Pakistan: General Developments - Musharraf warns of new military coup in Pakistan

[ajtr]

Brigade 313 and Taliban team up for Karachi assault

Brigade 313 and Taliban team up for Karachi assault​

By BILL ROGGIONovember 12, 2010


Read more: Brigade 313 and Taliban team up for Karachi assault - The Long War Journal
Yesterday the Taliban and Brigade 313, al Qaeda's branch in Pakistan, jointly carried out a devastating attack on a police headquarters in Karachi. Several members of the assault team escaped after the battle.

The assault took place at the Crime Investigation Department headquarters in a highly secured area of Karachi in Sindh province. Two vehicles, and not one as initially reported, were used in the assault, according to witness statements and closed circuit television footage analyzed by Pakistani investigators.

The first team of attackers dismounted from a jeep and attacked the guards at the front gate, killing them and clearing the path so that the second truck, which was packed with an estimated 1,000 to 2,000 pounds of explosives, could enter the compound.

"A Shezore or a larger Mazda truck laden with explosives was used in the blast and terrorists used a Prado jeep, whose occupants first killed guards posted at the CID gate, clearing the way for the truck to enter the building," a senior Pakistani police officer told Dawn.

Another Pakistani security official claimed that the suicide assault team had enough time to raid the headquarters' armory, and escaped with a number of weapons, Daily Times reported.

Several of the attackers boarded the jeep and fled the attack after the truck was detonated by a suicide bomber. During the assault, 17 people were killed, including two CID officers and five paramilitary soldiers guarding the building.

The attack appears to have been designed to free two Taliban commanders, one from Karachi and another associated with Bajaur Taliban chieftain Faqir Mohammed, and six Lashkar-e-Jhangvi operatives detained over the past week who were being held at the police compound. It is unclear if the captive Taliban commanders and LeJ members were freed or killed during the attack.

The attack also resulted in the loss of evidence and information on terrorists and criminals being held and investigated by the CID in Karachi. "The CID's data on crime, notorious criminals and informers was completely destroyed, so the CID officials have no information about the suspects who were being investigated," Daily Times reported.

Brigade 313 involved in Karachi CID assault

While the Taliban claimed it carried out yesterday's attack in Karachi, al Qaeda's branch in Pakistan was also likely involved in the operation. The Taliban immediately claimed the attack, just hours after the deadly blast.

"We will continue such attacks as long as military operations continue against us," Azam Tariq, the top spokesman for the Pakistani Taliban, told reporters.

But US intelligence officials familiar with al Qaeda's operations in Pakistan believe that Ilyas Kashmiri's Brigade 313 was involved in the assault. Al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, and a host of Pakistani terror groups often carry out joint operations in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India.

"You can see Kashmiri's hand in this attack; it has his signature," one official told The Long War Journal. "The attack was well scouted and planned, and executed almost flawlessly. They carried this attack out in a secure area, so it is likely they received some form of inside help from within Pakistan's security forces. Kashmiri has those links."

Kashmiri, a long-time jihadi trained and supported by Pakistan's military and intelligence services to wage jihad in Kashmiri, took command of al Qaeda's military wing after his predecessor, Abdullah Said al Libi, was killed in a US Predator strike in December 2009.

Kashmiri has organized multiple attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. "Kashmiri has supported attacks against Pakistani government personnel and facilities, including the 2009 attack against the offices of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Pakistani police in Lahore, Pakistan that killed 23 people and left hundreds injured," the US Treasury Department stated in a press release that announced his addition to the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists.

A US intelligence official also told The Long War Journal that Kashmiri planned and organized the October 2009 assault on the Pakistani Army's General Headquarters complex in Rawalpindi. In that attack, the terrorist assault team shut down the complex for 18 hours; 11 soldiers were killed, including a brigadier general and a lieutenant colonel, along with nine members of the assault team; and 39 hostages were freed.

Kashmiri has also planned and executed high-profile assassinations of top Pakistani military leaders. "He directed the October 2008 assassination of the former commander of the Pakistani Special Services Group, General Amir Faisal Alvi, in retaliation for his role in the fight against militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan," according to Treasury. "He also led an al Qaeda-linked cell in planning for the assassination of a Pakistani Army general – a plan that was eventually abandoned due to al Qaeda's strategic considerations."



Read more: Brigade 313 and Taliban team up for Karachi assault - The Long War Journal

 

[ajtr]

Pakistan's simmering Swat Valley​

There's a duel afoot in a pocket of Pakistan's wild west, or northwest to be precise, that is ripped straight from the set of any gunslinging, saloon-door swinging, shootout-in-a-dusty-street American movie about its own once-lawless frontier territory.

The Taliban and their opponents in the tribal village defense committee, or lashkar, of Bara Bandai in the Swat Valley are engaged in a dueling poster campaign, pinning 'wanted' posters of each other across the village in a psychological war of the words.

Last week, Pakistan's daily The News reported that militants in Bara Bandai, about 15 to 20 kilometers from the city of Mingora, had warned about half a dozen leading members of the lashkar to quit the body or "get ready for the consequences." The posters were apparently put up overnight last Monday, in an area that the Pakistani army says has been cleared of militants.

The paper quoted the head of Bara Bandai's lashkar, Idress Khan, saying that the defense committee had decided to respond in kind, printing up its own posters titled "public notice for terrorists" that listed the names of alleged militants.

It would be comical if it weren't so serious. Something is clearly astir in Bara Bandai and its surrounding villages. In the bad old days, Bara Bandai was a seat of Taliban power, a village adjacent to Swat Taliban leader Maulana Fazlullah's hometown of Imam Dherai, and the site of one of the first clashes in the northwest between the military and the Taliban.

I was there two weeks ago, on assignment for TIME for a story about the growing unease in the area. I visited several of the villages, including Dherai, where a member of that village's lashkar had been killed by the Taliban recently, to talk to female NGO workers about how comfortable or otherwise they felt coming to work, given that I'd been told in Islamabad that several NGOs were reconsidering projects in the area because of increased security concerns.

There's a massive Pakistani security presence on the ground, in an obvious show of force, and nighttime curfews are in place across many of the villages. On one of the days I was traveling through the area, the military had locked down the village of Koza Bandai (adjacent to Bara Bandai) and was conducting house-to-house searches looking for weapons caches and militants. The Taliban had claimed responsibility for recently destroying a boys' school in the village.

The situation is even more worrisome further north in Matta. There have been almost daily shootouts between militants and the military in the area. Just yesterday, six "terrorists" were killed in the village by security forces. Health workers there told me that the situation is precarious, but not as bad as it used to be. It's tempting to take a measure of comfort from such news, but then one has to remember that in this pocket of Pakistan's wild west, the baseline for what constitutes "better" is pretty low. Idress Khan, the head of Bara Bandai's lashkar, said that the fact the militants plastered their posters under cover of darkness, and not brazenly during the day, was a measure of how weak they were. Perhaps. But anyone who has ever watched a Wild West flick knows that a weak enemy isn't the same as a defeated one.

Rania Abouzeid is an independent journalist based in Islamabad.

 

[ajtr]

My Name is Khan and I Am a Terrorist

My Name is Khan and I Am a Terrorist​

That's right, my name is Khan and I am a terrorist, but I wasn't always one. In fact I wasn't even that religious before, though born in a so-called Muslim family. According to my current understanding I was actually a "Kafir" although I preferred to call myself an atheist or agnostic at best. So what happened? How did a liberated soul like mine get warped into becoming a Muslim firstly and then a terrorist willing to unleash my wrath on the enemies of Islam? Let me explain"¦

I was young when 9/11 happened and like any other normal person I was shocked beyond belief at what had occurred. However what was more shocking was the fact that a certain group of Muslims was being held responsible for the atrocious crime. I wondered what could trigger Muslims to commit such an evil act all the while calling it Jihad in the name of God. From then onwards I saw the media unleash its wrath upon the Muslims along with which the world was introduced to the "War on Terror" phenomenon. In what followed I saw the US forces invade Iraq, ensue foolish military endeavors in Afghanistan, I heard about Guantanomo Bay, the killing of innocent people being termed as "collateral damage", drone strikes in Pakistan and most recently the Wikileaks controversy. I also noticed that Muslims were being ridiculed all around the world and their faith was being attacked on international airwaves and their religion being portrayed as inherently evil. All this made me realise I was Muslim. It also made me feel important as I knew the whole world was against me. Soon it became quite clear that I was a victim of a world wide propaganda devilishly plotted by the evil Jews and pursued with full fervor by the neo-con Christians of the United States.

I began to practice Islam with much sincerity. I would pray five times a day, read the Holy Book, I even gave up the Western dress and adopted the Gallabiya and of course let my beard grow! I was particularly concerned regarding the political and social struggles of the Ummah and puzzled how this glorious religion, with its glorious past had become a source of shame for its followers. Of course I knew the cause, anyone with even one eye knows that we are the victims of the evil designs of the West, but I was looking for an answer. I was dying to know what I could do to reclaim the honor of my religion. I didn't think it was justified to just "stick to your prayers and be a good person" when my faith, my honor and my people were being attacked all around the world.

In search for answers I started going to the mosques to attend lectures putting all my hopes in our learned scholars. I was sure they would be able to outline a course of action for a young, energetic, religiously committed and zealous youth like myself. But boy was I disappointed! Everywhere I went it seemed like the scholars were living inside a cocoon and had absolutely no idea of what was going on in the world around them. No one spoke of the injustices of the West and how the media was playing a major role in brainwashing the people against Islam. At first I thought they were just stupid but then I realised they were nothing more than cowards and sell outs. Not finding any solace in the ramblings of the mainstream Mullah I made a transition into the online world. It is here that I found my answers, my leaders, my heroes, my army, my ideals and my ideology. I discovered there are thousands that share my world view and are ever ready to do something about the plight of the Ummah. I joined a number of online communities and chat forums with my brothers. It was a real awakening. All this time I had been looking for the right people in the wrong direction. In these forums everyone knew exactly what was going on. We knew fully well that local acts of terrorism are false flag operations, the pathetic state of the economy in Muslim lands is also because of the West and its evil designs and everything else going wrong anywhere in the Muslim lands is a propaganda devilishly planned by, you guessed it; the West. (And when I say West I mean A-merica to Z)

I was finally at ease as now I was aware of the ideology that would eventually help the Ummah to reclaim the honor of their faith and home in on the real enemies. I knew that my band of brothers was the victim of an evil design and this made the difficult path that lay ahead of me, very, very easy.

I was introduced to the real scholars of Islam, those that dared to speak out against the West and its injustices. I was also introduced to verses from the Holy Quran and a variety of different Ahadith that only a few selected people could interpret correctly and luckily I was fortunate enough to be associated with them. Suddenly everything was crystal clear. These great scholars not only justified the "militant ideology" (as termed by the shameless media) but made me feel as though these texts had been revealed particularly to address this particular selected group of selfless believers who would then rise up against the enemies of Islam and rid the world of their evil. Thus we found the explicit Islamic solutions to the problems of the Ummah by correctly interpreting the religious texts. (And the shameless media has the nerve to say the religion is outdated!).

The former intellectually challenged US President, George W. Bush, eloquently phrased a sentence that got Pakistan to hop on to the "War on Terror" wagon. Those words were "You're either with us or against us" and this is exactly what we, those whom you call "the terrorists", believe. (Back at ya Bush!)
To sum it all up; I was young and the way events were unfolding around me got me really confused. I was concerned and had a will to change the world for a better place. Naturally I looked towards the mainstream scholars to provide me explicit solutions in the light of Islam regarding the current political and social struggles of the Ummah. Their failure to do so made me look elsewhere and that is where I found what you would call, "the radical camp". They inundated me with real Islamic knowledge and solutions with the help of religious texts and thus provided me with a ticket to Jannah. Inspired by heroes that stood up against oppression in the history of Islam, (and believe you me, there are many such heroes) I too decided that if I was going to die then it would be fighting against the enemies of Islam. I am ready to give up my life for the cause and if a few hundred innocent people loose their lives in the process, so be it, call it collateral damage!

Rishadullah Shaikh is the New-Media Manager at Dawn.com

 

[ajtr]

For men fighting the war, women were 'easy targets'

For men fighting the war, women were 'easy targets'​

SWAT: While men were directly involved in violence in Swat, the valley's women supported the movement in whichever capacity they could – cooking, cleaning and donating.
The women of Nekpikhel district in particular and the entire valley in general were active members of the militancy movement as they appeared 'easy targets' for the militants to preach their ideology.
A resident of Peochar Valley, whose father was a Talib commander, told The Express Tribune on condition of anonymity that in the militants' training centres, women cooked and cleaned for them, washed their clothes, and many even married them. A number of women also volunteered to become suicide bombers. Some women were said to have rebelled against the men in their families and several divorce cases were reported.
Analysts believe that one reason many women took to the ideology was due to isolation. Many women in Swat take over families while their husbands are away from home for long periods of time in order to earn a livelihood.
"A large number of men from Swat are abroad. This means their wives are all on their own with young children. In such situations, they [women] are easily swayed by emotional religious sermons," says a moderate religious scholar from Mingora.
He said these women supported the movement with all their heart and wealth. "They even donated their jewellery and sent young children to be hired as suicide bombers."
Swat-based analyst Fazal Maula told The Express Tribune that women were specifically targeted by the militants. "A sort of competition developed. Women were especially motivated and addressed in radio sermons. Donations using fake names were initially announced only to attract women," Maula says. However, he says, there wasn't any practical involvement by women other than donations.
"The Taliban movement led by Fazlullah was well organised. In a very scientific way, they exploited women. Keeping in mind that they were confined within the four walls of their homes, Fazlullah used the radio to get to them," activist Ihsanullah Khan says.
In Swat, the literacy rate for women is also lower than that for men and many believe this made them softer targets. "Illiteracy matters as women from remote areas got entangled in this mess due to a lack of education and understanding," Maula says.
Apart from illiteracy and isolation, lack of proper religious knowledge also pushed women towards supporting the hardline movement, says renowned social activist Ziauddin Yousufzai. "Traditionally, women are marginalised and socially isolated. Women believed that Mullah Fazlullah [chief of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan's Swat chapter] was a Mujahid of Islam. This was because women in Swat are brought up in a purely religious environment, which was exploited by the militants," Yousufzai says.
The view was supported by Nazli, a resident of Charbagh district. "No woman practically participated in the militancy but they were misled by Fazlullah as they were convinced that he was working for the welfare of Islam," she said.

 

[ajtr]

Another torture video of pukhtoon old man by Pak Army surfaces in swat

 

[maomao]

Video deleted....post a new one. thanks!

 

[maomao]

One very Interesting video....if you can read between the lines!!

 

[ajtr]

Video deleted....post a new one. thanks!

wow too fast they deleted it???

 

[maomao]

 

[ajtr]

Kayani's doctrine of escalation​

The writer is director at the South Asia Free Media Association, Lahore [email protected]
Should we adjudge the 'intent' of India while framing our military defence, or should we look at India's 'capacity' to harm Pakistan? Intent is when India says it wants a stable Pakistan and wants normal, good-neighbourly relations with it. Capacity is the actual capability of the Indian army to harm Pakistan, its induction of new weapon systems and the upgradation of the systems it has. Our army chief, General Kayani, adheres to the second 'realist' assessment. He says he will frame Pakistan's defensive strategy in line with India's acquisition of Pakistan-specific weapons.
On Tuesday night, November 9, 2010 Dunya TV had anchor Najam Sethi saying that General Kayani's doctrine opened Pakistan to an arms race that Pakistan simply could not afford and that the 'doctrine' was a new concept in Pakistan's confrontation with India. Anchor Dr Moeed Pirzada, a well-read person among our TV commentators, said that the 'realist' doctrine of General Kayani was the widely accepted yardstick of defence response among nations. It was much safer to study the war capability developed by the enemy state than to pay heed to the peaceful 'intent' expressed by it.
The doctrine was embraced by the US in its confrontation with the Soviet Union. It paid off because the latter also tacitly accepted it in the bilateral arms race at the global level. Finally, the Soviet Union quit the field of military competition in the face of President Reagan's planned escalation under the rubric of 'space wars' initiative and was made to disintegrate later by its other internal contradictions. This happened after the 'disarmament' efforts by the two super-rivals had reached an advanced stage, delineating the nuclear status quo and precluding accidental nuclear conflict as far as possible. India and Pakistan are not even there as yet.
The Soviet Union simply could not keep up with the capacity of America's free economy to innovate in the development of weapons. The totalitarian vision of Lenin, which rejected competition by calling it 'economy of waste', was gone by the time Brezhnev came to power in the Soviet Union in the 1970s along with much more realistic regional leaders like Gorbachev in Leningrad and Yeltsin in Moscow. The Soviet economy simply could not keep up with the new advances that competition in the US market had made possible. Where does one place Pakistan in this 'realist' military paradigm?
India's economy, its high growth rate and its ability to indigenise military technology at a far higher scale than Pakistan, will go on compelling Pakistan to match India by inducting technologies it does not own. The ratio of its defence spending to the GDP is already too high to sustain. The arms race with India — including the acquisition of nuclear weapons — has damaged Pakistan; and the doctrine of escalation is already somewhat comparable to an imaginary acceptance of it by Cuba vis-à-vis America.
India has always thought of dictating Pakistan's military build-up till Pakistan can no longer sustain it without affecting the quality of life of the common man. India 'supported' Pakistan's nuclear programme when Pakistan's growth rate was hitting rock bottom as opposed to India's record high growth rate at the time of Pokhran. Pakistan did Kargil when its economy was almost belly-up, once again indicating the lack of realism among its military leadership. Now that its internal situation causes alarm across the globe, is it right to articulate this 'realist' policy of escalation?
Pakistan has always known that it can't match India in military capability. That is why it adopted the asymmetric approach. India had the same kind of problem vis-à-vis China but it ignored the doctrine that General Kayani has embraced in his India-centric strategy. It also did not adopt the asymmetric war approach against China. Pakistan has come to grief after half a century of using non-state actors against India. It is isolated internationally and is under attack from the very non-state actors it once nurtured and patronised.
It is time we changed the paradigm of defence in Pakistan and returned to the normalcy of trade and trade routes. Pakistan's revisionism vis-à-vis India must give way to compulsions of self-correction; and Pakistan must become open to international finance as an important adjunct to South Asia's rising economy.

 

[ajtr]

Helpless and hapless​

The writer is a defence analyst and retired as air-vice marshal in the Pakistan Air Force
Terror struck again, this time at the CID building next to the chief minister's house in Karachi's red zone. Someone let the 1,000 kilogramme explosives-laden truck through at the various check-points that possibly begin just outside the Pakhtunkhwa boundary limits and increase in frequency around and within all towns, all the way to Karachi — Pakistan's finance and trading hub.
Keep in mind it wasn't one of those shrine-blasters that need at best one teenage suicide aficionado and a minder. This was a blue-blooded, six to eight men, multi-directional, multi-vehicle attack that had the making of exquisite tactical detail in timing, coordinated effect and supporting diversionary manoeuvres. Any of the Pakistan Army's SSG members would have been proud to execute such complex action with such fine efficiency. Someone at the KESC had disconnected the CID building's power connection for three days with the result that the staff there were working without electricity. Even generators usually do not operate beyond an eight-hour cycle. This means that servers would not kick in on alternate power and after the generators were gone, the CCTV cameras, too, packed-up. This was happening for the last three days to the most important terror-investigative agency's headquarters right in the middle of Karachi, in the chief minister's own backyard, not some Godforsaken boondocks. The stage was then set for the final act.
Why do we keep failing repeatedly in doing something, anything, against these wanton acts of remorseless killing aided and abetted through incomprehensible ineptness? Foremost, because it hasn't yet crossed our minds to do something about it! To us, terrorist acts and the accompanied loss of life is simply an occupational hazard. Because we are in it, such things will happen. And hence that callous wariness to owning the losses and placing measures to avoid recurrence. Politics pervades everything else. The federal government is politically stretched, or has chosen to since it perceives that to be their area of strength — not governance; hence, the political fronts against the judiciary and the PML-N and preoccupation with coalition politics and the wheeling-dealing culture. Insecure environment and instability, along with formulations in policy that please a few, continue to render the economy asunder with no abatement. One time it is sugar, then oil and gas and perhaps next will be wheat. And that too doesn't trigger the government to act.
More pertinently, Karachi is divided as turf between four entities: the MQM, the ANP, the PPP and the religious factions — political and non-political — that generate their own dynamic as an overarching umbrella under which lawlessness, killings and terrorism abound. If Karachi was a microcosm, which it is, it encapsulates clearly why Karachi, and thus Pakistan, may not have integrated, coordinated and agreed anti-terror mechanisms in place. Politics supersedes all else, while factionalism provides enough to hide under.
The government may have, in effect, outsourced this war against terror to the military, and taken their eyes off it but the results of the last two years should be enough to convince it to retake control. The military has done well on the counter insurgency front but our losses mount because we have nothing in place to fight terror. Counter-terrorism needs a predominantly political effort with effective law-enforcement and necessary legal instruments; the military should assist with intelligence. For that to happen, politics must cede space to governance.

 

[ajtr]

Time to repeal the blasphemy law​

The writer is director current affairs, Dunya TV and a former fellow at Asia Center, Harvard University [email protected]
In June 2008, Asiya Bibi, a Pakistani farm worker and mother of five, fetched water for others working on the farm. Many refused the water because Asiya was Christian. The situation got ugly. Reports indicate Asiya was harassed because of her religion and the matter turned violent. Asiya, alone in a hostile environment, naturally would have attempted to defend herself but was put in police custody for her protection against a crowd that was harming her.
However, that protection move turned into one that was to earn Asiya a death sentence. A case was filed against her under sections 295-B and C of the Pakistan Penal Code, claiming that Asiya was a blasphemer. Her family will appeal against the judgment in the Lahore High Court.
The Asiya case raises the fundamental question of how Pakistan's minorities have been left unprotected since the passage of the blasphemy law. There may have been no hangings on account of the law but it has facilitated the spread of intolerance and populist rage against minorities, often leading to deaths. There is also a direct link between the Zia-ist state's intolerance against minorities and the rise of criminal treatment of Ahmadis.
Cases have ranged from the Kasur case to the more recent Gojra case, from the mind-boggling row of cases between 1988-1992 against 80-year-old development guru Dr Akhtar Hameed Khan, to the case of the son of an alleged blasphemer, an illiterate brick kiln worker who was beaten to death by a frenzied mob.
Although doctor sahib faced prolonged mental torture, he was saved from the maddening rage that has sent to prison, and in some cases devoured, many innocent, poor and hence unprotected Pakistanis.
There is a long list, prepared by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, of unjust punishments handed down to Pakistani citizens whose fundamental rights the state is obliged to protect. Beyond punishments, minorities live in constant fear of being lethally blackmailed by those who want to settle other scores.
Yet most political parties have refrained from calling for the law's repeal or improvement in its implementation mechanism. When, in the early 90s, I asked Nawaz Sharif sahib to criticise the hounding of Dr Khan, his response was a detailed recall of the story in which Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) went to ask after the health of a non-Muslim woman who repeatedly threw garbage over him. He condemned what was happening but said politics prevented him from doing so publicly. Later, General Musharraf, advised by other generals, reversed his announcement of changing the law's implementation mechanism. Small crowds protested against it. Among politicians, very few exceptions include the PPP parliamentarian Sherry Rehman and, more recently, the ANP's Bushra Gohar, who asked for its amendment and repeal.
Already sections of the judiciary have been critical of flawed judgements passed by lower courts in alleged blasphemy cases. Recently in July, Lahore High Court Chief Justice Khawaja Sharif quashed a blasphemy case against 60-year-old Zaibunnisa and ordered her release after almost 14 years in custody. According to the judgment, the "treatment meted out to the woman was an insult to humanity and the government and the civil organisations should be vigilant enough to help such people." Surely the Bench should know the plethora of abuses that Pakistan's minorities have suffered because of an evidently flawed law.
A message more appropriate, perhaps, would be to repeal the black law that grossly undermines the Constitution of Pakistan and indeed the teachings of Prophet Muhammad, one of the most tolerant and humane law-givers humankind has known. This environment of populist rage, fed by the distorted yet self-serving interpretation of religion principally by Zia and a populist mixing of religion and politics by a politically besieged Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, must be emphatically challenged. A collective effort to roll back these laws must come from parliament, the lawyers' forums, the judiciary, civil society groups and the media.

 

[ajtr]

FATA reforms and militancy​

The writer served as chief secretary of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and political agent of North Waziristan [email protected]
One of the most perplexing riddles facing decision-makers today is how to introduce reforms in Fata that will bring Pakistani tribal areas into the political and economic mainstream and lead to better control so that the presence of militant training camps in the region is stamped out; it may be recollected that the US leadership has stated on a number of occasions that if an attack on the US mainland or Europe is traced back to Fata, then all bets are off and a retaliatory attack could be expected.
Fata is situated on a geo-political tectonic plate; it is located between Afghanistan and the districts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, covers an area of about 27,000 sq km and has a population of 3.5 million, more than 60 per cent of whom live on or below the poverty line of incomes of $1 or less. Since Fata is a bridge between two weakly administered countries, border controls are weak and it is easy to enter and exit from the region, thus providing space to criminal networks of all sorts. In Fata, everything is temporary and in a flux and life is Hobbesian in the sense of being "brutish and short". Any tribesman who has skills or education wants to leave this hostile landscape. The problems of the inhabitants are further compounded because of the pressures from the so-called Great Game being played out in the region.
The reason why Fata is important to Pakistan and the international community derives from its function as the centre for training of jihadis whose aim is to attack the West. Pakistan is accused by the US of providing safe havens in the area to terrorists and militants. At the same time, the CIA has undertaken a secret counter-terrorism war inside Fata through drone attacks and 3,000 strong Afghan manned pursuit teams operating alongside more than 100,000 Pakistani military personnel. Yet, the threat to US forces in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan has only increased. The opinion in both the US and Europe is that the war in Afghanistan against the Taliban cannot be won. Existence of safe havens in Fata is cited as the main contributory cause. Unfortunately, the nature of the terrain, tribes and geography ensure that no state is able to control the tribal areas — let alone Pakistan that is, at best, a middling state.
The dean of jihad, Sheikh Abdullah Azaam, in his famous fatwa on "Defense of the Muslim Lands" delivered in 1984, spoke about the centrality of Fata to the jihad cause. In it, the Sheikh declared that the open border between Afghanistan and Fata is not under political influence and thus forms a protective shield for the mujahidin and is a great asset. Ironically, isn't lack of Fata reform in line with the Sheikh's declaration? Fata's terrain and geography pose formidable challenges in controlling an area that is mountainous, underdeveloped and inhabited by fighters.
Britain in its heyday as a superpower faced similar difficulties in controlling the tribes, when it took charge of the region in 1849 from the Sikhs. It was left to experienced British officers seconded to the Sikh Durbar to formulate the tribal policy after annexation. Edwards in Bannu, James in Peshawar, Lumsden in Mardan, Abbot in Hazara and Taylor in Derajat administered up to the hills. The tribes were not annexed. Under the 'close border policy', they administered themselves but were manipulated from the neighbouring districts by British officers; the tribes were punished by fines, blockades and punitive expeditions if they raided the districts. After the Second Afghan War in 1878, the British moved forward into Fata and created agencies. However, this 'forward policy' too failed to provide better control until their departure in 1947.
Evidently transforming Fata is a complicated matter. There are certain good possibilities for spearheading reform like the extension of the Political Parties Act, Reform of the FCR and extension of human rights. However, they must be part of a larger array of reforms based on creating private property rights, political empowerment, education and economic development of the tribesmen. Until this transformation is complete, safe havens and training camps are likely to remain in Fata.

 

[ajtr]

Education reform in context — I​

The writer is an associate professor of economics at LUMS (currently on leave) and a senior adviser at the Open Society Foundation
Over the last decade and especially since 9/11, there has been a lot of discussion about education reform and particularly, madrassah reform. In fact, given the international interest in the issue, a lot of effort has been focused on the issue of either madrassah reform directly or on curriculum reform with the objective of taking out elements that may have been promoting or could promote extremism. But in most of the discussion the historical context has been largely ignored.
Another consequence of the narrow focus has been the almost complete ignorance of reforming the mainstream public sector education system and the need to discuss/debate the content of education in public schools for subjects other than Islamic studies. What should we be teaching our children? Should a child living in Karachi have the same education as a child living in a fishing community or a child living in a village where the main occupation is animal rearing or agriculture? Maybe the answer is yes, maybe it is not, and maybe some of the content has to be similar but some subjects have to be tailored to the needs of the children. But whatever the answer, it is impossible to resolve these issues a priori and without rich discussion and debate, based on rigourous research. This discussion has been missing in the reform debate in Pakistan.
It is interesting to think through why this debate is needed at this point in time in our history and why these issues were not taken care of long ago. This is where the historical context becomes important. When the British were thinking of a design for the education system for India there was a lot of debate on what sort of education system would make sense for the colony and whether it should be a system that eventually tries to cover all children in India or not — and what should be the objectives of this education system. In the end, the British administration decided to go for an education system based on public schools that would educate a minority of children in India but make them sufficiently literate and educated in English and other 'modern' subjects so that a class could be created that would be able to interact with the rulers, help them in governing the masses and become a buffer between the rulers and the masses. The other options, of integrating vernacular schools into the mainstream system, having a more extensive state school system and even having some connections with religion schools, were all dropped in the interest of managing expenses and other administrative concerns.
Post 1857 some Muslim scholars and clerics felt that traditional Islamic education, culture and way of life was under threat from colonial invasion. They needed to respond. Though informal institutions like Farangi Mahal continued to work for some time, other more formal institutions (madrassas and darul ulums) also came into existence at this point. So, education in the sub-continent, even by the start of the 20th century, was already divided into a number of streams and sub-streams. And some of the institutions were very different and even distant from each other. What is more intriguing is that these streams or sub-streams were not really challenged and looked at critically even after a new country came into being. One would have thought, that for ideological as well as nation-building reasons, the new state would have looked at education issues very carefully and critically to ensure that the larger objectives of the new state would be addressed through the education system. But we do not find much evidence for that.

Education reform in context--II ​

The writer is an associate professor of economics at LUMS and a senior adviser at the Open Society Foundation
Pakistan has had a fairly inadequate public education system — vernacular schools, madrassas and missionary schools working within the same system — but there was no attempt to think about issues of uniformity or integration in the first education conference held in the country after Partition. In fact, the report of the education conference does not even mention madrassas. It is only in 1950 that we see references to madrassas in official documents on education. But even then, though there is some talk of the need for integration and uniformity in the education system, there aren't any concrete steps mentioned or an action plan given.
Nor does one find much discussion, in official policy documents or the larger debate in society, about what sort of education system the country should have and what role religious and/or cultural education should play in that. There is discussion on language issues, there is even some discussion on the need to ensure science and mathematics proficiency, largely for functional reasons, but there is no in-depth discussion of what sort of humans/Muslims/Pakistanis we are trying to develop. This is, for a nation that had just come into being on supposedly an ideological basis, surprising, to say the least.
The trend set in the late 40s and early 50s has continued till now. We have added tens of thousands of schools to our system, raised literacy and enrollment rates to an extent and done countless revisions of the curriculum but a comprehensive debate on the purposes of education and how to connect these to national objectives has never really taken place. We have, in document after document, harped on about the need for making children better Muslims and better Pakistanis, but the how of it has not been discussed widely and a consensus has never emerged on any of these issues.
Today, we stand in a place where our nation and society are deeply divided along multiple and cross-cutting cleavages. The divide between the haves and the have-nots and linguistic, ethnic, religious, geographic, ideological and even caste divides have become so entrenched in society that all debates and even identities in Pakistan have become fragmented. And though the extent of this is unclear, this fragmentation is starting to pose serious existential threats for Pakistan. Our education system, as well as the kind of education we are giving our children, reflects this fragmentation at the larger level. Private, public, secular, religious, ideological, English, Urdu, vernacular, local or foreign examination system — we can have any kind of education we like. Many defend this as a market place. But this is not a market place, it is reflective of the chaos in our society and the lack of clarity on what we actually want and need from an education system. And the current debate on madrassa reform and curriculum reform is yet again driven by urgent needs, part of the same dynamic and problem.
We do need to reform our education system but we need to think through what kind of system we want and need in a comprehensive way; especially since we have never had such a debate before. This debate has to be driven by our long-term interests and not short-term imperatives. Unless we do this, we will end up making the same kind of mistakes that we have made up to now. And the result will not be any different from the chaos we currently face. Given the challenges we are facing as a country, we cannot afford to continue to live with the existing chaos, nor can we afford another wasted and futile effort of reform.

 

[ajtr]

The fission of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi​

Militant outfit splinters into smaller cells for effective coordination of terror activities
ISLAMABAD: Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), the homegrown sectarian-jihadi outfit with strong links to al-Qaeda, is in the process of splitting its strength into at least eight small cells to better coordinate its activities from Karachi to Waziristan, according to sources in Kohat, Hangu, Peshawar and Lahore.
"Each sub-group is responsible for carrying out activities in a specific geographic location," disclosed one of the sources on condition of anonymity. Individuals having connections within the group and intelligence officials tackling them said the move appeared to be an attempt to outsmart Pakistani law enforcement agencies.
"It looks like they [LeJ strategists] don't want to put all their eggs in one basket," explained a local intelligence official. "It's a typical guerilla warfare and urban militancy technique. With scattered cells, they have better chances of survival by diverting the focus of law enforcement agencies," added the official.
The LeJ—an anti-Shia terror icon dominated by militants from Punjab —has established safe hideouts inside North Waziristan, the area controlled by the network of veteran Afghan jihadist, Maulana Jalaluddin Haqqani.
While there are hardly any significant signs suggesting that the Haqqani network is directly supporting anti-Pakistan LeJ activists, security officials contend the two groups have one strong commonality that keeps them connected—both take pride of being staunch allies of Arab al-Qaeda.
Jundullah
The LeJ's cell for Karachi and Balochistan has been named 'Jundullah' but it operates separately from an existing organisation of the same name, led by separatist Iranian Sunnis, that is also active in the region.
"That's where intelligence agencies' personnel are often mistaken. They sometimes confuse activists from one group with the other," an official in Sindh's Crime Investigation Department (CID) said.
The LeJ is the biggest group operating in Karachi and of 246 terrorists arrested from the city since 2001, 94 belonged to LeJ, according to a secret report by the CID.
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Almi
This group, headed by Maulana Abdul Khalil, a fugitive militant leader from central Punjab, operates mostly in central parts of Punjab and the tribal areas. The group works in close connection with al Qaeda and its activists are used as foot soldiers for Arab-dominated terror group's plots inside Pakistan.
Asian Tigers
This group emerged after the recent disappearance of a British journalist of Pakistani origin and two former pro-Taliban personnel of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) in North Waziristan. Officials believe it is one of the offshoots of the LeJ and is using a different name to spread confusion.
Like the LeJ itself, the Asian Tigers are dominated by Punjabi militants but some Mehsud militants are affiliated with it as well.
Junoodul Hafsa
This group comprises militants that aim to exact revenge for the storming of Islamabad's Lal Masjid and its affiliated female seminary, Jamia Hafsa, in a military operation in 2007.
The group operates in close coordination with Ghazi Force, a network named after one of the two clerics of Lal Masjid, Maulana Abdul Rasheed Ghazi, who was killed in the operation.
The outfit, led by a former student of Lal Masjid, Maulana Niaz Rahim, operates out of Ghaljo area of the Orakzai Agency and the adjacent Hangu district and targets military installations and personnel in parts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and upper Punjab, especially Islamabad.
Punjabi Taliban
Several small cells operate under this umbrella outfit including those belonging to Usman Punjabi, Qari Imran, Amjad Farooqi and Qari Zafar. These cells generally target Punjab.

 

[ajtr]

Lashkar-linked groups merge charity with politics​

Tom Hussain

Last Updated: Nov 19, 2010

ISLAMABAD // Two groups linked to Pakistan's most notorious terror organization, Lashkar-i-Taiba, have been particularly busy in recent months, raising their public profile.

The Tanzeem Falah-i-Insaniyat (TFI) - literally, the humanitarian relief organisation - was prominent in relief work during the flooding in August. It has apparently taken over as the primary charitable arm of the Lashkar-i-Taiba militant group, which staged the 2008 attacks in Mumbai that killed 166 people.

A second splinter group, the Tehrik Azadi-i-Kashmir (TAK) - movement for the freedom of Kashmir - held a rally at an Islamabad market in September. TAK has emerged as a new and, apparently, peaceful political movement.

The event was the first anti-India rally staged by militants in Islamabad in several years. It took place near the headquarters of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. United States officials say a faction of the ISI supports Pakistan's Islamist militants.

The keynote speaker was Hafiz Abdul Rehman Makki, a TAK leader and former head of political affairs for Jama'at ud Dawah (JuD), a charity arm of Lashkar-i-Taiba. The United Nations declared the JuD a terrorist organisation after the Mumbai attacks.

The rally announcement demonstrates the ties between TAK and the militants. Pakistani news media received invitations via mobile text message signed by Mohammed Yahya Mujahid, described as the co-ordinator of the TAK. He is the spokesman for the founder of the Lashkar-i-Taiba, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed.

In his speech, Mr Makki warned India that failure to settle its territorial dispute over Kashmir with Pakistan would leave militants "no other option but to take the course of jihad".


Mr Makki was one of two JuD figures singled out by the US treasury department for sanctions last week. US citizens have been barred from carrying out any financial transactions with him because of concerns that any money donated to his group could be used to finance terrorism.

Representatives of major political parties attended the rally.

Analysts say it appears that factions of Pakistan's anti-Inda terrorist community are moving towards a merger under JuD leadership.

They requested anonymity on grounds of personal security. They cited written threats, made since July, to Pakistani journalists who have reported on the resumption of public activity by JuD activists, and the historic ties between the militants and the Pakistani military.

At the public level, the TFI, during October established a network of roadside stalls in Lahore, ostensibly to collect donations and supplies for flood victims, residents said.

The residents said the stalls have large advertising boards that use the black and white colours and stripes of the JuD flag, but stopped short of using its name.

Similarly, the branding has been used on a number of billboards that have sprung across Lahore recently, inviting public participation in collective animal sacrifices on Eid al Adha.

Mr Saeed, the former JuD head, delivered a rare speech in Gujranwala on November 1, residents said. He was among four JuD leaders banned from political activity by the UN in December 2008.

He was arrested by Pakistani authorities after the imposition of the ban, but acquitted on charges of participation in the Mumbai attacks plot by the Lahore High Court in July 2009.

He was freed from house arrest in November 2009.

 

[ajtr]

Karachi Turns Deadly Amid Pakistan's Rivalries​

KARACHI, Pakistan — This chaotic city of 18 million people on the shores of the Arabian Sea has never shrunk from violence. But this year, Karachi has outdone even itself.Drive-by shootings motivated by political and ethnic rivalries have reached new heights. Marauding gangs are grabbing tracts of land to fatten their electoral rolls. Drug barons are carving out fiefs, and political parties are commonly described as having a finger in all of it.

The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan recently reported that more than 1,350 people had been killed in Karachi in targeted political killings so far this year, more than the number killed in terrorist attacks in all of Pakistan.

That tally has solidified Karachi's grim distinction as Pakistan's most deadly place, outside its actual war zones, where the army is embroiled in pushing back a Taliban insurgency.

Indeed, it is the effect of the war, which has displaced many thousands of ethnic Pashtuns from the northern tribal areas and sent them to this southern port, that has inflamed Karachi's always volatile ethnic balance. For the most part, extremists who torment the rest of Pakistan with suicide bomb attacks exploit the turmoil here to hide, recruit and raise funds.

The attack last week on the police headquarters by a suicide bomber that killed dozens was the exception, the first attack by extremists against a government institution in the city. Far more common have been killing by gangs affiliated with ethnic-based political parties hunting for turf in a city undergoing seismic demographic change.

Karachi has long been dominated by ethnic Mohajirs, Urdu-speaking people who left India in the 1947 partition and who have been represented politically by the Muttahida Qaumi Movement, commonly known as the M.Q.M.

The M.Q.M. has a long association with violence. In 1992, the army moved into Karachi to suppress it, accusing it of a four-year rampage of torture and murder. During what amounted to a two-year occupation by the army, "several thousand" people were killed, according to accounts at the time.

The latest challenge to the M.Q.M.'s hold is the influx of Pashtuns who have fled the war to seek work and shelter in Karachi's slums. Though the Pashtuns number some five million here now, they remain politically underrepresented, and the frustrations of the newcomers have increasingly been channeled into violent retribution by the Awami National Party, or A.N.P.

The two sides have set their gangs on each other. In August, after a senior M.Q.M. member was shot to death at a funeral, more than 100 people were killed in a weeklong orgy of violence.

The army, asked by some political parties to move in again and keep the peace, declined. During the by-election last month to fill the provincial assembly seat left vacant by the murder, more than 30 people were killed.

In that rampage, members of a self-styled people's peace committee affiliated with the Pakistan Peoples Party, which leads the national government and considers this province, Sindh, its base, stormed an outdoor market on motorcycles and shot 12 Mohajir shopkeepers, the police said.

Hours later, seven men of ethnic Baluch origin were killed, apparently in revenge for the deaths of the Mohajirs, said Zafar Baloch, a spokesman for the peace committee.

Amber Alibhai, the secretary general of Citizens for a Better Environment, said: "If our government is not going to wake up, I fear Karachi will have ethnic cleansing like Bosnia. There's no one to stop it. Who's going to stop it? The police? The army? They can't."

The cost of Karachi's violence hurts all of Pakistan. More liberal than the rest of the country in decorum and religious belief, Karachi is the economic engine of the nation, home to petrochemical plants, steel works, advertising agencies and high-tech start-ups.

The rich live in grand houses in gated communities paved with broad boulevards. The poor live in neighborhoods like Lyari, a slum with little sanitation, fleeting electricity and hardscrabble roads that sits under an expressway.
Other megacities in the developing world — like Shanghai and Mumbai — manage law and order through political leadership that is absent in Karachi, said Farrukh Saleem, a political analyst who writes in The News, a national newspaper.A scared, understaffed and in some cases complicit police force compounds the problem. That was the message of a new report by a parliamentary committee that said 603 police officers had been assassinated since 1996. This year, 33 officers have been killed, the report said.

Many of these senior police officers were targeted, the report said, as retribution for the military action against the M.Q.M. in 1992, a sign of the long memory of the M.Q.M.

But it is the persistent lack of Pashtun representation in the city and provincial governments that underlies the troubles, said Abdul Qadir Patel, the chairman of the committee that wrote the report and a Pakistan Peoples Party member of Parliament. "The Pashtuns are frustrated and the A.N.P. says, 'We'll fight back,' " Mr. Patel said.

In rare candor for a Pakistani government document, his report said "ethnicity, sectarianism, perceived insecurity due to demographic changes, gang war between mafias and clash of interests among workers of political parties have been the real cause of violence in Karachi."

Of 178 boroughs in the 18 towns of Karachi, only 4 are controlled by the Pashtuns. Of 168 seats in the provincial assembly of Sindh, where Karachi is located, the A.N.P., the party of the Pashtuns, has just 2.

Based on Karachi's demographics, Pashtuns "could have up to 25 seats in the provincial legislature," Mr. Saleem wrote. "That is political power way out of sync with demographic realities."

As part of the push and pull in the demographic war, the major political parties use armed thugs to commandeer public land so they can gerrymander election districts, said Mrs. Alibhai of the citizens' group. One of her group's workers was killed last year trying to protect a park.

"Land grabbing is used by political parties to increase their electoral mandate and enhance their financial position," she said.

A recent former M.Q.M. mayor of Karachi, Syed Mustafa Kamal, denied that his party, which has long been favored by Washington for its secular outlook, was involved in the killing of Pashtuns.

Mr. Kamal, who as mayor from 2005 until this year is credited with extending running water to several Pashtun neighborhoods, said Karachi was the rightful home of the Mohajirs. The Pashtun, he said, harbor the Taliban and foment terrorist attacks. "We are the victims," he insisted.

The gruesome clash between the Mohajirs and the Pashtuns has spread recently to the stalls in Gulshen Town, a Mohajir-dominated area, where people sip tea and chat.

There, Pashtun waiters who deliver hunks of roasted lamb to truck drivers at curbside tables, have become targets, said Noorullah Achakzai, the chairman of a union of hotel workers.

In April, Abdul Rehman, 35, said he was eating lunch with a friend when six men on three motorcycles fired at them. "I got one bullet, my friend got one, the others were scattered," he said.

Mr. Rehman showed a long scar across his stomach. His friend died, one of the first, Mr. Achakzai said, of 52 outdoor waiters killed in Karachi this year.

 

[ajtr]

Pakistan's biggest city on edge of gang-led civil war​

KARACHI, Pakistan -- At Karachi's giant Shershah automobile parts market, customers are scarce nowadays, fearing more violence of the sort that left 13 dead last month. The gunmen arrived by motorbike and rampaged through the narrow alleys of the bazaar, executing shopkeepers.
It was a shocking example of the attacks by ethnic gangs that are threatening to engulf Pakistan's biggest city and paralyze a vital part of the country's flagging economy, politicians, officials and foreign diplomats warn.
The groups are not so well known as the Taliban and al-Qaida, the religious extremists who also plague this megacity of 18 million. Last week, a car bomb demolished the compound of the anti-terror police in Karachi, killing 18 people, an attack blamed on a group allied to al-Qaida.
In Karachi, most of the violence is clan-based, and the killers operate as criminal gangs, engaged in a turf war. The Shershah market traders are largely "Mohajirs" who came here decades ago from northern India, while the assailants were believed to be ethnic Baloch, originally from the Pakistani province of Balochistan.
The gang war, which kicked off a year ago and claims several victims a day, had mostly involved the Mohajirs and the city's huge ethnic Pashtun population, but the Shershah killings confirm that the Baloch are now a third major player. Periodically, the bloodshed flares up into a multi-day killing frenzy. Elsewhere in Pakistan, Islamic extremists are blamed for the mayhem. But in Karachi, it's mobsters with political cover.
"It would only take one small thing for outright civil war to erupt in Karachi," said a Western diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue. "The question is whether there is going to be a tipping point."
What makes it intractable, and able to veer out of control, according to police, is that the principal gangs are linked to political parties - not just any parties, but those sharing in the civilian-led coalition that governs Pakistan.
A senior Karachi security official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he isn't allowed to speak to foreign media, said that police are "powerless" to stop the ethnic clash, as each warring group enjoyed political patronage. He warned that if it continued, the city could end up like Beirut, with clans fighting it out from their enclaves across the city.
By some estimates, Karachi accounts for 25 percent to 30 percent of the entire economy of key U.S. anti-terror ally Pakistan, making it a highly lucrative target for money-hungry gangs from poor neighborhoods. Karachi matters greatly to the United States, as 40 percent of all supplies to U.S. troops in neighboring Afghanistan funnels through the port.
Last month, the mix of criminal, ethnic and sectarian killing claimed 169 lives, with 1,300 dying in violence in Karachi over the past year, according to the Citizens Police Liaison Committee, an official organization that holds the police to account. Most of the victims belonged to no political party but were humble people targeted for their ethnicity or the area they lived in. They included roadside vendors, drivers of rickshaws and shopkeepers.
For years, one ethnic-based party, the Muttahida Quami Movement, which represents the Mohajirs, had a stranglehold on Karachi, allegedly running an extortion operation and death squads, according to police and rival political parties.
Now, the Baloch, and the Pashtuns, originally from northwest Pakistan but long established in the city, each with its own violent street gangs, are challenging the MQM. The bloodshed at Shershah market was one grim example. The security official said the attack on the market was a stark demonstration that the Baloch, who are based in the adjacent rundown Lyari area, had also emerged as a power.
The Baloch are associated with the Pakistan Peoples Party, which leads the national government in Islamabad, while the Pashtuns are represented by the Awami National Party. The situation is further complicated by the fact that all three political parties might be warring on the streets but they're also in the coalition government together. The fighting in Karachi regularly rocks the government in Islamabad and could yet bring it down.
The MQM, which controls about 80 percent of Karachi, claims it's the victim of propaganda from its enemies.
"In Karachi, it is the MQM versus the rest," said Haider Rizvi, a member of the national parliament from Karachi for the MQM. "We have been painted so black that even if a cat is killed, it is blamed on us."
The three-way ethnic tussle doesn't explain all the strands of Karachi violence. There's also a break-away faction of the MQM known as Haqiqi, which is at war with the original MQM, and Sunni Tehreek, a sectarian group.
At its heart: money, including profits from extorting protection money from shops, factories and offices, a property grabbing operation - occupying land or buildings - and the drug trade. The competition is over who collects. Crossing a single street can take you into the territory of another gang. Only the upscale areas of Defence and Clifton, where the city's elite lives, are spared.
Saleem Hingoro, a member of the provincial parliament for the Pakistan Peoples Party, for Karachi's Lyari area, insists his party doesn't support the Baloch gangs.
But, Hingoro added: "Criminals are taking shelter in every political party. If the parties stopped giving criminals shelter, the killing would stop. But all the parties would need to do this together."
The Awami National Party wants the army called in to clean things up. Shahi Syed, the head of the party in Karachi, told McClatchy Newspapers that the city needs an operation like the anti-Taliban offensives in the northwest of the country.
"Without an army operation here, the whole of Pakistan will be brought down," Syed said. "Karachi is the heart of Pakistan."
At Shershah market, there is now, belatedly, a visible police presence, but the shop owners still don't feel safe. One trader quietly told how on Oct. 19, gunmen pulled up the steel shutters of his store and shot his two sons and brother inside. His sons, age 24 and 26, died, while his brother was critically injured and is now partly paralyzed.
The shop owner said that he, along with every other outlet in the market, was dutifully paying extortion money to Baloch gangs.
"They shot them as if they were infidels," said the shop owner, who didn't want his name used out of fear for his safety. "We are not linked to any political party. We were just doing our business. What was our fault?"


Read more: http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/11/18/1931837_p2/pakistans-biggest-city-on-edge.html#ixzz15lUV4rfk

 

[ajtr]

Pakistan's biggest city on edge of gang-led civil war​

KARACHI, Pakistan -- At Karachi's giant Shershah automobile parts market, customers are scarce nowadays, fearing more violence of the sort that left 13 dead last month. The gunmen arrived by motorbike and rampaged through the narrow alleys of the bazaar, executing shopkeepers.
It was a shocking example of the attacks by ethnic gangs that are threatening to engulf Pakistan's biggest city and paralyze a vital part of the country's flagging economy, politicians, officials and foreign diplomats warn.
The groups are not so well known as the Taliban and al-Qaida, the religious extremists who also plague this megacity of 18 million. Last week, a car bomb demolished the compound of the anti-terror police in Karachi, killing 18 people, an attack blamed on a group allied to al-Qaida.
In Karachi, most of the violence is clan-based, and the killers operate as criminal gangs, engaged in a turf war. The Shershah market traders are largely "Mohajirs" who came here decades ago from northern India, while the assailants were believed to be ethnic Baloch, originally from the Pakistani province of Balochistan.
The gang war, which kicked off a year ago and claims several victims a day, had mostly involved the Mohajirs and the city's huge ethnic Pashtun population, but the Shershah killings confirm that the Baloch are now a third major player. Periodically, the bloodshed flares up into a multi-day killing frenzy. Elsewhere in Pakistan, Islamic extremists are blamed for the mayhem. But in Karachi, it's mobsters with political cover.
"It would only take one small thing for outright civil war to erupt in Karachi," said a Western diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue. "The question is whether there is going to be a tipping point."
What makes it intractable, and able to veer out of control, according to police, is that the principal gangs are linked to political parties - not just any parties, but those sharing in the civilian-led coalition that governs Pakistan.
A senior Karachi security official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he isn't allowed to speak to foreign media, said that police are "powerless" to stop the ethnic clash, as each warring group enjoyed political patronage. He warned that if it continued, the city could end up like Beirut, with clans fighting it out from their enclaves across the city.
By some estimates, Karachi accounts for 25 percent to 30 percent of the entire economy of key U.S. anti-terror ally Pakistan, making it a highly lucrative target for money-hungry gangs from poor neighborhoods. Karachi matters greatly to the United States, as 40 percent of all supplies to U.S. troops in neighboring Afghanistan funnels through the port.
Last month, the mix of criminal, ethnic and sectarian killing claimed 169 lives, with 1,300 dying in violence in Karachi over the past year, according to the Citizens Police Liaison Committee, an official organization that holds the police to account. Most of the victims belonged to no political party but were humble people targeted for their ethnicity or the area they lived in. They included roadside vendors, drivers of rickshaws and shopkeepers.
For years, one ethnic-based party, the Muttahida Quami Movement, which represents the Mohajirs, had a stranglehold on Karachi, allegedly running an extortion operation and death squads, according to police and rival political parties.
Now, the Baloch, and the Pashtuns, originally from northwest Pakistan but long established in the city, each with its own violent street gangs, are challenging the MQM. The bloodshed at Shershah market was one grim example. The security official said the attack on the market was a stark demonstration that the Baloch, who are based in the adjacent rundown Lyari area, had also emerged as a power.
The Baloch are associated with the Pakistan Peoples Party, which leads the national government in Islamabad, while the Pashtuns are represented by the Awami National Party. The situation is further complicated by the fact that all three political parties might be warring on the streets but they're also in the coalition government together. The fighting in Karachi regularly rocks the government in Islamabad and could yet bring it down.
The MQM, which controls about 80 percent of Karachi, claims it's the victim of propaganda from its enemies.
"In Karachi, it is the MQM versus the rest," said Haider Rizvi, a member of the national parliament from Karachi for the MQM. "We have been painted so black that even if a cat is killed, it is blamed on us."
The three-way ethnic tussle doesn't explain all the strands of Karachi violence. There's also a break-away faction of the MQM known as Haqiqi, which is at war with the original MQM, and Sunni Tehreek, a sectarian group.
At its heart: money, including profits from extorting protection money from shops, factories and offices, a property grabbing operation - occupying land or buildings - and the drug trade. The competition is over who collects. Crossing a single street can take you into the territory of another gang. Only the upscale areas of Defence and Clifton, where the city's elite lives, are spared.
Saleem Hingoro, a member of the provincial parliament for the Pakistan Peoples Party, for Karachi's Lyari area, insists his party doesn't support the Baloch gangs.
But, Hingoro added: "Criminals are taking shelter in every political party. If the parties stopped giving criminals shelter, the killing would stop. But all the parties would need to do this together."
The Awami National Party wants the army called in to clean things up. Shahi Syed, the head of the party in Karachi, told McClatchy Newspapers that the city needs an operation like the anti-Taliban offensives in the northwest of the country.
"Without an army operation here, the whole of Pakistan will be brought down," Syed said. "Karachi is the heart of Pakistan."
At Shershah market, there is now, belatedly, a visible police presence, but the shop owners still don't feel safe. One trader quietly told how on Oct. 19, gunmen pulled up the steel shutters of his store and shot his two sons and brother inside. His sons, age 24 and 26, died, while his brother was critically injured and is now partly paralyzed.
The shop owner said that he, along with every other outlet in the market, was dutifully paying extortion money to Baloch gangs.
"They shot them as if they were infidels," said the shop owner, who didn't want his name used out of fear for his safety. "We are not linked to any political party. We were just doing our business. What was our fault?"


Read more: http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/11/18/1931837_p2/pakistans-biggest-city-on-edge.html#ixzz15lUV4rfk

 

[ajtr]

More Or Less?​

The notion that we are being unfairly asked to "do more" by the US and that things would be fine if that was not done is a common feeling in Pakistan...

Within days of the arrest of some terrorists by the CID in Karachi, a group of terrorists was able to get together and attack CID headquarters with automatic weapons and a huge truck bomb. Obviously, these are not isolated disgruntled individuals taking revenge for the latest drone attack. They are well organized, well trained and well supplied with arms, ammunition, technical capability and intelligence. How did that come about? I had a Facebook exchange after the news which maybe relevant to the question and led to this article.

First some background: A very intelligent senior journalist in Pakistan had complained that we are suffering in the war on terror and the US is asking us to "do more" without realizing how hard things are. The notion that we are being unfairly asked to "do more" and things would be fine if that was not done is a common feeling in Pakistan. My reply follows.

According to this popular version of events, the US and other powers got a military dictator to arm and train these maniacs (no Pakistani interest in this scheme is implied), then things sort of coasted along happily for 12 years, then came 9-11 (frequently believed to be a Mossad-CIA operation) and the US turned around and said: "We want them dead now". Since then, the refrain goes, we have been dutifully trying to kill these maniacs and the current Pakistani government in particular is trying its best to kill them and it is unfair of the US to ask us to "do more".

I think this version of events misses some points.

First of all, the jihadi project was indeed a CIA project, but it was also our project from the very beginning. America wanted Russia humbled in Afghanistan. We wanted that humbling to be done by Islamist jihadis under our control and some of "us" had the foresight and brilliance to see in this an opportunity to settle scores with India and establish permanent control over domestic Pakistani politics and so on and so forth.

Second, after the CIA finished its dirty business in Afghanistan and left, "we" multiplied the jihadi infrastructure by 10. We redirected it to Kashmir and spread it throughout Pakistan. Of course the westoxicated burger-jihadi middle class had very little notion of what was going on. These were serious things, handled by serious people in the security establishment, not shared with the rest of the country except on a "need to know basis". It is disingenuous to think the multiplication of jihadi militias throughout the 1990s was also America's fault (though the US did ignore it—perhaps because they thought it improved their leverage over India, perhaps because they were busy with other things). Then, after 9-11 (which was not an inside job in my view), "we" (meaning our security services) protected good jihadis and failed to go after the indoctrination or finance pipelines because "we" wanted the infrastructure kept alive, both for domestic use and for future use against India.

Third, the current government may be "doing more", but how will "doing less" help in this situation? And if the army is now on board with stopping this menace (and I think it may be that their leaders indeed are on board by now, though the rank and file is being fed a diet of anti-Indian and anti-Israeli propaganda to justify this action) then why are army-sponsored PR operators and ex-generals and admirals still writing op-eds as if the jihadis are our heroes and America is the enemy?

These things indicate that the urge to maintain a jihadi option (for domestic use as much as for use against India) is still alive and well.

Of course, even if the rickety state apparatus does decide to go all out against the jihadis, the process will be neither pretty nor quick. There is no simple way to put the genie back into the bottle. The half million who are already trained (Arif Jamal's figure in Shadow Wars) will have to be dealt with. Luckily, some have already moved on to other occupations and others have become simple criminals, busy with kidnapping and armed robbery. But the more committed ones will have to be disarmed and jailed or killed. And in order to do that the state will have to shut down their financing, crack down on their above-ground supporters and win the battle of ideas in the minds of the public (and improve its functioning in general and make it less unjust, a problem it shares with India's rickety state).

None of this can succeed if the state's own paid propagandists are busy spreading confusion and propaganda that undermines the psy-ops effort. It will also not succeed if the army is simultaneously trying to protect assets for other uses (because the "good jihadis" don't seem to understand the distinction and frequently help out the "bad jihadis"). It will also not succeed if Saudi and Gulf financing is not being intercepted. In short, it will not stop unless the India-centric, zero-sum national security mindset is changed and the armed forces give up their totalitarian domestic political ambitions. The continued existence of these ambitions necessitates that a good part of the jihadi pipeline be protected.

For proof of this, you need to look no further than Musharraf's moronic interviews with Der Spiegel and, more recently, at the Atlantic council. In fact if you put this latest interview together with Admiral Fasih Bokhari's article you can see that the generals who are America's great white hope in Pakistan are perhaps more dangerous and deluded than the illiterate and corrupt gangsters that give the civilian political parties a bad name. But, military men being military men, no Pentagon general seems to be able to resist the sight of a man in a finely starched uniform, especially if he also likes whisky (the one sure sign of "enlightened moderation", if the diplomatic reports of the US embassy from the last 50 years are any guide).

Unless we can wean the army off these twin ambitions (alliance with the mullahs in domestic politics and anti-Indian hatred as an organizing principle), we are in for much worse than this.

Omar Ali is a Pakistani-American physician who also moderates the "Asiapeace" discussion group on the internet.