ppgj, I haven't forgotten our discussion.
i would agree avionics and ordnance upgrade is much easier but even structural architecture too goes thro' periodic stress analysis and the panels needing replacements are replaced via MLU and this is true for all forces. if you are referring to any structural defect or a weakness in SU 30MKIs i would like to hear on that.
Col.Fonaff (Red Flag) -
let's be pragmatic. one could look at those videos where the equivalent of a "group captain" Mr. Fornaff goes on a tirade lampooning, lambasting IAF pilots and the SU 30MKIs with cheers and mocking laughter from the retired AF pilot community. can any professional force or an MP can do that even with an adversary?? his tirade was based on many
wrong facts. an analysis of those comments summarised here -
http://vayu-sena.tripod.com/exercise-cope-india-article02.html
I am aware of Col. Fornoff's fallacies with respect to the Su30 MKI's engine and the Mig-21's radar. Your actually considered pretty wired in the defense world if you know the names of everything i.e. defence is your job and your hobby. However, his factual errors - or lack of knowledge on the specifics- does not discount the fact that he was actually
there, was actually
present at the exercise, actually flew in the aircraft designated against the IAF's Su-30 MKI's and Mig-21 Bison's, and actually
witnessed the aircraft falling out of the skies as it attempted a 22° maneuver while thrust vectoring. Now, if you were to base your account of a war on either a soldier, on the frontlines, or a military Gen., with a perfect knowledge of the military specifics, I'd choose to base mine on the former. I suppose, it is a question of whose opinion you choose to discount. I choose to go with Col. Fornoff, for I think he is expressing a "pretty objective" opinion on his side's performance against their 'opponents', and particularly because his testimony of the Su 30 MKI's performance during thrust maneuvering has nothing to do with a knowledge of technical specifics anyways.
I think, the Indian media got their "panties in a bunch", as soon as this despicable proselytizer of U.S. air supremacy came out with the video. Essentially, they've arrived at a false positive, by declaring his opinions 'invalid' by a focus on the factual errors in his post, when in fact his opinion has nothing to do with the technical specifics, but his testimony.
We may discount his opinion as an informed commandant. but we may not discount his opinion as a witness. For he was there.
there are the videos and the transcript there.even use of TVC use is determined by the pilot on the basis of the inputs and situational awareness and on both these counts SU 30MKI was handicapped as per the link above.
The decision to employ thrust vectoring is based on situational awareness. The negotiation of the maneuver is based on
structural facets: such as aerodynamic control surfaces, ailerons or flaps, engine size and the weight-penalty the airframe incurs, and in the case of tiltrotor aircraft, rotating engine nacelles. For the Su 30 MKI, two D TVC nozzles are employed that make the aircraft highly maneuverable, capable of near-zero airspeed at high angles of attack and a ±15 degree deflection in the vertical plane. For a fourth-generation aircraft, this much is ok. But for a next generation aircraft, you want something more.
In any case, the discussion about the Su 30 MKI is moot, because it is not part of the tender and is already in our inventory.
wrt Col.Fornaff's comments on TVC, every force which takes part in exercises do take home some wisdom. USAF has learnt the tactical remedial course post exercises with IAF in the past and which may have been seen in the Red Flag. tactics keep evolving. even IAF will correct their own tactics based on the knowledge gained. even F-22 sports TVC because it allows superior turn rates and hence affords more maneurability.
Agreed. But you have to remember that the USAF employed F-15's and F-16's in dogfights at Mountainhome AFB. And any number of 'tactics' will not prevent the Su 30 MKI from falling out of its arse in the sky while attempting severely limited hardturns due to the aircraft's size and airframe in thrust vectoring.
The problem is not TVC, it is the aircraft's structural limitings that allows enemy pilots to exploit severe vulnerabilities in hard turning.
here is Vishnu Som of the NDTV at the Red Flag where a USAF captain praises IAF.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mssPQb4TMSU&feature=player_embedded
Watched the video. The comments are very generic and describe preparation, 'aircraft', professionalism, spinup, pace of communication standards <sic>, world class training and working within an ATC.
Don't get me wrong, the USAF was all praise for the 'IAF' at Red Flag. So was Col. Fornoff, as a proper browsing of his arguments will show.
My comment hinges specifically on the Su30 MKI and its performance.
i don't know which structural integrity you are speaking of. the Boston Globe article and the strategypage article spoke of similar problem wrt the wings and spoke of life coming down from 6000hrs to 3500hrs.
The structural limitations detailedly expounded upon before.
now i gave you a link where
Super Hornet program manager Navy Capt. Don Gaddis rubbished it as "eggregious" and said that was sorted out long back. he went on to rubbish lot of other complaints too here -
http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2007/06/marine_superhornet_070617/
Obviously, the
manager of the S/H program will rubbish the accusations of those who fly it. I use specifically the term 'those who fly it', for all of my accusations were got from aviation boards, where members of the USAF-former and present- come to discuss their birds of war. I would expect nothing else from someone who expects the potential loss of contracts in contention against the F-35B STOVL, an erosion of their 'aiworthiness' in Greece, India, Brazil, Denmark and Russia and the possible loss of his job.
It again comes down to who you attach more credibility to.
Read the article, I admit to the possibility of the politics between the USMC vs the USAF as a possible cause for the 'spreading of these rumours', but see nothing in the entire article that stands in the way of a technical rebuttal to the allegations of 'wing flutter, high-altitude deterioration, agility <to which, ironically, even you've admitted to> or parts wearing out, except a comparison-contrast with the F/A-18Cs, which is not the position of the USMC anyway, since they are comparing it to the F-35B STOVL.
As for the section on 'Debunking Claims', I'd like to address each one separately:
* Claim: There is still "manageable wing flutter" with the aircraft and the "wing drop" problem persists.
Rebuttal: "We do not have a flutter problem with this airplane and have never had a flutter problem," declared Gaddis. "The only thing we can think of is they are getting it confused with the old wing drop problem. That was solved."
NAVAIR engineers noted that wing drop and wing flutter are different phenomena. Flutter, explained engineer Mike Masse, "is a self-excited oscillation" — basically, vibrations that cause aircraft instability. "There are no stability problems or restrictions on F/A-18 E/F," he said.
This, in fact, is a definition and then denial of the problem. I don't believe seasoned F/A-18 SH veterans would "confuse" wing drops with aeroelastic phenomena.
* Claim: The wing drop led to the weapons pylons being canted outboard six degrees, causing increased wear on weapons and severely cutting their ability to acquire a target before launch.
Rebuttal: Canting the pylons is "totally different," Gaddis said. "It's not related [to wing drop] in any form."
"That's been a myth for about 12 to 14 years," he said.
"We never flew the aircraft with straight pylons," Hovanesian said.
Rather, they pointed out, the cant was developed to ensure proper weapons separation as bombs and missiles are launched from the aircraft. Super Hornets have three weapons stations under each wing, compared with two on the older Hornets, and a four-degree outboard cant was developed to increase the distance between weapons.
That confuses cause and effect, it answers the question as to 'why' pylons were canted outboard, not due to wing drop, but due to proper separation between ordnance, but does not address the problem of
what happened as a result of the canted pylons: ordnance erosion.
The [F/A-18C] with a full load has the same limitations" in altitude and speed, Penfield said, while the Super Hornet has no problems carrying its top-rated full load of 66,000 pounds.
I'll let you decide this.
Another claim says the aircraft cannot go supersonic while carrying a full weapons load.
True enough, Penfield said — the aircraft "wasn't designed for that."
That speaks to the structural limitations I was adhering to earlier. And indeed to the question of agility. Agility, with maneuverability, are the prime characteristics of a fighter aircraft after all.
The Boston Globe article reported that failure of some parts could cause the aircraft's planned 6,000-flight-hour life to be limited to 3,000 hours. "That was probably one of the most egregious statements" in the article, he said.
The problem referred to in the article would have shortened the planes' lives, but it has been solved, Gaddis said.
"We found it early on" and a redesigned part already is being installed on new aircraft, he said, with a retrofit planned for earlier aircraft long before they reach any flight-hour limitations.
That is exactly what I'm referring to. The modification infact, the retrofit, has caused wing stability problems in several aircraft, as acknowledged by F/A-18 veterans.
There is, in fact, an acknowledgment that problems with "residual lateral activity" still remain:
Now, "as you pull the airplane, you get a little bit of lateral oscillation that is only there from 7.8 to 8.1 degrees [angle of attack]," he said. "You can pull a little bit harder and it's gone. You can pull a little bit less and it's gone."
besides USN is going ahead with more FA 18E/F's
-
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0610144720100506?type=marketsNews
why will they do it if it has serious structural integrity problem??
The USN has been a supporter of the F/A-18 SH from the outset. I believe your article provided an excellent overview of the political workings between the USN and the USMC.
For the USN, the F/A-18 SH provides the ideal choice for carrier-based operations. It has the required range, ordnance and ECM capabilities. For the Navy, problems like "residual lateral activity" don't matter much because they are less likely to encounter hostile aircraft.
For the Air Force, lateral oscillation does have the capability to impact performance considerably, particularly in dogfights which is the Air Force's primary domain.
In an interesting development, while the House Armed Services Committee has supported an additional multi-year contract to buy more Super Hornets at around $50 million each to cover the strike fighter gap, the Navy has suggested it spend $25 million for each F/A-18 Hornet to extend its lifespan from 8,600 to 10,000 flight hours:
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2009/06/navy_fighter_gap_062409w/
as to the structural stability of FA-18E/F here is an account of Carlo Kopp who flew it in 2006. the article is a little dated when even APG 79 was not on but worthy read particularly at 48 AOA
how the structural stability holds!!! a very detailed report.
http://www.ausairpower.net/SuperBug.html
I read the article. Talks, rather mentions, the 'structural commonalities' or lack thereof, of the SH with the F/A-18 A-D. But the issues I've mentioned are specific to the Super Hornet.
The paragraph addresses specifically the issues of airframe and high angle-of-attack sustainability:
Size is where the similarity between the Super Hornet and Eagle end, since the Super Hornet is optimised aerodynamically around the F/A-18A-D configuration, with a focus on transonic manoeuvre and load carrying performance, and carrier recovery characteristics. In terms of raw performance, the Super Hornet is very similar to the F/A-18C, but provides significantly better CAP endurance and operating radius by virtue of its larger wing and internal fuel load.
But I believe that is elaborated on here:
A notable aerodynamic feature is a significantly enlarged strake design over the baseline Hornet, intended to improve vortex lifting characteristics in high AoA manoeuvre, and reduce the static stability margin to enhance pitching characteristics - Boeing cite pitch rates in excess of 40 degrees per second.
It does not address issues of 'wing flutter', resistance to stall or drag at high altitudes owing to the pylon rearrangement. In addition to the others, of armament deterioration that your articles revealed.
It, however. acknowledges that the "designation F/A-18E/F reflects the fact that the aircraft is derived from the F/A-18A-D, even if it is a significantly larger airframe". And it also acknowledges, as I have said, that "[t]he simplest metric of the F/A-18E/F is that it is an F-15A-D sized F/A-18C derivative, optimised for the naval environment".
which FA 18E/F is IMO and the same is true for Rafale at a higher cost.
So the F-18 E/F fulfills one variable, cost-effectiveness, but loses out to its competitors in the structural integrity, soundness and capability departments? That is exactly the point I am making.
The point of listing all of those criteria is to provide a
cumulative assessment for a fighter, in order of importance, not to accord each in vacuum.
agree but cost wise Rafale will be more. but i do not mind if that happens.
my choice of SH was based on it's strike capability and the best avionics it carries. but you have every right to disagree with me.
My point is precisely this: the avionics of the Rafale can always be upgraded at a future date. Not so with the structural problems of the SH, which in the decade past, have shown a propensity to compound themselves. For example, since the Hornet I had suffered from wing flexing problems, the wing thickness had to be increased. The bigger wing meant more drag, so the sweepback was increased; and it also meant reduced maneuverability, so the LERX were redesigned. Ironically, the configuration of the LERX went back to something like that of the original Northrop Cobra concepts. It is tempting to call the Super Hornet the "Super Cobra", except that the Marines already had that name for their improved Bell AH-1 helicopter gunships.
Serious, permanent resolution to these problems will require going back to the airframe, in a way
ad hoc solutions, which have had a proclivity to compound themselves, will not do.
when i spoke of radar and range - the range, i was referring to was the "combat range" and not the radar range. with IFR on Mig 29s, it's perrenial short range problem will be addressed. also the previous radar on the Mig 29s were only A2A compliant and hence the role of escort missions and CAP role in IAF. this will change as the Zhuk Me radar is a MMR which will allow the Mig 29s to be multi role, which is what IAF has been emphasising post Kargill where the IAF lacuna was found wrt strike role of it's crafts.
on the point of "obsolesence" i will have to partly agree. while i do admit they may not comparable to say Rafale or a Typhoon or a SH, they are still good to be around. there is still lot of life left as these were inducted in the early 80s. a 15 - 20 year stretch will give IAF an option in at least arresting the falling numbers. this is particularly important when Mig 21s and Mig 27s which are even older are still serving.
That is exactly what I was referring to. 'Combat range' was my premise for argument.
My point still stands. In light of the serious difficulties in maintenance, tropical adaptability and serviceability I mentioned earlier, I don't think the Mig-29, with all of its upgrades, in-flight refuelling, avionics packages, Zhuk ME radar &C can be relied upon as more than a
second generation fighter over the next twenty years.
1. short range is being addressed with IFR.
2. i myself wonder why IAF did not go for the RD 33MK!!! i am not sure if RD 33 series 3 will address the smoke problem (marinised RD 33MK on Mig 29K is smokeless). if not, i am at a loss.
I can answer this. Because in 2006, a $275 million agreement to license-produce 120 extended-life cycle improvised RD-33 ser. 3 engines in India was signed.
Apparently, a deal was made at the MAKS-2009 Airshow, where 26 RD-33 series 3 engines were bought, relating to the deal to license-manufacture these engines at home. Given the transfer of technology and the ongoing work on this assignment, they probably decided it was not worth going for the RD-33MK.
3. again on the radar i have been wondering myself why Zhuk AE was not opted for!! most probably i guess 2 issues.
a) power and the cooling requirement of the AESA radar.
b) may be russian AESA is not complete to be operational yet.
having said that Zhuk ME MMR should be more or less equivalent to EL 2032/RDY 2 and hence should be fine.
I could agree with that. If it's not operational, it could impact the Russian's Mig-35 chances considerably.
I'd suggest that it was problems with cooling. The Russians designed their radar to produce linear power output at the range of 6-8 watt, to address power output and performance. The radar used multiple four-channel transceiver modules generating an output of 5watts per channel, installed on a liquid cooled base plate to dissipate the generated heat. If a specific transceiver is overheated, it will be switched off by the radar computer until it cools down. I'm not entirely sure of the viability of this method.
4. spares and maintainence was definitely a worry but IAF overcame that innovatively.
here is the story of 11 BRD Ojhar AFS. very interesting indeed.
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/Today/Unit-Articles/336-11BRD.html
Cheers.
that is pretty serious. thanks for pointing that link. well let me clear myself here. i am not defending the Mig 29s at all. just making a sense out of the upgrades and IAF's requirement of numbers.
agree there were various issues related to Mig 29s which were serious and was related to events leading upto Soviet Union breaking up and post breakup upheavals. still no justification for IAF "operational" readiness. i guess IAF must have studied everything before going in for the upgrades.
but i do agree with you on most of your points on Mig 29s being a secondary fighter even post upgrades.
I don't think we have too many disagreements in this respect.
no i did not miss the point. during Kargill,
only Mirages had limited A2G role due to its "comparatively" superior radar and it was the
only fighter which had Atlis LDP which could fire laser guided munitions.
none of the other a/c's in IAF had them. hence it was a
natural choice which is no more the case. here is the Mirage story of the Kargill time -
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/Kargil/PCamp.html
Very true. But the Altis pod and the Paveway II bombs were not the only reasons for the Mirage-2000's being committed to an A2G role.
I'd like you to read this paragraph from
Bharat Rakshak:
Following the commitment of combat resources by the IAF, initial operations involved low level air strikes in the Tololing Sector using Mil-17's and fighters, such as the MiG-21, 23 and 27. Strikes using these jet fighters were to continue throughout the duration of the war. During these operations two fighters were lost on the 27th May and one Mil 17 was lost on the 28th. The loss of the Mil 17 and its four crew proved to be a turning point in IAF thinking. The aircraft was on standby for an attack mission to Tololing and did not have adequate self-protection in the form of chaff and flares. However a helicopter with protection aborted its mission and as a result 4 crew were killed when the Mil-17 was attacked by 3 Stingers. Immediately the IAF decided to re-assess the situation. Of the attack helicopters only the Mil-17 could operate at this altitude, the Mil-35 could not. However the environment was awash with man portable SAM's and deemed too hostile to commit further helicopter resources. Planners at IAF HQ began to re-think their offensive strategy. They thought about committing the Mirage 2000 to the conflict to augment the other jet fighters. This aircraft could operate at this altitude with no problem, but it had no high altitude attack capability.
On the 30th May, IAF HQ decided to commit the aircraft, which had already moved to forward operating location in their air defence role, to the offensive. Now the work of the back room staff and pilots was to intensify greatly. The status as of early June was that aircraft, pilots and technicians were spread around at Western Air Command bases and Gwalior. The Mirage 2000 aircraft itself had always been regarded as an air defence fighter with a limited ground attack capability. Consequently it lacked certain resources such as bombs, hardpoint pylons, tooling, testers and ground crew experience in such matters. A big push was instigated at Gwalior to get the platform prepared. By the 12th June, the IAF Personnel had ironed out most of the faults.
Enough equipment was found to make twelve aircraft at any given time, capable of delivering bombs. However bombs were not readily available to suit, so a search was made of the IAF Inventory. Vintage 250kg bombs from the 1970's that were made in Spain for the HAL Ajeet aircraft and had been in storage were found and made available. A one off trial was carried out from Jaisalmer over the Porkoran Range on the 1st June and was deemed to be successful. They were immediately rushed into service with the Mirages of 7 Squadron. Initial missions were flown using dumb bombs only. Each aircraft would be configured with 12 bombs, 1 ventral fuel tank and 2 'MAGIC-2' Air to Air Missiles. The mission would depart and meet up with fighter escorts from 1 Squadron, and then fly into the Indian Side of Jammu and Kashmir, with Mig29's operating as top cover. The attacks took place initially on Point 5140 near Tololing in the Dras Sector and 4 strikes took place over 3 days. The Indian Army re-took this position on the 20th June after fighting in tandem with continuous IAF Strikes.
even Nukes need to be precision guided and can't be thrown like dumb bombs, like the jaguars or Mig 27s would have been able to then. the natural choice hence was Mirage 2000s then and later Jaguars got LDPs too hence they too are optimised for the nukes. but now the situation is different. most IAF craft have/will have both A2A/A2G due to the MMRs and LDPs now and hence the point is moot now.
Ofcourse, but among the Mirage-2000's 200-odd precision strikes during the Kargil war, the vast majority of these were with "dumb bombs". Remember, each aircraft was configured with "12 dumb bombs, 1 ventral fuel tank and 2 'MAGIC-2' Air to Air Missiles", and of the several strikes, "Initial missions were flown using dumb bombs only".
Notable amongst the Seven Squadrons operations, were the attacks on Muntho Dhalo, during which the major enemy supply depot was hit and destroyed by Seven Squadron using dumb bombs.
Even during the Tiger Hill operations, while the first strike was done using Paveway guided bombs, it was the second strike on on Enemy Battallion HQ that proved most effective.
agree. but this is across the board and not specific to the Mirages.
No, it is not specific. But it does also apply to the Mirages.
for the french, yes - it may have been a stop gap because Rafale was on the way. not so for india. 20 years of extension is by no means a stopgap. besides Mirages are well known for their trouble free maintainence. i have not heard of any crash in IAF due to any problem. infact India was planning to acquire more of these from Qatar AF. i love this aircraft.
Also for the IAF. At the rate the MRCA induction is proceeding, the LCA program has proceeded thus far, and the delivery schedules expected for both these aircrafts, 20 years is definitely a stopgap.
As for Mirage 2000 crashes, there have been several. I'm sure you can find them out. Let me point you to just one, which also highlights problems of maintenance:
IAF Mirage 2000 crashes
September 23 2004 at 3:22 PM
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mirage 2000 crashes after take off, pilot safe
Gwalior, Sept. 23 (PTI): A frontline Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft of the Indian Air Force crashed soon after take off from the airbase here today but the Pilot, Squadron Leader HS Gill, ejected safely.
The aircraft, which left the airbase for a practice interception sortie at 12.45 pm, developed problem with the undercarriage with a wheel falling off soon after take off, an IAF spokesman said.
Following the emergency, "the pilot undertook a planned ejection, burning out the fuel and then pointing it towards uninhabited area near the base," he said.
There was no casualty on the ground and the pilot who was picked up by rescue helicopters was reported to be completely safe and unscathed, the spokesman said.
A Court of Inquiry has been ordered into the crash, he said.
The French-made Mirage 2000s are the frontline aircraft of the IAF and have had a very safe flying record.
This is the fourth crash of the multi-mission fighters built by French Dassault company and inducted into the IAF in 1987.
A Mirage 2000 crashed during training sorties just two months after induction. Another crashed killing its pilot Wing Commander Joe Bakshi, during the Air Force Day air show over Palam technical area in 1988 and the last fighter crashed over the Gwalior airbase in 1994.
Mirages played a crucial role during the 1999 Kargil crises and the IAF is in the process of acquiring 125 upgraded Mirage 2000-5 version of the fighters.
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-122434541.html
this i have debated on the LCA thread. i too don't want to go into that again. it is too complex to be explained in simple words. Sanctions/IAF's no interest in the initial years/no infra/limited funds etc..
still an achievement considering it took ADA/DRDO 17 years - comparable to any.
Absoloutely.
P.S.: I don't know who voted your post a thumbs down. But I hope it wasn't me.
