Who is best in mountain warfare? India or China?

[sandeepdg]

China Preparing Tibet as Future War Zone


The bonhomie at the Hainan BRICS summit notwithstanding, China's massive infrastructure build-up in Tibet is causing concern to the government of India. Defence minister A K Antony has spoken in parliament of the rapid development of rail, road, airfield and telecom infrastructure and military camps being undertaken by the Chinese authorities in Tibet. He assured the MPs that 'necessary steps' were being taken to counter these developments.

Antony acknowledged that a road network stretching across 58,000 km coupled with five operational airfields at Gongar, Pangta, Linchi, Hoping and Gar Gunsa have come up in Tibet. Besides, extension of the Qinghai Tibet Railway (QTR) line to Xigaze and another line from Kashgar to Hotan in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region is also in progress.

Effectively controlling the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) is crucial for China's security as Tibet comprises approximately one-fourth of China's land mass.

Control over Tibet forms part of the larger concept of Chinese national integration under President Hu Jintao's dictum of 'going down the road of development with Chinese characteristics and a Tibetan flavour.' In the wake of ethnic violence in Tibet in 2008, increased force levels of the paramilitary people's armed police, Chinese frontier guards and the garrison duty forces have been stationed in the region.

Mobile PLA

China has chosen to upgrade the infrastructure and logistics system in Tibet to enhance the ability of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to become a more mobile and better-equipped fighting force that can be deployed faster and sustained over a longer period of time.

The concentrated expansion of infrastructure in Tibet has improved the PLA's capability to rapidly induct integrated forces.

The QTR railway line is being further extending westwards from Lhasa to Xigaze. Along with the rapid development of the lateral road network in Tibet and a large numbers of axial roads leading to passes bordering India. The roads are being constructed to military specifications in order to be turned over to the PLA in the event of war or an internal disorder. The logistics build-up opposite India's eastern theatre is a cause for concern since it augments the PLA's ability to deploy rapidly from the mainland.

Construction of new airfields and the upgradation of advanced landing grounds (ALGs) and helipads in and around the TAR, coupled with the acquisition of new transport aircraft, will enhance China's strategic airlift capability resulting in faster induction and concentration of field formations in comparatively shorter time-frames and, consequently, over shorter warning periods. The construction of airfields and ALGs closer to Indian borders boosts the PLA Air Force fighter aircrafts' striking range and provides it the ability to strike and engage targets in India on a broad front and in depth.

Another major infrastructure development is the construction of new missile bases in Tibet. According to recent reports, China has placed advanced Dong Feng-21 medium-range ballistic missiles along the borders it shares with India. During a future conflict with India, the PLA could easily move 500 to 600 mobile ballistic missile launchers to bases close to the Indian border from their current deployment opposite Taiwan.

Complexities of the Tibetan terrain, vagaries of climate, and sustenance capacities of the thrust lines chosen, are all factors that influence the depth of operations that are planned to be undertaken. To address this aspect, the PLA is reportedly constructing Hyperbaric Chambers to facilitate the rapid acclimatisation of troops brought in from lower altitudes. It is also building the first batch of oxygen-enriched barracks using plants for troops in the TAR at the Nagchu Military Sub-Command at an altitude of 4,500 metres.

It is in the Indian interest to upgrade the logistics infrastructure in the states bordering Tibet so as to facilitate the rapid reinforcement of sectors threatened by the Chinese during any future conflict. Simultaneously, India should enhance its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to maintain all round vigil on the border. The army and the air force must also upgrade their firepower capabilities by an order of magnitude so as to engage and destroy PLA forces at a distance. It needs to be remembered that effective defence does not come cheap.

http://www.irgamag.com/?page=chinatibet_20110609

 

[sandeepdg]

China way ahead on border infrastructure


Chinese vehicles carring traders enter Indian territory after crossing the China-India border at the 15,000-feet (4545-metre) Nathu La Pass, in India's northeastern state of Sikkim on 19 May 2008. India has built only nine of the 73 roads earmarked for construction by 2012 along the Sino-Indian border due to lack of pending mandatory clearances as well as inadequate funding.File photo/AFP/GettyImages/Diptendu Dutta/India

India woke up to China's massive buildup of military infrastructure all along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) rather late in the day. And now, it's floundering to execute its own relatively modest plans to strategically counter the Chinese moves.

It was in early 2006 that the UPA government was jolted out of its slumber to give the go-ahead for the creation of infrastructure in all the three sectors — western (Ladakh), middle (Uttarakhand, Himachal) and eastern (Sikkim, Arunachal) — along the unresolved 4,056-km LAC with China.

But progress of the road construction and telecommunication links has been tardy, to say the least, since then. Only nine of the 73 roads earmarked for construction along the Sino-Indian border have been built till now, top-level sources said.

Of the 73 all-weather roads, 27 fall in Arunachal Pradesh, 19 in Uttarakhand, 14 in Jammu & Kashmir, seven in Himachal Pradesh and six in Sikkim. While 27 of these roads are being constructed under the aegis of the home ministry, 15 are with Border Roads Organisation (BRO). The remaining 12 are to be constructed by CPWD or state PWDs. "The plan is to construct the 73 roads in a time-bound manner by 2012 to counter the rapid pace of military development in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). But there are huge delays due to pending mandatory clearances from the ministry of environment and forests as well as inadequate funding," said a source. While acknowledging environmental and geological concerns are important, the defence establishment holds national security concerns are equally, if not more, critical.

The plan is to construct the 73 roads in a time-bound manner by 2012 to counter the rapid pace of military development in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR). But there are huge delays due to pending mandatory clearances and inadequate funding.
"Suitable interventions and faster decision-making is required," added the source. BRO, in particular, has been directed to complete construction of the roads stretching from Ladakh to Diphu La in Arunachal, amounting to 608-km at a cost of Rs 992 crore (203,000,000 USD), by 2010 or so.

The infrastructure development is important to bolster India's troop mobility and logistics supply in the forward areas, especially since some existing roads simply stop dead 60 to 80 km from LAC.

"While Chinese soldiers can drive right till the border in their vehicles due to their superb roads, our soldiers have to sometimes trek 10-15 km to reach their border posts," said a senior official.

China, on its part, has built so many air, road and rail links along the LAC, especially in TAR, that it can amass a huge number of troops on the border for offensive operations in double-quick time compared to what was possible less than a decade ago.
The plan to build roads close to LAC, with more east-west lateral links, of course, represents the junking of long-standing Indian fears that such infrastructure would help the 2.5-million People's Liberation Army make swift inroads into India in the event of a conflict. China, on its part, has built so many air, road and rail links along the LAC, especially in TAR, that it can amass a huge number of troops on the border for offensive operations in double-quick time compared to what was possible less than a decade ago. China now has a 40,000-km road network in Tibet, apart from rail links like the 1,118-km one from Lhasa to Gormo in Qinghai province in China.

As a counter-measure, India is also progressively reactivating old ALGs (advanced landing grounds) like the Daulat Beg Oldi, Fukche, Chushul and Nyama airstrips in Ladakh. Similarly, apart from building new helipads and upgrading airbases, IAF is also going to soon start basing its Sukhoi-30 MKI fighters in the eastern sector for the first time.

http://www.tibetsun.com/archive/2009/01/19/china-way-ahead-on-border-infrastructure/

 

[sandeepdg]

China's Tibet Railway is permanent threat to India

The Gormo-Lhasa railway that links Tibet to China's capital Beijing is being promoted vigorously by the Chinese government as benefiting the Tibetan people but former president of People's Republic of China, Jiang Zemin had made it clear that the railway project - touted as an economic project - was in fact a political project necessitated by the need to consolidate permanently China's control over Tibet. From Jiang Zemin's statement that it was a political project dictated by political decision, it is clear that China's determination to construct the railway link to Lhasa is of political and military needs.

To get a full view of the security threat of the railway link to Lhasa on India, one should look back at the October 1962 Chinese invasion of the Arunachal Sector(known as North East Frontier Agency at that time) and its sudden declaration of ceasefire on 21 November, 1962. In military terms, it was a logical decision. As winter was already setting in, the Chinese Army found it extremely difficult to maintain its position on the snow-covered Himalayan passes. Reaching the plains of Assam, the Chinese Army were fearful of facing the reinforced Indian Army possessing heavy armament such as tanks. The Chinese army was in possession of light weapons and induction of heavy armament was impossible. The Golmud--Lhasa railway will further enhance China's military transport capabilities against India. Within a short period ot time, China will be able to mobilise upto 12 divisions on the India-Tibet border. The starting of the railway link will further bolster Chinese effort in expanding military bases and airfields on the India- Tibet border.

Then there is the nuclear aspect attached to the new railway line between Golmud and Lhasa. China can easily transport Intercontinental and Intermediate range missiles on the northern borders of India. It will make possible the deployment of recently developed rail car missiles, the DF-31A, similar to the Ukranian-built SS-24S on the Tibetan border with India.

Today China's military presence in Tibet includes 17 secret radar stations, 8 missile bases with 8 intercontinental missiles, 70 Medium range missiles, 20 intermediate range missiles, 14 airfields and 300,000 to 500,000 P.L.A troops. This railway project will make it possible for Beijing to convert Tibet into a permanent military base from where it can launch any kind of operations against India.This will make the northern borders of India more vulnerable.

China's Tibet Railway is permanent threat to India - www.phayul.com

 

[p2prada]

I would like to know the explanation of that? They cant link up with their forces coming through Nepal? You think Nepal is going to stop a Chinese Group Army? They will step aside. If Chicken Neck isnt such a problem, why are we crying hoarse about its apparent vulnerabilities


Are we trying to say here, that having a Airborne doesnt help in faster troop mobilization, how much of having a Airborne Corps would have helped in OP.Parakaram, in uping the ante. We were threatening Pakistan of war, when troops were hundreds of kilometers from the border. Pakistan must be laughing their asses out. Quick Deployment is a mantra of Airborne

Airborne troops are used for shock. After the initial shock you need to be backed up by superior forces from your side or get out. Or they will get annihilated. Ray sir used the premise that nobody will want to lose such a large force without a reason.

Chicken neck is a problem, but the 15th Airborne troops aren't acclimatized. They need 15 days to a month just to prepare living in those conditions let alone fighting in them. So, there is no guarantee the force will be used effectively. Our troops aren't any different, but a lot of them are the sons of the soil, Assamese, Meghalayans(or whatever they like to call themselves), Sikkimese, Gurkhas, exiled Tibetans etc. Nobody is expecting Kannadigas and Tamilians in such conditions. Also, compared to the main forces they are not equipped with heavy artillery and tanks, only the light stuff.

Read Ray sir's post carefully. He gives a statement here and there and the questions he asked are very simple. Some places he says Is light artillery enough? Somewhere else he says in which scenario can the Airborne be used considering the terrain? You cannot expect him to spell it out for you, it goes against the ethics and the laws of his profession. There is one post where he says something to the tune of Will they survive? Then he says the IAF is a force to reckon with. There is one place where he bluntly says the 15th is not particularly worrisome.

11000 men in 24 hours is scary, but they aren't the VDV or the 82nd. And the terrain isn't a fairy tale land. Air superiority needs to be guaranteed in such a situation. We have 40MKIs there and another 40MRCA may follow along with a number of Bisons prowling around along with SAMs. The entire battlespace will be crawling with aircraft, how many transports and helicopters do you expect to survive? Will it be all of them? After they land they are entirely on foot and so are we, and we hold the defensive positions, not them.

Also, transport aircraft and helicopters are handicapped in Sikkim and other areas. Their payload will be between half and a quarter the actual while over plains and range even less because they need to compensate for payload and the return flight after bingo.

Nepal; they may invade Nepal, but Nepal is a big country with no roads and a lot of land to traverse. Nepal is more friendly to us than they are to the Chinese, no matter what the Maoists think. We are planning on setting up 2 forward airbases in Nepal and was accepted by Prachanda and his cronies. Kathmandu airport may become ours to use incase of such an exigency. One airbase construction has already begun at Surkhet. So, we know whose side they are on and Nepal's army can defend themselves from 11000 men who have never lived on the mountains before.

Our own Airborne wouldn't have helped us when the Pakistanis had 350000 men across the border and we had 750000. Be realistic, 11000 dropped behind enemy lines is great, but it needs to be done when we have air superiority or a localized air superiority. Our main forces need to be ready to invade by then as well, to link up. And we clearly know they weren't ready for 3 weeks.

Airborne troops have their special uses, but very difficult in the Himalayas considering the climate and geography and the threat level. Even the Americans used their airborne over Iraq well after they had air superiority and they did it over friendly territory.

The Chinese have other better forces than the airborne which can truly threaten us. So, let's forget about the airborne, the brigadier has ended the discussion with his questions alone.

 

[sandeepdg]

Ray Sir, I think this report will be interesting.


PLA's rapid reaction capability in Tibet

Hong Kong, China — The eruption of riots in Tibet in March reflected an increasingly complicated political situation there, involving both internal and external factors.

Internally, the peaceful and nonviolent approach of the Dalai Lama toward China has encountered greater resistance from the young generation of Tibetans, and the Dalai Lama's political relevance has been gradually marginalized as a result.

Externally, India's China policy is now at a critical point, and India-China relations are likely to slip backward if they fail to quickly progress. India is adjusting the deployment of its armed forces along its border with China to guard against a Chinese intrusion.

Meanwhile, as the Beijing Olympic Games approach, the faction in Tibet that favors a showdown with the Chinese leadership views the present time as the best opportunity to put greater pressure on Beijing.

Under these circumstances, the Tibet issue is likely to remain the focus of attention by various parties before the Olympic Games, and constant protests by the Tibetans can be expected.

China's handling of the Tibet riots was very similar to the way it dealt with the 1989 demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. In the early phase, a large number of regular troops from the People's Liberation Army were sent to the scene to deter the protesters.

Within 48 hours of the start of the riots in Lhasa, T-90/89 armored personnel carriers and T-92 wheeled infantry fighting vehicles appeared on the streets as the 149th Division of the No. 13 Group Army under the Chengdu Military Region was dispatched to Lhasa.

This rapid troop deployment indicates that with the completion of the Qinghai-Tibet railroad in 2006, the rapid reaction capability of the Chinese armed forces in the Tibet region, particularly the ability to quickly maneuver heavy equipment, has been greatly enhanced.

This is indicated by the fact that the PLA soldiers on the T-90/89 vehicles on the streets of Lhasa were all wearing the "leopard" camouflage uniforms specifically designed for mountain warfare operations. These uniforms have appeared in video footage of the 149th Division during exercises.

When unrest occurred in Tibet in 1989 and a curfew was imposed in Lhasa, the 149th Division was also the first PLA combat unit to arrive on the scene. At that time, the army troops entered Tibet via the Sichuan-Tibet highway.

The 149th Division is based at Leshan in Sichuan province. As for the T-92 armored vehicles that appeared in Lhasa, the No. 52 Mountain Brigade of the Tibet Military Region received the vehicles around 2000.

The military value of the Qinghai-Tibet railway has thus been demonstrated in the rapid reaction of the PLA armed forces to the Lhasa riots.

Should China-India relations deteriorate to the verge of military confrontation and the riots in Tibet spread extensively, the first combat units of the PLA to be called to action would be the No. 52 and No. 53 Mountain Brigades under the Tibet Military Region.

The No. 52 Brigade, stationed at Linzhi, is highly mechanized and armed with T-92 wheeled armored vehicles and HJ-8/9 anti-tank missiles. National highway 318 directly connects Linzhi and Lhasa; thus it is logical to conclude that the T-92 wheeled armored vehicles on the streets of Lhasa were from this brigade. The No. 52 Mountain Brigade is stationed at Milin and is also the PLA combat unit stationed closest to the city of Lhasa.

National highway 318 is in fact the southern route of the Sichuan-Tibet highway. In the event of war or future large-scale riots in Tibet, the highway will be the key passageway for combat troops from the Chengdu Military Region to enter Tibet.

However, this key highway runs across the Minjiang River and the Daduhe River in a region with an average altitude of 4,250 meters (around 14,000 feet) above sea level, and thus is very susceptible to attack by the Indian Air Force or assault by organized rioters. Most of the highways within the Tibet region will be within striking range of the Su-30MKI fighters soon to be deployed in the No. 30 Squadron of the Indian Air Force at Tezpur.

If the T-90/89 armored personnel carriers used in Lhasa were indeed from the 149th Mechanized Rapid Reaction Division of the Chengdu Military Region, they were most likely transported first from Chongqing to Xining, then to Golmud to connect to the Qinghai-Tibet railway and continue on to Lhasa. The whole journey would take about 48 hours.

Such troop movements would be much faster and cheaper than before. Calculated on the basis of being able to transport most of the heavy equipment of a whole mechanized division within 48 hours – it is unlikely that all the division's equipment would be moved – the PLA would be able to transport approximately 10 light mechanized divisions and some heavy mechanized divisions through the railroad to Tibet from the Lanzhou and Chengdu Military Regions within 30 days.

Of course, should there be a military conflict between China and India, the Qinghai-Tibet railway would be a prime target for air strikes by the Su-30MKI fighters of the Indian Air Force's No. 30 Fighter Squadron, the MiG-27 fighters of the No. 22 Squadron at Hashimara and the "Jaguar" attackers of the No. 5 Squadron at Ambala.

The only obstacle to this mass movement of regular armed troops and equipment would be the capacity of Qinghai-Tibet railway and the number of available trains. China once claimed that the annual transport capacity of the railway was 5 million tons, an average of 13,888 tons per day.

The average load capacity of one Chinese train car is normally 60 tons, with about 20 cars in each cargo train. This would mean that each train could transport 1,200 tons, and thus 11 trains traveling both ways would be enough for each day. In time of war, the actual number of trains running on the railroad could double to roughly 20 trains both ways each day.

Suppose the total weight of the equipment and combat material needed for one rapid reaction division of the Chinese army was around 15,000 tons, the Qinghai-Tibet railway could transport a whole rapid reaction division on one average day. In other words, within every one-and-a-half to two days, China could move one rapid reaction division from the Chengdu Military Region or one rapid reaction division from the Lanzhou Military Region to Tibet.

China's air transport capability also needs to be taken into consideration. Additional airborne troops, rapid reaction troops and armed police could be directly delivered to Lhasa from the air. Since airdrop operations would take place in the Tibet region, there would be no need for ground-based air defense firepower. Thus, the No. 15 Airborne Division could be airdropped to Tibet, and equipment such as airborne fighting vehicles could be put to use.

In recent years, China has made great effort to revamp the Qinghai-Tibet highway and the Sichuan-Tibet highway. National highways 214, 317 and 109 – the shortest routes into Tibet by land – are now all asphalted. If China were to have a military confrontation with India, highway transport could be more reliable should the Qinghai-Tibet railway be damaged.

The railway would allow the 61st Plateau Rapid Reaction Motorized Division of No. 21 Group Army under the Lanzhou Military Region and the 149th Rapid Reaction Motorized Division of the Chengdu Military Region to quickly enter Tibet.

Because of the presence of U.S. military troops in Afghanistan and the escalating independence activities in the southern part of Xinjiang – northwest China's primarily Muslim Uyghur ethnic region – the Xinjiang Military Region and the Lanzhou Military Region are now the key forces to guard against internal riots in that part of the country. This is why the forces of the Chengdu Military Region were the first to be deployed in Tibet.

In addition, the riots in Tibet quickly spread to Gansu province, which borders Xinjiang; therefore the Xinjiang and Lanzhou Military Regions may face the new mission of cracking down on Tibetan independence movements as well as Muslim riots and the traditional Uyghur independence activities.

Once the Uyghur separatist movement in Xinjiang and the independence activities in Gansu and Tibet intensify, the 61st Rapid Reaction Division stationed at Tianshui in Gansu province will be the first one to be called upon in the crackdown. In addition, the No. 12 Armored Division stationed at Zhangye in Gansu province may also be mobilized.

The 4th Motorized Infantry Division of Xinjiang Military Region was the first local combat unit to receive new equipment in the region, including the T-92 100-mm wheeled assault cannons. Obviously, this division is now transforming into a rapid reaction unit and will probably be used to deal with any riots in southern Xinjiang. Besides, this division is also quite close to the Afghanistan border.

The 6th Motorized Infantry Division stationed at Kashi is the only mechanized combat unit in the Xinjiang Military Region. It is also close to Afghanistan and is located right in the heart of southern Xinjiang. Should Uyghur independence activities break out of control, the above two divisions would be the first to be dispatched.

As for the Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, it is covered by the 11th Brigade. As is widely known, the 63rd Division of the original No. 21 Group Army and the 7th Division of the Xinjiang Military Region have been restructured into the Armed Police No. 63 and No. 7 Divisions, and are stationed at the cities of Pingliang and Ili, respectively.

PLA's rapid reaction capability in Tibet

 

[Iamanidiot]

The other thing that is truly worrying me about the Chinese is the 2nd artillery strike force.@p2prada post more often in this thread.We like to hear from you.

 

[Iamanidiot]

Ground Permafrost I think effects the Tibetian highways and even railways they are higly maintenance heavy in both the summer and winter months

 

[Yusuf]

Point here, in the event of an approaching hostilities, I think the local Tibetan population will tip off India. Chinese are dependent on Tibetan railway and we can expect that the Tibetans will sabotage it. China will be left to fight uprising in Tibet and also Xinjiang which will be also up in arms. This too has to be factored in by both India and China. Actually I think a major war against India will severely damage china politically as far Tibet and Xinjiang goes.

 

[Yusuf]

I really don't think the 15th will get through with all their numbers. China will not be able to establish air superiority. May be they will start with cruise missile strikes to take our our air bases. But then they can't take out all and we will return the favor.

The thread is going great. Lot more stuff will keep coming up. End result I think will be that the Chinese will not be able to steam roll.

 

[Iamanidiot]

Yusuf the tibetians in tibet might mostly stay neutral and lhasa has significant percentage of han population so they aiding us will not haqen

 

[Iamanidiot]

India must urgently form something similar to the 2nd artillery division that china has

 

[SHASH2K2]

Point here, in the event of an approaching hostilities, I think the local Tibetan population will tip off India. Chinese are dependent on Tibetan railway and we can expect that the Tibetans will sabotage it. China will be left to fight uprising in Tibet and also Xinjiang which will be also up in arms. This too has to be factored in by both India and China. Actually I think a major war against India will severely damage china politically as far Tibet and Xinjiang goes.

I guess our intelligence agencies should work towards having more and more assets in Tibet area that can be used to sabotage chinese transportation during wars. unfortunately chinese have huge asset on our soil in terms of Maoists and NE insurgents. no one discussed their role during Indo china wars. They can be a game changer in future . off course against us .

 

[Yusuf]

Yusuf the tibetians in tibet might mostly stay neutral and lhasa has significant percentage of han population so they aiding us will not haqen

Yes they have han population there but the local guys will not leave a golden opportunity. Tibetans just rose before olympics.

 

[Yusuf]

I guess our intelligence agencies should work towards having more and more assets in Tibet area that can be used to sabotage chinese transportation during wars. unfortunately chinese have huge asset on our soil in terms of Maoists and NE insurgents. no one discussed their role during Indo china wars. They can be a game changer in future . off course against us .

The Maoists have stated that in an event of a war they will fight for India, if my memory serves me right.

 

[Iamanidiot]

Yes they have han population there but the local guys will not leave a golden opportunity. Tibetans just rose before olympics.

But OOE was saying that the riot was hyped and that the dalai lama effect is being too hyped

 

[Yusuf]

But OOE was saying that the riot was hyped and that the dalai lama effect is being too hyped

Chinese propaganda. Why did they deploy so many troops if it was all hyped?

 

[SHASH2K2]

The Maoists have stated that in an event of a war they will fight for India, if my memory serves me right.

I dont have even a single paisa of trust on these maoists and communists. china is their source of inspiration. Tibetans only have will with no firepower while these maoists and NE insurgents have will training and ammunition to carry Anti India activity.

 

[Iamanidiot]

Chinese propaganda. Why did they deploy so many troops if it was all hyped?

They always are known to deploy for any reason

 

[Ray]

Dalai Lama continues to be a messiah to the Tibetans.

Just like Jesus and Mohammed!

Jesus and Mohammed were humans and so is the Dalai Lama!

OoE is a Chinese. He will naturally be pro China as is his protégé, that Chinese chap he collared as a Mod to bankroll WAB. Whose money is bankrolling is another issue!

The 50 cent army has grown to great proportion!

 

[Yusuf]

I dont have even a single paisa of trust on these maoists and communists. china is their source of inspiration. Tibetans only have will with no firepower while these maoists and NE insurgents have will training and ammunition to carry Anti India activity.

The Maoists are Indians at the end of the day. They are fighting govt and policies which according to them is wrong. They cannot be equated to the Tibetans who are under occupation.

PS:- no intention to glorify Maoists.