this guy SHE jipi is some kind of ultra nationalist from the mao era
they want to cut off the north east via cutting the silguri land isthmus. we are always on the defensive ..... when will the day come when we take some offensive and push them against the walls instead ??
I don't know why we are so alarmed about the Chinks cutting off the Siliguri corridor. It's easier said than done and will be suicide for the PLA to try and do so.
Here's why.
Can The PLA Cut Off The Siliguri Corridor?
Much has been said about PLA cutting off the Siliguri Corridor called the Chicken’s Neck from Doklam Basin Tri Junction area in the event of war with India, thereby cutting off North East India. Nothing can be farther from the truth. Let’s see why it is tactically and strategically unfeasible.
I will mainly touch upon the logistics angle.
During wartime logistical practice at the operational (or theater) level of war is in many ways the most critical. At higher levels of policy and grand strategy, logistic decisions generally revolve around force composition and destination. Once the political-military decision-making occurs, logisticians need to figure out how to get the materiel that their forces will need to the theater or theaters where those forces are to be committed.
They must also plan to build up the infrastructure in the theater to a point where the materiel can be distributed to the troops with regularity. It is this intermediate level at which much of the true heavy lifting occurs when it comes to logistic issues. A lack of infrastructure in a theater or the inability to create such infrastructure can greatly handicap tactical re-supply and thus cripple military efforts.
China is proceeding through a very narrow strip of land as it stretches its military presence towards India, it leaves it very vulnerable to artillery shelling and air attacks from either Sikkim or Bhutan. If Indian aerial and artillery assaults are carried out effectively on the Chinese supply lines easily identified in the Chumbi valley stretched in a linear North-South direction, it would reduce PLA’s capabilities to fight to an extent that it would become untenable for the PLA to advance any further.
This was one of the reasons why the Chinese withdrew from Arunachal Pradesh in the 1962 war with India as they ran out of supplies.
All this nonsense coming out from the Chinese that they withdrew because their aim was only to ‘teach India a lesson’ is so much hogwash. During the later part of the conflict the Chinese troops had no water and drank from dirty streams causing disease and death. They even came down to eating shrubs and grass to survive and ran out of ammunition, according to extracts from the Henderson Brooks Report on the Sino Indian war of 1962.
Though logistics have improved considerably, it is still extremely difficult to wage even a limited war in mountainous terrain against a well armed and entrenched adversary.
The combat ratio needed for an offensive in mountains is 1:9 meaning the PLA would need approximately nine divisions to attack one Indian mountain division. There are three divisions, 17, 27 and 20 Mountain Divisions under 33 Corps in the general area of Sikkim – Bhutan. The PLA would need at least twenty or more divisions to capture this area!
Now, providing logistics to these Chinese Divisions would be an uphill task (pun unintended!)
Each attacking division needs a daily tonnage of approximately 600 tons of ammunition, food, water, medical equipment, spares, fuel, etc to prosecute an offensive. There would therefore be a need for constructing a two way road through mountainous terrain to the Doklam/Bhutan sector. But then, that would be easier said than done as this road will be continuously interdicted by Indian arty and air attacks. Their forward logistics bases would be interdicted too. They would require 600 x 1-ton trucks daily, operating 24x7 to supply just one division over a tenuous road link over mountainous terrain. Whether road space for this is available is the moot question. Further, deployablilty around the Chumbi Valley being restricted due to the terrain configuration, it would be impossible to employ more than one division for an offensive. This is way below the combat ratio needed for an offensive against Indian troops deployed in the area which is 9:1.
That was up to the Doklam sector. Now let’s delve ahead. Assume the extreme case of the PLA succeeding in capturing and holding the Chumbi Valley and its shoulders. The distance as the crow flies from there to the Chicken’s Neck area is 20kms. A road winding along the mountains would be near 50kms. Even if they have a class 9 road building capability of 1 km a day, it would take approx 50 days to complete the road!
However, this road will be continuously interdicted by the Indian Air Force as well as artillery suitably deployed to destroy the road infrastructure as well as the PLA’s forward logistics bases along this axis. As mentioned earlier, even one PLA division will find it near impossible to launch an offensive into the Siliguri corridor along this tenuous line of communication. The PLA would need at least 20 divisions for an offensive to cut the Chicken’s neck from Doklam/Tri Junction.
In the near impossible scenario of some PLA formations succeeding in entering the Siliguri corridor, they would be cut off and disintegrate sooner than later. It would not be possible for the PLA to sustain this offensive.
In a nutshell it will be impossible for the PLA to even pose a threat to the Siliguri corridor.