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so basically , sun tzu is fight manual for worst type of " daarpook " people !!
LOC, LAC & International Border skirmishs
- Thread starter Kunal Biswas
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Win battles with minimum losses.
We also have similar sayings "beat ur enemy at the weakest spot"
Sun Tzu aims to weaken his enemy and fight him where you have advantage.
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no we do not have that saying......
we are tought...
Chidian De Naal Baaz Larava, Tabhe Gobind Singh Naam Kahava
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Please give English translation too...
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Aj CNN 18 wali chikh rahe thi ki Doval ko royally snub kar diya China ne uski visit se pehle.
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Is Coercion the New Normal in China’s Economic Statecraft?
Evan A. Feigenbaum
Is Coercion the New Normal in China’s Economic Statecraft?
At a meeting in Germany on July 8, China’s president Xi Jinping told Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe that “political issues … must not hinder the development of bilateral economic relations.” That’s a stunning de-linkage of economics from politics, considering that the Chinese government has spent much of the past few years doing precisely the opposite.
Since 2010, after all, security and political tensions between Beijing and Tokyo have escalated apace. This in, in turn, has put more than a few Japanese brands into the Chinese government’s crosshairs, exposing them to the wrath of online “netizens” and the slings and arrows of street protesters. A rise in manufacturing costs was already leading many Japanese corporates to look at alternatives to China for their Asia-based production and operations. Street protests and consumer boycotts in China have fueled a further diversification of Japan’s corporate FDI.
All that raises this troubling, yet important, question: just how durable—and vulnerable—are any country’s economic ties to China in the face of political headwinds and strategic strains?
Perhaps more than any country in Asia, China has experimented in recent years with the use of economic levers in coercive ways. To see this in action, just contrast Xi’s encouraging statement to Abe with another of his meetings in Hamburg—with South Korea’s new president, Moon Jae-in.
When Moon took office on May 10, he inherited months of tension with Beijing over the deployment of terminal high-altitude area missile defenses (THAAD). Beijing hates THAAD, viewing it is a threat to China’s strategic deterrent and a symbol of enhanced operational coordination between Washington and Seoul that could ultimately be turned against China.
And so China has turned up the heat:
It banned Chinese tour groups—pummeling Korea’s airline, hospitality, and duty free industries.
Its state and social media have encouraged unofficial boycotts of Korean products.
Regulators have cited “fire code violations” to pressure and shutter Korean businesses in China, including some 80% of the supermarkets operated by Lotte, the Korean firm whose land swap provided the golf course that will house the new THAAD batteries.
Moon, a left-of-center politician, seeks productive relations with China and dialogue with North Korea. So his election should, in theory, have changed all this. But it has not. Instead, Xi told Moon that THAAD remains a precondition to “overall” progress and placed the onus squarely on Seoul to “remove obstacles” to the improvement of relations.
What, then, is Beijing’s true policy: is it to be linkage of economics to politics (as with Moon) or de-linkage (as with Abe)?
This question matters for two reasons—first, because if blunt coercion is, in fact, some sort of “new normal,” then foreign governments and firms need to mitigate the risks of being caught in Beijing’s crosshairs; and second, because Beijing’s relations with so many countries are tense, thus any of them, particularly on China’s Asian periphery, could become a future target. Just look at the Philippines, whose rocky relationship with Beijing has improved under President Rodrigo Duterte. Should Manila prepare for slag, ash, and fruit boycotts if its next president reverses Duterte’s accommodating stance in the South China Sea?
Beijing’s Toolkit
From my vantage point, at least, Beijing seems certain to continue using economic leverage for political and strategic ends. There are just too many examples of it now to doubt it.
But blunt coercion isn’t likely to become routine either. It is not, in other words, a “new normal” of Chinese statecraft. It is a tool—one tool—in an increasingly diverse toolkit.
It may be useful, therefore, to lay out a rough typology of precisely what Beijing now has in its toolbox:
With its $11 trillion economy, China is integrated with dozens of other economies, both big and small. It is the world’s number-one trader, manufacturer, and oil consumer. For some countries, it is among their biggest buyers of debt and/or providers of project finance and other forms of capital.
In fact, “going global,” especially through investments in advanced industrial economies, has given Beijing more economic levers to pull. One example is Spain. A report last week in POLITICO’s European edition suggested that, in 2014, Beijing held some 20 percent of Spanish bonds not held by that country’s residents. This gave Beijing new leverage because the Rajoy government calculated that China might use its debt holdings to punish Madrid for criticism of Beijing’s human rights record or other political differences.
And yet because China’s economic interactions with the world are so diverse now, blunt coercion is one of just five types of leverage—and not necessarily the most important one.
Let’s call these five types: “passive,” “active,” “exclusionary,” “coercive,” and “latent” leverage.
When Beijing uses what I term “passive” leverage, it essentially lets China’s size, weight, and market power do the talking. In these cases, Beijing doesn’t need to threaten, cajole, or do much of anything at all to try to get its way. Instead, it will rely on foreign economic interests, such as companies with a stake in its economy, to pressure their home governments for stable, predictable, non-confrontational relations with China.
One example of this is the United States: for decades, Beijing has counted heavily on US firms and business lobbies to mitigate political risks and forestall potential disruptions to the US-China relationship.
Using “active” leverage, by contrast, means that China doesn’t just let its size do the talking. Instead, it will try to take a direct hand in shaping rules and norms in other countries.
Beijing’s goal here has been to use its economic power—or the lure of Chinese foreign direct investment—to lock in its political and economic preferences, and potential advantages for Chinese firms. For example, if a country hopes for investment under China’s multitrillion dollar “Belt and Road” infrastructure initiative, it will probably tread carefully around China’s political preferences and adopt some of its preferred investment provisions.
Beijing’s success with this tool will surely vary. In Africa, for instance, distinct countries have had distinct degrees of success in fending off Chinese conditionality. But generally speaking, the weaker the recipient state, the more susceptible it has been to this form of pressure from Beijing, which can include: agreeing to convert debt owed to China into equity; accommodating China’s preferred labor practices by agreeing to “buy and hire Chinese” in contractual provisions; giving contracts to Chinese state-owned enterprises; adopting Chinese technological and engineering standards as default standards; or accepting Beijing’s procurement rules.
Third, there is Beijing’s use of “exclusionary” leverage. Rather than attempting to shape rules and choices in other countries, this type of leverage means granting or denying access to China’s own domestic market in an effort to ratchet up the pressure.
This is just the form of leverage China has wielded against South Korea recently, with Chinese regulators citing safety rules to restrict Lotte’s operations. Beijing has clearly hoped to persuade Lotte and other Korean firms to compel a change in their government’s policies on THAAD.
My colleague, Matt Sheehan, has offered another useful example of this use of “exclusionary” economic leverage tied to a political goal—namely, China’s effort to foster its own view of “cyber sovereignty,” which, of course, includes government censorship. The United States and China have a strong political disagreement about cyber sovereignty. But US firms have nonetheless accommodated China’s views to ensure continuing access to its market, agreeing to build alternate versions of their products or situate data in China.
Beijing’s use of what I term “coercive” leverage is even more direct. Here China doesn’t simply wield access to its market as a weapon but attempts to inflict discrete punishments tied to discrete “offenses.”
The best recent example of this is probably Mongolia. One week after Ulaanbaatar permitted the Dalai Lama to visit last November, Beijing imposed new fees on Mongolian commodity exports to China, piling on new cross-border transaction costs. And when Mongolia relented, China’s foreign minister Wang Yi drove home the point, noting that Beijing hoped Mongolia had learned its “lesson.”
Another example is Norway. Once China’s largest source of salmon imports, it fell behind the small Faroe Islands after the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo. Oslo ultimately got Beijing’s intended message: a new bilateral seafood agreement came only after a joint statement in which Norway conceded Beijing’s main political concerns.
Finally, there is what I would call Beijing’s “latent” economic leverage—in other words, the coercive cards it holds but chooses not to play.
This is the leverage Washington hopes China will use against North Korea. But thus far, Beijing has used it to shape Washington’s actions as much, if not more, than Pyongyang’s.
Not Every Problem a Nail
What can we learn from China’s use of these five distinct economic levers? Personally, I don’t see a clear pattern, yet one scenario stands out from the extremes on the spectrum of alternatives:
At one end of this spectrum, Beijing can simply let nature take its course, relying on “passive” leverage to influence debates in other countries. Depsite growing tensions, this still seems to be Beijing’s preferred course with the United States, where it continues to lean on partners in the business community and binding economic ties.
At the other end of the spectrum, China can try to go “hard and heavy,” as it did with Mongolia and Norway. With both countries, Beijing tried to reverse their policies by delivering a short sharp shock. And although its efforts produced concessions, these are small economies, not necessarily representative, and landlocked Mongolia was unusually vulnerable.
To me, therefore, the South Korean case seems a real harbinger.
It shows that Beijing is learning to mix and match from among these five tools in the kit. China wielded “exclusionary” leverage by restricting Lotte’s operations in China yet simultaneously deployed direct leverage through its restrictions on Chinese tour groups.
What Beijing has not yet done, I think, is develop a systematic ladder of escalation—moving from limited actions, on to stronger actions, and finally on to tactical and strategic “punishments” aimed at compelling foreign governments to act as China wishes.
Such a step-by-step, carefully calibrated escalation ladder would be a momentous turn in China’s use of economic coercion.
So it bears watching.
As China develops a heftier role in the world economy, it will have greater capacity—and thus a greater temptation—to do just that.
https://macropolo.org/coercion-new-normal-chinas-economic-statecraft/
Evan A. Feigenbaum
Is Coercion the New Normal in China’s Economic Statecraft?
At a meeting in Germany on July 8, China’s president Xi Jinping told Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe that “political issues … must not hinder the development of bilateral economic relations.” That’s a stunning de-linkage of economics from politics, considering that the Chinese government has spent much of the past few years doing precisely the opposite.
Since 2010, after all, security and political tensions between Beijing and Tokyo have escalated apace. This in, in turn, has put more than a few Japanese brands into the Chinese government’s crosshairs, exposing them to the wrath of online “netizens” and the slings and arrows of street protesters. A rise in manufacturing costs was already leading many Japanese corporates to look at alternatives to China for their Asia-based production and operations. Street protests and consumer boycotts in China have fueled a further diversification of Japan’s corporate FDI.
All that raises this troubling, yet important, question: just how durable—and vulnerable—are any country’s economic ties to China in the face of political headwinds and strategic strains?
Perhaps more than any country in Asia, China has experimented in recent years with the use of economic levers in coercive ways. To see this in action, just contrast Xi’s encouraging statement to Abe with another of his meetings in Hamburg—with South Korea’s new president, Moon Jae-in.
When Moon took office on May 10, he inherited months of tension with Beijing over the deployment of terminal high-altitude area missile defenses (THAAD). Beijing hates THAAD, viewing it is a threat to China’s strategic deterrent and a symbol of enhanced operational coordination between Washington and Seoul that could ultimately be turned against China.
And so China has turned up the heat:
It banned Chinese tour groups—pummeling Korea’s airline, hospitality, and duty free industries.
Its state and social media have encouraged unofficial boycotts of Korean products.
Regulators have cited “fire code violations” to pressure and shutter Korean businesses in China, including some 80% of the supermarkets operated by Lotte, the Korean firm whose land swap provided the golf course that will house the new THAAD batteries.
Moon, a left-of-center politician, seeks productive relations with China and dialogue with North Korea. So his election should, in theory, have changed all this. But it has not. Instead, Xi told Moon that THAAD remains a precondition to “overall” progress and placed the onus squarely on Seoul to “remove obstacles” to the improvement of relations.
What, then, is Beijing’s true policy: is it to be linkage of economics to politics (as with Moon) or de-linkage (as with Abe)?
This question matters for two reasons—first, because if blunt coercion is, in fact, some sort of “new normal,” then foreign governments and firms need to mitigate the risks of being caught in Beijing’s crosshairs; and second, because Beijing’s relations with so many countries are tense, thus any of them, particularly on China’s Asian periphery, could become a future target. Just look at the Philippines, whose rocky relationship with Beijing has improved under President Rodrigo Duterte. Should Manila prepare for slag, ash, and fruit boycotts if its next president reverses Duterte’s accommodating stance in the South China Sea?
Beijing’s Toolkit
From my vantage point, at least, Beijing seems certain to continue using economic leverage for political and strategic ends. There are just too many examples of it now to doubt it.
But blunt coercion isn’t likely to become routine either. It is not, in other words, a “new normal” of Chinese statecraft. It is a tool—one tool—in an increasingly diverse toolkit.
It may be useful, therefore, to lay out a rough typology of precisely what Beijing now has in its toolbox:
With its $11 trillion economy, China is integrated with dozens of other economies, both big and small. It is the world’s number-one trader, manufacturer, and oil consumer. For some countries, it is among their biggest buyers of debt and/or providers of project finance and other forms of capital.
In fact, “going global,” especially through investments in advanced industrial economies, has given Beijing more economic levers to pull. One example is Spain. A report last week in POLITICO’s European edition suggested that, in 2014, Beijing held some 20 percent of Spanish bonds not held by that country’s residents. This gave Beijing new leverage because the Rajoy government calculated that China might use its debt holdings to punish Madrid for criticism of Beijing’s human rights record or other political differences.
And yet because China’s economic interactions with the world are so diverse now, blunt coercion is one of just five types of leverage—and not necessarily the most important one.
Let’s call these five types: “passive,” “active,” “exclusionary,” “coercive,” and “latent” leverage.
When Beijing uses what I term “passive” leverage, it essentially lets China’s size, weight, and market power do the talking. In these cases, Beijing doesn’t need to threaten, cajole, or do much of anything at all to try to get its way. Instead, it will rely on foreign economic interests, such as companies with a stake in its economy, to pressure their home governments for stable, predictable, non-confrontational relations with China.
One example of this is the United States: for decades, Beijing has counted heavily on US firms and business lobbies to mitigate political risks and forestall potential disruptions to the US-China relationship.
Using “active” leverage, by contrast, means that China doesn’t just let its size do the talking. Instead, it will try to take a direct hand in shaping rules and norms in other countries.
Beijing’s goal here has been to use its economic power—or the lure of Chinese foreign direct investment—to lock in its political and economic preferences, and potential advantages for Chinese firms. For example, if a country hopes for investment under China’s multitrillion dollar “Belt and Road” infrastructure initiative, it will probably tread carefully around China’s political preferences and adopt some of its preferred investment provisions.
Beijing’s success with this tool will surely vary. In Africa, for instance, distinct countries have had distinct degrees of success in fending off Chinese conditionality. But generally speaking, the weaker the recipient state, the more susceptible it has been to this form of pressure from Beijing, which can include: agreeing to convert debt owed to China into equity; accommodating China’s preferred labor practices by agreeing to “buy and hire Chinese” in contractual provisions; giving contracts to Chinese state-owned enterprises; adopting Chinese technological and engineering standards as default standards; or accepting Beijing’s procurement rules.
Third, there is Beijing’s use of “exclusionary” leverage. Rather than attempting to shape rules and choices in other countries, this type of leverage means granting or denying access to China’s own domestic market in an effort to ratchet up the pressure.
This is just the form of leverage China has wielded against South Korea recently, with Chinese regulators citing safety rules to restrict Lotte’s operations. Beijing has clearly hoped to persuade Lotte and other Korean firms to compel a change in their government’s policies on THAAD.
My colleague, Matt Sheehan, has offered another useful example of this use of “exclusionary” economic leverage tied to a political goal—namely, China’s effort to foster its own view of “cyber sovereignty,” which, of course, includes government censorship. The United States and China have a strong political disagreement about cyber sovereignty. But US firms have nonetheless accommodated China’s views to ensure continuing access to its market, agreeing to build alternate versions of their products or situate data in China.
Beijing’s use of what I term “coercive” leverage is even more direct. Here China doesn’t simply wield access to its market as a weapon but attempts to inflict discrete punishments tied to discrete “offenses.”
The best recent example of this is probably Mongolia. One week after Ulaanbaatar permitted the Dalai Lama to visit last November, Beijing imposed new fees on Mongolian commodity exports to China, piling on new cross-border transaction costs. And when Mongolia relented, China’s foreign minister Wang Yi drove home the point, noting that Beijing hoped Mongolia had learned its “lesson.”
Another example is Norway. Once China’s largest source of salmon imports, it fell behind the small Faroe Islands after the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo. Oslo ultimately got Beijing’s intended message: a new bilateral seafood agreement came only after a joint statement in which Norway conceded Beijing’s main political concerns.
Finally, there is what I would call Beijing’s “latent” economic leverage—in other words, the coercive cards it holds but chooses not to play.
This is the leverage Washington hopes China will use against North Korea. But thus far, Beijing has used it to shape Washington’s actions as much, if not more, than Pyongyang’s.
Not Every Problem a Nail
What can we learn from China’s use of these five distinct economic levers? Personally, I don’t see a clear pattern, yet one scenario stands out from the extremes on the spectrum of alternatives:
At one end of this spectrum, Beijing can simply let nature take its course, relying on “passive” leverage to influence debates in other countries. Depsite growing tensions, this still seems to be Beijing’s preferred course with the United States, where it continues to lean on partners in the business community and binding economic ties.
At the other end of the spectrum, China can try to go “hard and heavy,” as it did with Mongolia and Norway. With both countries, Beijing tried to reverse their policies by delivering a short sharp shock. And although its efforts produced concessions, these are small economies, not necessarily representative, and landlocked Mongolia was unusually vulnerable.
To me, therefore, the South Korean case seems a real harbinger.
It shows that Beijing is learning to mix and match from among these five tools in the kit. China wielded “exclusionary” leverage by restricting Lotte’s operations in China yet simultaneously deployed direct leverage through its restrictions on Chinese tour groups.
What Beijing has not yet done, I think, is develop a systematic ladder of escalation—moving from limited actions, on to stronger actions, and finally on to tactical and strategic “punishments” aimed at compelling foreign governments to act as China wishes.
Such a step-by-step, carefully calibrated escalation ladder would be a momentous turn in China’s use of economic coercion.
So it bears watching.
As China develops a heftier role in the world economy, it will have greater capacity—and thus a greater temptation—to do just that.
https://macropolo.org/coercion-new-normal-chinas-economic-statecraft/
airtel
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Well Sikhism is fatalistic. Survival does not matter, only Dharam and truth does. Not sure if that paradigm is appropriate for India as a nation.
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Reacting to India's move to launch an anti-dumping investigation over photovoltaic cells and units imported from the China, Taiwan, and Malaysia, Wang Hejun, head of the Ministry of Commerce's (MOC) trade remedy and investigation bureau, said China is paying close attention to the investigation and hopes India will conduct it in a prudent manner and as per relevant rules.
He was quoted by the state-run Xinhua news agency as saying that India should avoid "abusing" trade remedy measures and hoped the two countries can settle trade disputes through consultation.
Wang said adopting restrictive measures for the trade of photovoltaic products would not only harm photovoltaic sector development in India, but also dampen the sector's long-term development worldwide as well as economic and trade cooperation between China and India.
He was quoted by the state-run Xinhua news agency as saying that India should avoid "abusing" trade remedy measures and hoped the two countries can settle trade disputes through consultation.
Wang said adopting restrictive measures for the trade of photovoltaic products would not only harm photovoltaic sector development in India, but also dampen the sector's long-term development worldwide as well as economic and trade cooperation between China and India.
Kshatriya87
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Times of India finally starts using "Dolam" instead of Doklam.
Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
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IndiaRising
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there was a blast in kabul just yesterday. I'm pretty sure afghans are up for it, but they need a better military. right now, its just a rag-tag bunch of fighters. i feel like after america leaves, india will fill up the vacuum, without sending troops over.
lcafanboy
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INDIA RAISES CHOPPER POWER ON CHINA BORDER
MONDAY, JULY 24, 2017 BY INDIANDEFENSE NEWS
by Pradip R Sagar
NEW DELHI: Aggressive air support is crucial for advancing ground troops in a short and intense war. Last week, the government also allowed the Army to make ‘emergency procurement’ without going into red-tapeism, to be prepared for a ‘short intense war’.
According to officials privy to the development, Boeing, which manufactures these helicopters, will start delivering from early next year, and all 22 machines will be handed over to IAF in a time span of nine months. IAF has been asked to develop infrastructure, including hangers and helipads, to create base for these helicopters.
According to IAF, Apache will be the first pure attack helicopter in the Indian forces. The IAF already operates two squadrons of the Russian-origin Mi-25 and Mi-35 attack helicopters, which are deployed close to the frontlines on the Pakistan border. But these helicopters are on the verge of retirement and were designed only to carry troops into heavily defended territories.
Equipped with laser and infrared systems for all-weather, day-night operability, the Apache fires the Hellfire air-to-air missiles, besides its arsenal of 70 mm rockets and an automatic cannon. Apache helicopters are capable of detecting 256 moving targets and engaging them, the twin-engine Apache is operated by two pilots.
The attack choppers can track up to 128 targets in a minute and prioritise threats
Armed with fire-and-forget Hellfire missiles, besides its arsenal of 70 mm rockets and an automatic cannon.
These missiles equip the helicopter gunships with heavy anti-armour capabilities
The stealthy chopper is equipped with laser and infrared systems for all-weather, day-night operability
Both crew members are capable of flying the aircraft and performing methods of weapon engagements independently.
Source>>
MONDAY, JULY 24, 2017 BY INDIANDEFENSE NEWS
by Pradip R Sagar
NEW DELHI: Aggressive air support is crucial for advancing ground troops in a short and intense war. Last week, the government also allowed the Army to make ‘emergency procurement’ without going into red-tapeism, to be prepared for a ‘short intense war’.
According to officials privy to the development, Boeing, which manufactures these helicopters, will start delivering from early next year, and all 22 machines will be handed over to IAF in a time span of nine months. IAF has been asked to develop infrastructure, including hangers and helipads, to create base for these helicopters.
According to IAF, Apache will be the first pure attack helicopter in the Indian forces. The IAF already operates two squadrons of the Russian-origin Mi-25 and Mi-35 attack helicopters, which are deployed close to the frontlines on the Pakistan border. But these helicopters are on the verge of retirement and were designed only to carry troops into heavily defended territories.
Equipped with laser and infrared systems for all-weather, day-night operability, the Apache fires the Hellfire air-to-air missiles, besides its arsenal of 70 mm rockets and an automatic cannon. Apache helicopters are capable of detecting 256 moving targets and engaging them, the twin-engine Apache is operated by two pilots.
The attack choppers can track up to 128 targets in a minute and prioritise threats
Armed with fire-and-forget Hellfire missiles, besides its arsenal of 70 mm rockets and an automatic cannon.
These missiles equip the helicopter gunships with heavy anti-armour capabilities
The stealthy chopper is equipped with laser and infrared systems for all-weather, day-night operability
Both crew members are capable of flying the aircraft and performing methods of weapon engagements independently.
Source>>
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Afghani Army morale is pretty low, I think they could be motivated given the right amount of money, equipment, brainwashing but right now they desertion in favor of Taliban is a serious problem. And we all know who support the Afghan Taliban.
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The worse thing is that indian politician class is not letting our intel agencies let loose.
Once they grab a hold on the desperate paki youth,we can cause hundreds of terror attacks.Afghanistan and IRAN can help.
We need a political leadership with spine.
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See, this will be an unpopular opinion on this forum but I am not in favor of using Islamic proxies to attack anybody. It hasn't worked out for anyone in history including Americans, Russians, Pakistanis. If you sleep with snakes, then you get bitten. Instead, I would be in favor of cementing already strong military ties with Afghanistan by giving them money and military hardware and focus on propaganda there in terms of destablizing the foothold of Islam in that nation. China's strategy of CPEC colonization is a good one for us to adopt in case of Afghanistan.
A military base near the Pak/Afghan border with any shelling in Kashmir responded to via that sector would get the Porks to squeal very quickly.
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Well i would like to see fried pork every morning but i also cannot disagree with sleeping with snakes.
Their are few ways which come into my mind to neutralize pakistan.
1.Increase economic and tech gap between both us and make it impossible for pak to keep up with our defense budget.
2. fuel political uprising and unrests.
3. use espionage to keep pak unstable.
4. Buy corrupt mediahouses,military guys and politicians.
And i would love to see 10000-15000 indian soldiers in afghanistan with 2 air combat squadrons.
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Paki mind farts.
stop visiting that gutter.
=====================================================
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that website is run by isi.....
- Status
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