Modernisation of Indian Army Infantry

[vampyrbladez]

Negev is too expensive for fielding in large quantities. Much cheaper though bit heavier UKM2000Ps or PKPs/Bulgarian PKM variants could be more suitable for regular infantry.

OFB GPMG can also fill the gap easily. It is essentially a PKM.

 

[Gessler]

OFB GPMG can also fill the gap easily. It is essentially a PKM.

...essentially an FN MAG you mean. :biggrin2:

 

[sthf]

It remains to be seen what kind of scope we will adopt. From what IA RFIs say so far, only 4x optics are meant to be procured. The numbers discussed therein are certainly not for the whole infantry - my guess is, the guns with the 4x optics will see pretty limited use.

4x magnification, the same you see as standard-issue with the TA31 ACOGs on US Army & Marine M4s and M16s when they clear rooms.

Your quote.

In my opinion, a section needs at least 2 men capable of expert marksmanship. Even with everyone issued 7.62 Nato rifles with 4x scopes and 16" barrels, a marksman with the same rifle but with a 20" barrel (if available), 6x scope and a bipod would still be capable of reaching out and touching targets reliably at a much farther range than his teammates.

I am telling you facts of the matter mate, you are sharing your opinion laced with "what ifs". If a section wants to engage further than their engagement range they call up people whose job is to do so. As I said, IA is not USMC, PA is not Taliban and a conventional war will be fought as a war not as an COIN/CT WOT.

If you have 6 guys with SIG716/AK-203s in a section and 2 of them have 4x optics while the rest have non-magnifying collimators (if anything at all), then those 2 are marksmen.

No they are not. Handing over a scoped rifle and a bipod to a rifleman doesn't make him a marksman, training and his defined role in the section does.

Even though this is getting tiresome, let me reiterate one more time, IA does not/ will not have a section DMR. It is redundant, of little use and takes away the manpower which is already in short supply.

 

[Gessler]

Your quote.

As I said in the original post, it was my opinion of what would be ideal equipment for a marksman. Never said IA intended to procure 6x optics.

No they are not. Handing over a scoped rifle and a bipod to a rifleman doesn't make him a marksman, training and his defined role in the section does.

Why would a soldier be handed a piece of equipment without the training to go with it? Are they issued LMGs without being taught how to lay down supressive fire?

The same will be case when 4x magnifiers are issued to infantrymen.

 

[sthf]

Here you are perfectly describing Kargil.

How did you reach that conclusion? I don't think you have read enough about Kargil, I can provide you with some reading materials if you want. IA learned many many lessons during and after Kargil, putting up a DMR in a section wasn't one of them.

Spoiler: Lessons learned.

D. TURNING THE TIDE: OFFENSIVE TACTICS Units that deployed to Kargil in early May suffered several disadvantages. Soldiers arrived ill equipped for survival in the harsh Himalayan landscape, much less up to the task of defeating a determined foe atop the heights. Units that began to arrive in June adapted to the environment and applied the tactical lessons of the early failures. Initial operations illustrated that massive firepower was essential to permit the infantry to scale the heights. The army massed artillery regiments in Kargil, and infantry battalions retooled their approach to high altitude tactics.

The experience of 2 Rajputana Rifles (2 RAJ RIF) provides an example of a unit that made the right adjustments, and whose victory provided a turning point in the conflict. 1. The Capture of Tololing 2 RAJ RIF, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) M.B. Ravindranath, prepared his unit for ground combat at high altitude and won a series of impressive victories. 2 RAJ RIF deployed to Sonamarg from the Kashmir Valley, where it was conducting CI operations. The battalion remained in Sonamarg for a few days before departing for the combat zone in Dras. At Sonamarg LTC Ravindranath initiated planning, forming teams of senior leaders charged with creating a mountain assault doctrine, an acclimatization program, and a logistic support plan.135 These efforts proved to be the determining factor in the battalion’s success.

The battalion requisitioned large quantities of cold weather gear, and limited soldiers’ load to a light assault kit during the attack.136 The acclimatization program, condensed to eight days from the army standard of twelve, resulted in no high altitude illnesses in the battalion throughout the operation (see Table 1). The most significant product of the battalions’ preparation was its approach to high altitude tactics, which it would test on Tololing. 135 Harinder Baweja, A Soldier's Diary: Kargil, The Inside Story, 75. 136 The assault kit weighed 30 pounds (15 kilograms) and contained rations, a sleeping bag and ammunition. Ibid. 51 Days Activity 1-2 Normal road walks with no change in elevation 3-4 Gradual climbing 5-6 Climbing without loads to 15,000 feet 7-8 Climbing to 15,000 feet with full battle load Table 1. 2 RAJ RIF Acclimatization Program. (From: Amarinder Singh, A Ridge Too Far: War in the Kargil Heights 1999, 195) LTC Ravindranath reported to 56 Mountain Brigade on 3 June and received the order to seize Tololing. 18 Grenadiers, still sitting under fire around the peaks and unable to advance, would support 2 RAJ RIF’s attack with suppressive fire. Twenty artillery batteries totaling over 120 guns would support the operation as well.

After a thorough reconnaissance, LTC Ravindranath identified two avenues of approach to the Pakistani positions, over which he could launch multi-directional attacks and achieve surprise.137 He established ammunition and water supply points on each axis. The battalion ferried equipment forward along the approach for two days before the assault. Mules carried the battalion’s machine guns, mortars and ammunition up only a third of the route. Porters had to take over at that point, making a treacherous seven-hour uphill climb. The altitude and terrain restricted porters to making only one trip per day, and forced Ravindranath to use as many as sixty porters continually on each axis. The task of transporting water alone required twenty men daily. On the night of 12 June, a massive six-hour bombardment by all twenty artillery batteries preceded the assault. The companies moved quickly on both axes of advance.

Fire by 18 Grenadiers and the artillery batteries allowed Ravindranath’s troops to seize their initial objectives in a matter of hours. The artillery barrage continued unabated until soldiers reached to within 200 meters of their objectives; at that point, 18 Grenadiers picked up a heavy volume of fire that effectively suppressed the Pakistani positions. By early morning the battalion had captured Tololing Top and beaten back several desperate Pakistani counterattacks.138 Point 5140 fell a week later, on 20 June, following another 137 Harinder Baweja, A Soldier's Diary: Kargil, The Inside Story, 76. 138 Gurmeet Kanwal, Colonel, Indian Army, Heroes of Kargil, 17. 52 multi-directional attack supported by the full complement of twenty artillery batteries. 2 RAJ RIF had given the Indian Army its first major victory in the war, and provided the foothold to move forward to other objectives, primarily the commanding heights of Tiger Hill.

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a417318.pdf

DMRs give IA section counter sniping and anti heavy weapon capability with additional marksman badge level training to soldiers.

Hypothetical and unwarranted capability at the cost of diminished manpower.

Our troops will be armed with AK 203s and Sig 716 G2s as service rifles. CAR 816/5.56 mm RFI rifles will be given to officers,radiomen and crewed weapon operators.

I don't think any rifleman will be issued with the AK 203. You are right about the rest.

Officers hated the 9mm sterling and prefer AKs to that gun.

Agreed.

Other than that I expect to see X 95 Tavors and even some FAB AKMs being placed in the ring, especially for Ghatak units.

Why FAB AKMs when AK 203 is being purchased?

For LMG RFI, I expect the IMI Negev 7.62 to win. Effectively 5.56 mm is being phased out as it should be.

It did.

The contract worth INR3 billion (USD46.8 million) was scrapped on 9 August 2017 after Israel Weapon Industries (IWI) emerged as the sole vendor with its Negev NG7 model, after winning over the LMG fielded by Bulgaria’s Arsenal in user trials between 2015 and early 2017, IHS Jane's reported Wednesday.

http://www.defenseworld.net/news/20459/Indian_Army_s_Light_Machine_Gun_Tender_Cancelled#.XIz7T6AzYps

 

[sthf]

As I said in the original post, it was my opinion of what would be ideal equipment for a marksman. Never said IA intended to procure 6x optics.

And I pointed out to you the facts that you are continuously ignoring.

Why would a soldier be handed a piece of equipment without the training to go with it? Are they issued LMGs without being taught how to lay down supressive fire?

The same will be case when 4x magnifiers are issued to infantrymen.

Wasn't this precisely your point?

If you have 6 guys with SIG716/AK-203s in a section and 2 of them have 4x optics while the rest have non-magnifying collimators (if anything at all), then those 2 are marksmen.

If there are 2 guys with 4x optics in a section, "then those two are marksmen".

 

[Gessler]

Wasn't this precisely your point?

If there are 2 guys with 4x optics in a section, "then those two are marksmen".

Obviously - as the optic allows them to place accurate fire out to a much longer distance than the rest of the section.

It's no different than saying "if 2 men are issued LMGs, then those 2 are Support/MG gunners". The aspect that they were would be trained in the proper use and how to take advantage of the equipment they are provided with is a given.

 

[sthf]

Obviously - as the optic allows them to place accurate fire out to a much longer distance than the rest of the section.

Yeah nah.

By your own admission, men issued with a scope automatically qualifies them as marksmen "then those 2 are marksmen" your words not mine. Essentially your entire argument rests on the unavailability of optics.

It's no different than saying "if 2 men are issued LMGs, then those 2 are Support/MG gunners". The aspect that they were would be trained in the proper use and how to take advantage of the equipment they are provided with is a given.

Bad analogy.

All men in a section are trained to use LMGs. That is skill set that all men share unlike sharpshooter course.

 

[Gessler]

Yeah nah.

By your own admission, men issued with a scope automatically qualifies them as marksmen "then those 2 are marksmen" your words not mine. Essentially your entire argument rests on the unavailability of optics.



Bad analogy.

All men in a section are trained to use LMGs. That is skill set that all men share unlike sharpshooter course.

So you want to assume...that IA will procure 4x optics (which our infantrymen haven't seen in their lives), and won't train men equipped with them to take advantage of the same? i.e. becoming a marksman?

EDIT - New equipment, especially of a new kind, always warrants new training regimes. When Ghatak teams start getting some SIG716s, obviously they can't spray those like they can with the AKs they have now. Their training will change.

Same will be the case when select infantrymen are issued 4x optics - for which RFIs are already out.

 

[sthf]

So you want to assume...that IA will procure 4x optics (which our infantrymen haven't seen in their lives), and won't train men equipped with them to take advantage of the same? i.e. becoming a marksman?

Can you quote me where did I say that?

I made no assumption of any kind. I not just told that there is no such thing as a designated marksman in an IA infantry section and now that all riflemen will be issued with rifle chambered with a full power round it doesn't need any.

My posts are not a long list of "what ifs" or wishful thinking.

 

[bhramos]

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[Killswitch]

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I wish I could buy some of those plates on Ebay.

 

[Anikastha]

I wish I could buy some of those plates on Ebay.

Why do you need armour plates unless you are going for crusade.

 

[singhboy98]

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Why do we never induct these plates? Are they too expensive to become standard issue?

 

[ezsasa]

Why do we never induct these plates? Are they too expensive to become standard issue?

This is very recent development, pretty sure the search of manufacturing partners will start shortly...

 

[Major Sahab RR]

16000 LMGs may be procured under FTP.

 

[Prashant12]

Defence Ministry clears major project for the Indian Army for acquisition of 10 lakh 'made in India' multi mode hand grenades.

 

[arya]

Defence Ministry clears major project for the Indian Army for acquisition of 10 lakh 'made in India' multi mode hand grenades.

That's good news

But we India want something more , what is status on hyper sonic missile , what is status of AMCA, status of AC .

that's the big questions ????

 

[Suryavanshi]

Defence Ministry clears major project for the Indian Army for acquisition of 10 lakh 'made in India' multi mode hand grenades.

What about the pevious grenades are they gonna be destroyed?
We should consider donating it all to Afghanistan if possible.

 

[porky_kicker]

Defence Ministry clears major project for the Indian Army for acquisition of 10 lakh 'made in India' multi mode hand grenades.

DRDO Shivalik multimode grenade

1.8 million grenades previously ordered in the past.

This will be a repeat order IMO