LOC, LAC & IB warfare

[SanjeevM]

I would say, let's not forget what just happened. Take lessons from these incidents. Here are my suggestions:-
1. We need to work on our propaganda machinery. Our Media channels mainly NDTV completely acted like Chinese Moles. We need to work on media management. I believe Zee and Republic TV need to be involved in this strategy.

2. Opposition parties, instead of keeping silent, questioned Modi. Recent example is Pappy asking Modi. They should instead walk to government and have closed doors meeting and If they can't speak positive, keep their mouths shut.

3. We need to increase our efforts to finish off pending boarder roads projects ASAP.

4. Armed forces need to do something soul searching and finish pending trials on war footing. They should think if tomorrow there is a 2 front war, unless these pending trials are over, production cannot start. For God's sake finish trials and give feedback immediately. Whatever needs to be done, do fast. Don't linger it for years.

5. Trenches, bunkers, posts, storage facilities need to be built on eastern front where we can permanently station some units so that we don't see a kargil repeat in eastern front.


6. We just saw Russia refused to give us semi finished frigates. In the event of war, many of our suppliers may stop supplies because of fear of China. We have to take this into account every time we have to take a decision between indigenous manufacturing or import. Whether it is guns required for army, Arjun tanks or howitzer or jets. Even some of the Europeans can stop supplies when we need them the most. If OFBs designed guns are good, get them into production. Changes can be made later like INSAS issues were resolved a little later.

7. IAF need to give more orders for Tejas and HAL can either increased its own production lines or pass on the production lines to TATA or Mahindra.

8. Work on Rustam and other UAV UACV need to be fast tracked.

9. We need more submarines. Get the Reliance and all Indian ship building companies into submarine making. It's the numbers that will create fear among Chinese. Remember in Pearl harbor, 100s of Japanese submarines were used . We need multiple subs. If Japanese can help, else indigenous are also fine.

India never attack any other country. But if we are attacked, enemy should get a bloody nose.

 

[square]

I would say, let's not forget what just happened. Take lessons from these incidents. Here are my suggestions:-
1. We need to work on our propaganda machinery. Our Media channels mainly NDTV completely acted like Chinese Moles. We need to work on media management. I believe Zee and Republic TV need to be involved in this strategy.

2. Opposition parties, instead of keeping silent, questioned Modi. Recent example is Pappy asking Modi. They should instead walk to government and have closed doors meeting and If they can't speak positive, keep their mouths shut.

3. We need to increase our efforts to finish off pending boarder roads projects ASAP.

4. Armed forces need to do something soul searching and finish pending trials on war footing. They should think if tomorrow there is a 2 front war, unless these pending trials are over, production cannot start. For God's sake finish trials and give feedback immediately. Whatever needs to be done, do fast. Don't linger it for years.

5. Trenches, bunkers, posts, storage facilities need to be built on eastern front where we can permanently station some units so that we don't see a kargil repeat in eastern front.


6. We just saw Russia refused to give us semi finished frigates. In the event of war, many of our suppliers may stop supplies because of fear of China. We have to take this into account every time we have to take a decision between indigenous manufacturing or import. Whether it is guns required for army, Arjun tanks or howitzer or jets. Even some of the Europeans can stop supplies when we need them the most. If OFBs designed guns are good, get them into production. Changes can be made later like INSAS issues were resolved a little later.

7. IAF need to give more orders for Tejas and HAL can either increased its own production lines or pass on the production lines to TATA or Mahindra.

8. Work on Rustam and other UAV UACV need to be fast tracked.

9. We need more submarines. Get the Reliance and all Indian ship building companies into submarine making. It's the numbers that will create fear among Chinese. Remember in Pearl harbor, 100s of Japanese submarines were used . We need multiple subs. If Japanese can help, else indigenous are also fine.

India never attack any other country. But if we are attacked, enemy should get a bloody nose.

i agree to most of the points......

there is one more point which need to be addressed.......that is the bipoler world....

russia as you already mention , has inclination towards china.....
now , till we has hot border with pakistan it was ok , but incase of china we know what will be russian reaction and probabally action.......

in 70's we had security pect with russia even we call ourself non- allienc......

we will be needing friends in the emerging challenges......
US and west can onlysupport us in peace time , we has no idea how they will react during war ,.........its always better to make early preperations.....


.

 

[AmoghaVarsha]

i agree to most of the points......

there is one more point which need to be addressed.......that is the bipoler world....

russia as you already mention , has inclination towards china.....
now , till we has hot border with pakistan it was ok , but incase of china we know what will be russian reaction and probabally action.......

in 70's we had security pect with russia even we call ourself non- allienc......

we will be needing friends in the emerging challenges......
US and west can onlysupport us in peace time , we has no idea how they will react during war ,.........its always better to make early preperations.....


NATO !!!!

Russians will likely be neutral.

 

[square]

Russians will likely be neutral.

better , not to get surprised when you least expect it.....

 

[aliyah]

i agree to most of the points......

there is one more point which need to be addressed.......that is the bipoler world....

russia as you already mention , has inclination towards china.....
now , till we has hot border with pakistan it was ok , but incase of china we know what will be russian reaction and probabally action.......

in 70's we had security pect with russia even we call ourself non- allienc......

we will be needing friends in the emerging challenges......
US and west can onlysupport us in peace time , we has no idea how they will react during war ,.........its always better to make early preperations.....


.

they will sit back n sell arms to both

 

[captscooby81]

The kid had raised a very valid point here... but we as usual not ready to be little pessimistic and always over optimistic ..Why does China needs to share our strength to its public remember CPC has the army not the chinese people..PLA is party force ..So they don t need to appraise the public about our strength ..They are doing propaganda for sure both to our public and to their public ..They are projecting us as bigger evil to the common man so that there is a groundswell support to the PLA and CPC from the non party public too ..Again i am saying look at the chinese economy the answer lies in sudden failure of its big corporations and rampant corruption people are getting slowly unhappy with the CPC rule when they are struggling for roz roti ...A war is what which can rake up the emotions of the people and trust me when someone is emotionally high he may even die starving giving his money to defend the country ..Remember how our poor people and daily wager contribute when ever there was a war fund collection happened ..Nationalism triumphs all the other physiological and sociological needs ...The chinese are preparing for something big may be not immediately but definitely ..Time our MoD Bureaucrats and Generals use this window gap what ever we get to push rapid modernisation and weapons acquisitions ..Lets not do any more procrastination we did enough till now ...

Why they are trying to take common chinese citizens in confidence and spreading India related propaganda?? Man i am feeling they are planning something really big against us, we all are taking these things lightly but my pessimistic mind is sensing something very fishy over here.

 

[lcafanboy]

At BRICS meeting, Xi Jinping calls for 'peaceful settlement' of regional disputes
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...al-disputes/articleshow/59492035.cms?from=mdr

DAR GAYA CHINA
Peaceful? Wait Face saving.

 

[Cutting Edge 2]

At BRICS meeting, Xi Jinping calls for 'peaceful settlement' of regional disputes
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...al-disputes/articleshow/59492035.cms?from=mdr

DAR GAYA CHINA
Peaceful? Wait Face saving.

Chinese(and commies in general) have a habit of attacking when we are least expecting.

If they try to be too friendly, start ringing alarm bells.

 

[itsme]

Chinese(and commies in general) have a habit of attacking when we are least expecting.

If they try to be too friendly, start ringing alarm bells.

Exactly, these look like some kinda ruse.

 

[Kunal Biswas]

The Sikkim patrol clash

The territorial and boundary dispute between India and China is a complex, historical, multi-layered wrangle across a sprawling 3,500 kilometre-long border. Yet, a relatively simple disagreement has brought patrols from both armies eyeball-to-eyeball on the Sikkim-Tibet border since June 16 and led to China blocking the travel of Indian pilgrims to Kailash Mansarovar through the Nathu La border pass. At issue is sovereignty over a scenic, 4,000-metre-high pasture called Doklam – less than 100 square kilometres in spread. India claims that the Chumbi Valley, a dagger-shaped wedge of Chinese territory protruding southward from the Tibetan plateau, ends north of Doklam at the Batang La pass. China asserts ownership of Doklam too, claiming the boundary runs south of the pasture, along the dominating Gyemo Chen mountain, which China calls Mount Gipmochi. Complicating this otherwise straightforward dispute is Bhutan, since the tri-junction of the Sikkim-Tibet-Bhutan boundary falls here. Bhutan’s claims are supportive of India’s.

Except for Ladakh, which lies northeast of the Himalayas, the de facto Sino-Indian boundary, called the Line of Actual Control (LAC), broadly follows the Himalayan watershed. The commonest form of dispute – and there are 14 separate disputes along the LAC – is whether one ridgeline, or the neighbouring one, constitutes the watershed. The 1962 war was sparked off near Ziminthang by disagreement over whether the boundary ran along the Thagla Ridge, as India claimed, or along the Hathungla ridgeline to its south, as China contended. The 1986 Sumdorong Chu confrontation, which saw India moving tens of thousands of troops to the trouble spot, was over the tiny Thangdrong grazing ground near Tawang, with India claiming the watershed ran north of that meadow, and China claiming it was to the south. At Walong too, at the eastern end of the Sino-Indian boundary, disagreement centres on which ridgeline constitutes the watershed. These small disputes over the alignment of the LAC are sub-sets of a major overarching territorial dispute – in which China claims all of Arunachal Pradesh (Southern Tibet); and India claims the Aksai Chin plateau.

Why then is Beijing pressing its case for the Doklam Plateau so determinedly? The answer is probably that, unlike many claims elsewhere, Beijing has an arguable case here. As China’s foreign ministry spokesperson spelt out in tedious detail last week, the 1890 Anglo-Chinese Convention Relating to Sikkim and Tibet specifically mentioned Mount Gipmochi as tri-junction of China, India and Bhutan. True, Beijing rejects as “colonial impositions” other British era agreements, like the 1914 Simla Convention that birthed the McMahon Line. But, there is a difference – China actually signed the 1890 agreement, and not the 1914 one. Beijing also argues that Jawaharlal Nehru endorsed the 1890 agreement in a 1959 letter to Zhou Enlai.

Beijing also cites a pastureland claim over Doklam, arguing that the yak graziers of Yadong have long held grazing rights over Doklam, and that graziers from Bhutan paid a “grass tax” to Yadong graziers if they wanted to herd there. China’s foreign ministry claims the Tibet Archives still possess “grass tax” receipts from earlier times. The grazier argument is a powerful one in borderlands peopled by nomadic herders. Both China and India use it to back their territorial claims in other disputed sectors.

Although Beijing has made Indian withdrawal a precondition for de-escalating the Doklam face-off, Indian forces are showing no sign of blinking. This firmness follows a pattern seen in earlier patrol confrontations in Ladakh, like in Daulet Beg Oldi in April-May 2013; and in Chumar in September 2014. Over the preceding decade, India’s defensive posture has been greatly stiffened by raising two new divisions in the Northeast; an armoured brigade each for Ladakh and the Northeast; a mountain strike corps currently being raised and major improvements in India’s air defence and air strike capabilities. Whereas once, China bullied India on the LAC and – as it is attempting in Doklam – built roads, tracks and bunkers as “facts on the ground” to consolidate its position in any future negotiation; today the Indian Army is rightly willing to, and capable of, physically blocking such attempts.

The question then is: Does the army’s new assertiveness risk a patrol clash escalating into shooting and possibly skirmishes on a wider front? There has been no shooting on the LAC since 1975, a peace bolstered by the successful “Peace and Tranquillity Agreement” that New Delhi and Beijing signed in 1993. China has pressed for additional agreements, most recently a “Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination” in January 2012; and a “Border Defence Cooperation Agreement” in October 2013. Yet, inexplicably, Beijing continues to resist Indian calls to formalise the LAC’s alignment – an important first step towards resolving the larger territorial dispute. A clear LAC alignment, recognised by both sides, would end the imperative to “create facts on the ground”. This would also greatly reduce patrol clashes – and tamp down the nationalism sentiment in stands in both countries in the way of a comprehensive settlement. Paradoxically, India’s pro-active LAC stance is creating incentives in Beijing for an LAC settlement. Yet, calibrating the aggression and managing each patrol confrontation remain tricky balancing acts. Until an LAC agreement comes about, New Delhi must develop the instruments and expertise needed for managing such crises.

Source : http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/

 

[Kunal Biswas]

The China-India Standoff Explained

With Maps

Source : http://trishul-trident.blogspot.in/

 

[Suryavanshi]

Can we have a deal with Bangladesh to grant us an alternate route to Meghalaya via their land.

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Mr Sengupta may not got all the correct information, Some inputs ..

 

[Kunal Biswas]

The Great Game over Sikkim

Tibetan Army at the beginning of the 20th century

The spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been vociferously trying to convince the Indian correspondents in Beijing about the 1890 Convention (known as Convention of March 17, 1890 between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet).

However, Beijing forgot to mention about the two main stakeholders, Tibet and Sikkim, who were not even consulted by the 'Great Imperial Powers'.

It is interesting to have the views of Tsepon WD Shakabpa, the Tibetan politician and famous historian.
In his Tibet: a Political History, he explained:

In 1890 a convention was drawn up in Calcutta by Lord Lansdowne, the Governor-General of India and Sheng-t'ai, the Manchu Amban from Lhasa, without consulting the government of Tibet. The first article of the convention agreement defined the boundary between Tibet and Sikkim, and the second article recognized a British protectorate over Sikkim, which gave them exclusive control over the internal administration and the foreign relations of that country.

There was, however, no corresponding acknowledgment on the part of the British of China's authority over Tibet. The remaining six articles related to Tibet, and since she was not represented at the Convention, those articles were not allowed to be put into practice by the Tibetans. The British were aware that China exercised no real power in Tibet at that time; but it suited their interests to deal with the Manchus, because of the advantages they gained from the Convention.

It is also possible that, because of the brief clash between the Tibetans and the British at Lungthur [see note below], the Manchus were afraid that Tibet and Britain might enter into direct negotiations; they therefore agreed to a Convention to forestall such a possibility.

An addition was made to the Convention, known as the Trade Regulations of 1893, in which the question of increasing trade facilities across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier was discussed. Again, the provisions of that agreement could not be enforced because Tibet had not been a party to the negotiations. It is surprising that the British entered into a second agreement with the Manchus, when they knew from the results of the first agreement that there was no way of putting the agreement into effect. The Manchus had signed on behalf of the Tibetans; yet they were totally unable to persuade or force them to carry out the provisions of the agreement. A Tibetan, Lachag Paljor Dorje Shatra, was sent to Darjeeling to study the situation. He sent valuable reports to Lhasa; but they did not meet with the favor of the government, which still believed that too close a contact with the British would damage the Tibetan way of life and religion.

About that time, a Japanese monk, Ekai Kawaguchi, under the pretext of being a Ladahki monk, was enrolled for studies at the Sera monastery. He was delivering inaccurate information to the British in India through Sarat Chandra Das. Those inaccurate reports led the British to believe that Tibet was receiving military aid in the form of "small firearms, bullets, and other interesting objects" from Russia.

Moreover, Kawaguchi estimated that there must have been over two hundred Buriat students in the major monasteries of Tibet. The increasing fear of the establishment of Russian influence in Tibet, which would constitute a grave danger to India, led the British to realize that they could no longer deal with Tibet through China; but that they must attempt to establish direct contact with the Lhasa government.
The fact that the Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893 proved in practice to be of not the slightest use was because Tibet never recognized them. Francis Younghusband quotes Claude White, the Political Officer of Sikkim, as saying that the Chinese had "no authority whatever" in Tibet and that "China was suzerain over Tibet only in name".

Note on Lungthur:

In 1887, a fortified post was built by the Tibetans in Lungthur in North Sikkim, which according them, was inside their territory. Unfortunately the British did not agree with the demarcations and demanded their immediate removal.

An ultimatum was sent to the Tibetan commanders to vacate their fortifications before March 15, 1888. At the same time the British sent a formal protest which was forwarded to the Manchus and the Dalai Lama by the Choegyal.

Though not in a position to intervene, the Manchus told the British that “no marked separation existed formerly between Tibet and Sikkim” and that the Tibetans regarded the kingdom of Sikkim as an extension of their own country.

The Kashag (Cabinet of Ministers) replied to the Choegyal that there was no harm if Tibet defended its own borders. This time the British were not in a mood to discuss or even negotiate the exact position of the border.

With the pressure mounting, the British positioned more than 2,000 troops of the Sikkim Field Force. The Tibetans sent 900 men as reinforcement under two generals and a minister, Kalon Lhalu.

Till the last minute the Choegyal tried to mediate, but each party was determined to show the other that they were within their rights. Unfortunately for the Tibetans, their troops were no match for the British, neither in training, equipment nor discipline. The clash which took place at Lungthur was short and the Tibetans were trounced.


Where is Gipmochi?
Article 1 of the 1890 Convention states:

The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluents from the waters flowing in to the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier, and follows the above-mentioned water-parting to the point where it meets Nepal territory. The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluents from the waters flowing in to the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier, and follows the above-mentioned water-parting to the point where it meets Nepal territory.

According to Sikkimese records, Gipmochi is Batang La, 5 km north of Doka La.
It means the territory South of Batang La is Bhutanese, therefore India did not 'trespass' into Tibet.

All this fuss for nothing?


Source : http://claudearpi.blogspot.in/

 

[Butter Chicken]

3 Jawans injured in Porki firing in Poonch district....

 

[SanjeevM]

I hope injured jawans are safe.

 

[tharun]

Mr Sengupta may not got all the correct information, Some inputs ..

Bro what is the total strength and composition of PLA ground forces facing India.
I mean total no of soldiers, armour, artillery etc.

 

[rishivashista13]

Can we have a deal with Bangladesh to grant us an alternate route to Meghalaya via their land.

And how it will help ?

Sent from my Redmi 4A using Tapatalk

 

[Butter Chicken]

2 civilians killed by Porki firing in Poonch sector



EDit-Soldier on leave and wife killed by Porkis

 

[Bornubus]

The Great Game over Sikkim

The spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been vociferously trying to convince the Indian correspondents in Beijing about the 1890 Convention (known as Convention of March 17, 1890 between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet).

However, Beijing forgot to mention about the two main stakeholders, Tibet and Sikkim, who were not even consulted by the 'Great Imperial Powers'.

It is interesting to have the views of Tsepon WD Shakabpa, the Tibetan politician and famous historian.
In his Tibet: a Political History, he explained:

In 1890 a convention was drawn up in Calcutta by Lord Lansdowne, the Governor-General of India and Sheng-t'ai, the Manchu Amban from Lhasa, without consulting the government of Tibet. The first article of the convention agreement defined the boundary between Tibet and Sikkim, and the second article recognized a British protectorate over Sikkim, which gave them exclusive control over the internal administration and the foreign relations of that country.

There was, however, no corresponding acknowledgment on the part of the British of China's authority over Tibet. The remaining six articles related to Tibet, and since she was not represented at the Convention, those articles were not allowed to be put into practice by the Tibetans. The British were aware that China exercised no real power in Tibet at that time; but it suited their interests to deal with the Manchus, because of the advantages they gained from the Convention.

It is also possible that, because of the brief clash between the Tibetans and the British at Lungthur [see note below], the Manchus were afraid that Tibet and Britain might enter into direct negotiations; they therefore agreed to a Convention to forestall such a possibility.

An addition was made to the Convention, known as the Trade Regulations of 1893, in which the question of increasing trade facilities across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier was discussed. Again, the provisions of that agreement could not be enforced because Tibet had not been a party to the negotiations. It is surprising that the British entered into a second agreement with the Manchus, when they knew from the results of the first agreement that there was no way of putting the agreement into effect. The Manchus had signed on behalf of the Tibetans; yet they were totally unable to persuade or force them to carry out the provisions of the agreement. A Tibetan, Lachag Paljor Dorje Shatra, was sent to Darjeeling to study the situation. He sent valuable reports to Lhasa; but they did not meet with the favor of the government, which still believed that too close a contact with the British would damage the Tibetan way of life and religion.

About that time, a Japanese monk, Ekai Kawaguchi, under the pretext of being a Ladahki monk, was enrolled for studies at the Sera monastery. He was delivering inaccurate information to the British in India through Sarat Chandra Das. Those inaccurate reports led the British to believe that Tibet was receiving military aid in the form of "small firearms, bullets, and other interesting objects" from Russia.

Moreover, Kawaguchi estimated that there must have been over two hundred Buriat students in the major monasteries of Tibet. The increasing fear of the establishment of Russian influence in Tibet, which would constitute a grave danger to India, led the British to realize that they could no longer deal with Tibet through China; but that they must attempt to establish direct contact with the Lhasa government.
The fact that the Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893 proved in practice to be of not the slightest use was because Tibet never recognized them. Francis Younghusband quotes Claude White, the Political Officer of Sikkim, as saying that the Chinese had "no authority whatever" in Tibet and that "China was suzerain over Tibet only in name".

Note on Lungthur:

In 1887, a fortified post was built by the Tibetans in Lungthur in North Sikkim, which according them, was inside their territory. Unfortunately the British did not agree with the demarcations and demanded their immediate removal.

An ultimatum was sent to the Tibetan commanders to vacate their fortifications before March 15, 1888. At the same time the British sent a formal protest which was forwarded to the Manchus and the Dalai Lama by the Choegyal.

Though not in a position to intervene, the Manchus told the British that “no marked separation existed formerly between Tibet and Sikkim” and that the Tibetans regarded the kingdom of Sikkim as an extension of their own country.

The Kashag (Cabinet of Ministers) replied to the Choegyal that there was no harm if Tibet defended its own borders. This time the British were not in a mood to discuss or even negotiate the exact position of the border.

With the pressure mounting, the British positioned more than 2,000 troops of the Sikkim Field Force. The Tibetans sent 900 men as reinforcement under two generals and a minister, Kalon Lhalu.

Till the last minute the Choegyal tried to mediate, but each party was determined to show the other that they were within their rights. Unfortunately for the Tibetans, their troops were no match for the British, neither in training, equipment nor discipline. The clash which took place at Lungthur was short and the Tibetans were trounced.


Where is Gipmochi?
Article 1 of the 1890 Convention states:

The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluents from the waters flowing in to the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier, and follows the above-mentioned water-parting to the point where it meets Nepal territory. The boundary of Sikkim and Tibet shall be the crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its affluents from the waters flowing in to the Tibetan Mochu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier, and follows the above-mentioned water-parting to the point where it meets Nepal territory.

According to Sikkimese records, Gipmochi is Batang La, 5 km north of Doka La.
It means the territory South of Batang La is Bhutanese, therefore India did not 'trespass' into Tibet.

All this fuss for nothing?


Source : http://claudearpi.blogspot.in/

China do not honor any treaty. 1842 treaty of Chushul was signed by Dogras (under Sikh) and Chinese, but China violated in 1962