@COLDHEARTED AVIATOR @abingdonboy
The building was simply too large to be brought down, not in technical terms, but imagine the sight of Army bringing down a high profile multi-storey building for "just" 2 terrorists.
The building did not support ingress from chopper. And even if it did - how many dozens of operators will you bring in to contain the situation? Comparison with Chabad house is not appropriate as the situation was contained to just a couple of rooms in one floor there.
I also disagree that night time operations were an option. The SF simply does not have optics in that quantity and quality. Why thats the case is a different matter - in my view though with the likes of Tonbo imaging based out of India, our SFs should have the best the world has to offer - period.
It was my view then and even now, that the senior general officer responsible for the area should accepted the complexity of the situation and called in the NSG. Para SF is also trained for CQB but my gut feeling is that they probably train for smaller house sized interventions, unlike NSG who has experience of intervening in large complexes right from Golden Temple to Akshardham to Taj & Oberoi to Pathankot. Para SF never say no to an operation so it should have been a decision at a higher level.
Recently when JeM attacked District Police Lines Pulwama, the NSG was indeed brought in.
https://idsa.in/idsanews/army-respects-human-rights:-sacrifice-of-soldiers-in-pampore-encounter
Col. Vivek Chaddha
February 22, 2016
On February 20, 2016, a Central Reserve Police Force convoy was ambushed at Pampore, just a few kilometres away from the heart of Srinagar town. The terrorists, after achieving initial success, moved into the Entrepreneurship Development Institute(EDI), in the near vicinity of the ambush site. At that time, there were a number of employees and students in the building. Thereafter began a prolonged operation that has continued since over the weekend, leading to the loss of invaluable lives of soldiers.
Amongst those martyred in the encounter are three paratroopers who belong to some of the finest special forces battalions of the Indian Army. It would seem an anomaly at first to hear of such a high casualty figure, especially since the terrorists had sought refuge in a building and had no where to escape thereafter. However, a more deliberate assessment of the situation provides an answer to the harsh reality of everyday operations conducted by the army in these areas.
The presence of civilian population in any operation makes its conduct that much more complex and difficult to handle. The possibility of losing innocent lives in crossfire or worse as a result of people being used as human shields cannot be ruled out under such circumstances.
Second, purely from an operational perspective, it limits the options available to the army to take out terrorists who seek refuge in such buildings. This is especially so when the buildings provide limited avenues of ingress and egress and further do not facilitate a top-down entry from the roof. This was exactly the case with the building in question which has a sloping tin roof and multiple rooms which can be used by terrorists to fire at incoming soldiers. This implies clearing each floor and room physically, more often than not without the knowledge of the exact location of terrorists as also the possibility of presence of civilians.
Third, the easiest solution to neutralising the terrorists is to bring down a building or a house. In this case as well, this could well have been possible. However, over a period of time, the army has deliberately take the precaution of minimising collateral damage during operations, even at the cost of casualty to its troops.
Fourth, the operation was conspicuous by the absence of heavy calibre weapons. This is unlike similar operations that have been conducted in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq, where, artillery, drone based precision missiles and rockets were used with impunity. The Indian Army's refusal to do so is again a part of its counterinsurgency ethos of minimum force and strict rules of engagement.
Fifth, the martyrdom of two officers in the operation yet again reinforces the time honoured tradition of the army, which was witnessed during the Kargil conflict as well. It is the officer class and especially the young officers who lead from the front and lead by example. This is one reason why the army continues to remain the bastion of reliability and faith that the nation reposes in it.
