Dont know if this has been posted before - Article from 2011 But relevant in 2018 (also given some of the discussions we have been having)
Indian Special Forces 2030. (Gen Katoch)
http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/1395292151PC Katoch CJ Winter 2011.pdf
some extracts:
"Their potential in asymmetric wars to further national security objectives is not understood by the national hierarchy. Special forces should actually be central to our asymmetric response, which does not necessarily imply operating in units/ sub-units. In most case, such a special forces response does not even automatically relate to a physical attack – a physical attack being only the extreme and potentially most dangerous expression of asymmetric warfare."
"All these forces (less the SRGs) are actually what comprise the special forces of India though mostly the difference between “special forces” and “special operation forces (SOF)” is little understood and the media reports all and sundry as special forces, including the entire NSG, parachute units of the Army and SFF, Special Protection Group (SPG), various task forces of the police like Special Task Forces (STF), Special Operations Groups (SOGs), Force One of Maharashtra, Grey Hounds, Cobra, Octopus, Straco, CCB, SSG, Anti-Guerrilla Force, National Disaster Response Force (NDRF), Railway Protection Force Commandos (RPFC) and what have you."
"Varied command and control channels leave the hierarchy confused as to which force is trained for what capacity. For example, during 26/11, while the NSG had its own problems of take-off (absence of psychologist/negotiator et al)), the decision-makers were unaware that the SG of the SFF is also trained for anti-hijack operations."
"Ignoring the four globally acknowledged special forces truths (Humans are More Important than Hardware; Quality is Better than Quantity; Special Forces Cannot be Mass Produced; Competent Special Forces Cannot be Created after Emergencies Arise), we have gone in for rapid expansion of our special forces, diluting their combat potential in terms of manning, equipping and training"
"By 2030, our special forces scene should look as follow:
1. A National Policy for Employment of Special Forces in place and implemented.
2. An Integrated Special Forces Command (ISFC) established directly under the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) integrating the Military Special Forces, Special Group of the SFF and SAGs of the NSG. The ISFC should continue to meet the special forces’ requirements of the Services, coordinated through Strategic Special Forces Cells (SSFCs) functioning directly under the Service Chiefs, Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).
3. Incognito deployment of special forces in areas of India’s strategic interest for strategic surveillance, controlling the fault lines of our adversaries, targeting the sources of cross-border terrorism and continuous shaping of the battlefield in furtherance of national interests and objectives.
4. Raising and consolidation of a full-fledged marine corps under the Andaman & Nicobar Command (ANC), following which the ANC may be renamed as the Strategic Marine Command (SMC). This must be given due consideration by the government as the concept of the ANC looking towards Mainland India for troops will be unworkable in the emerging strategic environment given its vast regional responsibility and the grave possibilities of the Indian Ocean region hotting up.