Indian Special Forces (archived)

[rkhanna]

What we are realising now that to deal with hostage situation we have different type of special units like NSG,SF,or MARCOS but a minimum lack of coordination we just lost a CO @COLDHEARTED AVIATOR ,@rkhanna
Every operation is itself a goldmine of experience for our forces...

Well there is a law of diminishing returns for SOF. Low Value High Risk ops are unnecessary and costs lives. the Basic experience of these low value CASO ops are available for Infantry as well.

SF is never going to come out of CASO 100% - But within the tactical battlespace there needs to be a rethought C&C and TOC where SF and Infantry/RR roles are demarkated - Tactically/Strategically and new SOPs need to be developed where SF footprint in CASO is minimal with maximum effect

This is where i also believe MARCOS/Garud are far more usefull to use than PARA SF) - They need the experience more than SF

Para SF come from Infantry -> Para -> SF - their infantry drills and infantry experience is locked in.

MARCOS goes from a Ship - > Selection - Training - Deployment. MARCOS lack basic infantry experience. So IMO they should be thrown into these CASO more than SF.

Long Story short all our SOF need to be looked at Holistically and deployed holistically. Is there a reason to restrict MARCOS only to the Lake? - a SOCOM like structure (an actual command and not the AFSOD) will be a big boon in rationalizing strategy, training, kit, deployment, Jointness etc

 

[another_armchair]

Shaurya Chakra Amit Singh Rana

https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/node/23629

Shaurya Chakra for Naval Marcos, PVSM for 6 senior officers

Shaurya Chakra for Naval Marcos, PVSM for 6 senior officers

Shaurya Chakra for Naval Marcos, PVSM for 6 senior officers

www.indiatoday.in

Here is the entire list of Gallantry Awards for IN personnel, many of them awarded for participating in COIN ops.

Indian Navy | Gallantry Awards

Ministry of Defence invites recommendations twice in a year from the Armed Forces and Union Ministry of Home Affairs for gallantry awards. Recommendations are invited normally in the month of August for the awards to be announced on the occasion of the Republic Day and in the month of March for...

gallantryawards.gov.in

Anybody suspecting the physical fitness and abilities of MARCOS in undertaking land ops is living in delusion.

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

So basically aside from a few new helmets here and there MARCOs have seen very little updates since 2011.



It’s an ego issue.

NSG are deployed to JK but army has never once called them in, thinking they can do everything themselves. Then debacles like EDI and Handwara happen but oh well.....


One of the few legitimate SF Ops MARCOs have been able to undertake in the last decade.


It’s always tragic to see MARCOs training with Russian Marines or Royal Navy marines. These aren’t SF units and the respective units have naval SF but don’t seem to send them to these Exs like the US does to train with PARA (SF)

Similarly there are MARCOs detachments deployed to ships deployed in the gulf of Aden for anti-Piracy but VBSS is hardly a SF mission.


I guess this is where AFSOD does create a legitimate SF capability sort of a “tier one” unit

No it's not an ego issue.

Marcos or Garuds have to come to the GOC Northern Command and say ..sir we would like to be a part of special ops kindly next time you plan such ops please include a squad of us.

This is something which Marcos or Garuds havent done.All they want is to engage in low intensity firefights and go back home.

And what fault is there of the Army?Ghataks have more experience than Marcos and Garuds combined.They are regularly engaging Pak Army.They do raids as regularly as you eat burgers.

How can the GOC or the Army on his own put Marcos or Garuds in such ops when they are themselves not coming forward.

I am saying this coz Para men do this all the time.They are ever ready to engage and that is why they are my favorite.Their beret carries the blood of their enemies.

People say Marcos did Kargil,Marcos did this ..did that..did surgical strikes and they cannot be named.

I am sorry but its all fiction.And that is why i say that a highly trained unit like Marcos should be included in cross loc raids.

Garuds story is different.When they first went to Kashmir they did not impress anyone in the Corps battle school and hence you don't see or hear about their involvement in kashmir ops until recently where they did well.

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

I think all of us are guilty of wandering into these logical traps at one time or the other. One hand we want SF to do truly special operations, but then we know that CICT ops are good for experience, but moment they sucked in there we feel Ghataks should be doing the job.

My own view is that;

- SFs have to fight the wars we are fighting.
- There is of plenty of "war" for everyone to have a fair share
- There are plenty of SF units - SF, SG, Archers, NSG, MARCOS, Garuds etc
- No harm in letting these units fight CICT, but a portion of this capability should be kept in reserve at any point for true special ops, with money no bar.

You need just one or max 2 full battalions of Para SF and elements of Garuds and MARCOS to keep up an effective tempo of special ops in J&K.

PS: I am not sure everyone knows that Army has raised one full time SF aviation unit 301 Army Aviation Squadron (Special Operations)

That is why the model of SF command what i posted earlier is the best suited for India according to me.

 

[abingdonboy]

What we are realising now that to deal with hostage situation we have different type of special units like NSG,SF,or MARCOS but a minimum lack of coordination we just lost a CO @COLDHEARTED AVIATOR ,@rkhanna
Every operation is itself a goldmine of experience for our forces...

It’s not about coordination per se but inter-service rivalries and small petty thinking.

NSG is India’s premier hostage rescue intervention unit, hostage situations have emerged numerous times in Kashmir but not ONCE has the army even requested for NSG assistance. Many of these events have subsequently been botched by the army but the next time it happens the same recipe is repeated.

army commanders need confidence but they also have a a self aggrandising view of themselves and their institution. An NSG detachment is posted to JK sat idle (other than some training of local units) becuase of this inward and petty thinking.


It’s like when the IAF tried to strangle the naval air arm and AAC of the army

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

It’s not about coordination per se but inter-service rivalries and small petty thinking.

NSG is India’s premier hostage rescue intervention unit, hostage situations have emerged numerous times in Kashmir but not ONCE has the army even requested for NSG assistance. Many of these events have subsequently been botched by the army but the next time it happens the same recipe is repeated.

army commanders need confidence but they also have a a self aggrandising view of themselves and their institution. An NSG detachment is posted to JK sat idle (other than some training of local units) becuase of this inward and petty thinking.


It’s like when the IAF tried to strangle the naval air arm and AAC of the army

There is some problem with regards to NSG involvement but i cannot clearly say what.

There is a rivalry between NSG IPS officers being arrogant in their relationship with the Army.And that is why Army at a point wanted the custody of NSG.

IPS officers with not much experience in combat when given a unit like NSG forget that NSG draws men from Army.They get a superiority complex and dont want to establish a relationship.

So you cannot just blame the Army General for everything.

If Army officers were so bad then SOG would never be a part of Army ops.

IPS officers are no saint.

 

[abingdonboy]

No it's not an ego issue.

Marcos or Garuds have to come to the GOC Northern Command and say ..sir we would like to be a part of special ops kindly next time you plan such ops please include a squad of us.

This is something which Marcos or Garuds havent done.All they want is to engage in low intensity firefights and go back home.

And what fault is there of the Army?Ghataks have more experience than Marcos and Garuds combined.They are regularly engaging Pak Army.They do raids as regularly as you eat burgers.

How can the GOC or the Army on his own put Marcos or Garuds in such ops when they are themselves not coming forward.

I am saying this coz Para men do this all the time.They are ever ready to engage and that is why they are my favorite.Their beret carries the blood of their enemies.

People say Marcos did Kargil,Marcos did this ..did that..did surgical strikes and they cannot be named.

I am sorry but its all fiction.And that is why i say that a highly trained unit like Marcos should be included in cross loc raids.

Garuds story is different.When they first went to Kashmir they did not impress anyone in the Corps battle school and hence you don't see or hear about their involvement in kashmir ops until recently where they did well.

I was talking about the NSG issue.

Garuds and MARCOs wanted to be deployed to JK just to say they were deployed in JK even if they were far removed from the fighting. That’s just my interpretation.

Garuds were deployed to protect certain strategic assets in JK and MARCOs at Dal Lake but neither were getting stuck in into urban direct action missions or cross border Ops.

Garuds woke up to this the hard way (Pathankot) and now a stint in kinetic Ops in JK is mandatory as part of one of their training modules to be qualified as a Garud.

What you have highlighted in terms of C&C is spot on. It’s not up to the GOC to seek out MARCOs or Garuds for specific Ops, he plays with what he has on hand and his local commanders have SF teams from the army.

this is EXACTLY why a SOCOM is needed. The way SOCOM works is a request is made to SOCOM and then SOCOM deploys assets whether that is Green Berets, SEALS etc etc. Since SOCOM was raised in the 1980s, SOF assets have not been under any big military command.


AFSOD won’t rectify this issue but it’s meant to be the precursor to a dedicated full fledged SOCOM later down the road but clearly this matter will persist for a while and we will keep banging our heads against the wall until then. This is a long long term effort.

 

[abingdonboy]

There is some problem with regards to NSG involvement but i cannot clearly say what.

There is a rivalry between NSG IPS officers being arrogant in their relationship with the Army.And that is why Army at a point wanted the custody of NSG.

IPS officers with not much experience in combat when given a unit like NSG forget that NSG draws men from Army.They get a superiority complex and dont want to establish a relationship.

So you cannot just blame the Army General for everything.

If Army officers were so bad then SOG would never be a part of Army ops.

IPS officers are no saint.

SAG is headed by army officers. The detachment based in JK is from SAG (it maybe a SCG but those are headed by Army officers too).

not saying IPS are saints but this is about the bigger picture and if IA and IPS can’t work together than that is about inter-service rivalry.

NSG is a specialist unit, if army officers cannot find a way to coordinate and leverage their strengths then more fool them. More botched hostage rescue operations and more soldiers in body bags await them.

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

I was talking about the NSG issue.

Garuds and MARCOs wanted to be deployed to JK just to say they were deployed in JK even if they were far removed from the fighting. That’s just my interpretation.

Garuds were deployed to protect certain strategic assets in JK and MARCOs at Dal Lake but neither were getting stuck in into urban direct action missions or cross border Ops.

Garuds woke up to this the hard way (Pathankot) and now a stint in kinetic Ops in JK is mandatory as part of one of their training modules to be qualified as a Garud.

What you have highlighted in terms of C&C is spot on. It’s not up to the GOC to seek out MARCOs or Garuds for specific Ops, he plays with what he has on hand and his local commanders have SF teams from the army.

this is EXACTLY why a SOCOM is needed. The way SOCOM works is a request is made to SOCOM and then SOCOM deploys assets whether that is Green Berets, SEALS etc etc. Since SOCOM was raised in the 1980s, SOF assets have not been under any big military command.


AFSOD won’t rectify this issue but it’s meant to be the precursor to a dedicated full fledged SOCOM later down the road but clearly this matter will persist for a while and we will keep banging our heads against the wall until then. This is a long long term effort.

And how would you put inexperienced Marcos or Garuds on the same level as the highly experienced Para SF operators?(sf command)

Army works on body language.When they see the jawan is not in JOSH they dont send him to combat.(regarding GOC not putting Marcos and Garuds in spl ops).

Garuds and Marcos in my opinion want to be a part of a small firefight and go home.Coz if they had a problem with the ops alloted they would have got involved on the LOC with the permisiion of the GOC.

And within the spectrum of Valley ops there is a big pie of Special ops Garuds and Marcos could be pulling out..

1.Tracking and hunting terrorists in Kupwara forests.
2.undercover ops in south kashmir.
3.cross border raids on posts/training camps.
4.high value target assassinations in POK.

So its not like there is no scope for SF ops in Kashmir.

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

SAG is headed by army officers. The detachment based in JK is from SAG (it maybe a SCG but those are headed by Army officers too).

not saying IPS are saints but this is about the bigger picture and if IA and IPS can’t work together than that is about inter-service rivalry.

NSG is a specialist unit, if army officers cannot find a way to coordinate and leverage their strengths then more fool them. More botched hostage rescue operations and more soldiers in body bags await them.

Bro Army officers in NSG are of Colonel level max...the seniors ie Brigadier level and General level are IPS officers.

 

[abingdonboy]

And how would you put inexperienced Marcos or Garuds on the same level as the highly experienced Para SF operators?(sf command)

Army works on body language.When they see the jawan is not in JOSH they dont send him to combat.(regarding GOC not putting Marcos and Garuds in spl ops).

Garuds and Marcos in my opinion want to be a part of a small firefight and go home.Coz if they had a problem with the ops alloted they would have got involved on the LOC with the permisiion of the GOC.

And within the spectrum of Valley ops there is a big pie of Special ops Garuds and Marcos could be pulling out..

1.Tracking and hunting terrorists in Kupwara forests.
2.undercover ops in south kashmir.
3.cross border raids on posts/training camps.
4.high value target assassinations in POK.

So its not like there is no scope for SF ops in Kashmir.

The same could’ve been said of the US’s relative SF units as their SOCOM was raised. Green berets had bucket loads of experience from the Cold War all over the world. Granted so did USAF/USN special Ops but nowhere near the same degree.

to this day there persists some skepticism or friction within SOCOM similar to the arguments being made here ie that SEALS don’t have the strong infantry skills of Green Berets. But the idea is on the whole these guys’ strengths compliment each other. It is the SOCOM Deploys the most suitable assets based on mission task.

Say in the future a strategic mission is required in JK/LOC the GOC would call upon the INSOCOM assets attached to his command. It is up to INSOCOM what assets those might be. It might be a mix of MARCOs and PARA (SF) teams around the UT with Garuds on call for CSAR role.

Bro Army officers in NSG are of Colonel level max...the seniors ie Brigadier level and General level are IPS officers.

I know but the operational leadership are all army but I guess the friction would be at the top. But again, this is petty nonsense. From what I understand it NSG as per current rules can only act when a direct call is made by a local administration to the MHA. The army is in charge of the security situation in JK and so those calls never go out. There just is no mechanism for NSG to deploy unless the army leadership directly reaches out but I don’t think this thought even comes in their head.

 

[COLDHEARTED AVIATOR]

The same could’ve been said of the US’s relative SF units as their SOCOM was raised. Green berets had bucket loads of experience from the Cold War all over the world. Granted so did USAF/USN special Ops but nowhere near the same degree.

to this day there persists some skepticism or friction within SOCOM similar to the arguments being made here ie that SEALS don’t have the strong infantry skills of Green Berets. But the idea is on the whole these guys’ strengths compliment each other. It is the SOCOM Deploys the most suitable assets based on mission task.

Say in the future a strategic mission is required in JK/LOC the GOC would call upon the INSOCOM assets attached to his command. It is up to INSOCOM what assets those might be. It might be a mix of MARCOs and PARA (SF) teams around the UT with Garuds on call for CSAR role.


I know but the operational leadership are all army but I guess the friction would be at the top. But again, this is petty nonsense. From what I understand it NSG as per current rules can only act when a direct call is made by a local administration to the MHA. The army is in charge of the security situation in JK and so those calls never go out. There just is no mechanism for NSG to deploy unless the army leadership directly reaches out but I don’t think this thought even comes in their head.

The US SOCOM was founded when Green berets,Marines and Seals had plenty of experience in Vietnam.


And here we have majority of Marcos and Garuds having no experience of being behind enemy lines.
.

 

[Freezer Dam]

SAG is headed by army officers. The detachment based in JK is from SAG (it maybe a SCG but those are headed by Army officers too).

not saying IPS are saints but this is about the bigger picture and if IA and IPS can’t work together than that is about inter-service rivalry.

NSG is a specialist unit, if army officers cannot find a way to coordinate and leverage their strengths then more fool them. More botched hostage rescue operations and more soldiers in body bags await them.

But through the ops,the force can updated their tactics which is much needed for any further hostage situation to deal with....Now in Handwara, we may devlop a new tactics but whatever the reason behind these forces internally,we just lost this opportunity..

 

[Bhadra]

I was talking about the NSG issue.

Garuds and MARCOs wanted to be deployed to JK just to say they were deployed in JK even if they were far removed from the fighting. That’s just my interpretation.

Garuds were deployed to protect certain strategic assets in JK and MARCOs at Dal Lake but neither were getting stuck in into urban direct action missions or cross border Ops.

Garuds woke up to this the hard way (Pathankot) and now a stint in kinetic Ops in JK is mandatory as part of one of their training modules to be qualified as a Garud.

What you have highlighted in terms of C&C is spot on. It’s not up to the GOC to seek out MARCOs or Garuds for specific Ops, he plays with what he has on hand and his local commanders have SF teams from the army.

this is EXACTLY why a SOCOM is needed. The way SOCOM works is a request is made to SOCOM and then SOCOM deploys assets whether that is Green Berets, SEALS etc etc. Since SOCOM was raised in the 1980s, SOF assets have not been under any big military command.


AFSOD won’t rectify this issue but it’s meant to be the precursor to a dedicated full fledged SOCOM later down the road but clearly this matter will persist for a while and we will keep banging our heads against the wall until then. This is a long long term effort.

If any Force wishes to be employed on J&K. it has to mesh in with the existing CI/CT grid for almost all purposes including maintenance, rations and ammunition. Most of the time they need a secure base which is an additional burden on the local commander.

Whatever be the force. the crux of the success of their operation is intelligence. Prophylactic bashing based on trends, terrain, estimations and for seeking opportunity contacts can only be done by large force like RR.

No force can operate in the Valley out of the area of responsibility of RR units / CRPF units (in Urban Sri Nagar). Hence coordination and even a support operation is required to be conducted by the RR units. Even if it is a simple raid or an ambush the RR units will have to be kept in the loop to avoid friendly matches.
SFs many a time behaves very demandingly and feels it below them to go to a CO and coordinate with him. They are very reluctant in sharing the inputs, sometimes rightly but most of the time wrongly.

SFs be it MARCOS or NSG have to depend on intelligence on someone's or establish their own network which is not possible as that warrants some permanency. Intelligence comes either from Local police or RR Unis. When the intelligence does come in RR Unit CO rightly feels that his force can easily undertake the operation. Actually there is nothing in CI/CT operation that can not be done by a RR unit.

SF thus are deployed either on very hard intelligence of MI, IB or some high ended source when the target is considered within the capability of their strength or mostly employed as an emergency reaction and quick reaction force. There is nothing very special about their ops which can only be done by them. It is rather their capability of fast deployment and emergency responses for which they are used.

 

[Bhadra]

People here also talk of Ghatakas. Ghataks as a subunit exist in an Infantry battalion not in RR battalions.

Hardly any Infantry battalion is deployed in CI/CT grid. Infantry battalions conducting a CI/CT operation is a different ballgame. An RR battalion having its fifty percent soldiers from other Arms and Services is a very very different organization albeit doing very well in spite of inherent shortcomings.

CI / CT operations especially offensive operations are driven by the ability of the battalion to garner intelligence. Sources in CI/CT grid are terrifyingly afraid and security conscious. They only go to the agency wherein they find surely of success of their operation lest his head is off his shoulders the next day. Moreover, he wants the security of his incentive money. This is the only factor that makes some RR battalion better than others. RR is better poised to develop sources than any other force.


SF are constrained in these aspects because they are less approachable, they have no permanent bases and there is less surety of incentive money from a mobile force.

I have been seeing this problem with SF since Srilanka days. SF is nothing without intelligence. and we all know about our intelligence.....

 

[aditya g]

Any SF unit - Army, Navy or Air Force - will not have permanent basing like the way RR has.

As such, SF is only attached to a commander. The commander can then lean on this unit to execute tasks that come to him. Eg; MARCOS and Garuds are attached to a RR unit, and hence the CO, a colonel level officer will task them. Para SF obviously operate in J&K, and my understanding is that there is 1 SF unit per Corps.

So the question is at what level is your commander? The higher the level, more strategic is the tasking.

Some operations can be at Command level, so GOC-in-C's HQ will task you. 2016 surgical strikes are an excellent example of a command level special operation. So even if on ground it was only an attack on a terrorist launch pad, because of its spread and scope it was levels above what we did earlier.

Special Forces thinkers like Prakash Katoch think top down - they want SF to take direction from PM or at most NSA - as that will by default ensure strategic impact.

Intelligence at higher formation levels may be beyond just the local HUMINT - but can be via TECHINT or RAW as well.

There is opportunity for SF deployment at all levels - and depending on levels the nature of task will differ.

If any Force wishes to be employed on J&K. it has to mesh in with the existing CI/CT grid for almost all purposes including maintenance, rations and ammunition. Most of the time they need a secure base which is an additional burden on the local commander.

Whatever be the force. the crux of the success of their operation is intelligence. Prophylactic bashing based on trends, terrain, estimations and for seeking opportunity contacts can only be done by large force like RR.

No force can operate in the Valley out of the area of responsibility of RR units / CRPF units (in Urban Sri Nagar). Hence coordination and even a support operation is required to be conducted by the RR units. Even if it is a simple raid or an ambush the RR units will have to be kept in the loop to avoid friendly matches.
SFs many a time behaves very demandingly and feels it below them to go to a CO and coordinate with him. They are very reluctant in sharing the inputs, sometimes rightly but most of the time wrongly.

SFs be it MARCOS or NSG have to depend on intelligence on someone's or establish their own network which is not possible as that warrants some permanency. Intelligence comes either from Local police or RR Unis. When the intelligence does come in RR Unit CO rightly feels that his force can easily undertake the operation. Actually there is nothing in CI/CT operation that can not be done by a RR unit.

SF thus are deployed either on very hard intelligence of MI, IB or some high ended source when the target is considered within the capability of their strength or mostly employed as an emergency reaction and quick reaction force. There is nothing very special about their ops which can only be done by them. It is rather their capability of fast deployment and emergency responses for which they are used.

People here also talk of Ghatakas. Ghataks as a subunit exist in an Infantry battalion not in RR battalions.

Hardly any Infantry battalion is deployed in CI/CT grid. Infantry battalions conducting a CI/CT operation is a different ballgame. An RR battalion having its fifty percent soldiers from other Arms and Services is a very very different organization albeit doing very well in spite of inherent shortcomings.

CI / CT operations especially offensive operations are driven by the ability of the battalion to garner intelligence. Sources in CI/CT grid are terrifyingly afraid and security conscious. They only go to the agency wherein they find surely of success of their operation lest his head is off his shoulders the next day. Moreover, he wants the security of his incentive money. This is the only factor that makes some RR battalion better than others. RR is better poised to develop sources than any other force.


SF are constrained in these aspects because they are less approachable, they have no permanent bases and there is less surety of incentive money from a mobile force.

I have been seeing this problem with SF since Srilanka days. SF is nothing without intelligence. and we all know about our intelligence.....

 

[WARREN SS]

NSG is India’s premier hostage rescue intervention unit, hostage situations have emerged numerous times in Kashmir but not ONCE has the army even requested for NSG assistance. Many of these events have subsequently been botched by the army but the next time it happens the same recipe is repeated.

First I Don't Like Idea Of National asset
Like NSG deployed in Any random op Day in day Out

Indian Army have Enough Resources And Funds To raise
Special Weapons and Tactics Teams And CQB Training School
Hell if Indian Police Can Raise SWAT's Why Not Military

And in other World
US Army dedicated Whole project for Modern urban warfare in USMA

Urban Warfare Project - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu

 

[Bhadra]

Any SF unit - Army, Navy or Air Force - will not have permanent basing like the way RR has.

As such, SF is only attached to a commander. The commander can then lean on this unit to execute tasks that come to him. Eg; MARCOS and Garuds are attached to a RR unit, and hence the CO, a colonel level officer will task them. Para SF obviously operate in J&K, and my understanding is that there is 1 SF unit per Corps.

No.... SF consider it below their dignity to be attached to a battalion or Brigade. Exceptions are always there but it is rarely done. However, I am witness to such an eventuality too.

So the question is at what level is your commander? The higher the level, more strategic is the tasking.

The military strategy of CI/CT ops is containment and bringing down the level of violence to an extent where civilian administration writ of the state could run. Strategy higher than that involves political considerations and measures including population management. Hence the most fundamental military objectives of CI/CT is inflicting heavy military losses on terrorists/insurgents. There is not many SF tasks in that unless the terrorist capabilities rise beyond the capabilities of CI/CT Force.

Some operations can be at Command level, so GOC-in-C's HQ will task you. 2016 surgical strikes are an excellent example of a command level special operation. So even if on ground it was only an attack on a terrorist launch pad, because of its spread and scope it was levels above what we did earlier.

Surgical strikes go beyond tactical levels and would fall into strategic arena if the purpose is to convey a strategic message and has a strategic impact. Otherwise transborder operations inside Myanmar would hardly fall into the Operational arena.
We are talking about CI/ CT ops and hence leave aside trans LC ops which have to be conducted even if there was no terrorism in Kashmir.

Special Forces thinkers like Prakash Katoch think top down - they want SF to take direction from PM or at most NSA - as that will by default ensure strategic impact.

Yes , special operations of national importance would necessitate that, Not killing two terrorists in Rajwar Forests.

Intelligence at higher formation levels may be beyond just the local HUMINT - but can be via TECHINT or RAW as well.

That is how it is supposed to at least on paper. But there are also grave limitations of technology. The DFs deployed in watery bodies of the Valley surrounded by mountain ranges could not triangulate even a single radio set so far in 30 years. LTTE was using citizens band transmission in Srilanka with RS supplied by RAW who never let Army know about it. Army had no equipment whatsoever to listen in. Terrorists can always remain ahead of Security forces in the technology curve because they need very less and they can afford that cost.
However the best ground level intelligence comes from ground commanders. Higher HQ can buy intelligence because they have more money. However an innovative RR Co can generate resources to buy information.

CI /CT environment is very complex nonmilitary environment where the largest hindrances to military operation is the need to maintain the sanctity of laws. That means Civilian administration is still supreme who can hinder capabilities in narrow bureaucratic interests - for example the high-end mobile interceptors were not allowed to be used by the Army for a very long time by Police Forces. There are serious problems wherein Indian Army has to fight with one hand tied to the back. SF can not be an exception to that.

There is opportunity for SF deployment at all levels - and depending on levels the nature of task will differ.

Our commanders of IA are very possessive about SFs . Contrary to the normal rants and wailing you hear in the forum, they are treated as special, accorded due priority and importance.
We all love them because we all need better mirror images of ourselves.

 

[Assassin 2.0]

First I Don't Like Idea Of National asset
Like NSG deployed in Any random op Day in day Out

Indian Army have Enough Resources And Funds To raise
Special Weapons and Tactics Teams And CQB Training School
Hell if Indian Police Can Raise SWAT's Why Not Military

And in other New
US Army dedicated Whole project for Modern urban warfare in USMA

Urban Warfare Project - Modern War Institute

mwi.usma.edu

We should not risk NSG for solving kashmiri public drama of hostage crisis.
Or waste national asset on them.

But NSG were called when there was a hostage crisis in up.
Man holds 20 children, women hostage in UP's Farrukhabad, NSG commandos called in

Man holds 20 children, women hostage in UP's Farrukhabad, NSG commandos called in

www.indiatoday.in

 

[WARREN SS]

We should not risk NSG for solving kashmiri public drama of hostage crisis.
Or waste national asset on them.

But NSG were called when there was a hostage crisis in up.
Man holds 20 children, women hostage in UP's Farrukhabad, NSG commandos called in

Man holds 20 children, women hostage in UP's Farrukhabad, NSG commandos called in

www.indiatoday.in

Eventually UP SWAT killed the Man and his Wife

Wife of man who held children hostage in UP’s Farrukhabad killed in operation

Farrukhabad hostage situation ends: The body of the deceased, Rubi Batham, the wife of Subhash, is still inside the house which is locked by the police from the outside.

indianexpress.com