The Kargil War

JAISWAL

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In a candid admission that only regular troops of the Pakistan Army took part in the Kargil conflict with India in 1999 and not mujahideen fighters as claimed by Islamabad, a retired Pakistani Lieutenant General, who was then heading the analysis wing of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), has written that the intrusion was an "unsound military plan based on invalid assumptions" and there was a "cover-up" later by his then chief, General Pervez Musharraf.
In an article published in Pakistan's The Nation newspaper on January 6, Lt Gen Shahid Aziz, who retired in 2005 as commander of the IV Corps in Lahore, presents an account of the Kargil war that rejects many Pakistani claims about the conflict.

"There were no mujahideen, only taped wireless messages, which fooled no one. Our soldiers were made to occupy barren ridges, with hand held weapons and ammunition," Aziz said.

Criticising Musharraf in the article, Aziz makes the point that the entire battle was ill-planned and young soldiers were used as "war fodder" for the "misadventure".

"An unsound military plan based on invalid assumptions, launched with little preparations and in total disregard to the regional and international environment, was bound to fail. That may well have been the reason for its secrecy. It was a total disaster."

"Whatever little I know, took a while to emerge, since General Musharraf had put a tight lid on Kargil. Three years later, a study commenced by GHQ to identify issues of concern at the lowest levels of command, was forcefully stopped by him. 'What is your intent?' he asked."

The intrusion was clearly intended to dominate the supply line to Siachen and cut off the glacier for an invasion by Pakistani troops.

"It certainly wasn't a defensive manoeuvre. There were no indications of an Indian attack. We didn't pre-empt anything; nothing was on the cards. I was then heading the Analysis Wing of Inter Services Intelligence and it was my job to know," he wrote.

"To say that occupying empty spaces along the Line of Control was not a violation of any agreement and came under the purview of the local commander is astounding. This area was with the Indians as a result of Shimla Agreement, and there had been no major violation of the Line of Control since 1971."

Describing how Pakistan army soldiers died after they were isolated and came under the Indian counter attack, Aziz said assumptions were made by the military leadership that the Indian Army would not be able to dislodge the fighters from the heights.

"The boys were comforted by their commander's assessment that no serious response would come. But it did — wave after wave, supported by massive air bursting artillery and repeated air attacks. The enemy still couldn't manage to capture the peaks, and instead filled in the valleys. Cut off and forsaken, our posts started collapsing one after the other, though the General (Musharraf) publicly denied it," he said.

He criticised the manner in which Pakistani leaders thought that India would have a more subdued reaction to the invasion.

"The entire planning and execution was done in a cavalier manner, in total disregard of military convention. In justification, to say that our assessment was not wrong, but there was, "unreasonably escalated Indian response" is a sorry excuse for not being able to assess Indian reaction. Assumptions were made that they would not be able to dislodge us and the world would sit back idly."

"Kargil, like every other meaningless war that we have fought, brings home lessons we continue to refuse to learn. Instead, we proudly call it our history written in the blood of our children. Indeed, our children penning down our misdeeds with their blood! Medals for some, few songs, a cross road renamed, and of course annual remembrance day and a memorial for those who sacrificed their tomorrow for our today; thus preparing more war fodder for our continuing misadventures. Since nothing went wrong, so there is nothing to learn. We shall do it again," he wrote.

'Boys were told no serious response would come'

There were no mujahideen, only taped wireless messages... our soldiers were made to occupy barren ridges

Wasn't a defensive manoeuvre. There were no indications of an Indian attack. We didn't pre-empt anything

Boys comforted by assessment that no serious response would come. But it did — wave after wave

Astounding to say occupying empty spaces along Line of Control was not a violation of any agreement

.
.
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No mujahideen, only soldiers in Kargil: Pak General - Indian Express Mobile


Putting our children in line of fire

Kargil, like every other meaningless war that we have fought, brings home lessons we continue to refuse to learn. Instead, we proudly call it our history written in the blood of our children. Indeed, our children penning down our misdeeds with their blood! Medals for some, few songs, a cross road renamed, and of course annual remembrance day and a memorial for those who sacrificed their tomorrow for our today; thus preparing more war fodder for our continuing misadventures. Since nothing went wrong, so there is nothing to learn. We shall do it again. We decide. You die. We sing.

Cut off from the reality of pain and affliction that would be brought upon the nation, the decision maker takes the course most suited to his whimsical ambitions. Possible hurdles are sidetracked, on the basis of 'need to know', or merely bulldozed. Never has there been an institutional decision for the bloodshed. And at the end of each fiasco, original objectives are redefined to cry, "Hurrah! We have won".

Our leaders seek personal glory, and desire honour in the eyes of other nations. Sadly, that has become our definition of national honour; but how can we be respected when we have little self respect? So concerned have we become about how they perceive us that we openly deride our religion and all the social values that we once stood for.

The whole truth about Kargil is yet to be known. We await the stories of forgotten starved soldiers hiding behind cold desolate rocks, with empty guns still held in their hands. What stood them there could only be a love higher than that of life. Some refused to withdraw even when ordered, and stayed to fight the proverbial last man last round. Such precious blood spilled without cause!
Whatever little I know, took a while to emerge, since General Musharraf had put a tight lid on Kargil. Three years later, a study commenced by GHQ to identify issues of concern at the lowest levels of command, was forcefully stopped by him. "What is your intent?" he asked. His cover-up was revealed many years later, on publication of his book.

An unsound military plan based on invalid assumptions, launched with little preparations and in total disregard to the regional and international environment, was bound to fail. That may well have been the reason for its secrecy. It was a total disaster. The question then arises why was it undertaken? Were there motives other than those proclaimed, or was it only a blunder, as I had assumed for many years?

It certainly wasn't a defensive manoeuvre. There were no indications of an Indian attack. We didn't pre-empt anything; nothing was on the cards. I was then heading the Analysis Wing of Inter Services Intelligence and it was my job to know. Our clearly expressed intent was to cut the supply line to Siachen and force the Indians to pull out. This was not a small result we sought and cannot be classified as a tactical manoeuvre, where no one other than the local commander needed to be aware. General Musharraf himself writes, "800 sq kms of area was captured.... and it created strategic effects". To say that occupying empty spaces along the Line of Control was not a violation of any agreement and came under the purview of the local commander is astounding. This area was with the Indians as a result of Simla Agreement, and there had been no major violation of the Line of Control since 1971.

The entire planning and execution was done in a cavalier manner, in total disregard of military convention. In justification, to say that our assessment was not wrong, but there was, "unreasonably escalated Indian response" is a sorry excuse for not being able to assess Indian reaction. Assumptions were made that they would not be able to dislodge us and the world would sit back idly.

There were no mujahideen, only taped wireless messages, which fooled no one. Our soldiers were made to occupy barren ridges, with hand held weapons and ammunition. There was no way to dig in, so they were told to make parapets with lose stones and sit behind them, with no overhead protection. The boys were comforted by their commander's assessment that no serious response would come. But it did — wave after wave, supported by massive air bursting artillery and repeated air attacks. The enemy still couldn't manage to capture the peaks, and instead filled in the valleys. Cut off and forsaken, our posts started collapsing one after the other, though the general publicly denied it.

The gung-ho mannerism, when there were no pressures, was cowed when lines started shrinking and the international setting became frightening. There was no will to stay the course. Media was hushed to silence, so that pulling out does not become a political issue. We will sing when our songs don't tie us down.

The operation, in any case, didn't have the capacity to choke Siachen. When this truth surfaced, the initial aim was quickly modified. Now the book reads, "I would like to state emphatically that whatever movement has taken place so far in the direction of finding a solution to Kashmir is due considerably to the Kargil conflict." Glory be to the victors.

We continue to indulge in bloody enterprises, under the hoax of safeguarding national interest. How many more medals will we put on coffins? How many more songs are we to sing? And how many more martyrs will our silences hide? If there is purpose to war then yes, we shall all go to the battle front, but a war where truth has to be hidden, makes one wonder whose interest is it serving?
It must be Allah's country, for who else is holding it afloat?!


The writer is a retired lieutenant general and former corps commander of Lahore.

http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-n...Jan-2013/putting-our-children-in-line-of-fire
 

Ray

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The repeated humiliation war after war is making the poor chaps realise that is is futile to prove that 1 Pakistani is equal to 10 Indians!
 

Tolaha

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This article pasted 2 weeks back has 10 comments (most by Indians) while the article on Hindu terrorism in India posted a week back in the same site has close to 100 comments. If Pakistanis don't change, why will their army?
 

cobra commando

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"No mujahideen, only soldiers
in Kargil: Pak General"

Pfft tell us something we don't know :dude:
 

Dovah

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This means they refused to rake back bodies of their own soldiers?

:pakistan: Such honourable people.
 

rock127

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Ex-ISI General admitting this.

Few days ago Mushraf idiot was refuting Arnab in TimesNow debate that he and his "Army" had no hand in it and it was local Mujahiddin with "public support" taking on Indian Army.

This again PROVED Mushraf aka Pakistan a LIAR... his last BIG LIE was not knowing where Osama is.
 

Kunal Biswas

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Ahh .. So first it was Men dressed as Mujaheddin and now just dress in there default uniform, What makes the difference for the bullet ??

What a show .. :D
 

Daredevil

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Delusional @farhan_9909 listen what your won ISI generals are telling about Kargil. :rofl:

I hope you can come out of your delusions now. The story is same with 1947, 1965 wars as well. Pakistan always underestimated Indian Army and got a sound thrashing in the back.
 
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lcatejas

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Its all election propaganda ... its all old story . There are nothing new in it...:tsk:
 

Daredevil

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Its all election propaganda ... its all old story . There are nothing new in it...:tsk:
Its old story but its first time that it came from a General who was in a authoritative position during the war - Intelligence Analyst DG ISI.
 

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Kargil adventure was four-man show: general


The Kargil operation began in the summer of 1999 when Pakistani soldiers infiltrated into positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control.
The infiltration, which managed to cut off Indian supply lines, took New Delhi by surprise. — File Photo

ISLAMABAD: The men who witnessed the Kargil fiasco continue to spill the beans. Lt Gen (retd) Shahid Aziz, a former chief of general staff of Pakistan Army who has till now kept his peace about what he witnessed in the summer of '99, says the 'misadventure' was a four-man show the details of which were hidden from the rest of the military commanders initially.

This is the first time someone this senior in the military hierarchy of the time has spoken in such detail and with such frankness about the fiasco that was Kargil.

According to him, initially the Kargil operation was known only to Gen Pervez Musharraf, chief of general staff Lt Gen Mohammad Aziz, FCNA (Force Command Northern Areas) commander Lt Gen Javed Hassan and 10-Corps commander Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmad.

The majority of corps commanders and principal staff officers were kept in the dark, says Gen Aziz. "Even the-then director general military operations (DGMO) Lt Gen Tauqir Zia came to know about it later," says Gen Aziz who at the time was serving as director general of the analysis wing of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

He said that Gen Musharraf worked on a policy of "need to know" throughout his tenure as COAS and later president — in other words, Musharraf would issue orders to only those who were required to implement orders instead of first consulting corps commanders and other military officers.

The Kargil operation began in the summer of 1999 when Pakistani soldiers infiltrated into positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control.
The infiltration, which managed to cut off Indian supply lines, took New Delhi by surprise.

Initially, Islamabad claimed that the infiltrators were mujahideen but it could not maintain this façade for long. The Indian response coupled with international pressure forced the Pakistan military to withdraw.

However, the aftermath of the operation served to heighten tensions between Gen Musharraf and then prime minister Nawaz Sharif which culminated in the October coup when the military removed the elected government and took over.

'Operation was never planned'

"The Pakistan Army did not plan the operation because Gen Musharraf never saw Kargil as a major operation. Only the FCNA was involved in it and perhaps a section of 10-Corps," says Aziz, adding that it was a major intelligence failure for India. More details of the operation are expected in Gen Aziz's book which is hitting the bookshelves next week.

"It was a miscalculated move," he says when asked about the operation, adding that "its objectives were not clear and its ramifications were not properly evaluated".

At his picturesque farmhouse in Pind Begwal in the foothills of Murree, about 30km from the capital, Gen Aziz was not averse to speaking frankly about the operation.

"It was a failure because we had to hide its objectives and results from our own people and the nation. It had no purpose, no planning and nobody knows even today how many soldiers lost their lives."

He said he was personally not aware of what information had been shared with then prime minister Nawaz Sharif, but he felt that Mr Sharif "was not fully in the picture".

He, however, recalls a general telling him that Nawaz Sharif asked "when are you giving us Kashmir?" during an informal discussion. This suggests, says Gen Aziz, that Mr Sharif was not completely in the dark.

Gen Aziz himself first discovered that something was up when he came across wireless communication intercepts from which he could tell that something was making the Indian forces panic.

"The intercepts worried me as I thought we were not aware of whatever was unsettling the Indians. I deputed two officers to figure out what was happening." The next day's wireless intercepts were clear enough for Gen Aziz to realise that the Indians' anxiety stemmed from the fact that someone from Pakistan had captured some areas in Kargil-Drass sector but it was not clear if they were mujahideen or regular troops. "I took these intercepts to then ISI director general Lt Gen Ziauddin Butt and asked what was happening."

It was then that Gen Aziz was finally told by Gen Butt that the army had captured some area in Kargil.

This, says Gen Aziz, was not right. In his opinion, he should have been told about the proposed operation in advance so that he could have provided his analysis in advance.

A day after this conversation between Aziz and Butt, the latter called Gen Aziz and told him that he had been invited to the General Headquarters for a briefing on Kargil.

The briefing

During the briefing, which was also attended by all the principal staff officers, Director General Military Operations Lt Gen Tauqir Zia explained that units of NLI (Northern Light Infantry) and regular troops had captured areas in the Drass-Kargil sector.

Aziz feels that even though the briefing was conducted by DGMO Tauqir Zia, it was clear that he had not been aware of the operation from the beginning.

The day after the DGMO briefing, the friction at Kargil operation was reported in the Pakistani media; interestingly, the Indian media had carried stories a day earlier.

This shows that the military leadership was informed about such a critical operation only after it began and by that time information was trickling down to the media.

At the briefing, Gen Zia did explain the 'objectives' of the operation — it had cut off India's supply lines to Siachen because of the closure of Zojila Pass on Srinagar-Drass-Kargil-Leh road.

This, said Gen Zia, would block India from supplying its troops in Siachen and subsequently, India would evacuate Siachen. That this did not happen is now history.

Gen Aziz says this was because the planners "miscalculated the Indian response and overall repercussions".

At the briefing, Gen Tauqir Zia talked about airing pre-recorded Pashto messages that he hoped would be intercepted by the Indian forces.
His objective was that these intercepts would fool India into thinking that the Afghan mujahideen had occupied areas in Kargil.

Gen Aziz says he objected to this plan as "these would get exposed very shortly". He adds that this led to lengthy discussions and finally Tauqir Zia conceded that the truth could not be hidden for long.

In retrospect, Gen Aziz feels that "even if only NLI men were up there, it would be wrong to suggest that the operation was carried out by paramilitary forces because NLI falls under the military chain of command unlike the Rangers that are headed by a military officer but technically they fall under the control of the ministry of interior".

The study that never was

But for Gen Aziz the end of the operation did not mean the end of the matter.

After he was promoted as chief of general staff, he says that in 2004 he ordered a small study to inquire into what miscalculations had led to
such a huge loss of men and money. He also asked each battalion concerned for details.

But the reaction was swift.

An angry Gen Musharraf called him and asked what the objectives of the study were. "I told him it would provide a professional understanding of our mistakes and losses but Gen Musharraf insisted that this was not the time for such a study and ordered that it be stopped.
 

Tolaha

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^^ I wish Musharraf comes back to rule Pakistan! Or any general for that matter. Pakistan is at it's best when generals rule it directly rather than through proxies.
 

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Tell us Truth about Kargil : Dawn Editorial

IT is only as information has leaked out in bits and pieces over the years that we have understood how Kargil came to be what it really was: a poorly planned and badly executed operation that put hundreds of our soldiers at risk, and not the mujahideen-led jihad initially sold to the nation. New revelations paint an even bleaker picture of this gamble that Gen Musharraf took as army chief. One man's testimony cannot provide a complete picture of a controversial armed conflict. But when the head of the ISI's analysis wing at the time says he only found out about the operation after it had been launched — and that the same was true for most of the corps commanders and senior army staff, including the head of military operations — his words should prompt yet another look at the Kargil fiasco. Not taking the senior leadership into confidence, both within the army and in the other armed forces, had obvious consequences: the lack of a viable strategy, inadequate logistical planning and a poor calculation of the Indian response, all of which cost Pakistan the lives of hundreds of soldiers, further damaged relations with India and contributed to the political upheaval that followed.

And yet aside from occasional insights provided by those who are relatively well-informed and have chosen to speak up, there is no objective public record of what took place. Gen Musharraf had reportedly banned discussion of the topic at the National Defence University, where military operations otherwise form important case studies. And while it eventually surfaced that scores of Pakistani soldiers had died, the lies the media was fed in the early days of the conflict indicate that misinformation was a critical component of this operation. Told in daily press briefings that this was a mujahideen struggle and shown what appeared to be mujahideen training camps, reporters were blatantly used to mislead and rally the public.

Many questions still remain, including about the role of the political leadership. Was the prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, aware of the plan? Was he ordered to seek out American help for a ceasefire, or was he responsible, as Gen Musharraf has claimed, for the operation's failure? A decade and a half later, it is time for an objective, official examination of the facts, and for making them public. If Lt Gen (retd) Shahid Aziz and others who have spoken up are wrong, they should be contradicted. Even though preventing future mistakes is all that can be done now, the country deserves to know the truth.

Time for truth | Newspaper | DAWN.COM
 

cobra commando

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Pakis doing what they do best..each and every time when they get Bitchslapped by India then slap each other on the face :pm: :lol:
 

arnabmit

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THE BATTLES OF TOLOLING AND POINT 4875

By the first week of May 99, it had become clear to the Indian Army that Pakistani intruders were occupying a number of important Indian heights in the Dras, Kargil and Batalik Sectors. In the Dras sector, well entrenched enemy soldiers were directing precise artillery fire onto the Srinagar-Leh highway from Tololing. Due to the domination of the feature, it was vital to capture this Complex at the earliest, both to prevent interdiction of the highway and also to act as a launch pad for further operations. On 20 May, 18 GRENADIERS was tasked to recapture Tololing.

On 21st May, troops carried out reconnaissance and simultaneously dumped ammunition and supplies for the attack. The attack on Tololing was launched on 22nd May. Soon after, the Ghatak (Commando) platoon came under heavy fire 300 metres short of their objective. Operations were also hindered by extremely bad weather throughout the night. Though one more company was moved up to assist the Ghatak platoon, no headway could be made due to heavy enemy fire.

In the early hours of 25th May, two companies were launched from the South West; they too drew heavy fire and were pinned down 400 metres short of the objective. On 26th and 27th May, helicopter gunships were used but proved to be ineffective. On 28th May, a fresh attempt was made to capture Tololing along the South Eastern and South Western spurs. Despite some initial headway, the attack was soon stalled by accurate enemy fire.

At 2100 hours on 30th May, intense artillery fire was brought down onto the objective. Next day, one Company and the Ghatak platoon once again launched their attacks. Throughout 1st and 2nd June, contact was maintained with the enemy. By now, the troops had been in battle for 10 days in the open, in extremely harsh weather conditions. The fact that they continued to fight tenaciously speaks volumes of their morale and determination. At 0300 hours on 3rd June, the battalion second-in-command personally led an attack and was martyred in the effort. However, he had enabled the Battalion in establishing a firm base 30 metres from the top.

By 3rd June, it had become clear that more deliberate operations were required to minimise our casualties. Over the next nine days, approximately 250 artillery guns were built up in the area of operations.

2 RAJPUTANA RIFLES (RAJ RIF) was tasked to continue the assault from the 18 GRENADIERS firm base. Patrolling and analysis of air photos indicated that the enemy had at least one company in the Tololing Complex. The artillery continued with its bombardment and under the cover of this fire, one Company gained a foot hold close to the enemy by 2300 Hours on 12th June. A part of the Tololing complex was captured. This was a momentous event, being the first major success in Operation Vijay. However the task was far from complete.

Point 5140 was the highest enemy occupied post in the Tololing complex. Earlier attempts on Point 5140, by 1 NAGA and 18 GARHWAL RIFLES (GARH RIF) had been stalled by very heavy enemy fire. 18 GARH RIF had however established a firm base in the area. Exploiting this success, 18 GRENADIERS assaulted on 13th June with a Company, and captured a feature named 'Hump' on 14th June.

13 Jammu and Kashmir Rifles (JAK RIF) also concentrated at Dras on 12th June and began preparations to take part in the operations. After the operations of 18 GRENADIERS, a Company of 13 JAK RIF swept through the Hump Complex beyond which stood Point 5140, a strongly fortified position held in strength by the enemy with a large number of automatic weapons. Captain Vikram Batra was serving with 13 Jammu and Kashmir Rifles (13 JAK RIF) during Operation Vijay in the summer of 1999. Captain Batra displayed sterling leadership qualities by leading from the front to physically assault enemy positions on Point 5140. He launched a daredevil assault on the enemy, personally killing four intruders in a hand-to-hand fight. 18 GARH RIF and 1 NAGA were tasked along with 13 JAK RIF to complete the operations. After heavy fighting, Point 5140 was finally captured by 0330 Hours on 20th June and Tololing Complex had been regained. The battle of Tololing was the first major Indian victory of the 1999 conflict and laid the foundation for subsequent triumphs.

On 7 July 1999, Captain Vikram Batra volunteered to again assault and recapture the area North of Point 4875 from where an enemy locality was interfering actively in the operations of 13 JAK RIF. The task involved an assault along a narrow ridge with sharp cuttings on either side to clear a heavily fortified feature. It was before going on this assault that the gallant officer with an insatiable appetite for life gave his famous interview to a TV journalist, mouthing the line "Yeh Dil Maange More" and epitomising the energy and patriotism of every young Indian soldier in battle.

Personally leading the assault on Point 4875, Captain Batra engaged the enemy in a fierce hand-to-hand fight and killed five enemy soldiers at point blank range. During the assault, despite sustaining grievous bullet injuries, Captain Batra crawled towards the next enemy sangar and continued to hurl grenades and fire from his AK-47. He rallied his men, pressed home the attack and finally succeeded in achieving what had seemed to be a militarily impossible task. Inspired by this extraordinary display of fearlessness and raw courage by their leader, the troops fell upon the enemy with a vengeance and vanquished them.

With victory at his feet and cries of "Bharat Mata ki Jai" and "Durge Mata ki Jai" resounding in his ears, this brave son of India made the supreme sacrifice and wrote a new saga of courage that will further enrich the traditions of the Indian Army. For his unparalleled feats of conspicuous personal gallantry and fearlessness in the face of enemy, exceptional fighting spirit, exemplary junior leadership and selfless devotion to duty, Captain Vikarm Batra was posthumously awarded the Param Vir Chakra, India's highest gallantry award.





 

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