http://iswresearch.blogspot.gr/2015/11/russia-repositions-military-assets-in.html
Russia shifted military assets into Eastern Homs Province in response to an ISIS offensive against pro-regime forces south of Homs City that began on November 1, 2015. Russia positioned at least five attack helicopters at the T4 (Tiyas) military airbase and additional rotary wing aircraft at the Shayrat military east of Homs City by November 4. Russia is also operating rotary wing aircraft out of the Hama military airport, while their fixed wing aircraft remain based at the Bassel al-Assad military airbase in Latakia. Russia has also deployed an additional 2,000 personnel to Syria since the start of its air campaign on September 30, according to U.S. security officials, though it is unclear whether these personnel are located at these bases in Eastern Homs Province. Russia also maintains a military base at the Hama municipal stadium, which likely houses Russian military personnel. The Russians have spoken of the plus-up. Russian Air Force Commander Viktor Bondarev, in an interview on November 5, stated “we sent not just fighter planes, strike aircraft, and helicopters but also anti-aircraft rocket systems” because “we took into account every possible threat.” It is unclear whether Bondarev’s remarks indicate that Russia has deployed additional anti-aircraft Systems to Syria since the start of Russian airstrikes in Syria on September 30, 2015.
An ISIS offensive against pro-regime forces south of Homs City prompted some of the Russian deployment into Eastern Homs Province. ISIS captured the desert city of Palmyra in May 2015 and has been positioning itself for further offensives toward Homs. ISIS advanced westward from the town of Quryatayn in southeastern Homs Province on November 1. It seized the regime-held town of Mahin and attacked the neighboring town of Sadad, located less than 15 km. east of the M5 highway. ISIS likely seeks to seize portions of the M5 highway south of Homs City, possibly by seizing the town of Hasiya and the adjacent industrial city on the highway. Capturing the town would sever the regime’s ground line of communication (GLOC) from Homs City to Damascus, limiting the regime’s ability to move forces between fronts in southern and central Syria.
ISIS may be pursuing other operational level goals with the new offensive. It could seek to fix regime forces away from the regime-held T4 (Tiyas) airbase east of Homs City. ISIS has launched periodic attacks against the airbase since the capture of Palmyra and has stated its intent to capture it. ISIS could instead intend to seize the Shayrat military airbase, located less than 30 kilometers northwest of Mahin. ISIS will likely attack pro-regime forces on multiple axes in a future offensive against any of these regime-held positions and is . positioned to conduct a pincer movement on any of the objectives listed here. ISIS has a support zone in the northeastern corner of Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, bordering Syria, and could simultaneously attack Hezbollah forces concentrated south of Homs City from Lebanon in order to disrupt the ability of pro-regime forces to respond. ISW forecasted in mid-September that ISIS would most likely launch a multi-pronged offensive to seize either the T4 or Shayrat military airbases, and most dangerously attack south of Homs near Qusayr.
ISIS has been conducting mutually supporting operations to thwart the Russian-backed ground advance in several locations. ISIS had severed the regime’s ground line of communications (GLOC) from Hama to Aleppo City on October 23, before its assault south of Homs City, and had seized multiple checkpoints along the road between the towns of Ithriya and Khannaser. ISIS also attacked the regime’s command and control node in Safira, southeast of Aleppo City along the GLOC, on October 28. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) members in Northern Syria appear to headquarter in Safira, as evidenced by the death of multiple IRGC officers in the area since 2012. Russian special forces are coordinating airstrikes on behalf of the regime in Syria, and could also be present in Safira. ISIS’s attack against Safira forced the regime to abandon an ongoing offensive to break ISIS’s siege on the Kuweiris airbase east of Aleppo City. Pro-regime forces repelled ISIS from Safira and regained control of the GLOC by November 4 with the support of Russian airstrikes in Aleppo.
The Russian deployment to the T4 and Shayrat airbases positions Russia to blunt the ISIS advance using airpower. Russia has also increased the defensive fortifications of both bases, likely including heavy artillery. Russia conducted airstrikes against ISIS in Eastern Syria from November 2-3, including positions near Quryatayn and Palmyra. These strikes did not directly target the ISIS forces attacking Sadad and are not the first Russian airstrikes against ISIS in Eastern Syria. It is possible, however, that Russia will shift fixed wing aircraft to either the T4 or Shayrat military airbases in order to increase its air sorties against ISIS in Eastern Syria. The forward deployment of attack helicopters in Homs could also support a future regime offensive to retake the ISIS-held city of Palmyra, although such an offensive appears unlikely in the near term.
ISIS’s attacks in Aleppo and Homs Provinces demonstrate that ISIS remains capable of launching offensive operations in Western Syria in November 2015. ISIS attacked strategic regime terrain in both Northern and Central Syria in quick succession, forcing the regime and its Russian backers to alter their deployment. ISIS is likely setting conditions for a major offensive by stressing the regime’s ability to defend core terrain on numerous fronts. ISIS has thus far focused its major attacks on pro-regime forces but will likely attack rebel-held terrain in Western Syria if the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) successfully isolates ar-Raqqa City from the north. The current strategy of the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition does not adequately account for this risk; the U.S. does not have sufficient ground partners in Western Syria to prevent further expansion by ISIS. The U.S. must develop an alternate strategy to prevent ISIS from expanding into Western Syria in order to preserve the impact of counter-ISIS operations in Northern Syria on ISIS's overall strength in Syria.
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The military situation in Syria by November 6, 2015
http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2464510.html
A month after the start of a large-scale offensive the Syrian army with the support of Russia and Iran can be stated that none of the operational tasks has not been solved. There was both a tactical victory and a tactical failure. The initiative as a whole is still on the side of Assad, but opponents are increasingly trying to snatch her up, adapting to the actions of the Russian aviation, which has already led to the escalation at several sites.
Lataki & HAMA
Offensive in the Northern provinces of Latakia and Hama, in General, are staying in mountain areas, the army continues trying to chew through the rebels ' defense, but significant forces are stuck in the battle for Salma and then it is not necessary to expect rapid results. To vostoku from Salma on the offensive stood in the area Shermanii. Attempts to form copper at El Vitamina in fact failed. Moreover, the enemy went on the offensive, expanding and protecting the neck of El Latnenskogo pocket, taking including important town Morec.
With the loss Moreka about the environment of El Latinskoi militant groups does not have to speak, as a maximum, the situation would amount to ousting the militants and return of former positions. Assad forces apparently ran out of steam and they need regrouping and replenishment to continue intensive offensive operations in the face of strong resistance and feeding militants supply of weapons and mercenaries across the Turkish border. The goal was to qualify to the border with Turkey by the breakthrough of the front in Latakia or Hama so far, it appears malorichens. Constant counterattacks prozapadnaya the rebels have limited the activity of the Syrian army, which is to a considerable extent of front is forced to move to defense.
2. The battle for Aleppo.
Under Aleppo continues chaotic battle in which the parties continue the fight for the initiative.
a) North of the city's Pro-Western rebels in General stopped the advance of the Caliphate and trying to conduct offensive operations to retake some lost territory. The battle developed in a positional way. The front line between the Caliphate and the army of Assad has stabilized here.
b) Assad army Offensive South of Aleppo is gaining momentum - every day cleanse from fighters a lot of territory and of settlements and the control zone to the South of the city expands. To the South-East was a battlefield for al-Carassi and al-Khader (town is not completely captured). South of Aleppo the density of enemy troops is less and here the troops of Assad are moving more confidently.
C) to Release the air base in Cowarie still not possible - the Caliphate rested here and despite all the efforts to walk several kilometers to the desired goal, the army can't. Fighting continues in Sheikh-Ahmad, followed by the desired track, the cutting of which could worsen the situation of the Caliphate group, which recently tried to step on al-Safira and Nasiriya. On the southern flank of the offensive, the army regained some ground in Gabala lost during the offensive, troops of the Caliphate at the end of October. The fights here are very fierce, both sides suffered serious losses in men and materiel.
g) In Aleppo, the situation overall has not changed, his fate continues to be decided in the battles around the city.
d) the Army as a whole was able to prevent the threat of supply road on which hangs the whole group Aleppo Assad - troops of the Caliphate suffered losses and were driven back from the road, but the problem is that its length allows the Caliphate to resume attacks on her from the desert regions after regrouping and replenishing (from Iraqi territory to Syria recently were deployed reinforcements). Equipment new posts for the retention of the route will require the allocation of people and equipment, which is lacking on more important areas.
Overall, the battle continues. From the stated objectives only partially solved the problem of extending the control zone to the South of the city and caused the March of the case, retaining the track which is supplied with the leading group, fighting to the East of Aleppo. The task of deblokade Kouvaris yet to be resolved. Still with the Caliphate turned out to be much harder to fight than with a Pro-Western rebels.
