Skirmishs at LOC, LAC & International Border

[aghamarshana]

Will you people ever come out of your bubble !!!! If would use Artillery you would also get response by our Artillery.

https://www.google.co.in/url?sa=t&s...FjAAegQIBBAB&usg=AOvVaw33HBDsDUsS8CGTUS9dj6WJ
Especially for you.Within minutes we know ur arty positions.

 

[TheVarun]

Pakistan has more motive to start firing first. To give cover fire for infiltrators, to attack border villages particularly if they have non-Moslems, to simply keep the "Kashmir issue" alive with an idea to force India to the negotiating table.

 

[ezsasa]

We need to have a faq for the new paki that comes to the forum. The cycle always repeats it self.

It always starts with blistering assumptions of grandeur like @assasin is having now.

Then we start showing news reports to counter his claims.

He starts doubting his theory but does not accept defeat, he starts going back to independence and maharaja Hari Singh.

Then we start showing some more data and facts..

He starts going into UN resolution on Kashmir.

We show him the exact wordings of UN resolution that it is more about Pakistan occupied Kashmir and less about J&K.

He realises that he has been lied to for his entire existence, yet his patriotism does not allow him to accept defeat of ISI narrative over his own logical reasoning. He starts calling us baniyas and yindoos.

We remind him about Baluchistan and CPEC.

He gets mad and reminds us about our toilets.

We remind him that our sanitation coverage has grown from 39% to 85% in last three years.

He goes back and desperately searches for dirt on India and finds that world bank says Pakistan is 100% electrification And India is only 70% electrified.

I come in and point to him that as per 2017 USAID report 50 million Pakistanis our of 200 million do not have electricity in their homes. More over I tell him India is at 85% electrified now.

He finally arrives at the age old tradition of paki members here at DFI of Gali galoch.

And he is banned...

Two months down the line, new guy comes and cycle repeats itself..

 

[pankaj nema]

FINALLY Modiji and Rajnath Singh have WOKEN up

 

[Assassin]

Nope, the cowards that you are opened fire first after begging for a ceasefire earlier. Now await repayment in kind with interest.

We never begged for ceasefire Sir. We have clear policy you open fire than we would make sure you pay a really heavy price. Pakistan is most battle hardened Army and they are ready to unleash hell on any one who messes with them.

 

[nongaddarliberal]

We never begged for ceasefire Sir. We have clear policy you open fire than we would make sure you pay a really heavy price. Pakistan is most battle hardened Army and they are ready to unleash hell on any one who messes with them.

It's quite rich to provide fire support for incoming terrorists from your side of the LOC, and then put the blame on India for violating ceasefire. No one buys your "response" bullshit. And the simple fact that you don't reveal casualty figures from your side shows just how much of a hammering your surrender hardened army is getting.

 

[kalakaar]

We never begged for ceasefire Sir. We have clear policy you open fire than we would make sure you pay a really heavy price. Pakistan is most battle hardened Army and they are ready to unleash hell on any one who messes with them.

O bhn k l*dy we have price to pay, but napakis like you wouldnt have any thing left to pay except for ammis and baajis. Don't try to act smart here. Where are those mard e momins who went into Kargil, where is that jazba now? Where are your guts of crossing the LC in uniform?? Bhncho itna marenge ki B'desh ka laga zakhm bhool jaoge is kay samne.

Puss*es like your generals don't event accept the bodies of your fallen soldiers and hide your casuality. This is what battle hardened ones do? Abey jaa GHQ mein ja kar itni lambi paad maar wahi suni jayegi teri.

 

[Mikesingh]

Why do you guys even bother to reply to a Pork like @Assassin? He's one of the 20 crore sheeple of the Land Of The Pure who's brainwashed by their Mullah brigade and the ISPR that lies through its teeth.

These buggers will never learn in spite of the thrashing they've been getting every time right since 1947 when they invaded Kashmir in OPERATION GULMARG under Maj Gen Akbar Khan and almost reached Srinagar when the Indian Army was called in to help the Maharaja to defend Kashmir against the Paki marauders. The IA surprised the Porks with their lightning action and threw them back to where the LoC generally runs today. If Nehru hadn't agreed to a UN brokered ceasefire we would have overrun the Pakis and taken back the whole of POK as the Pakis were in full retreat.

And we all know what happened to the pussy Islamist Army of Porkistan in 1965 when they invaded Kashmir in OPERATION GIBRALTAR and got a bloody nose instead. Less said the better about 1971 and Kargil.

But these dorks are so shameless and brainwashed that they think they've won all wars against India!! Lol! Seriously, it's thus written in their school history books and taught in their 30,000 madrasas too which churn out jihadis like a frikkin sausage factory.

 

[indiatester]

you mean most battle surrendered army,
quick questions for you:
which army is known for being too scared to fight directly therefore it sends its troops in other country's territory in disguise? hint: 1947,1965,1999

which army is known for refusing to take back their "most battle hardened" dead bodies ,and then lie about the number of their dead? hint: it is only army in the world who has given presidents, PM and runs its own businesses
And finally
which army is known to claim 1 muzzie =10 Hindus bf4 war and then 93000 of them surrender to 3000 evil Hindus, even after having ammo and food to fight for days ahead ?hint:biggest and most shameful surrender in the modern history.and has also surrendered to Taliban.

You missed asking about the army whose generals live abroad and some Lt.Gens are killed in Afghan/Syria.

 

[lcafanboy]

And we would return the favor with interest. Just like we did here. You opened fire we responded

Will you people ever come out of your bubble !!!! If would use Artillery you would also get response by our Artillery.

We never begged for ceasefire Sir. We have clear policy you open fire than we would make sure you pay a really heavy price. Pakistan is most battle hardened Army and they are ready to unleash hell on any one who messes with them.

IS THE INDIAN MILITARY PREPARING FOR TOTAL WAR?
May 31, 2018 by Ali Ahmed

Three recent exercises undertaken by the Indian military suggest it may be gearing up for prosecuting war in the nuclear age: air exercise Gagan Shakti(Power of the Sky), reportedly the largest ever Indian Air Force (IAF) exercise; Vijay Prahaar (A Blow for Victory) carried out by Strike 1 Corps of the South West Command in the desert sector; and the South Western Command’s pivot corps, Chetak Corps’ Gandiv Vijay (Victory to Arjuna’s Bow). From the reports about these exercises in the press, it is not evident that these were based on a limited war doctrine, the deliberate pulling of conventional punches in cognizance of the nuclear threshold, that India espouses. In contrast, the military appears to be bracing for total war—that is, it is willing to countenance a war going nuclear—despite observing twenty years of the nuclear age on the subcontinent.

Battlefield Capabilities

Gagan Shakti

The scenario for Ex Gagan Shakti was a war on two fronts – along India’s border with Pakistan, and with China in the Indian Ocean region – which, in addition to the nuclear escalation potential of future conflicts, is perhaps India’s worst-case scenario. According to media reports, the air force shifted its sights from the western to the eastern adversary in quick time. It seems to have put the smaller neighbor’s air force out of action with offensive counter air and degradation tasks and, leaving that front to land forces, gone on to concentrate on the more difficult foe in the mountains. There were also long-range strikes across the Bay of Bengal for simulated interdiction of the Malacca Straits.

The scenario for Ex Gagan Shakti was a war on two fronts – along India’s border with Pakistan, and with China in the Indian Ocean region – which, in addition to the nuclear escalation potential of future conflicts, is perhaps India’s worst-case scenario.
Further into the exercise, there was also a mass casualty evacuation drill, presumably reflecting on the IAF’s capability for dealing with nuclear, chemical, radiological, and biological warfare contingencies. Incidentally, this was from the air base at Chabua in the north east, closest to the China border. This indicates that that the No First Use (NFU) pledge of either state did not quite hold up in this hypothetical conflict scenario. This portion of the exercise may have been more plausible if it was carried out on the western front, in light of Pakistan’s lack of an NFU doctrine and possession of battlefield nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the lessons are valid for both fronts, and the IAF was able to express confidence in its capability to deal with nuclear, biological, and chemical attack scenarios.

Vijay Prahaar

The press release on Ex Vijay Prahaar reports that troops practiced “penetrative manoeuvres (sic) across the obstacle ridden terrain under a nuclear umbrella.” The formations of the Mathura-headquartered Strike 1 Corps, a potent offensive hammer under the Jaipur-based command, refined their drills and procedures for fighting in the nuclear environment. The air cavalry concept “aimed at reshaping land battle by defeating the enemy with an offensive punch from the air” was validated. Taking place immediately after Ex Gagan Shakti, Vijay Prahaar showcased jointmanship between the army and the air force in a future war scenario, where the IAF would handle the “enemy” in the air, as per the former exercise, while the army handles arms operations on the ground involving real-time information and deployment, as per Vijay Prahaar.

The Indian army’s advertisement of its ability to fight dirty suggests a turn to warfighting in a nuclear environment, a disconcerting comfort with total war.
A press release by the army informed of “deep thrusts… sustained effectively” and “continuing the offensive” through a capability for “fighting dirty.” However, the Pakistanis’ tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) are meant precisely to deter these deep thrusts. Such thrusts can trigger TNW use, precipitating nuclear war. This suggests that the Indian military is unmindful of the nuclear threshold, rather complacent that nuclear deterrence would hold. The Indian army’s advertisement of its ability to fight dirty suggests a turn to warfighting in a nuclear environment, a disconcerting comfort with total war. This tendency is against the limited war concept, which must necessarily inform a conventional doctrine in the nuclear age.

Gandiv Vijay

For the past two months, the pivot corps of South Western Command, Chetak Corps, has also been engaged in a field exercise of its own—Ex Gandiv Vijay. The Corps’s Kota-based RAPID (Reorganized Army Plains Infantry Division) was its offensive component, reportedlypracticing “multi-mode mobilization from dispersed locations to the time and place of decision in a terrain orchestrated on the lines of operational responsibility of the formation.” The exercise overlapped with Gagan Shakti and Vijay Prahaar, indicating a seamless war from pivot corps limited offensives setting the stage for strike corps breakout operations, all under an umbrella of offensive air operations.

Reinforcing Military Jointmanship

Applied together, the three exercises—each reinforcing jointmanship among the Indian armed forces—seem to integrate the army’s Cold Start Doctrine with the air force’s doctrine. While in Ex Gandiv Vijay, the pivot corps scrambled from a cold start to its battle locations, its RAPID division went on a limited offensive. At this time, perhaps, Ex Gagan Shakti’s phase one would play out, creating conditions for the “speedy depletion of the enemy’s combat potential” through “coercive strategies.” Thereafter, Ex Vijay Prahaar‘s Strike 1 Corps would be unleashed, passing over obstacles into enemy forces to knock out armored reserves reacting to the ongoing strikes. Alongside “swift offensive action”, Strike 1 will likely launch its Brahmos Block IIIcruise missiles, as practiced in 2017, in a “synergistic employment of long range vectors along with the Infantry and Mechanized Forces and the Air Arm to achieve a decisive victory.” Whether the nuclear deterrent would hold under the joint onslaught across a broad front – recall India has three strike corps and three commands facing west – puts a question mark on whether a limited war concept informs India’s military doctrine any more.

Moving Away From Limited War?

The land forces appear to be bent on making deep penetrations across obstacles and degrading the enemy’s reserves, thus flirting with both the territorial and degradation thresholds of nuclear first use.
While analysts argue that the armed forces are cognizant of “high-tempo and intense limited conflict,” these recent exercises do not lend confidence that India’s limited war doctrine will hold. In the cases considered, the land forces appear to be bent on making deep penetrations across obstacles and degrading the enemy’s reserves, thus flirting with both the territorial and degradation thresholds of nuclear first use. Recall both thresholds figure among the four that Khalid Kidwai, a former head of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, had mentioned while Operation Parakram was on. Meanwhile, the air force takes the enemy on both over land and water, in reaction to a hypothetical, simulated setback, but absent escalation control mechanisms, both in place at the time of a real conflict and practiced during simulations, this horizontal escalation in real time can lead to potential nuclear outbreak.

Strategy is a two-way street. Gung-ho exercise-scenario-writing can be projected as a way to reinforce deterrence, showcasing India’s nuclear warfighting capability, thereby prevailing on Pakistan against taking a nuclear recourse because India has an answer to that too. However, it needs reminding that this cannot be done without also having robust nuclear risk management mechanisms in place to prevent and tackle escalation. India’s political authorities must put pressure on the military to clarify this. However, this is not happening as there is a disconnect, with the civilian side mistakenly believing that the doctrinal sphere is that of the military. This is not valid for the nuclear age.

Limited war is sine qua non in the nuclear age, or the only war that can plausibly be fought. India’s Cold Start Doctrine started out as a limited war doctrine, enabling conventional power application in a nuclear backdrop. This doctrinal concept must be reflected realistically in exercise scenarios. While exercises at the operational level are worst-case scenario-based and meant to demonstrate and validate capabilities – such as nuclear warfighting – the key strategic level takeaway from the aforementioned exercises is that offensive content in India’s doctrine militates against what the doctrine professes. To this end, India would do well to revisit the moorings of its military doctrines and reexamine if the limited war concept holds true.
https://southasianvoices.org/is-the-indian-military-preparing-for-total-war/
@Neo

BhoseDK padh teri military aur military planners ki GAAND PHATI padhi hai aur Pant GILI hui padhi hai. They know what is coming their way.

Jitna bhonkna hai bhonk lo thode dino ki baat hai na rahega baans (Porkistan) na baje gi bansuri (bhonknewale kute tere jaise aur Hafeez kute kute jaise). Just wait and watch.

 

[pankaj nema]

IS THE INDIAN MILITARY PREPARING FOR TOTAL WAR?
May 31, 2018 by Ali Ahmed

Three recent exercises undertaken by the Indian military suggest it may be gearing up for prosecuting war in the nuclear age: air exercise Gagan Shakti(Power of the Sky), reportedly the largest ever Indian Air Force (IAF) exercise; Vijay Prahaar (A Blow for Victory) carried out by Strike 1 Corps of the South West Command in the desert sector; and the South Western Command’s pivot corps, Chetak Corps’ Gandiv Vijay (Victory to Arjuna’s Bow). From the reports about these exercises in the press, it is not evident that these were based on a limited war doctrine, the deliberate pulling of conventional punches in cognizance of the nuclear threshold, that India espouses. In contrast, the military appears to be bracing for total war—that is, it is willing to countenance a war going nuclear—despite observing twenty years of the nuclear age on the subcontinent.

Battlefield Capabilities

Gagan Shakti

The scenario for Ex Gagan Shakti was a war on two fronts – along India’s border with Pakistan, and with China in the Indian Ocean region – which, in addition to the nuclear escalation potential of future conflicts, is perhaps India’s worst-case scenario. According to media reports, the air force shifted its sights from the western to the eastern adversary in quick time. It seems to have put the smaller neighbor’s air force out of action with offensive counter air and degradation tasks and, leaving that front to land forces, gone on to concentrate on the more difficult foe in the mountains. There were also long-range strikes across the Bay of Bengal for simulated interdiction of the Malacca Straits.

The scenario for Ex Gagan Shakti was a war on two fronts – along India’s border with Pakistan, and with China in the Indian Ocean region – which, in addition to the nuclear escalation potential of future conflicts, is perhaps India’s worst-case scenario.
Further into the exercise, there was also a mass casualty evacuation drill, presumably reflecting on the IAF’s capability for dealing with nuclear, chemical, radiological, and biological warfare contingencies. Incidentally, this was from the air base at Chabua in the north east, closest to the China border. This indicates that that the No First Use (NFU) pledge of either state did not quite hold up in this hypothetical conflict scenario. This portion of the exercise may have been more plausible if it was carried out on the western front, in light of Pakistan’s lack of an NFU doctrine and possession of battlefield nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the lessons are valid for both fronts, and the IAF was able to express confidence in its capability to deal with nuclear, biological, and chemical attack scenarios.

Vijay Prahaar

The press release on Ex Vijay Prahaar reports that troops practiced “penetrative manoeuvres (sic) across the obstacle ridden terrain under a nuclear umbrella.” The formations of the Mathura-headquartered Strike 1 Corps, a potent offensive hammer under the Jaipur-based command, refined their drills and procedures for fighting in the nuclear environment. The air cavalry concept “aimed at reshaping land battle by defeating the enemy with an offensive punch from the air” was validated. Taking place immediately after Ex Gagan Shakti, Vijay Prahaar showcased jointmanship between the army and the air force in a future war scenario, where the IAF would handle the “enemy” in the air, as per the former exercise, while the army handles arms operations on the ground involving real-time information and deployment, as per Vijay Prahaar.

The Indian army’s advertisement of its ability to fight dirty suggests a turn to warfighting in a nuclear environment, a disconcerting comfort with total war.
A press release by the army informed of “deep thrusts… sustained effectively” and “continuing the offensive” through a capability for “fighting dirty.” However, the Pakistanis’ tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) are meant precisely to deter these deep thrusts. Such thrusts can trigger TNW use, precipitating nuclear war. This suggests that the Indian military is unmindful of the nuclear threshold, rather complacent that nuclear deterrence would hold. The Indian army’s advertisement of its ability to fight dirty suggests a turn to warfighting in a nuclear environment, a disconcerting comfort with total war. This tendency is against the limited war concept, which must necessarily inform a conventional doctrine in the nuclear age.

Gandiv Vijay

For the past two months, the pivot corps of South Western Command, Chetak Corps, has also been engaged in a field exercise of its own—Ex Gandiv Vijay. The Corps’s Kota-based RAPID (Reorganized Army Plains Infantry Division) was its offensive component, reportedlypracticing “multi-mode mobilization from dispersed locations to the time and place of decision in a terrain orchestrated on the lines of operational responsibility of the formation.” The exercise overlapped with Gagan Shakti and Vijay Prahaar, indicating a seamless war from pivot corps limited offensives setting the stage for strike corps breakout operations, all under an umbrella of offensive air operations.

Reinforcing Military Jointmanship

Applied together, the three exercises—each reinforcing jointmanship among the Indian armed forces—seem to integrate the army’s Cold Start Doctrine with the air force’s doctrine. While in Ex Gandiv Vijay, the pivot corps scrambled from a cold start to its battle locations, its RAPID division went on a limited offensive. At this time, perhaps, Ex Gagan Shakti’s phase one would play out, creating conditions for the “speedy depletion of the enemy’s combat potential” through “coercive strategies.” Thereafter, Ex Vijay Prahaar‘s Strike 1 Corps would be unleashed, passing over obstacles into enemy forces to knock out armored reserves reacting to the ongoing strikes. Alongside “swift offensive action”, Strike 1 will likely launch its Brahmos Block IIIcruise missiles, as practiced in 2017, in a “synergistic employment of long range vectors along with the Infantry and Mechanized Forces and the Air Arm to achieve a decisive victory.” Whether the nuclear deterrent would hold under the joint onslaught across a broad front – recall India has three strike corps and three commands facing west – puts a question mark on whether a limited war concept informs India’s military doctrine any more.

Moving Away From Limited War?

The land forces appear to be bent on making deep penetrations across obstacles and degrading the enemy’s reserves, thus flirting with both the territorial and degradation thresholds of nuclear first use.
While analysts argue that the armed forces are cognizant of “high-tempo and intense limited conflict,” these recent exercises do not lend confidence that India’s limited war doctrine will hold. In the cases considered, the land forces appear to be bent on making deep penetrations across obstacles and degrading the enemy’s reserves, thus flirting with both the territorial and degradation thresholds of nuclear first use. Recall both thresholds figure among the four that Khalid Kidwai, a former head of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, had mentioned while Operation Parakram was on. Meanwhile, the air force takes the enemy on both over land and water, in reaction to a hypothetical, simulated setback, but absent escalation control mechanisms, both in place at the time of a real conflict and practiced during simulations, this horizontal escalation in real time can lead to potential nuclear outbreak.

Strategy is a two-way street. Gung-ho exercise-scenario-writing can be projected as a way to reinforce deterrence, showcasing India’s nuclear warfighting capability, thereby prevailing on Pakistan against taking a nuclear recourse because India has an answer to that too. However, it needs reminding that this cannot be done without also having robust nuclear risk management mechanisms in place to prevent and tackle escalation. India’s political authorities must put pressure on the military to clarify this. However, this is not happening as there is a disconnect, with the civilian side mistakenly believing that the doctrinal sphere is that of the military. This is not valid for the nuclear age.

Limited war is sine qua non in the nuclear age, or the only war that can plausibly be fought. India’s Cold Start Doctrine started out as a limited war doctrine, enabling conventional power application in a nuclear backdrop. This doctrinal concept must be reflected realistically in exercise scenarios. While exercises at the operational level are worst-case scenario-based and meant to demonstrate and validate capabilities – such as nuclear warfighting – the key strategic level takeaway from the aforementioned exercises is that offensive content in India’s doctrine militates against what the doctrine professes. To this end, India would do well to revisit the moorings of its military doctrines and reexamine if the limited war concept holds true.
https://southasianvoices.org/is-the-indian-military-preparing-for-total-war/
@Neo

BhoseDK padh teri military aur military planners ki GAAND PHATI padhi hai aur Pant GILI hui padhi hai. They know what is coming their way.

Jitna bhonkna hai bhonk lo thode dino ki baat hai na rahega baans (Porkistan) na baje gi bansuri (bhonknewale kute tere jaise aur Hafeez kute kute jaise). Just wait and watch.

Mate are you sure that we will Punish Pakistan

On the other hand we are not even doing anything at LOC

 

[Chinmoy]

Mate are you sure that we will Punish Pakistan

On the other hand we are not even doing anything at LOC

We are doing this.

LOC is something which neither India nor Pakistan agrees upon.

 

[IndiaRising]

We are doing this.

LOC is something which neither India nor Pakistan agrees upon.

complete war is not possible. it is RAW that will need to take revenge this time, not Indian Army

 

[nongaddarliberal]

IS THE INDIAN MILITARY PREPARING FOR TOTAL WAR?
May 31, 2018 by Ali Ahmed

Three recent exercises undertaken by the Indian military suggest it may be gearing up for prosecuting war in the nuclear age: air exercise Gagan Shakti(Power of the Sky), reportedly the largest ever Indian Air Force (IAF) exercise; Vijay Prahaar (A Blow for Victory) carried out by Strike 1 Corps of the South West Command in the desert sector; and the South Western Command’s pivot corps, Chetak Corps’ Gandiv Vijay (Victory to Arjuna’s Bow). From the reports about these exercises in the press, it is not evident that these were based on a limited war doctrine, the deliberate pulling of conventional punches in cognizance of the nuclear threshold, that India espouses. In contrast, the military appears to be bracing for total war—that is, it is willing to countenance a war going nuclear—despite observing twenty years of the nuclear age on the subcontinent.

Battlefield Capabilities

Gagan Shakti

The scenario for Ex Gagan Shakti was a war on two fronts – along India’s border with Pakistan, and with China in the Indian Ocean region – which, in addition to the nuclear escalation potential of future conflicts, is perhaps India’s worst-case scenario. According to media reports, the air force shifted its sights from the western to the eastern adversary in quick time. It seems to have put the smaller neighbor’s air force out of action with offensive counter air and degradation tasks and, leaving that front to land forces, gone on to concentrate on the more difficult foe in the mountains. There were also long-range strikes across the Bay of Bengal for simulated interdiction of the Malacca Straits.

The scenario for Ex Gagan Shakti was a war on two fronts – along India’s border with Pakistan, and with China in the Indian Ocean region – which, in addition to the nuclear escalation potential of future conflicts, is perhaps India’s worst-case scenario.
Further into the exercise, there was also a mass casualty evacuation drill, presumably reflecting on the IAF’s capability for dealing with nuclear, chemical, radiological, and biological warfare contingencies. Incidentally, this was from the air base at Chabua in the north east, closest to the China border. This indicates that that the No First Use (NFU) pledge of either state did not quite hold up in this hypothetical conflict scenario. This portion of the exercise may have been more plausible if it was carried out on the western front, in light of Pakistan’s lack of an NFU doctrine and possession of battlefield nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the lessons are valid for both fronts, and the IAF was able to express confidence in its capability to deal with nuclear, biological, and chemical attack scenarios.

Vijay Prahaar

The press release on Ex Vijay Prahaar reports that troops practiced “penetrative manoeuvres (sic) across the obstacle ridden terrain under a nuclear umbrella.” The formations of the Mathura-headquartered Strike 1 Corps, a potent offensive hammer under the Jaipur-based command, refined their drills and procedures for fighting in the nuclear environment. The air cavalry concept “aimed at reshaping land battle by defeating the enemy with an offensive punch from the air” was validated. Taking place immediately after Ex Gagan Shakti, Vijay Prahaar showcased jointmanship between the army and the air force in a future war scenario, where the IAF would handle the “enemy” in the air, as per the former exercise, while the army handles arms operations on the ground involving real-time information and deployment, as per Vijay Prahaar.

The Indian army’s advertisement of its ability to fight dirty suggests a turn to warfighting in a nuclear environment, a disconcerting comfort with total war.
A press release by the army informed of “deep thrusts… sustained effectively” and “continuing the offensive” through a capability for “fighting dirty.” However, the Pakistanis’ tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) are meant precisely to deter these deep thrusts. Such thrusts can trigger TNW use, precipitating nuclear war. This suggests that the Indian military is unmindful of the nuclear threshold, rather complacent that nuclear deterrence would hold. The Indian army’s advertisement of its ability to fight dirty suggests a turn to warfighting in a nuclear environment, a disconcerting comfort with total war. This tendency is against the limited war concept, which must necessarily inform a conventional doctrine in the nuclear age.

Gandiv Vijay

For the past two months, the pivot corps of South Western Command, Chetak Corps, has also been engaged in a field exercise of its own—Ex Gandiv Vijay. The Corps’s Kota-based RAPID (Reorganized Army Plains Infantry Division) was its offensive component, reportedlypracticing “multi-mode mobilization from dispersed locations to the time and place of decision in a terrain orchestrated on the lines of operational responsibility of the formation.” The exercise overlapped with Gagan Shakti and Vijay Prahaar, indicating a seamless war from pivot corps limited offensives setting the stage for strike corps breakout operations, all under an umbrella of offensive air operations.

Reinforcing Military Jointmanship

Applied together, the three exercises—each reinforcing jointmanship among the Indian armed forces—seem to integrate the army’s Cold Start Doctrine with the air force’s doctrine. While in Ex Gandiv Vijay, the pivot corps scrambled from a cold start to its battle locations, its RAPID division went on a limited offensive. At this time, perhaps, Ex Gagan Shakti’s phase one would play out, creating conditions for the “speedy depletion of the enemy’s combat potential” through “coercive strategies.” Thereafter, Ex Vijay Prahaar‘s Strike 1 Corps would be unleashed, passing over obstacles into enemy forces to knock out armored reserves reacting to the ongoing strikes. Alongside “swift offensive action”, Strike 1 will likely launch its Brahmos Block IIIcruise missiles, as practiced in 2017, in a “synergistic employment of long range vectors along with the Infantry and Mechanized Forces and the Air Arm to achieve a decisive victory.” Whether the nuclear deterrent would hold under the joint onslaught across a broad front – recall India has three strike corps and three commands facing west – puts a question mark on whether a limited war concept informs India’s military doctrine any more.

Moving Away From Limited War?

The land forces appear to be bent on making deep penetrations across obstacles and degrading the enemy’s reserves, thus flirting with both the territorial and degradation thresholds of nuclear first use.
While analysts argue that the armed forces are cognizant of “high-tempo and intense limited conflict,” these recent exercises do not lend confidence that India’s limited war doctrine will hold. In the cases considered, the land forces appear to be bent on making deep penetrations across obstacles and degrading the enemy’s reserves, thus flirting with both the territorial and degradation thresholds of nuclear first use. Recall both thresholds figure among the four that Khalid Kidwai, a former head of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, had mentioned while Operation Parakram was on. Meanwhile, the air force takes the enemy on both over land and water, in reaction to a hypothetical, simulated setback, but absent escalation control mechanisms, both in place at the time of a real conflict and practiced during simulations, this horizontal escalation in real time can lead to potential nuclear outbreak.

Strategy is a two-way street. Gung-ho exercise-scenario-writing can be projected as a way to reinforce deterrence, showcasing India’s nuclear warfighting capability, thereby prevailing on Pakistan against taking a nuclear recourse because India has an answer to that too. However, it needs reminding that this cannot be done without also having robust nuclear risk management mechanisms in place to prevent and tackle escalation. India’s political authorities must put pressure on the military to clarify this. However, this is not happening as there is a disconnect, with the civilian side mistakenly believing that the doctrinal sphere is that of the military. This is not valid for the nuclear age.

Limited war is sine qua non in the nuclear age, or the only war that can plausibly be fought. India’s Cold Start Doctrine started out as a limited war doctrine, enabling conventional power application in a nuclear backdrop. This doctrinal concept must be reflected realistically in exercise scenarios. While exercises at the operational level are worst-case scenario-based and meant to demonstrate and validate capabilities – such as nuclear warfighting – the key strategic level takeaway from the aforementioned exercises is that offensive content in India’s doctrine militates against what the doctrine professes. To this end, India would do well to revisit the moorings of its military doctrines and reexamine if the limited war concept holds true.
https://southasianvoices.org/is-the-indian-military-preparing-for-total-war/
@Neo

BhoseDK padh teri military aur military planners ki GAAND PHATI padhi hai aur Pant GILI hui padhi hai. They know what is coming their way.

Jitna bhonkna hai bhonk lo thode dino ki baat hai na rahega baans (Porkistan) na baje gi bansuri (bhonknewale kute tere jaise aur Hafeez kute kute jaise). Just wait and watch.

If the pakis do one more Mumbai and this time under Modi govt, then we will have a real war. Let's see if they are that foolish.

 

[lcafanboy]

Mate are you sure that we will Punish Pakistan

On the other hand we are not even doing anything at LOC

Then why the hell government and moody spending billions on these excercises? I live near very important iaf base and earlier during khangress rule hardly I spotted fighters but now every day SU30MKIs wake me up and for whole day they make deafening noise.

Also people in Arunachal Pradesh today protested for continuos bombing excercises due to which they have lost farm animals and few even sustained injuries...

Definitely something is on cards. It's election year and any mistake by porkistan and even cutlets at home won't go unpunished..... Or maybe a surprise event like porkistan getting balkanized due to RAW activities and porki army retaliating...:biggrin2:

Living in fear: Arunachal Pradesh villagers are agitating to remove an Indian Air Force base
https://www.google.co.in/amp/s/amp....-agitating-to-remove-an-indian-air-force-base

 

[Poseidon]

Pathetic! What happened to, "we will fire 10 bullets for every bullet fired by them" 56 inch jumla.

 

[Poseidon]

We never begged for ceasefire Sir. We have clear policy you open fire than we would make sure you pay a really heavy price. Pakistan is most battle hardened Army and they are ready to unleash hell on any one who messes with them.

Simple question, if Pakistan army is so battle hardened, why do they hide LoC casualties?
On this very forum itself you can find names of dozens of Pakistani soldiers killed on LoC whose names were never revealed by ISPR or Pak media.

 

[The Ultranationalist]

Then why the hell government and moody spending billions on these excercises? I live near very important iaf base and earlier during khangress rule hardly I spotted fighters but now every day SU30MKIs wake me up and for whole day they make deafening noise.

Also people in Arunachal Pradesh today protested for continuos bombing excercises due to which they have lost farm animals and few even sustained injuries...

Definitely something is on cards. It's election year and any mistake by porkistan and even cutlets at home won't go unpunished..... Or maybe a surprise event like porkistan getting balkanized due to RAW activities and porki army retaliating...:biggrin2:

Living in fear: Arunachal Pradesh villagers are agitating to remove an Indian Air Force base
https://www.google.co.in/amp/s/amp....-agitating-to-remove-an-indian-air-force-base

I think the govt is just fooling around, if it hadn't been we would had seen our forces using heavy and high calibre weapons like 155s and thermobaric bombs at porkis. Seriously man whats the use of having such a powerful military when even surrender freaks like porkis have the audacity to kill our jawans and our govt is busy with economic concerns and election campaigns.

 

[indus]

complete war is not possible. it is RAW that will need to take revenge this time, not Indian Army

Even if RaW sets the scene Army has to be ready for any spillover or retaliation from Poaks.

 

[Kalki_2018]

Pakios have always come running and begging for ceasefire when BSF starts pounding. They simply don't have firepower or money to fight. Why do you think rangers DGMO keeps crying about ceasefire