And this another problem, that You and similiar people are unable to just screw such things and go further.
You know what should be done? Arjun program should be closed and svaed money should be used for new MBT development, the real 4th generation MBT with crew in isolated cabine in hull and with unmanned turret. So then IA would have something really better than Pakistan or PRC, and as a interim solution more T-90S or T-90MS should be fielded. Look at Russians, they will do exactly the same thing, screw T-90 and fund "Armata" program. Look at USA, there are allready ideas to expand GCV program from only IFV in to also new SPH and if possible other vehicles, like new MBT for example.
Sometimes it is good to let something die, so something completely new and better can born.
And relentless criticism of tank design do not mean that I'am enemy of India or Indian people.
And with this Damian, you just depicted that you have not been tracking actual product development and nor are you looking at the big picture. Because, no country, no MIC which is developing core capabilities for the first time would be so foolish as to leave its own MBT design and then jump onto the next bandwagon without first perfecting the first design, manufacturing it, putting it into the field and learning vital lessons, all the while working on iteratively modernizing it further.
In fact, an Israeli Armour div guy who visited India castigated the Indian Army for wanting to jump to the next best thing each time around, instead he said work on your own products, mature them and then move. India simply does not face the transformational threat that it needs to rush headlong into a new design without even learning the right lessons from its first.
You bring up the US at every opportunity. Have you actually ever visited the US, or spent some time with actual US designers in real life as versus the internet? Do so sometime, talk with them, study/work with them & some interesting things will emerge. The entire US industry today is where it is thanks to the incredible, blank check investment of the Cold War. Today, the US is proceeding ahead with what it can after it has outsourced & let many components of its core heavy engineering and technology enabled value chains go abroad. Even so, the MIC/Defence industry allows the US to play in several segments of the entire value chain where it can promote firms with interdisciplinary capabilities. And it developed those capabilities on the back of huge investments in several industries like the automotive sector which allowed US firms to leverage subsystems developed by partners.
To compare that to India is pointless.
India never went through such a phase with multiple industries developing sequentially and then picking and choosing which could be economically retained. In India's case, all of its industries have developed in parallel. Our automotive sector is picking up steam today, at the same time as our MIC. The missile and space launch vehicle sector are progressing in parallel with our software sector which is moving up in complexity from the transactional work earlier to value added work today.
This is what makes things much more challenging for India and why programs face a hurdle as it is developing the ecosystem simultaneously and not just doing product integration or new product development with the advantage of previously existing industries acting as enablers.
It is critical for a country like India to finish its key programs, see them to success and then move, rather than jumping from project to project. Pretty much every program where the country has seen substantial success has followed a progression of iterative marks. Mastering the baseline technology allows for gains to be made on follow on programs. The same is being done with the Arjun today which is the testbed for pretty much everything that India is developing locally in armour systems from ammunition to vetronics. And via the Arjun these technologies will mature.
I could quote examples from the missile program to make you understand, but if you are truly interested look here:
Ballistic Glide Re Entry Vehicle (BGRV) and Indian Missile Program
These technologies being used in the latest Indian missiles and which are fairly competitive against other systems worldwide, were matured by the Prithvi missile system (which showed Indian scientists how to tailor trajectories and the overall integration and development of various systems) and the Agni TD. Today, they are deployed across multiple classes. Further, the production of the Prithvi, widely panned as "obsolete" gave India both a functional system, and the understanding of how to actually mass manufacture, and qualify an end to end weapons system. Today, it has come in handy to make everything from ICBM class missile systems to BMD programs.
Point is program success builds iteratively. India neither has the resources nor the time to apply the scattershot, 100 programs cancel a few keep others running the US and Russia did. Comanche style resource hogs are not available to India. This sort of wasteful technology development funnel is a big reason why the US industry is increasingly challenged by cost and time pressures. The latter is one thing, the former means Comanche, Crusader, B-2, Zumwalt style fiascos.
In India, they'll take time and trade it off against program cost, but they will deploy and finish the program to its original intention wherever possible. The second, third tranche of programs that follow then, reap the benefits in reduced development cycle time and designer, test, user experience. We have already done so for radars, electronic systems and missiles. The challenge is greater for both aircraft and tanks because in these cases the platforms are more complex and more interdisciplinary. They are also more wide ranging and expensive.
Bottomline, this business of cancel and go with a new program would be a disaster for Indian MIC development. The challenge for India is to better plan its activities and do a proper resource estimation and budgeting at the beginning itself, as versus unrealistic staff requirements followed by mission creep exacerbated by technology lag. The answer is to not jump from program to program.