Is the tank becoming obsolete?

Damian

New Member
Joined
Aug 20, 2011
Messages
4,836
Likes
2,202
Yes in theory at least, the turret on WPB Anders, can be used as separated combat module, that can be placed on other platforms.

There were even ideas with replacing the old turret on PT-91 with that from WPB Anders, but some people said that turret basket of this turret is just too long, so it won't fit in to the hull of T-72 FoV.
 

Kunal Biswas

Member of the Year 2011
New Member
Joined
May 26, 2010
Messages
31,122
Likes
41,041
but some people said that turret basket of this turret is just too long, so it won't fit in to the hull of T-72 FoV.

Its way shorter than EX turret, I doubt Anders turret would pose such limitation..



On Arjun this might look like this..

Not my work, But Sayareakd..
 

Damian

New Member
Joined
Aug 20, 2011
Messages
4,836
Likes
2,202
You don't understand Kunal, the problem is with turret basket, where crew sits, they can't place it in T-72/PT-91 hull, because the basket is too high.
 

W.G.Ewald

Defence Professionals/ DFI member of 2
New Member
Joined
Sep 28, 2011
Messages
14,139
Likes
8,606
Which is the better concept, the unmanned turret, or the turretless tank, e.g. "S-tank."
 

Armand2REP

CHINI EXPERT
New Member
Joined
Dec 17, 2009
Messages
13,811
Likes
6,734
Country flag
I'm sorry to bring this up guys, but Anders as any kind of tank is laughable. Adding a 120mm turret is going to add several tonnes to its base weight. At only Level 3 it won't be able to stay in combat against an IFV. The Level 5 add on would be required adding another 5-6 tonnes of armour. At that weight it will have the mobility of a T-55. :shocked:
 

Ray

The Chairman
New Member
Joined
Apr 17, 2009
Messages
43,132
Likes
23,841
Has the Tank become obsolete in modern warfare ?

Actually the answer lies in Brig Richard E Simpkins book 'Race to the Swift' Chapter 7 titled Rotary Wing Revolution.

He contends that the miltiaries of the twenties saw the freedom of movement of prepared surfaces as one of the major assets of the 'caterpillar track'. They envisaged the entire mechanised force, logistic backing and all, rolling freely in tactical formation over the countryside like any Fleet sailing in blue water.

They were wrong; and for three solid reasons.

"¢ Even the best of cross country vehicles move far more slowly off roads and other prepared surfaces than it does on them.

"¢ Most cross country vehicles use more deadweight to lift a ton of payload than their road bound counterparts, and even a vehicle of the same all up mass uses far more fuel and suffers more wear and tear cross country than on roads. The result is that a cross country supply echelon can easily become self consuming requiring greater weight in fuel and stores that it can carry. Even with road bound supply vehicles, there are many routes in many parts of the world over which only the lightest of forces can be supplied by land.

"¢ Even if the cost of cross country logistic vehicles could be tolerated, the money and resources could be put to better military effect.

By the same token, the pioneers of Airborne Forces felt that they had liberated themselves from the bondage of surface movement. They too were wrong. Throughout the development of flight, the greater technical problem and hazards has been associated with leaving and returning to ground.

Being tied to prepared surfaces imposes a linearity of its own at take off In the face of modern surveillance sensors, the need to concentrate transport aircraft on the ground for loading is likely to limit airborne operations to a brigade level, and because of the risk of losing surprise, severely to restrict their scope. The flight mode of fixed wing aircraft prevents paratroopers from achieving the concentration in space and time on dropping which their lack of protected mobility on the ground calls for. Their linearity over the dropping zone has proved to be the Achilles Heel of paratroopers, limiting to tactical level their successful use against organised opposition.

The rotary wing (helicopter) overcomes the above handicaps mentioned in the cases discussed.

Take the example of the Soviet Airborne Assault Brigade, with 60 attack/ assault helicopters and 24 first lime medium transport helicopters, and a strength probably of 1900 men. The Soviets assumed this to be an operational formation and rated its combat worth in the mobile force as equivalent to that of a Tank Division (with over 10,000 men and 500 major tactical vehicles).

This Brigade obtained its momentum from very high tempo and very small mass , thus solving the movement problem before it started. An armoured group of 84 tactical vehicles moving at 'forced march' speed and normal Soviet density has a pass time of 1/4 hour or so. But his helicopter brigade could do one thing that almost every theorist and analytical historian agrees about – it can move dispersed and fight concentrated . What is more, it can lie dispersed and well back, in comparative safety. It can be envisaged in waiting in dispersed company hides along a lateral, taking off simultaneously, flying nap of the earth in open line, and converging radially on its objective. It will then have Zero pass time!

The Soviet Airborne assault brigade thus used their helicopters as infantry fighting vehicles.
 

Ray

The Chairman
New Member
Joined
Apr 17, 2009
Messages
43,132
Likes
23,841
The above is merely a glimpse on the vast discourse on his Thoughts on 21 st Century Warfare of what Brig Simpkins, who is an acknowledged Mechanised Warfare authority, felt in his rather detailed analysis of Mechanised Warfare.

One cannot reproduce all what he had to say and so what's above is a one off.

**********************

Brigadier Richard Evelyn Simpkin MC (1921–1986) was a British Army officer.

Simpkin was commissioned into the Royal Tank Regiment in 1941. He cut short a degree course at the University of Cambridge to do so. He served in North Africa where he won the Military Cross and was taken prisoner. Simpkin was awarded an Order of the British Empire (OBE) for his part in the new design of the Chieftain tank and retired from the army in 1971. He continued to write, lecture and consult about armor doctrine, tactics and Soviet thinking, living at first in Norfolk, England where he was brought up and then in Elgin, Scotland. This was the birthplace of his wife, Barbara, descended from the Grant family who owned Glen Grant Whiskey before it was sold to Seagrams in the 1970s.
Simpkin became a Russian language specialist and military theorist.

Race to the Swift is a comprehensive military theory work in the NATO context; it contains Simpkin's ideas and observations on the nature of warfare, technology and manoeuvre.

Deep Battle is a work about Red Army general and theorist Mikhail Tukhachevsky. It is part biography, part theory, and part translation of Tukhachevsky's works, focusing on Tukhachevsky's concepts of Deep Battle Theory. The centerpiece is the translation of the 1936 Red Army operations manual PU-36 Deep Operation, which Tukhachevsky is believed to have masterminded.
 
Last edited:

Ray

The Chairman
New Member
Joined
Apr 17, 2009
Messages
43,132
Likes
23,841
REAR AREA SECURITY
By MAJOR B. M. Young's, USMC
April 6, 1984

"Rear area security has been a continuing problem for armies throughout history. Today is no different; the capability of the Soviet Union to inflict damage to our rear areas is a serious threat. Those threats and actions within the . . . rear area which impede or deny the orderly flow of supplies and services to the forward maneuver elements affect directly the ability of those maneuver elements to accomplish their mission.

The U. S. Army's FM 100-5, Operations, considered to be the capstone publication for U. S. maneuver warfare, specifically warns:
'Just as we plan to fight in the enemy's rear area, so he plans to fight in ours. The enemy will carefully coordinate his attack in our rear area with his actions in the main battle area....the object of these rear area attacks is to destroy critical links, to cause disruption, and to degrade the capability of forces dedicated to support or reinforce the main effort.'
. . .

Perhaps at the outset, some terms should be defined. The rear area is the area in the rear of the combat and forward areas. Rear area security (RAS) is defined as those measures taken prior to, during, and/or after an enemy airborne attack, sabotage action, infiltration, guerrilla action, and/or initiation of psychological or propaganda warfare to minimize the effects thereof. Rear area protection (RAP) includes all measures taken to prevent interruptions of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) operations.

A historical review of rear area operations reveals that the Soviet Union has traditionally been successful in employing forces in the enemy's rear area. These rear area operations were conducted to disrupt or destroy enemy combat support and combat service support operations and as economy of force measures to force enemy commanders to divert tactical or frontline units in defense of their rear areas. Successful rear area operations in military history serve to emphasize the importance and magnitude of the rear area security problem.

. . .

The Soviet Army has had tremendous experience with rear area operations and is cognizant of their effectiveness.

Having stated the historical significance of rear area operations, it is now appropriate to examine briefly the threat impose by our most likely enemy in futur3e conflicts.

The lessons of World War II are still vivid in the minds of the Soviet military hierarchy. The two principles of war which seem to dominate Soviet military doctrine are: offensive and mass. Western strategists and tacticians are continuously working on methods to defeat or counter these
Soviet capabilities.

The immediate question should be, "What is the threat today?" The principles of war, economy of force (the reciprocal of mass) and the offensive are the driving factors in the importance of rear area operations as a force multiplier in Soviet doctrine today.

The evolution of Soviet doctrine for the employment of ground forces developed rapidly in post World War II. Soviet conventional ground forces were trained and equipped to maneuver motorized rifle and tank units in seizing objectives deep in the enemy rear areas. Soviet doctrine continues to emphasize the offensive and high-speed penetration of enemy defenses and combat formations to seize deep objectives.

The Soviet desant concept advocates employing forces in the enemy rear areas or flanks. This concept is a consolidation of Soviet thinking in the employment of airborne, heliborne, and amphibious forces in economy of force operations to disrupt the enemy rear area. The desant concept is an accessory to the principle of the offensive because its primary purpose is to support the advance of the Soviet regular ground forces.

The Soviet forces involved in rear area operations would be drawn primarily from three sources: airborne units, long-range reconnaissance units from tank and motorized rifle units, and designated combined arms units (also called forward detachments) from tank and motorized rifle units.

The Soviet Union maintains the world's largest airborne force which is organized into seven active divisions. The most important feature of these airborne divisions and their subordinate units is that, once landed, they are a light-armor mechanized force. The BMD is the airborne equivalent of the Soviet Infantry combat fighting vehicle BMP, and, as such, provides Soviet airborne forces a significant mobility and firepower capability.

Soviet doctrine assigns three basic missions to airborne forces: (1) strategic; (2) operational; and (3) tactical.

The primary difference in these missions is the depth of operation and the nature of the objectives. Of importance to this paper are the operational and tactical missions. Operational missions in support of the Front (largest Soviet fighting organization) are executed under the control of the Front commander. These missions include seizing bridgeheads, airfields, road junctions, as well as destruction of enemy logistical facilities. Operating in the enemy rear areas, these units prevent the effective and timely employment of reserve forces and generally disrupt the enemy's offensive and defensive posture. Standard procedure for operational missions of this nature would involve dropping a regimental sized unit up to 300km beyond the FEBA in support of a Front offensive. Ground forces linkup would occur within two to three days with the airborne forces.

The tactical mission concept includes battalion to regimental-sized operations up to 100km beyond the FEBA in support of an Army offensive. Linkup in these operations is planned within 48 hours. The tactical mission has objectives similar to operational missions, but on a smaller scale.

Tactical long-range reconnaissance units are found in reconnaissance battalions of motorized rifle and tank divisions, the mission of these units is to conduct ground reconnaissance of the enemy rear area up to 100km beyond the FEBA. These battalions are capable of operating in an area of 50-60km wide on three or four axes. Six to eight armored reconnaissance squads, each consisting of two to three BRDM's and/or BMP-R's and motorcycles, are used. Their primary mission is reconnaissance, but they may attack small targets of opportunity or even conduct sabotage operations against logistic units. In addition, long-range reconnaissance patrols are often flown by helicopter. They can operate throughout a rear area to locate both reserve force and command post locations and to recon possible avenues of approach.

The special combined arms unit, also called a forward detachment, is typically composed of a motorized rifle battalion with tanks, self-propelled artillery, and air defense weapons. This detachment is a small, highly mobile and firepower intensive unit. These forward detachments take advantage of a gap in the enemy front and penetrate deep into the enemy rear area. The objectives of these small independent units vary according to the situation. These detachments are key elements in the successful linkup with airborne and helicopter forces. How valid a threat is a forward detachment? According to Victor Suvorov, author of Inside the Soviet Army, one battalion in each Soviet regiment is held ready to assume the mission of a forward detachment at all times.

In conjunction with the Soviet forces previously mentioned three additional organizations have been recently identified as having the primary mission of operating in an enemy's rear area. The three organizations are: the Spetsnaz; Air Assault Brigades; and the Operational Maneuver Group (OMG).

The Spetsnaz are the special purpose or unconventional warfare forces of the Soviet Union. Each Combined Arms Army and Tank Army has a Spetsnaz Company totaling approximately 105 personnel. Depending upon its assigned mission, the company can operate as an entity or it can be fragmented into smaller groups and teams. In addition, each Front has a Spetsnaz Brigade of approximately 1300 highly-skilled, elite troops. Spetsnaz troops are all volunteers and are superbly trained to operate in a clandestine manner behind enemy lines. The Soviets consider that Spetsnaz operations can only be successful if they take place simultaneously on a massive scale with other operations. Spetsnaz units are placed in areas where there are numerous high-value targets (i.e., command posts, logistical facilities).

The Soviet Air Assault Brigades represent a significant increase in the Front level combat capability. These brigades have a combination of battalions which are parachute and BMD-equipped. The air assault brigade is capable of undertaking a myriad of missions because of its unique structure, mobility, and firepower. The brigade consists of three battalions with approximately 2,500 personnel; the battalions are employed by airborne drop or by helicopter. The missions assigned the heliborne battalions include neutralization of command posts, seizure of key terrain, and destruction of logistics sites. Soviet doctrine for the employment of heliborne forces states that those forces can be inserted anywhere in the tactical depth of the enemy's defense or combat formations up to 50km from friendly forces.

The Operational Maneuver Group (OMG) appears to be a large one-way raiding force, composed of infantry, tanks, artillery, air defense and a heavy air assault component. The Soviets believe that successful OMG operations could severely disrupt the enemy rear area, thereby increasing the chances of maintaining the rapid advance of Army and Front level forces. The OMG is a specially tailored combat force with no fixed structure. The OMG has three main missions, all of which are directed at the enemy's rear area: (1) destruction of enemy weapons systems; (2) destruction of the enemy's in-depth defense or offensive combat formation (actions by the OMG would include destruction of command and control positions, logistics assets and surprise attacks on flank and rear area units); (3) seizure of deep key terrain and critical objectives.

It should be readily apparent that the Soviet threat to rear area security is quite significant. Soviet operations in the rear area will not of themselves be of sufficient scale to bring about a Soviet victory. One major function of all the forces mentioned is to reduce the enemy's capacity to resist, thus making it easier for the main attacking forces to accomplish their missions.

Having described the Soviet threat to rear areas, it would be appropriate to review what current doctrine provides the conduct of rear area security operations.

U. S. Army doctrine is found in FM 31-85, Rear Area Protection (RAP) Operations. Though issued in 1970, it does provide a basic philosophy of RAS and eight principles which are still valid: austerity, command, and economy of force, integrated protection, offensive, responsiveness, supervision, and priority of risks.

The cornerstone of Army doctrine is FM 100-5, Operations, which provides information on Rear Area Protection and gives a concise and meaningful resume of the threat as it is projected and adequately outlines responsibilities for rear and combat operations (RACO)."
 

Ray

The Chairman
New Member
Joined
Apr 17, 2009
Messages
43,132
Likes
23,841
So, the issue is still a complex one.

It all depends on the political leadership as to what is the nation's aim, how far they are willing to go, how fast, how deep and what would be the exit policy.

It will also depend on which nation is addressing the issue - a third world one, a developing nation or a developed nation.

There is no universal answer that can be applied across the board.

Weapons and Organisation depends the Nation's CNP.
 

Akim

New Member
Joined
Jun 14, 2012
Messages
10,353
Likes
8,645
Country flag
Structurally - it so. I will not begin to refute is this information, a long ago already open. I will add only. Such correlation of troops, allowed of the Soviet army for three days to go out to English Channel.
But that it was, then passed already. Conversation of conect about the fate of tank in modern terms.
 

Akim

New Member
Joined
Jun 14, 2012
Messages
10,353
Likes
8,645
Country flag
According to Victor Suvorov, author of Inside the Soviet Army, one battalion in each Soviet regiment is held ready to assume the mission of a forward detachment at all times.

Viktor Suvorov (Rezun) - the biggest liar. All his books aimed at, to make more money.
 

Bhadra

New Member
Joined
Jul 11, 2011
Messages
11,991
Likes
23,756
Country flag
So, the issue is still a complex one.

It all depends on the political leadership as to what is the nation's aim, how far they are willing to go, how fast, how deep and what would be the exit policy.

It will also depend on which nation is addressing the issue - a third world one, a developing nation or a developed nation.

There is no universal answer that can be applied across the board.

Weapons and Organisation depends the Nation's CNP.


The biggest problem would be that except for Russia and USA who has got oil to move such kind of forces guzzling away dollar based imported oil. In India Pakistan context the tanks would be stopped dead on their tracks after a three days campaign as the countries would come to their reserve stocks endangering the economies of the nations ??

The achievements at the end of three days wars would be another Asla Uttar or Chawinda tanks shooting each other like static pill boxes..

In this forum people like Edwald, Ekim, my Ukrainian and Polish NCO friends, Kunal turn abusive rather than having abilities to see other point of view. They are nut bolt specialists, all right.
If you argue with them than moderators are too eager to impose infringements as if they find a reason for existence.
 

Akim

New Member
Joined
Jun 14, 2012
Messages
10,353
Likes
8,645
Country flag
In this forum people like Edwald, Ekim, my Ukrainian and Polish NCO friends, Kunal turn abusive rather than having abilities to see other point of view. They are nut bolt specialists, all right.
If you argue with them than moderators are too eager to impose infringements as if they find a reason for existence.
Tell, then in detail about your vision of tactic/pl of modern fight. How can soldier take a enemy trench?
 

Damian

New Member
Joined
Aug 20, 2011
Messages
4,836
Likes
2,202
Problem with supplies is greatly overestimated, and do not take in to consideration new types of vehicles propulsion, be it hybrid or even completely electric. Even Poland is working on hybrid powerpacks for armored figthing vehicles (tracked and wheeled), I do not understand why countries like India can't? USA already have some interesting achievements in this area.
 

Bhadra

New Member
Joined
Jul 11, 2011
Messages
11,991
Likes
23,756
Country flag
Tell, then in detail about your vision of tactic/pl of modern fight. How can soldier take a enemy trench?
The rotary revolution, as explained by Gen Ray quoting Richard Simpkin is the new weapon of manoeuvre ...

How does one capture a trench in mountains, jungles and riverine warfare without tanks? How did India capture a country called Bangladesh without using any tanks? European plains do not exist everywhere in the world? European plains are the most ideal tank terrains extended by Russian barren lands and Steppes.

And who ever told you tanks can capture infantry trench ?? Why could tank capture infantry trenches in Yom Kippur war? The primary job of tanks in an assault is to carry the infantry to enemy infantry trenches and degrade their potential and never to capture those trenches! If you do not understand this much, you need to brush up your basics.

The job of the tanks is destruction of enemy mobile forces by mobility, manoeuvre, fire power and shock action all cumulatively called displacement in physical and psychological dimensions. The aim of the mechanised warfare is to defeat enemy mind and render him incapable of facing your forces. Then carry out relentless destruction of enemy forces by advance , contact and pursuits.

You are still at employment of armor in the first world war. Please come out of the trench !
 
Last edited:

Articles

Top