Iran Military Developments

[nandu]

Iran's Navies Flex Their Muscle

Iran's Navies Flex Their Muscle

Iran's first domestically made destroyer, "Jamaran," sails in the Persian Gulf in February.

Iranian naval forces have recently staged two large-scale maneuvers intended both to enhance their combat capabilities and to demonstrate their strength to the West.

The first exercise, called Great Prophet V and held on April 22-25, was conducted by the navy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. The second, dubbed Velayat 89, began on May 5 and is scheduled to last eight days. It is being conducted by the Iranian naval branch of the Iranian military (IRIM) in the Gulf of Oman.

In order to deal with a complex security environment in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman and taking into account many constraints on its naval power, Iran has been working to align its operational doctrine with its goals and capabilities. Accordingly, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as supreme commander of the armed forces, has assigned the IRGC's navy sole responsibility for defending Iranian interests in the Persian Gulf, while the IRIM's navy is tasked with boosting Iran's presence in the Gulf of Oman.

Although this division of labor was formally announced in September 2008, the process of implementing it has already been under way for several years. Despite official rhetoric about "the brotherhood of the two navies" and reports of their close cooperation and coordination in many fields, the two forces are most definitely rivals.

The IRGC's navy -- which wields immense political influence at the General Command Headquarters (Khamenei's military headquarters), the Defense Ministry, the government, and among influential clerics - has been in a privileged position for resources and funding. Its operational role has expanded continuously since its establishment as an independent force in 1985, during the Iran-Iraq war.

Photo:IRGC starts military drills in Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz

High-Profile Exercises

The IRGC navy has some 22,000 personnel, including about 5,000 marines. Its sailors and marines are stationed in almost every Iranian port and on islands in the Persian Gulf. According to its outgoing commander, Rear Admiral Morteza Saffari, the IRGC navy has the capability of increasing its manpower three times over during a time of crisis by mobilizing Basij militia members from littoral provinces.

Brigadier General Hossein Salami, deputy IRGC commander, reportedly that more than 300 missile boats, torpedo boats, and speed boats with rocket launchers and machine guns participated in the high-profile three-day Great Prophet V exercises.

During the final phase, the IGRC navy fired domestically produced shore-to-sea and sea-to-sea missiles that are based on Chinese models. These included the Saeqeh (Lightning); Noor (Light, based on the Chinese C-802); and Nasr (Victory, based on the C-704). Most of these weapons can be installed on trucks or high-speed attack boats, and most of the shore-to-sea missiles can engage targets up to 200 kilometers away.

(China, by the way, has been quietly providing Iran with missile technology for some time now; about six weeks before the exercises, the Nasr missile production site was officially opened by Defense Minister Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi and was widely covered by the Iranian media.)

Vahidi was also quoted as saying that during the war games, "a number of domestically produced drones" and "laser smart weapons" were tested. Also, some 30 vessels practiced laying dummy mines in the waters of the strait. The exercises also saw the deployment of the new "radar-evading and high speed" Ya Mahdi boat. Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri was quoted as saying the new boat, which is now in mass production, is "a remote-controlled vessel whose missiles can blow 7-meter holes in any enemy ship."

Asymmetrical Operations

The highlight of the exercises - which were widely covered in Iran's state-run media - was a swarming exercise in which "60 high-speed boats in formations of 10 attacked a hypothetical enemy ship." This is in keeping with the IRGC's doctrine, which emphasizes asymmetrical operations relying on surprise, maneuverability, speed, deception, and hit-and-run attacks in order to counter the overwhelming naval superiority of the United States.

Meanwhile, IRIM navy commander Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari told the Fars news agency that the Velayat 89 exercise in the Gulf of Oman was intended to demonstrate Iran's "might" and the country's ability to protect its interests in the gulf and beyond into the Indian Ocean. At the same time, he said the war games convey "a message of peace and friendship" to the countries of the region and expressed Iran's willingness to conduct joint exercises with neighboring countries. He said "the maintenance of security in the [Persian] Gulf region does not require the presence of foreign forces."

The Velayat 89 exercises have been divided into six phases and will cover an area of some 250,000 square kilometers. They will involve surface ships, submarines, helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and units from the IRIM army and air force. During the final phase, new missiles and torpedoes will be tested. Iran's first domestically built destroyer, the "Jamaran," is also participating in the exercises.

New Line Of Defense

For the first time, the exercises are being directed from the new Jask naval base, opened in October 2008 and located 300 kilometers east of the port of Bandar Abbas. The navy is expected to build a new line of defense east of the Strait of Hormuz and to project itself into the Gulf of Oman and even further, into the northwestern part of the Indian Ocean. This, incidentally, as also a dream of the last shah, an effort that was disrupted by the 1979 revolution.

Photos: Iran's Persian Gulf Naval Maneuvers, 3rd Day

Despite these ambitions, the fact remains that the IRIM navy is just a shadow of the shah's Imperial Navy and has been largely ignored since the revolution. As a result, its capabilities have eroded steadily. The revolution broke the backbone of this navy in terms of both human and other resources. With the exception of the purchase of three Russian-made submarines, no serious attempt has been made to replace the navy's decaying shah-era Western-supplied ships or to revive its fleet air arm. Most of its surface fleet is over 35 years old. Although the Russian Kilo-class subs are capable of laying mines, firing torpedoes, and (possibly) launching antiship missiles, they are vulnerable in the absence of surface or air support.

"The Velayat 89 exercises will show that the projection of the IRIM's navy in the high seas is very serious and noticeable," Sayyari said.

However, the IRIM force is clearly not a blue-water navy and will not acquire such capabilities in the near future. Brigadier General Abdolrahim Musavi's October 2008 claim at the opening of the Jask base that "the mastery of the Islamic republic is going to reach into the Indian Ocean" may safely be dismissed as mere bravado.

Likewise, Sayyari's assertion of an "impenetrable line" of defense east of the Strait of Hormuz along the coast of the Gulf of Oman appears to be an empty promise. The area between Jask and the Pakistani border is barren, isolated, sparsely populated, and boasts little infrastructure except for a small IRIM navy base at Chahbahar. Jask itself has no adequate facilities or infrastructure to support large warships or submarines.

Invested Heavily

It is clear that one of the major aims of Iranian naval preparations in recent years is to deter a possible attack on its territory by Israel or the United States by presenting a credible threat of disrupting access to the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 40 percent of the world's seaborne oil trade travels. Iranian military commanders have repeatedly discussed the possibility of closing the strait in response to a possible attack on Iran. Tehran has invested heavily in coastal-defense missiles, speed boats, and vast stockpiles of mines.

However, Iran also knows that closing the strait would have dire consequences for the Islamic republic itself. Most of Iran's oil exports pass through Hormuz, as does about 40 percent of the gasoline that Iran imports. Moreover, although closing the strait could wreak havoc on oil prices for a time, it is doubtful it would have a lasting impact on global oil supplies or the regional balance of power. Clearly, Tehran would only resort to such a drastic action if it were attacked or felt an attack was imminent.

The conventional wisdom has been that if Iran decided to try to close down the strait, it would lay mines and use shore-based missiles to disrupt shipping. In response, the United States would use overwhelming military power to destroy on-shore missile batteries in short order and then sweep the mines.

But it may be wrong to think the United States could carry out such an operation smoothly. A study by Caitlin Talmadge, a former fellow of John M. Olin Institute of Strategic Studies at Harvard University, indicates that even if Iran initiated just a small mine-laying operation, the sweeping of mines and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz would take at least five weeks or, possibly, even months.

In short, a conflict in the Strait of Hormuz is fraught with uncertainty and risk for both Iran and the West.

http://www.payvand.com/news/10/may/1130.html

 

[nandu]

Iran And The Hormuz Booby Trap

May 15, 2010: Within the past few weeks, Iran has conducted wargames simulating a blockade on the Strait of Hormuz. During these exercises Iran showcased both its maneuvers and green water fleet. Iran is clearly trying to send a message showing the consequences of a military strike on its facilities. However, even if Iran does possess the ability to block the Strait of Hormuz, it would be useless. With Hormuz closed, Iran would choke itself.

When one looks at a map of Iran, they notice that Iran borders seven countries: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, and Iraq. Iran's estimated combined trade with these countries is approximately $22.5 billion (Iran's total exports total $70.16 billion and bilateral trade reaches $127.32 billion), approximately 32 percent of its exports. The rest of Iran's trade, around $48 billion, occurs through shipping routes either through the Caspian Sea or the Persian Gulf.

If Iran attempted to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, the US and NATO would likely respond with their own blockade. The U.S. possesses a superior fleet, so it would be highly unlikely for Iran to eliminate the U.S. fleet and its blockade. Immediately, all trade both ways through the Strait of Hormuz would be stopped.

Iran could never afford such an action. Iran's largest ports, Kharg Island and Lavan Island (which both store and export oil) and Bandar Abbas (which imports and exports commercial and industrial goods), are all in the Persian Gulf. The only exit out of the Persian Gulf is through the Strait of Hormuz. This is where most of Iran's trade flows; Iran has yet to establish significant trade routes in the Caspian Sea.

Crude oil makes up 80 percent of Iran's exports, approximately $56.13 billion. Since both of Iran's largest oil export ports (Kharg Island and Lavan Island) are in the Strait of Hormuz, Iran's exports would shrink drastically. Iran would be unable to ship oil. On top of that, Iran's fleet of 29 supertankers would be confined to the inner Persian Gulf. These large ships, which contribute a significant amount to the Iranian economy, could not break the U.S. blockade.

Even worse, the U.S. would likely pressure its allies in the Middle East to stop trading with Iran. Two countries that would likely cooperate (based on the U.S. troop presence in the country) would be Afghanistan and Iraq, which Iran exports a combined $4.5 billion worth of goods to. If the US offered incentives and gained the support of the UN, other nations (specifically the United Arab Emirates and Turkey) bordering Iran also might halt their trade.

Iran has made several dangerous mistakes. Not only has it relied on one main resource for the majority of its exports, but it also has relied on only a few trade routes; Iran relies too much on the Strait of Hormuz. As a result, a blockade against the Strait of Hormuz, combined with cutting off some of the trade between Iran and its neighbors, would strike a devastating blow to Iran's economy. The economic downturn in Iran would likely cause both internal strife and a decrease in military spending that would weaken Iran's blockade. Blocking the Strait of Hormuz, which 40 percent of the world's oil flows through, may seem like a solid strategy, but in fact it has several flaws. Hopefully Iran considers the economic consequences of closing the Strait of Hormuz.

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htseamo/articles/20100515.aspx

 

[nandu]

Iranian S-300s: To Be, or Not To Be?

Iranian S-300s: To Be, or Not To Be?

A convenient excuse borne of evolving geopolitics or genuine awareness of heated Middle east tensions? Reports are suggesting that some Russian and U.S. officials are saying the new U.N. sanctions on Iran essentially kill the stalled sale of S-300 air defense system by Moscow to Tehran.

Yesterday afternoon a U.S. State Department spokesman volunteered the following to reporters: "UNSCR 1929 prohibits the sale or transfer of items on the UN Register of Conventional Arms, which does not include the S-300. However, for the first time, the resolution calls for States to exercise vigilance and restraint in the sale or transfer of all other arms and related materiel. We appreciate Russia's restraint in the transfer of the S-300 missile system to Iran."

Iranian S-300 mock up?

And just hours ago, a Kremlin official reportedly said Russia will not be able to deliver S-300 air-defense missiles to Iran because of the new U.N. sanctions, according to the Associated Press. The Kremlin official, speaking Friday on condition of anonymity, said "the S-300 falls under these sanctions."

As Aviation Week reported April 26, Iran has long-standing ambitions to acquire the Almaz Antey S-300PMU2 (SA-20 Gargoyle); a deal is believed to have been struck several years ago with Moscow. However, delivery of the system remains in question.

"Tehran continues to invest heavily in advanced air defenses, and the potential acquisition of the Russian SA-20 surface-to-air missile remains a major part of its air defense modernization effort," says a classified Pentagon report to Congress on Iran's military, released a day after the Army Day parade this spring. The report flags the utility of such systems in protecting "key nuclear and industrial facilities."

But to be sure, confusion still reigns on the potential Russian sale, as Oliver Bloom at the Washington think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies blogs about today. He notes how one report on Russian TV network RT said Russia's Federal Service for Military-Industrial Cooperation informed reporters on Thursday that Russia will continue work on the contract to supply the S300 anti-aircraft missile systems to Iran.

Seems like the more things change on this sale, the more they stay the same.

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blog...&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest

 

[youngindian]

Israel vs Iran: The Risk of War

Iran is at the centre of a global storm: targeted by new sanctions, suspected by Washington, defended by Brazil and Turkey. But the complex diplomacy around its nuclear programme could be ended by decisions made not in the United States but in Israel, Paul Rogers writes for openDemocracy.

Iran has returned to the centre of international diplomacy, and with a vengeance. A week after the crisis over Israel's assault on an aid-flotilla bound for Gaza, the United Nations Security Council on 9 June 2010 adopted a resolution imposing another tranche of sanctions on the Tehran regime over its contested nuclear programme. The response - from Iran's ambassador at the UN to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at home - was characteristically vigorous. In the anniversary week of Ahmadinejad's victory in Iran's disputed presidential election on 12 June 2010, Iran's leadership is as determined as ever to withstand what it sees as unjust interference in its internal affairs.

But this is more than just another episode in an endless cycle of confrontation between Iran and the west in general and the United States in particular. The Tehran-Washington polarisation remains one of the principal faultlines of global politics, but two additional elements in the current situation make it both more complex and more perilous than ever:

* the emergence of rising powers onto the global stage

* the deep concern in Israel about Iran's nuclear plans, and its influence over the Hizbollah movement in Lebanon.

A cascade of pressure

The Security Council Resolution 1929, which imposes new restrictions on trade with Iran, was welcomed by Washington as a signal of the international-community's determination to take a tough line with Tehran. The reality is more prosaic: after a lengthy process of negotiation among the council's permanent members, the content of the resolution was gutted in order to accommodate the concerns of Russia and China before they could vote for it.

Even then, it was opposed by two key non-permanent members of the council with influence in their region and in the majority-world, Turkey and Brazil. The leaders of these two states, prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Lula, had agreed a uranium-exchange deal in Tehran on 17 May 2010 in an attempt to defuse the crisis; this reflects both their ambition to play a more prominent role in the "multipolar world" and, more immediately, their deep concern about the possibility of an escalation of the crisis over Iran.

Turkey's active and confident regional diplomacy, not least the critical stance its government has adopted towards Israel (before and after the assault on the Mavi Marmara, in which nine of its citizens were killed), has given the country a new profile across the middle east (see "Israel-Turkey-United States: Gaza's global moment", 3 June 2010). The challenge to leading Arab states that pursue a more conservative path, Hosni Mubarak's Egypt in particular, is evident.

The sanctions issue is only one aspect of these evolving regional dynamics. In themselves, the new measures will have little impact on a near-moribund Iranian economy; and far from posing a threat to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's position, they may even (as the Iranian analyst Ali Ansari suggests) prove counterproductive by fuelling his regime's defiance of perceived western bullying. A year after the eruption of street-protests following Ahmadinejad's contested election victory, a state that continues to work hard to suppress internal dissent can find a ready domestic audience by portraying the latest sanctions as part of an "imperial" agenda.

But three aspects of the sanctions package and their diplomatic context do have implications for Iran. The first is that Russia is now unlikely to supply Iran with the S-300 anti-aircraft/anti-missile system, as had earlier been agreed. The largely obsolete Iranian air-defence system would have gained great military benefits from acquiring the long-range S-300 system; the end of the deal will be a significant loss for Tehran.

The second is that Tehran may (according to official Iranian media sources) now revise its relationship with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The strong indication here is that Iran's government will limit the IAEA's access to Iran's nuclear-energy facilities. The cold rationale of this position is: if the UN Security Council is determined to sanction Iran more, even at a time when the Brazil-Turkey-Iran deal was on offer (and even encouraged at one stage by the United States), why should Iran work with the United Nations?

The third aspect is that the Barack Obama administration (according to a report from Washington) is preparing to shift the position on Iran's nuclear ambitions that was elaborated in the national-intelligence estimate (NIE) published during George W Bush's presidency in December 2007.

That NIE assessment - Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities - reached the conclusion (surprising to many, given Washington's confrontational public stance towards Iran at the time) that Iran's civil-nuclear-power programme was indeed developing rapidly, but that specific work on weapons-systems had largely ceased in 2003. The briefings now underway suggest that the the forthcoming NIE, while not directly contradicting the 2007 report, will find that Iran is (possibly under the aegis of the Revolutionary Guards [IRGC]) conducting applied-research programmes on matters such as the construction of nuclear-triggers.

The combination of these three factors amounts to a tightening of pressure on Iran. At the same time, they do not portend any real prospect of United States military action against Iran. Barack Obama's outreach to Iran during his first year in office, symbolised by his nowrooz (new-year) greeting in March 2009, may have delivered little; but his administration still maintains that it would prefer dialogue with Tehran leading to a negotiated solution.

But what applies to the United States most definitely does not apply to Israel.

A view to the north

Israel's plans and intentions towards Iran are a vital if uncertain component of the regional strategic landscape. It cannot be said with any certainty that Israel is moving towards an early assault on Iran's nuclear- and missile-complexes. What can be said the view held by the current Israeli government of Binyamin Netanyahu - and shared to a great extent across the Israeli political spectrum - is that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons would represent an existential threat to Israel that must be prevented at all costs.

Binyamin Netanyahu outlined the three greatest strategic challenges to Israel in an important speech at the Sabin Forum in November 2008. In his view these are: Iran's nuclear ambitions; missiles from Iran, Hamas (in Gaza) and Hizbollah (in Lebanon); and a pervasive international denial of Israel's right to self-defence.

The attack on the Mavi Marmara on 31 May 2010 is part of the response to the last of these threats. The crisis over this event has received huge media attention, which to an extent has overshadowed an even more significant development in recent days: news in Israel both of the deployment of Scud missiles in Lebanon and of detailed Israeli military plans for a massive assault against Hizbollah.

The well-informed and reliable Defense News reports that the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) have, since the failed war of July-August 2006, fundamentally rethought its strategy and tactics. The IDF is now ready for an even more intense - and, it is hoped, decisive - war with Hizbollah.

At present, it seems that the planning for such a war does not envisage that it would be launched "out of the blue" but rather that it might arise from a provocation, a crisis with Iran - or sheer military miscalculation. This "known unknown" notwithstanding, the details of the proposed operation are worth quoting at length:

""¦a new fight against Iranian- and Syrian-backed Hizbollah would see an all-out assault on the party's arsenals, command centres, commercial assets and strongholds throughout the country. But it would also include attacks on national infrastructure; a total maritime blockade; and interdiction strikes on bridges, highways and other smuggling routes along the Lebanese border with Syria. Meanwhile land forces would extend a ferocious land grab well beyond the Litani River that Israeli brigades belatedly hobbled towards but failed to reach in the last war. Finally, Israel would consider the kind of targeted killings that it now executes only in the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip".

The Hizbollah movement which fought Israel to a standstill in the 2006 war - thus claiming victory in the aftermath - is now a senior partner in the Beirut government headed by Saad Hariri; a third of Hariri's cabinet are Hizbollah representatives. IDF planners view this domestic political compromise, the outcome of an extended and bitter post-war standoff, in terms of the Lebanese government's failure to control Hizbollah. They draw the conclusion that Lebanon's national assets - including even the Lebanese army - are now legitimate targets.

Israeli claims that Hizbollah has now added Scud missiles to its already extensive arsenal - and may even intend to deploy them in northern Lebanon where they are difficult to counter - may or may not be correct. But there is evidence that Hizbollah has greatly increased its arsenal of shorter-range weapons; and its Iranian ally has steadily developed versatile solid-fuel medium-range ballistic-missiles that could reach deep into Israel and leave no part of the country immune.

A last throw

The Israeli plans for a definitive war in Lebanon are part of a core military outlook that sees the demonstration of overwhelming military power against intransigent opponents who are resolutely against peace as the only route to security. Before and after such armed confrontations, strong deterrence is needed.

An interview in Defense News with Israel's deputy chief-of-staff, Major-General Benjamin Gantz, offers an unusually revealing insight into this mindset. The journal paraphrases his warning "that it could take repeated rounds of high-intensity wars to remove the Iranian-trained and financed threat from the north. The aim, he said, is to prolong the periods of relative quiet between war fighting."

Major-General Gantz is then quoted directly:

"Israel cannot exist with protracted peaks of warfare. Therefore we have to reduce them to reasonable levels - similar to the way we drove down terror in the aftermath of Defensive Shield [the IDF's operation in the West Bank in 2002]. That way we allow our people to live reasonably under a protracted emergency situation until we fix it, and then we go back to square one."

"I doubt there will be peace afterwards, but at least we'll be able to extend the time between peaks"¦ Through strategic attrition - one round then another round - we'll create a situation where each new round brings worse results than the last. And that, in and of itself, brings a formidable deterrent."

Israel's deputy chief-of-staff here exposes Israel's security predicament. Israel is essentially impervious to any serious military attack by land or sea; but the modern experience of rocket-assault - the Scud-attacks launched by Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1991, the hundreds of rockets fired by Hizbollah in 2006, and even the crude devices launched from Gaza since the withdrawal of Israeli forces in 2005 - means that Israel is now living with a form of insecurity as (or even more) serious as anything since the Yom Kippur/Ramadan war of October 1973.

The Binyamin Netanyahu government and much of Israel's military establishment think that peace is not now possible; Israel can only be secure by being a fortress that periodically strikes out at its enemies to massive effect. There are many dangers in this view. But its logic is also clear: that there is a real risk of another war before too long - and that this will be a double war, against both Iran and Hizbollah.



Paul Rogers is professor of peace studies at Bradford University, northern England. He has been writing a weekly column on global security on openDemocracy since 26 September 2001.

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-...-b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4&lng=en&id=117401

 

[nandu]

Iranian army to build submarine-controlled UAVs

Iranian army to build submarine-controlled UAVs

TEHRAN (FNA) - A senior Iranian commander announced here on Tuesday that the country's Army plans to design and manufacture Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) that can be controlled from submarines.

""Today the world is seeking UAVs that can be controlled from submarines, from sub-surface and from vessels' deck. And we, too, are mulling over such fields of activity as they can be achieved,"" Head of the Iranian Army's Self-Sufficiency Jihad and Industrial Researches (department) Admiral Mohammad Sadri said in an exclusive interview with FNA on Tuesday.

The commander said that Iran has already used the domestically built UAVs in sea missions to check its newly developed weapon systems and also for targeting purposes.

Pointing to the unique radar-evading capability of Iran-made UAVs and their small sizes, Sadri said Army's research and development centers are serious in the field.

""Thanks God, good work has been done in area of UAV production in (the Army's) ground and air divisions,"" Sadri noted.

Last week, Lieutenant Commander of Iran's Air Force Mohsen Darrebaqi told FNA that the Iranian Air Force plans to form a battalion of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in all its bases across the country.

""In every Air Force fighters base, a UAV battalion will be formed,"" Darrwbaqi said, adding, ""These UAV battalions have already been formed in four bases.""

Noting that the UAV units of the Air Force have been operative for as long as many years, Darrebaqi pointed out that these units are currently tasked with intelligence and information gathering and reconnaissance missions.

""But in future we want to use them for assault missions so that these UAVs can hit targets,"" he added.

Iran has recently made good progress in the air industry and has succeeded in gaining the technical know-how for producing stealth aircraft and drones.

The country in February inaugurated the production line of two home-made Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) with bombing and reconnaissance capabilities.

The two hi-tech drones named 'Ra'd' (Thunder) and 'Nazir' (Harbinger) are capable of conducting long-range reconnaissance, patrolling, assault and bombing missions with high precision.

Ra'd which is a UAV of choice for assault and bombing missions has the capability to destroy the specified targets with high pinpoint precision.

Experts believe that once the UAV enters the scene of aerial missions, it would enhance the reconnaissance, patrolling and defensive power of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Armed Force.

Iran successfully tested a home-made radar-evading UAV with bombing capabilities last June. Also in 2008, the country's Defense Industries launched production lines of two well-known home-made fighter jets, namely Saeqeh (Thunderbolt) and Azarakhsh (Lightening).

Iran had earlier started construction of a plant in the northern province of Mazandaran in 2008 to mass produce UAVs for different civilian and military missions.

http://www.tehrantimes.com/Index_view.asp?code=221436

 

[EagleOne]

Iran has enough uranium for 'two weapons': CIA chief

CIA chief Leon Panetta said on Sunday he thinks Iran has enough low-enriched uranium to make two weapons, and that it would take at least two years to prepare the bombs and a delivery system.
"We think they have enough low-enriched uranium for two weapons," Panetta told the ABC network's "This Week" program, but added that Tehran would need a year to enrich it fully to produce a bomb.
It would take "another year to develop the kind of weapon delivery system in order to make that viable," he said.

http://www.hindustantimes.com/Iran-has-enough-uranium-for-two-weapons-CIA-chief/H1-Article1-564015.aspx

 

[nandu]

'Iran to unveil new submarines'

An Iranian submarine, file photo

Iran's Defense Minister Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi says Iran is to unveil its new domestic submarines next month.

Vahidi said the submarines are totally made in the country and will be delivered to Iran's Navy by mid-August.

Asked about the Russian S-300 defense system deal, Vahidi said the deal is not cancelled and Tehran is seriously following up on the issue through negotiations.

Under a contract signed in 2005, Russia was required to provide Iran with at least five S-300 air-defense systems. However, Moscow has continually delayed the delivery of the sophisticated defense system prompting Tehran to express displeasure with the Russian procrastination.

Concerning the sanctions against the country, Vahidi also said: "Sanctions had no effect on our activities".

On June 9, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution imposing a fourth round of sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program.

Tehran rejects Western accusations that it is seeking to develop nuclear weapons, arguing that the International Atomic Energy Agency in its reports has confirmed the non-diversion of nuclear material in Iran.

http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=135351&sectionid=351020101

 

[youngindian]

Iran's navy gets 4 new Iranian-built submarines.


http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5ixeFBxfLzaSjs8Mb8cuFmtPOT6-wD9HFA3HG0

 

[keshtopatel]

Iran on brink of nuclear weapon, warns UN watchdog

LONDON: Iran is on the brink of developing an atomic missile, weapons inspectors of the UN's nuclear watchdog have warned.

A report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said Iranian scientists had made at least 22 kg of enriched uranium with at least 20 percent purity, the Daily Telegraph reported on Tuesday.

Experts estimate that 20 kg of uranium is the minimum required to arm a warhead. The uranium would still need to have its purity raised to 90 percent but that is a relatively easy process.

The agency's report comes in spite of the recent imposition at the UN of a fresh round of sanctions against Iran and will heighten fears of an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear plants.

The prospect of an attack had receded only recently with American assurances that Tehran was more than a year away from acquiring a bomb.

The Vienna-based watchdog said Tehran had maintained its absolute defiance of international pressure to curb its nuclear programme despite the imposition of harsh sanctions in May.

The IAEA has grown increasingly alarmed at Iran's behaviour. The latest report, which will be presented to the agency's governors next week, lambasted Tehran on a series of fronts.

The country's refusal to answer questions on its attempts to make a nuclear warhead that could be fitted on to its most advanced missiles was denounced as a violation of sanctions.

The agency also rebuked the Iran government for its repeated failure to co-operate with weapons inspections designed to ensure that material was held securely at Iranian plants.

 

[Patriot]

Information on an Iranian regime strategic secret nuclear enrichment site at Behjatabad-Abyek


9 September 2010
National Press Club, Holeman Lounge



Overview:

Today, according to information obtained by Iran 's main opposition, the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK), we would like to make public for the first time exclusive details on a major top-secret and strategic nuclear enrichment site in the town of Abyek, 120 kilometers west of the Iranian capital, Tehran . The Behjatabad-Abyek nuclear enrichment site is code-named 311, and is near Qazvin.

The details on this site were made possible by the several-year of extensive and vigilant investigation, research and intelligence work by the internal network of the PMOI. The work, as complicated as it has been entailed serious risks and danger for the sources.

The construction of this site began in early (February or March) 2005 and 85 percent of the construction work on it has been completed. The site is built deep inside mountains to withstand aerial bombings and confirms that the regime is in hot pursuit of nuclear weapons and will in no way abandon it.

The Armed Forces General Headquarters, headed by Major General Hassan Firouz-Abadi, and the Ministry of Defense, headed by Brig. Gen. Ahmad Vahidi, have embarked on building this new secret site, located between the cities of Abyek and Qazvin . The project began under the former Minister of Defense who is currently Minister of the Interior, Mostafa Mohammad Najjar.

The date when work began on this site is significant because it proves that contrary to its deceptive tactics, implying that the regime had stopped its military nuclear activities in 2003, this type of work has gone underground and expanded.

So far the regime has spent 100 million dollars on the project, but experts involved in the projects have said that it has unlimited budget. For example, one of the companies
affiliated with the MoD, which is tasked with building some of the facilities in the site has received 25 million dollars in the past three years alone.

The extensive dimensions of the site show that the regime's nuclear weapons program is far larger than what the International Atomic Energy Agency knows about. Specifically, the enrichment program is much more extensive than what has been revealed to the IAEA, which explains why the Iranian regime is refusing to ratify the Additional Protocol.

This site is far more important than the Fardow site near the holy city of Qom, which explains why the MoD has taken extraordinary concealment measure to avoid its detection.

The Fardow plant, as is widely reported, was first unveiled by the PMOI in a press conference on December 20, 2005 in Paris . Later, in a press conference on 25 September 2009, President Obama confirmed the existence of that site.

According to a confidential directive issued by the Armed Forces' General Headquarters and the Ministry of Defense to all engineers and technicians as well as others involved in the planning and building of this site, the disclosure of the site will irreparably undermine the regime's international standing and would have unimaginable repercussions.

All persons involved in this project as under the tight control of the MoD's counterintelligence department. MoD agencies and highest ranking commanders of the Ministry are monitoring and controlling the building of this site.



1. General Information:
* The top-secret site is code named 311 used by MoD and IRGC agencies working on it.
* To keep the site secret from local inhabitants, the site is named Javad-nia 2. Javad-nia is a MoD training garrison about two miles south of the current site. The name Javadnia-2 is meant to mislead the locals. (Map of Javad-nia Garrison is visible on the satellite imagery).
* This site is a new part of the Command center and nuclear weapons manufacture of the Iranian regime, namely Mojdeh site. It is under the supervision of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi, who is the director of Mojdeh.
* Although the construction of this site is not yet complete, similar to Fardow in Qom, currently, nuclear experts from Mojdeh nuclear site have been stationed at this site to realize the intended nuclear objectives.
2. Exact location of the site:
* The precise location of this top-secret site is 20 kms from the city of Abyek, on the land between the villages of Behjatabad and Todaran. This region is located along a mountainous area east of the central section of the town of Abyek . (The center for this region is Nasser-Abad village).
* To build this site, the Ministry of Defense has possessed the ownership of 3,000 hectares (30 Sq. Km) of land in this region as well as the Behjatabad to Taleqan highway.
* To get to the site, one has to drive on Tehran-Qazvin expressway. At Km 15, past the city of Abyek, there is an exit for Behjat-Abad village. After passing through the village, for about 7 km, one reaches the fence around the perimeter of the site.
* The nuclear site is built within a 30 Sqr. Km fenced area inside a mountain. (As you can see by comparing the 2004 and 2010 imagery, the shape of the earth has completely changed here).
* Anti-Aircraft batteries will be stationed around the area to protect it from air strikes. The MoD has already requested the construction of the base for the batteries and work is well on the way.
* South-East of this region, a training base, Javad-nia 1, is located adjacent to the village of Jazmeh . Javad-nia 1 is used to provide the logistical support for the initial phase of constructing the new site, including electricity and other requirements. The use of electricity in this region has risen dramatically since last year, which demonstrates increased activity inside the site.
* West of this site, the Ansar Al-Mehdi base, belonging to the Ministry of Defense, is located near the village of Vandar . The facilities, which belong to the "Ya Mahdi" missile industry, can be indentified on satellite imagery.
3. Details on inside of the site:
* The site has a tunnel as the main entrance, 8 meters wide and nearly 200 meters long. It leads deep inside the ground to three large halls, 16-20 meters wide and 200 meters long. The site also has an exit shaft and a vertical shaft. There are halls and office space inside the tunnels.
* As such, the mountain which sits on top of the tunnel has a height of 100 meters. According to assessment of nuclear experts, the suitable height to prevent radioactive material emission is 80 meters. The thickness of dirt on top of the tunnel also neutralizes any possible impact of aerial bombardment on the facilities inside the tunnels.
* The site has four entrances and exits in total. Two main entrances in the main warehouse which is used for entry. One is for entering and the other for exiting. In addition, there is one individual exit and one emergency escape exit through the vertical shaft.
* The facilities inside the site are set up to installing centrifuges and building workshops for nuclear work.
* At the present, the work on building the tunnels has been completed and the electrical, water and ventilation systems are being put in place.
* Nuclear safety systems as well as radiation detecting devices have also been installed inside both complexes and experts are monitoring the work progress and its quality.
4. Agencies involved in the construction of the sites:
* The Armed Forces' General Headquarters has set up an extensive organization to construct underground secret site. The head of this organization is Brig. Gen. Jalali, Deputy Commander of the Passive Defense forces for the Armed Forces. Brig. Gen. Tabatabi, his deputy, oversees the day-to-day operations. Brig. Gen. Jalali is Deputy to Major General Hassan Firouz-Abadi, the Commander of the Armed Forces' General Headquarters.
* The AFGH has tasked the MoD and the IRGC's engineering directorates with constructing secret tunnels. The Aero-space Engineering Directorate headed by Brig. Gen. Nasrollahi-Zadeh is the executive director of the project in Abyek. The official directly responsible to implement the plan is Brig. Gen. Abolqassem Amiri, who is Nasrollahi-Zadeh's deputy.
* The AFGH and the MoD have set up a series of companies to construct the tunnels. "Pars Garma [Heat] Company is a MoD subsidiary and responsible for excavating and drilling the tunnels and constructing the underground centers. The company has set up a workshop in Abyek region to advance the work on the project.
* In addition to Pars Garma, Shams Omran Company, which is another MoD front company, is working on the building of the underground facilities in the site. Hamidreza Moniri Abyaneh is the head of this company. The company has transferred many of the experts and technicians who worked on Qom 's Fardow site to this site to use their expertise. This company was also involved in the construction of the Bushehr nuclear reactor.
* In early 2005, the Ministry of Defense began building this site, but the work has proceeded slowly. One reason was the geology of the land, which made the drill of the tunnels very difficult. The ground in this area is hard and includes volcano-type rocky area. Another reason has been the extreme security measure adopted to avoid detection.
5. Security measures:
* All commute to the site is controlled by the Armed Forces Counter-Intelligence Department in Tehran . Even MoD officers are not allowed to enter the site.
* All maps, blueprints and plans for the site have been removed from the computers of the engineers who were involved in drafting the plans and building the site. The Counter-Intelligence Department has them stored in its top-secret archives.
* Due to the sensitivity of the project, all those involved in the work on this project are kept uninformed as to which MoD agency will be using this site.
6. Environmental impact:
* The constant use of the Behjatabad village road by heavy 50-ton trucks has destroyed the pavement and has angered the local people.
* Large areas of land that belong to the villagers have also been confiscated by the MoD, which has aroused opposition from the population. The MoD has also seized parcels of land around Todaran village which originally belonged to the Agency for Environmental Protection. (The area has a very small population).
* Because of the drilling inside the mountain, the rocks that are turned into powder enter the springs in the area, which contaminate the water, turning it into a milky-like thick liquid that has damaged all the gardens in Tazeh Abad and Jazmeh villages. Because of its cement-like quality, all trees have been affected by it. (Two rivers adjacent to the two villages can be seen in the satellite imagery).
* Todaran villagers have been contemplating taking legal action, which the MoD's legal department is trying to avert.



Conclusion:

The recent sanctions by the United Nations Security Council and the complementary sanctions by the United States, the European Union, Japan and other countries are necessary and have pressured the regime. But their impact is far slower than the pace of the progress of the regime's nuclear weapons projects.

To effectively thwart Tehran 's nuclear drive, a two-pronged policy is imperative. The first is to impose comprehensive sanctions on the regime. The second is removing the barriers placed on the path of the opposition, particularly the main opposition, the PMOI. The terrorist label against the group has acted as a major impediment to democratic change in Iran .

It has also hindered its ability to discover and transfer information on the regime's hidden nuclear activities. If President Obama and the US government are serious in their effort to stop Tehran 's nuclear weapons program, they should not have tied the PMOI's hands. They are fully aware that a vast majority of the information on Iran 's nuclear program was revealed by the PMOI and the National Council of Resistance of Iran. Were it not for the PMOI, the mullahs would have had the bomb by now.

Soona Samsami was US Representative of National Council of Resistance of Iran until August 2003; She first exposed the Kala Electric nuclear site near Tehran in February 2003.

Alireza Jafarzadeh, author of The Iran Threat, was media spokesman for the National Council of Resistance of Iran in the United States until August 2003. Jafarzadeh exposed the uranium enrichment facility in Natanz and heavy water facility in Arak in August 2002 which triggered the IAEA inspection of Iranian sites since 2003.





Information on an Iranian regime strategic secret nuclear enrichment site at Behjatabad-Abyek

 

[Patriot]

Russian arms ban boosts Iran gunrunners

TEHRAN, Sept. 27 (UPI) -- Arms dealer Jacques Monsieur was jailed by a U.S. court for plotting to smuggle jet engines to Iran but, with the Islamic Republic smarting under a new Russian arms ban and international sanctions, Tehran's going to need suppliers like Monsieur more than ever.

The swashbuckling Monsieur, a veteran gunrunner and former intelligence agent known as The Field Marshal, pleaded guilty in a Mobile, Ala., court and was given a 2-year prison sentence Friday after a plea bargain.

After 13 months behind bars since his arrest in New York Aug. 27, 2009, he will only have to spend about 10 months more in prison for conspiracy to smuggle U.S.-made J85-21 engines for F-5 fighter jets to the Islamic Republic.

The Belgian-born Monsieur is only one of a score of people convicted in recent months of involvement in smuggling weapons, along with missile and nuclear components, to Iran, in most cases from the United States.

The Americans have led a global campaign to cripple Iran's clandestine arms-purchasing network and the gunrunners defying U.N. and U.S. arms bans on Iran.

But Tehran has established a global network of people like Monsieur and a web of shell companies distant from Iran in Malta, Samoa, Cyprus, Hong Kong, the United Arab Emirates and Britain's Isle of Man to disguise its purchases.

These companies, which sometimes operate only for a few weeks, are often run out of Iranian embassies in Europe. The purchases include high-tech components so Iran's burgeoning arms industry can produce its own weapons systems.

Last week, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev agreed to ban the sale of Russian missiles, aircraft, tanks, armored vehicles and artillery, along with spares, to Iran because it refuses to abandon its nuclear program. That cut off a vital source of arms for the Iranians.

On top of a fourth round of U.N., U.S. and EU sanctions on Iran in recent weeks, Tehran will have to turn to the gunrunners and its network of clandestine arms buyers to help its drive to upgrade its military forces.

The Islamic Republic has had to conduct much of its arms procurement secretly almost from the moment Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, armed to the teeth by the Americans, was toppled in January 1979.

According to former U.S. Justice Department official Pat Rowan, who tracked Iran's arms-buying operations, Tehran depends to a large extent on middlemen running "shady companies around the world.

"It's an extraordinary network they've developed to work around the web of sanctions that's intended to stop them."

This network was given great impetus by the 1980-88 war with Iraq, when ensuring a steady supply of weaponry became crucial for the infant republic's survival after Saddam Hussein invaded.

These days the procurement network is largely controlled by the Intelligence Ministry and the Revolutionary Guards Corps, which also controls the defense industry.

They report to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

According to Claude Moniquet, president of the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center, a Brussels think tank that monitors international terrorism, the network is still mainly run by the Iranian embassies in Berlin and Paris.

"The scientific counselor of the embassy in Paris is a post which is usually occupied by an intelligence officer charged with industrial and scientific espionage," he said in a recent analysis.

"He performs this function for the entire European Union with the exception of Great Britain."

In June 2005, the U.S. Justice Department said that it had thwarted several plots that prevented arms worth $2.5 billion, including 18 F-4 and 13 F-5 fighter jets, 20 helicopters and thousands of missiles of various types, reaching Iran.

Among those indicted was a Samuel Evans, a 50-year-old U.S. corporate lawyer based in London and a retired Israeli army general, Avraham Baram. It was the biggest arms bust U.S. authorities had ever made.

One of the big fish the Americans caught was Amir Hossein Ardebili, an Iranian engineer arrested in October 2007 in a sting operation run by U.S. agents. On Dec. 15, 2009, he was jailed for five years by a U.S. court on 14 counts of violating U.S. arms control regulations. Court documents described him as a "prolific" arms buyer for Tehran.



Russian arms ban boosts Iran gunrunners - UPI.com

 

[EagleOne]

flying boats ...

Iran's radar-evading flying boats

 

[Patriot]

Iran to press for recognition of 'nuclear rights' in talks

by Staff Writers
Tehran (AFP) Sept 28, 2010
Iran will press to have its "nuclear rights" recognised in talks with world powers who accuse Tehran of seeking atomic weapons, a foreign ministry spokesman told reporters on Tuesday.

"Iran has announced its view points and readiness for talks with the P5+1. We are seeking to have Iran's nuclear rights recognised in these talks," Ramin Mehmanparast said at his weekly press briefing.

He said Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili was seeking to set "a date and venue" to meet EU foreign affairs chief Catherine Ashton, who represents permanent UN Security Council members and Germany -- known as the P5+1.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad last week said an Iranian official may meet with Ashton in October "for preparatory work" in a new bid to open negotiations on Iran's contested nuclear drive.

"If Ms Ashton contacts the Iranian representative she can set a time for talks," the Iranian leader told a press conference in New York.

He also said that "in October the representative of Iran will meet with one member of the P5+1 to decide the framework of talks."

The six world powers - the United States, Britain, China, France, Germany and Russia - are leading the talks aimed at persuading Tehran to rein in its suspect nuclear programme.

But Ahmadinejad told the New York press conference that any talks with the Western powers, who accuse Iran of seeking a nuclear bomb, must be carried out on the principle of "justice and respect."

The Iranian leader had also said that some members of the world powers had had contacts with Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly held last week.

He gave no details apart from saying there had been no contacts with the US government in New York.

In June, the UN Security Council imposed a fourth round of sanctions against the Islamic republic, which in turn said it would suspend talks until September.

In a statement last Wednesday the United States and the other five powers said they are seeking an "early negotiated solution" to the standoff.

Iran's uranium enrichment work is at the centre of international concerns as the process can be used to make nuclear fuel as well as the core of an atom bomb.

Iran denies seeking nuclear weapons and has pressed on with enrichment, insisting it has a right to the process as a signatory of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

 

[Patriot]

Iran muscles into the UAV battlefield

The United States and Israel lead the field in developing unmanned aerial vehicles, including missile-armed drones used extensively against their enemies in an evolving form of remote-control warfare.

But their common foe, Iran, is in the race, too, and that has serious implications for the military balance in the Middle East.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad unveiled a long-range, bomb-carrying drone called the Karar, Farsi for "assailant," in August that reputedly has a range of 600 miles and can carry a military payload of 450 pounds.

That's not enough for the jet-powered UAV to reach Israel -- but it could if it was launched from Lebanon or Syria by Iran's allies.

With the Levant simmering amid rising tension over Iran, Iraq and the Middle East peace process, the Iranian drive to develop long-range UAVs is causing concern in Israel and pro-Western Arab states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Hezbollah of Lebanon, Iran's main proxy in the Arab world, allegedly has as many as 45,000 rockets and missiles provided by Iran and its ally Syria and since 2004 has operated the Iranian-built Mirsad-1 UAV.

This has been used to carry out aerial reconnaissance over Israel, much to the annoyance of the Jewish state's military. Mirsad is an early generation, relatively unsophisticated system with little endurance capability and doesn't, as far as is known, carry weapons.

But the more advanced versions of the Karar, which Iran presumably has in the works, would be a very different story.

It could, conceivably, be upgraded to perform the kind of deadly remote-control attacks that the U.S. MQ-1 Predator or its successor, the MQ-9 Reaper, are conducting in Afghanistan and Pakistan against al-Qaida and the Taliban.

These craft are produced by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems.

Global security analyst Paul Rogers, professor of peace studies at Britain's Bradford University, noted recently that the current phase of developing these craft as instruments of war is to apply the stealth and weapons technologies developed for the Lockheed F-117A Nighthawk and the Northrop Grumman B-2 bombers.

By giving UAVs radar-evading capabilities, these craft could fly over Iran or other hostile states "with impunity, and with minimal fear of interception," Rogers observed.

The Pentagon's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is planning a new generation of fast and heavily armed UAVs.

"A current project is to adapt the Fairchild A-10 -- among the world's most powerful close-air support planes -- for autonomous operations," Rogers wrote.

The A-10, known as the "Warthog" because of its seemingly ungainly lines, carries a fearsome array of weapons that include a 30mm cannon, laser-guided rockets, AGM-56E Maverick air-to-ground missiles and GPS-guided bombs.

The next-generation UAV platform would thus combine "the intense firepower and high subsonic speed of the A-10 with an endurance of up to 18 hours," Rogers noted.

The Israelis, considered to be the second-ranking UAV producer after the United States, is the world's top drone exporter with more than 1,000 sold to 42 countries, says Jacques Chemia, chief engineer at the UAV division of state-owned Israel Aerospace Industries, flagship of Israel's defense industry.

Israel's military employs a wide array of UAVs, including armed craft deployed against Hezbollah and Palestinian Hamas militants.

It is also reported to fly surveillance drones over Iran, presumably to locate targets for threatened pre-emptive strikes against the Islamic Republic's nuclear infrastructure.

Israel reportedly used long-endurance IAI Heron drones to spot Iranian arms consignments bound for Hamas in Gaza across the Red Sea to Sudan in early 2009 -- and to destroy two convoys loaded with weapons in the desert.

With Iran now pushing its growing technological expertise to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles and spy satellites, its efforts to produce long-range UAVs may not be too far off.

"The Karar may well be unarmed and have limited intelligence capabilities," says Rogers, "but its very existence will reverberate Â"¦

"If the Iranians have been able to develop a long-range drone, then it is more likely that they will attempt to launch reconnaissance drone sorties against Israeli territory -- at a time of their own choosing.

"The military effect will be minimal but the political impact will be very great Â"¦ The role of drones in asymmetric warfare -- or even just asymmetric psychological warfare -- may come much sooner than many expect."





Iran muscles into the UAV battlefield

 

[SHASH2K2]

Though Iran is making a lot of these modern weapons but if you look at quality of them they are worthless. I would say they are just to appease domestic audiences to show that they are Capable of taking on world.

 

[Tshering22]

I said it before and I shall speak again of it; Iran could have had it so easy for the world to accept if it allows IAEA to inspect its civilian plants. Even we agreed to this when the nuke deal was there despite not having signed CTBT. If indeed what Ahmadinejad says is true about peaceful nuclear energy, then why the hell is it so protective about its nuke plants from NSG and IAEA? What's the harm in showing civilian plants to IAEA inspectors? This vehement opposing of IAEA inspection itself shows that they're obsessed with nuke weapons and want to have one just because Israel has one and using Israel as an excuse, are making one to compete for "praises" in the Muslim world alongside Pakistan.

I also feel that there's a political edge to it. Most Iranians despise their government because of their radical attitude and those who've become powerful living in USA and other Western countries are making cracks appear in the theocratic mulla regime of Iran. Hence by diverting public attention from a possible counter-revolution and focusing on demonizing external sources, the mulla regime is trying to gain popularity of people through "soft" means. It is a common tactic of fanatic rulers around the world that have failed to have a stable rule in their countries: Uganda's Idi Amin, Zimbabwe's Rober Mughabe, Iran's mulla elite, Saudi's royal family (in a way), Pakistan's many failed governments, Bangladesh's BNP, Nepal's Maoists, PRC under Mao etc.

 

[Vladimir79]

We know well what Iranian weapons ential. For S-300 they paraded trucks with balloon tubes.

 

[Sridhar]

Bolivia to Buy Warplanes, Helicopters from Iran

LA PAZ – Bolivia will buy military airplanes and helicopters from Tehran under an agreement signed during the visit of President Evo Morales to Iran last week, the government said Sunday.

"We have expressed ... our interest in buying some airplanes and helicopters of Iranian manufacture, which are basically for training," Economy and Finance Minister Luis Arce told state media.

The airplanes include the FAJR-3, S-68 and the Iran-140, of which Arce said only that the third can transport 52 people, and the helicopters will be four-seat versions. He added that all the aircraft will be used to train Bolivian Air Force pilots.

Included in the same agreement, the minister said, is a provision for Iranian technicians to come to Bolivia to perform maintenance on the military aircraft.

Bolivia's current fleet of military aircraft comes from the United States.

During Morales' visit, the two nations also signed documents concerning Iran's interest in teaming up with Bolivia to manufacture lithium batteries in the Uyuni Salt Flats, in the Andean province of Potosi.

In addition, Iran offered to cooperate with Morales in establishing in Bolivia a nuclear energy plant for peaceful purposes.

Arce said on Sunday that during his visit the two countries did not negotiate or discuss anything concerning uranium, because Bolivia has no studies or research in hand regarding what its reserves of that substance might be.

"We still haven't talked about uranium. I think that we're still not in shape to do so. We have to make studies, analyses and investigations to be able to speak about uranium," the minister said.

The manager of the vanishing resources division of the Mining Ministry, Luis Alberto Echazu, who is in charge of lithium development, said Sunday – however – that there is a uranium deposit in Cotaje, Potosi, and small quantities of the radioactive element were extracted from there in 1974.



http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=374965&CategoryId=14919

 

[Neil]

Iran's military looks to the sky as new priority

DUBAI, United Arab Emirates – In military maneuvers and air shows, Iran has been proudly touting advances in its air forces and defenses, including radar systems, anti-aircraft batteries and new attack and reconnaissance drones.

It's a sign of a new priority for Iran's military — trying to quickly bolster its ability to patrol its skies in the belief that U.S. or Israeli warplanes or missiles could strike its nuclear facilities.

But Iran's highly publicized unveilings of air systems in recent months — including an armed drone dubbed the "ambassador of death" — have not yet translated into any significant tactical gains for the Islamic Republic, defense analysts say.

For the most part, Iran's air attack capabilities still depend heavily on domestically modified versions of long-outdated warplanes, including former Soviet MiGs and American F14A Tomcats from the 1970s, and its anti-aircraft batteries and drones remain untested, the analysts say.

"What we see from Iran is a lot of show and a lot of talk, but nothing that comes close to being a game changer," said John Pike, director of the security analyst group globalsecurity.org based in Alexandria, Virginia.

Still, Iran clearly is trying to close security gaps around nuclear sites — including Iran's main uranium enrichment lab — and blunt the edge that the Pentagon and Israel gain from drone technology. Iranian commanders now view drones as a critical tool, including to monitor the U.S. 5th Fleet based across the Gulf in Bahrain.

The Americans have confirmed they've shot down an unspecified number of Iranian surveillance drones over Iraq. Iran, meanwhile, has boasted that its drones have taken reconnaissance photos of U.S. warships in the Gulf.

Iran's other military emphasis has been improving its long-range missile program. Washington believes Iran may have obtained advanced missiles from North Korea, known as BM-25, which could extend the strike range for Iran from the known 1,200 miles (1,900 kilometers) to up to 2,400 miles (4,000 kilometers), according to State Department cables obtained by the website WikiLeaks and made public Sunday. Such missiles could hit well beyond Iran's top regional enemy Israel and into Europe or Russia.

But the Iranian effort to build up its air power is mostly a homegrown project, tweaking older technology or using domestic know-how to build its first generations of drone spy and attack aircraft. It comes at a time when its rivals across the Gulf, led by Saudi Arabia, are on buying sprees to modernize and expand their own air power.

Iran learned the risks of relying on outside help this year when Russia canceled the delivery of an advanced S-300 anti-aircraft system, saying it was banned from selling them to Tehran by U.N. sanctions.

During five days of military exercises in November, Iran claimed it successfully tested an air defense missile battery built from a previously obtained Russian S-200 anti-aircraft system that it claimed was upgraded to the level of the S-300. The Iranian version launches a modified version of America's 1970s-era Hawk missile.

The maneuvers also included simulations of attacks on Iran's nuclear sites. Afterward, the head of the Revolutionary Guard, Brig. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari, claimed last week that his forces are "more prepared than ever before" to counter military threats.

But many Western military observers say Iran is still just trying to squeeze what it can from decades-old weapons.

"What Iranians have produced isn't really much more advanced than systems other nations deployed in the late 1970s," said James Lewis, director of technology and public policy program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "There is a lot of bluster and exaggeration. The real purpose is political — to show that they can defend themselves, exert power in the region and aren't deterred by the embargo."

Before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran's air forces were considered second only to Israel in the Middle East, built up by aid from the country's then-ally the United States. But after the ouster of the pro-American shah, the new ruling clerics purged the combat pilot ranks and strongly emphasized ground troops during the grinding 1980-88 war with Iraq.

Its standing forces remain its military centerpiece, including a regular military, the even better-equipped Revolutionary Guard with 120,000 personnel and an estimated 1 million volunteer militia fighters known as Basiji.

But Iran restructured its military last year in an effort to improve its air defenses. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ordered a new branch to be split off from the air force to deal exclusively with threats to the country's airspace.

Since then, Iran has invested heavily in advances in surveillance and attack drones.

In August, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad unveiled the latest addition to the country's drone fleet: a 13-foot-long (four-meter-long) unmanned aircraft — called the "ambassador of death" — which can carry up to four cruise missiles with a claimed range of 620 miles (1,000 kilometers).

That's still short of Israel's borders. Many analysts believe a longer-range drone is the logical next step.

"It is more than likely that (Iran) will attempt to launch reconnaissance drone-sorties against Israeli territory at a time of their own choosing," wrote Paul Rogers, a professor at Bradford University in Britain and a frequent commentator on security affairs. "The military effect will be minimal, but the political impact will be very great."

Alex Vatanka, a senior Middle East analyst at Jane's Information Group, sees Iran's military engineers remaining committed to long-range missiles — which now have a reported ranges that cover Israel and most of the Middle East.

But he notes that Iran has shown an "appreciation of the strong and growing utility of (drones) both in terms of surveillance and as firepower" with U.S. forces sandwiching Iran from Iraq and Afghanistan.

"Its about prestige," he said. "The Iranians see what the US has done with these platform in Afghanistan and Pakistan or what the Saudis have reportedly been able to do in Yemen."



http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20101201/ap_on_re_mi_ea/ml_iran_s_air_arsenal_1

 

[amoy]

PressTV - Iran launches indigenous Jamaran 2 destroyer in Caspian Sea

Jamaran 2, a Wave-class warship, has been designed and built by the experts at Iran's Defense Ministry and has state-of-the-art navigation equipment and complex defensive systems.

The production line of the advanced indigenous destroyer was inaugurated in Bandar Anzali six years ago with the aim of protecting Iran's 20-percent share of the Caspian Sea.

The 1420-ton destroyer is powered by a 20000-horsepower engine with a speed of 30 knots and has the capability to carry helicopters, different surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, advanced artilleries and torpedo system. It is also equipped with electronic war system.

The Jamaran 2 destroyer is a symbol of the Islamic Republic's capability and strength and conveys the message of peace and friendship to the Caspian Sea states.