many MNC fighter makers can bluff fancy ranges and loads for their fighters in brochures, but reality is sobering, it is mostly like those fance mileage figures given for bikes under ,"test condition". In real world they dont apply.

I have already put this question to you three times you are still maintaining a well kept silence on this rafale's reunion flight range and endurance.

Then we will see which is a point defence fighter?

For your info I have already posted a HAL aeroindia 2013 poster which says that tejas has an endurance of 2.5 hours.Which point defence fighter has such endurance?

 

[Zebra]

Re: ADA LCA Tejas Mark-II

ANALYSISOctober 30, 2014

IAF fighter strength to dip further
IAF fighter strength to dip further | StratPost

IAF wants to spend nearly $50 million each in upgrade of old Jaguars and Mirage-5000s. But such big expenditure won't help them to increase squadron strength.

That is why people argued about it and said use old aircrafts as it is. On top of it choose two different but cheaper MMRCA aircrafts. At least that will improve squadron strength.

At that time IAF cried a lot against two different aircrafts and two separate set up costs.

 

[sgarg]

Re: ADA LCA Tejas Mark-II

The logical thing is to replace Jaguar and Mig-27 with LCA Tejas. The strike fleet of 200 Mig-27 and 150 Jaguar should be replaced with an equal number of LCA Tejas. This can be done by producing 30 LCA Tejas per year.
If India can produce 15 Su-30 per year, 30 Tejas is not a tough task.

Around 4 airbases on Western border and 10 airbases in central and eastern border need these small fighters.

Whatever plan IAF has - MMRCA, AMCA, FGFA are riskier projects and induction schedules are difficult to predict. Realistically AMCA will replace Mig-29 and Mirage-2000. FGFA should be used for increasing inventory.

If India is serious about China then it needs around 25 squadrons for the central and eastern sectors. 20 squadrons are needed for the Western and northern areas and 10 squadrons are needed for strategic attack and defence of peninsular India.

The current 34 squadrons leaves large areas of India without adequate air defence and there are simply insufficient reserves.

 

[SajeevJino]

Re: ADA LCA Tejas Mark-II

The logical thing is to replace Jaguar and Mig-27 with LCA Tejas. The strike fleet of 200 Mig-27 and 150 Jaguar should be replaced with an equal number of LCA Tejas. This can be done by producing 30 LCA Tejas per year.

IAF plans to Keep the Jaguar upto 1035 ..then How is LCA going to Replace ..AMCA is mentioned to Replace the Jags

 

[sgarg]

Re: ADA LCA Tejas Mark-II

IAF plans to Keep the Jaguar upto 1035 ..then How is LCA going to Replace ..AMCA is mentioned to Replace the Jags

I think you mean 2035. Jaguar has lost its relevance due to too many portable SAMs around. Also the planes are old.

A section of IAF feels that the money is being thrown at the Jags just to suck funds from LCA program. The Jags wont last in a real war.

 

[venkat]

Re: ADA LCA Tejas Mark-II

From MoD annual report:

The EW suite for Tejas has finished ground acceptance tests on the grounded prototype PV-1.

Earlier report about the EW suite:-

========

Also, about AESA for Tejas Mk2, Uttam:-

kunal!!!!! its not AESA radar!!!! its the pic of LCA MMR(multi mode Radar)////The project is dead and lying R.I.P!!!!!