Indian Special Forces (archived)

[Bornubus]

Cambrian Patrol Gold - 2/8 GR

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[Bornubus]

That's why Drone's data is considered classified and a treasure for intel agencies and Hackers. This is same Heron TP India is getting from Israel.

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PHOTO
19
ANARCHIST SNAPSHOTS
Hacked Images From Israel’s Drone Fleet
f
t

⎕
16
Cora Currier, Henrik Moltke

January 29 2016, 8:38 a.m.


Images: Laura Poitras

British and American spies collected live video from Israeli drones as part of a classified program code-named “Anarchist,” which operated from a mountaintop listening post on the Mediterranean island of Cyprus. Among the files provided by former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden are a series of “snapshots” from Israeli drone feeds, which offer a rare glimpse at the closely guarded secret of Israel’s drone fleet.

The images presented here show several different types of unmanned planes, including what appear to be rare public images of Israeli drones carrying missiles. Although Israeli drone strikes have been widely reported, officially the government refuses to confirm the use of armed drones. (Neither NSA, GCHQ, nor the Israel Defense Forces provided comment for this story.)

For more details, read our accompanying story.

These and other images from Anarchist will be on view as part of Intercept co-founder Laura Poitras’ solo exhibition at the Whitney Museum of American Art in New York. The exhibition,Astro Noise, opens February 5.

On January 28, 2010, GCHQ analysts on Cyprus captured six minutes of video from what appears to be a Heron TP, a giant drone manufactured by the state-owned Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI).

In this snapshot still from the video, a large missile-shaped object is clearly visible on the left side. A GCHQ report mentions “regular collects of Heron TP carrying weapons” in 2009. A very similar image, likely from the same intercept, is named “Heron_TP_Payload.” The video is shot from the right-hand rear vertical stabilizer of the TP (this open-source videooffers a similar viewpoint).

Drone experts consulted byThe Intercept confirmed that the image shows a Heron TP.

“It certainly looks like the missile-shaped objects are weapons,” said Bill Sweetman, an editor at Aviation Week. “The bodies appear to have cruciform tail fins. The distortion makes it a bit hard to tell size, but — assuming they are bombs — these are definitely less than 500-pound class.” He added that because the Heron-TP is an Israeli strategic intelligence system, the objects could be decoys, used to “force a response from Iran’s air defenses, while the UAV orbits and hoovers up signals.”

This is another image taken from a Heron TP, intercepted on February 9, 2010. The Heron TP or Eitan (meaning “strong” or “steadfast”) has an 85-foot wingspan, can carry a 1-ton load, and can stay aloft for up to 36 hours. It has been described in the press as “the drone that can reach Iran.”

The image is blurred, but objects appear to be mounted under the wings. The GCHQ file notes that the signal was “too poor to process” further.

Here is an IAI Heron, intercepted on April 26, 2009. “This is the standard IAI Heron, which can be recognized by the shape of the satellite communications radome,” said Sweetman.

Former U.S. drone pilots interviewed for this story told The Intercept that this view, showing the body of the aircraft, was a way of checking for ice or other problems.

This particular Heron seems to be modified to carry arms or other wing-mounted equipment such as sensors, but given the quality of the image, it is not entirely clear.

This is an IAI Searcher MK III, according to Sweetman. The Searcher was developed in the 1980s, but is still used by the Israel Defense Forces and by a number of other countries.

This image was intercepted early on the morning of January 7, 2010. Based on the display markings, like the dial in the upper right-hand corner, it appears to be from a drone made by the company Aeronautics. (This video from the manufacturer shows a similar view.) The image indicates that this model was equipped with Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) camera.

Unlike other Anarchist snapshots identified byThe Intercept, the video angles downward and appears to show a view of buildings below.

A GCHQ document from 2010 reported that analysts on Cyprus had collected signals from Aeronautics’ Aerostar Tactical, a medium-sized drone that has been used by the Israeli military since 2000, and sold to countries from Poland toThailand.

This blurred image was recorded on August 25, 2009, the same day that news agencies reported that the IDF bombed a smuggler tunnel in Gaza, killing three Palestinians inside. According to an Anarchist document, the signal was “too poor to process” further.

 

[Bornubus]

Here is an IAI Heron, intercepted on April 26, 2009. “This is the standard IAI Heron, which can be recognized by the shape of the satellite communications radome,” said Sweetman.

Former U.S. drone pilots interviewed for this story told The Intercept that this view, showing the body of the aircraft, was a way of checking for ice or other problems.

This particular Heron seems to be modified to carry arms or other wing-mounted equipment such as sensors, but given the quality of the image, it is not entirely clear.

This is an IAI Searcher MK III, according to Sweetman. The Searcher was developed in the 1980s, but is still used by the Israel Defense Forces and by a number of other countries.

This image was intercepted early on the morning of January 7, 2010. Based on the display markings, like the dial in the upper right-hand corner, it appears to be from a drone made by the company Aeronautics. (This video from the manufacturer shows a similar view.) The image indicates that this model was equipped with Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) camera.

Unlike other Anarchist snapshots identified byThe Intercept, the video angles downward and appears to show a view of buildings below.

A GCHQ document from 2010 reported that analysts on Cyprus had collected signals from Aeronautics’ Aerostar Tactical, a medium-sized drone that has been used by the Israeli military since 2000, and sold to countries from Poland toThailand.

This blurred image was recorded on August 25, 2009, the same day that news agencies reported that the IDF bombed a smuggler tunnel in Gaza, killing three Palestinians inside. According to an Anarchist document, the signal was “too poor to process” further.

This image is from a March 2008 internal NSA newsletter celebrating the successful capture of video from the cockpit of an Israeli F-16 during unrest in the Gaza Strip. The newsletter describes a “14-second-long video” captured on January 3, 2008, which “showed an ‘unbroken line’ running through the targeting display, indicating that the target being tracked was on the ground.” On that same day, Israeli airstrikes and shelling from tanks reportedly killed nine people in Gaza.

The F-16 display was captured by operators of satellite surveillance systems at Menwith Hill, an important NSA site in England, working “closely with a GCHQ site in Cyprus for tip-offs.”

This image comes from a PowerPointpresentation and shows a video still from an Iranian-made Ababil III drone flying out of western Syria. The signal was captured by Anarchist analysts and recorded on March 11, 2012.

“MHS [Menwith Hill Station] reacted and made a collect on both the video and telemetry signals and were able to derive a couple of minutes of clear video,” a GCHQ report notes. This was “a bit of a result” for the Anarchist team, not least because the captured video resulted in “presidential interest” — presumably a reference to U.S. President Barack Obama — “in further samples of the Regime launching attacks upon the general populous [sic].”

The image offers rare evidence of Iranian drones operated by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s military, although their use has been reportedbased on testimony from unnamed officials and on videos filmed by eyewitnesses on the ground.

A 2009 GCHQ report notes that “Iran also has an effective UAV industry and their technology has been exported to a number of terrorist organisations.”

 

[Bornubus]

Two intercepts at different times on July 20, 2009, show how the quality of the images Anarchist grabbed could vary. Analysts would have to reprocess the feeds and clean up images to get an idea of what they were looking at.

A training manual for Anarchist explains how analysts decoded video feeds that were encrypted. Publicly available, open-source tools — such as AntiSky and ImageMagick — were used to decrypt and further process the video frames.

“The computing power needed to descramble the images in near real time is considerable,” the manual notes, but “it is still possible to descramble individual frames to determine the image content without too much effort.”

Anarchist also tracked the location of drones. This map shows movement data collected on June 24, 2009, from an Israeli drone of an unspecified type. Several locations are recorded, including one north of Nablus, a city in the West Bank, and another further southwest in the West Bank.

A 2010 GCHQ report includes stills from a video captured by Anarchist that “revealed multiple video streams from different cameras.” The report explains that “this is potentially a significant upgrade to the normal analogue video we see, this new system adds the capability to see a number of video feeds simultaneously.” It concludes that “we currently have no collection system capable of processing this signal due to the high data rate and complexity of the underlying data,” and suggests expanding capabilities in order to capture such videos.

The recording, from April 12, 2010, also contained the drone’s location data, near the Palestinian town of Attil.

 

[Bornubus]

The recording, from April 12, 2010, also contained the drone’s location data, near the Palestinian town of Attil.

This is another ground-track showing a map of location data from an Israeli drone, intercepted on June 25, 2009. This two-second recording seems to have been made while the drone was stationary. The map has three locations marked: Tel Nof and Palmachim, both Israeli air force bases home to drone squadrons, and Ein Shemer, which houses an anti-ballistic missile battery, and where the IDF conducts drone-training flights.

Another snapshot shows what appears to be the landing gear of a drone. Sweetman, of Aviation Week, suggested that it was an Aerostar Tactical UAV.

This snapshot from a 14-second-long video dated July 13, 2009, was recorded at 4:51 in the morning, and shows what appears to be an Aerostar Tactical UAV flying at low altitude.

This is another shot of a Heron TP, taken almost six minutes into a recording captured on June 9, 2010. There is no visible missile mount or payload, but the drone appears to be carrying a modification, which Sweetman called a “ventral pannier.” Publicly available photos show similar storage compartments under the main hull.

 

[swastic_1170]

Cambrian Patrol Gold - 2/8 GR

View attachment 11171

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I Don't know if is the modern cameo.. but our jawans are looking fabulous... they will give Hollywood movie characters run for their money..

 

[rkhanna]

Considering this is an SF thread. Getting back to it...

http://indianmavericks.blogspot.in/

In the days of old a warlord in a distant land approached a very capable police officer in India and spoke about his fears that India's neighbor was building and testing nuclear weapons. To find out if this was actually the case a special group of people was set up. The selection process for this special group was quite tough. People with a certain flair for independent thinking and coherent action were selected. The emphasis was on people who were very fit but did not have to be given very detailed orders for every little thing and were willing and able to do whatever was needed to make it all hold together.

This special group climbed mountains and looked over the horizon at what was happening. They also trekked deep within the neighbor's yard and repeatedly picked up the neighbor's family members and asked them if they knew anything about his nuclear intentions. As long as they could determine that neighbor did not intend to deploy nuclear weapons in his back yard there was a chance that the peace of a thousand years could remain.

The people of this special group sat in a set of old huts behind the President's house. They had unfettered access to parts of Hindon and Palam - which all they really seemed to need. It was a small low/no profile affair.

And as time wore on, the warlord lost interest in this part of the world but his friend the police officer grew in national stature. It was after all a small country back then and everyone knew everyone. The police officer was asked by his commander to help solve a vexing problem along the eastern border. Again he fell back on the men of the special group. Again they delivered. This became a pattern whatever was asked - they delivered with no questions. They did grumble occasionally but it was nothing compared to what they delivered.
What started as a small group of misfits - gradually morphed into a real but nameless establishment with a real sense of national thought. As they were usually the last steps of the national thought process - they became the real stakeholders in all policy making. Never has a small group of people had so much influence on the nation since the companions of Gandhiji.

What emerged from this establishment was a very lean and mean version of India's national security policy. A minimalist national thinking - long on substance and short on bullshit. Long after the policeman retired, the group continued to affect the way India thought about critical issues. As the national sphere expanded and threats morphed, the group grew in size to meet the various needs. Eventually a place was set up in Himachal Pradesh to gradually fill the ranks. The place was managed by the Army and the volunteers from the Army staffed the ranks. The standards were extremely high - about 1% of those that applied actually made it through. Those that got through were capable of picking up new languages, dialects, adapting to new cultures while still retaining the capacity for extreme physical exertion. This establishment became the mothership from which all other conflict resolution capabilities emerged. Whether it was hostage rescue, or riot control a variety of policing functions grew naturally from their roots planted by the establishment.

There was a catch though. Per the policeman's world view - if you were to become part of this special group - you could not be part of the uniformed services. The rationale was that a member of the uniformed services being caught in a foreign land could be interpreted as an act of war. So you could only join this group by renouncing the connection to your parent cadre or service. From that point on - you were a civilian.

Now over the last decade, things have been changing. The Armed forces came in and expanded the setup in Himachal. They came to have a bigger and bigger role in the day to day affairs of the establishment. It became harder and harder to claim that the establishment and the Armed forces were not tied at the hip. The policeman's principle of separating the two elements became increasingly unworkable.

The old members of the establishment looked upon this with disdain. They felt the standard were being diluted and pretty soon the special group would spend its time painting anything that didn't move. They reconciled to all this with the understanding that whatever new capabilities were raised outside the needs of the special group would remain confined to national borders. This was all effectively a glorified internal security operation.

But that was not to be. By crossing the borders and then crowing about it in public - the enfant terrible of the establishment made it clear that it was not going to remain subservient to the older ways and do what it felt was right.

 

[rkhanna]

Same link as above

I think a lot of media folk are finding it hard to distinguish between the various groups of Indian special operators.

India (despite what you hear in the press) is still not rich enough to bring all its armed forces to very high levels of readiness and training. So the GoI decided to do this piecemeal. Where possible they raised special units with some immediate justification and then used the units to incubate a gradual improvement in the training and quality of the main force. I think the scheme has paid off - to an extent - but the result is a massive proliferation of special forces. This making the landscape visually complicated.

One my pet peeves is when a local channel attempts to pass off footage of special forces people as something completely different. Recently a channel was showing some SOG people and then talking about them as if it was footage of actually Jihadis. That is not a good thing.

I hear that a somewhat related problem in the Op Rakshak Theater is IFF. There should be a color-of-the-day but that is quite risky so the alternative is to simply shoot first and ask questions later. Worst case you get chewed out by your CO for being trigger-happy - best case you immobilize a threat.

Anyway - here is a visual guide with some information.

1) SG/22/Mavericks - No uniform, facial camouflage, any weapon.[Ex. Maj. Sudhir Kumar, Maj. Amit Deswal, Maj. Udai Singh] - if you see a name against a photo of one of these people - it most likely implies they are dead. Their faces are seldom exposed, they perform a lot of undercover work. There are many sub-branches of this establishment (Ex. Vikas Regiment) very few have been photographed. I have even heard of Ladakh Scouts people being lumped with this establishment.

2) IA - SF in the valley - Maroon beret/patka, facial camouflage, Tavor or AK.[Ex. RR Cdo] Mainly provide high endurance interdiction of known Jihadi modules over adverse terrain.

3) Unified Command - SOG in the valley - Mixed fatigues, No Patka/Beret, face covered, AK variant [Ex. Pulwama SOG]. This organization used to have two parts - the SOG and the STF. The STF component AFAIK is no longer active. Typically used for intelligence gathering and targeted operations.

4) "SG-I and SG-II" (Most likely under UC) - Fatigues, no head gear, AK variant. Limited to operations in the Pir Panjals. Comprised of Gujjars and other natives of the area - these units help interdict an arms supply channel from Pakistan. I have only seen one set of photos of these guys - it was circa 2003 and I'm not sure if these units are still on active status.

5) JK-Ikhwan/National Security Organization (UC) - Shalwar kameez, beards, AK variants, (Ex. This Guy). Limited levels of active duty personnel. Most units disbanded.

6) IA - SF (Para) in the valley - Maroon beret, no facial camouflage, Tavor/AK variant. Deploy from ALH for AIOS security roles - exposed faces mean they are not assigned undercover roles. [see here]

7) MHA-NSG (Phantom) - Black attire, conspicuous webbing, HRT gear, black balaclava masks. [Ex. This Guy] - primarily HRT roles. Usually a subset something called 51-SAG.

MHA-NSG (SRG) - Black dungarees, Black or Maroom Beret, usually with HKMP5 or MP5k variant. Typically assigned to VIP security. [See these people]

9) MHA-SPG - Usually seen around PMs and ex-PMs or family of ex-PMs. Hard to mistake for anything else [Here their Counter-Fire Team]

10) IN - MARCOS - Black attire, facial camouflage, scuba gear, rarely seen in public barring the occasional media spectacle. [See here]

11) IAF - Garud - Peculiar fatigues, Cloth hats, helmets, eyes covered and faces shaved. Seen at airbases and the odd security detail for senior IAF officers in a sensitive area [see here]

12) CRPF - Cobra - Jungle fatigues, cloth hats, helmets, faces exposed, Tavors [a typical image]. One typically sees these guys in the Maoist insurgency areas.

13) CISF Commandos - Mixed fatigues, cloth hats, peculiar balaclava with white stripes. AK variants some Tavors [see here]. Mostly seen on YouTube - supposedly trained to provide QRFs at critical installations.

14) "Ghatak/Commando" - Slightly better kitted versions of their peers mainly for serving HRM (High Risk Missions) and providing local QRFs. Closer to the F-INSAS standard promoted some years ago. Usually have a prominent personal comm-link on the left top.

 

[Bornubus]

Para SF

___________________________________________________________________

 

[Predator707]

Same link as above

I think a lot of media folk are finding it hard to distinguish between the various groups of Indian special operators.

India (despite what you hear in the press) is still not rich enough to bring all its armed forces to very high levels of readiness and training. So the GoI decided to do this piecemeal. Where possible they raised special units with some immediate justification and then used the units to incubate a gradual improvement in the training and quality of the main force. I think the scheme has paid off - to an extent - but the result is a massive proliferation of special forces. This making the landscape visually complicated.

One my pet peeves is when a local channel attempts to pass off footage of special forces people as something completely different. Recently a channel was showing some SOG people and then talking about them as if it was footage of actually Jihadis. That is not a good thing.

I hear that a somewhat related problem in the Op Rakshak Theater is IFF. There should be a color-of-the-day but that is quite risky so the alternative is to simply shoot first and ask questions later. Worst case you get chewed out by your CO for being trigger-happy - best case you immobilize a threat.

Anyway - here is a visual guide with some information.

1) SG/22/Mavericks - No uniform, facial camouflage, any weapon.[Ex. Maj. Sudhir Kumar, Maj. Amit Deswal, Maj. Udai Singh] - if you see a name against a photo of one of these people - it most likely implies they are dead. Their faces are seldom exposed, they perform a lot of undercover work. There are many sub-branches of this establishment (Ex. Vikas Regiment) very few have been photographed. I have even heard of Ladakh Scouts people being lumped with this establishment.

2) IA - SF in the valley - Maroon beret/patka, facial camouflage, Tavor or AK.[Ex. RR Cdo] Mainly provide high endurance interdiction of known Jihadi modules over adverse terrain.

3) Unified Command - SOG in the valley - Mixed fatigues, No Patka/Beret, face covered, AK variant [Ex. Pulwama SOG]. This organization used to have two parts - the SOG and the STF. The STF component AFAIK is no longer active. Typically used for intelligence gathering and targeted operations.

4) "SG-I and SG-II" (Most likely under UC) - Fatigues, no head gear, AK variant. Limited to operations in the Pir Panjals. Comprised of Gujjars and other natives of the area - these units help interdict an arms supply channel from Pakistan. I have only seen one set of photos of these guys - it was circa 2003 and I'm not sure if these units are still on active status.

5) JK-Ikhwan/National Security Organization (UC) - Shalwar kameez, beards, AK variants, (Ex. This Guy). Limited levels of active duty personnel. Most units disbanded.

6) IA - SF (Para) in the valley - Maroon beret, no facial camouflage, Tavor/AK variant. Deploy from ALH for AIOS security roles - exposed faces mean they are not assigned undercover roles. [see here]

7) MHA-NSG (Phantom) - Black attire, conspicuous webbing, HRT gear, black balaclava masks. [Ex. This Guy] - primarily HRT roles. Usually a subset something called 51-SAG.

MHA-NSG (SRG) - Black dungarees, Black or Maroom Beret, usually with HKMP5 or MP5k variant. Typically assigned to VIP security. [See these people]

9) MHA-SPG - Usually seen around PMs and ex-PMs or family of ex-PMs. Hard to mistake for anything else [Here their Counter-Fire Team]

10) IN - MARCOS - Black attire, facial camouflage, scuba gear, rarely seen in public barring the occasional media spectacle. [See here]

11) IAF - Garud - Peculiar fatigues, Cloth hats, helmets, eyes covered and faces shaved. Seen at airbases and the odd security detail for senior IAF officers in a sensitive area [see here]

12) CRPF - Cobra - Jungle fatigues, cloth hats, helmets, faces exposed, Tavors [a typical image]. One typically sees these guys in the Maoist insurgency areas.

13) CISF Commandos - Mixed fatigues, cloth hats, peculiar balaclava with white stripes. AK variants some Tavors [see here]. Mostly seen on YouTube - supposedly trained to provide QRFs at critical installations.

14) "Ghatak/Commando" - Slightly better kitted versions of their peers mainly for serving HRM (High Risk Missions) and providing local QRFs. Closer to the F-INSAS standard promoted some years ago. Usually have a prominent personal comm-link on the left top.

As per my knowledge and experience with the paras operating in kashmir they dont wear maroon beret in the valley. Neither the kabootar wings and balidan badge in any public interaction though any official ceremony is a different case..

Sent from my Moto G (4) using Tapatalk

 

[Predator707]

Para SF

View attachment 11221


View attachment 11222


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Dirty Dozens sir ??

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[rkhanna]

I am seriously puzzled by this new trend of our Operators posing for Instagram Pictures.

 

[raheel besharam]

I am seriously puzzled by this new trend of our Operators posing for Instagram Pictures.

No harm if face is blurred.............

 

[rkhanna]

No harm if face is blurred.............

No Harm yes but whatever happened to the "Quiet Professionals". and IMO lacks a little professionalism and opsec that is required of a SOF unit. Alot of pictures like these make them look like young Cadets playing warrior.

 

[Bornubus]

As per my knowledge and experience with the paras operating in kashmir they dont wear maroon beret in the valley. Neither the kabootar wings and balidan badge in any public interaction though any official ceremony is a different case..

Sent from my Moto G (4) using Tapatalk

Partially true and it depends on the posting. If a Para is posted in a RR unit then you can only distinguish him with Chest Badges which usually they don't wear only RR insignia like other troops.


But if the entire unit is posted then then could wear Marron beret and Balidan badge. Also Para Airborne serves in Siachen and High altitude posts like regular infantry but Para SF don't


Old pic when he was posted in Kashmir.

 

[armyofhind]

Para SF

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great to see SF practicing the art of Kali. They were instructed by Agalon Kanishka Sharma.
Great guy with some interesting stories about SF guys at Nahan. He's got a school here in Noida where I go to learn.

 

[rishivashista13]

great to see SF practicing the art of Kali. They were instructed by Agalon Kanishka Sharma.
Great guy with some interesting stories about SF guys at Nahan. He's got a school here in Noida where I go to learn.

Really !!
You met Shifu Kanishk Sharma face to face ?????

Sent from my Micromax Q380 using Tapatalk

 

[armyofhind]

Really !!
You met Shifu Kanishk Sharma face to face ?????

Sent from my Micromax Q380 using Tapatalk

Yeah. He runs his school in his house only. Quite a lot of times he's away but mostly he's around. As of classes he instructs only the senior students and the teachers, but he does talk to beginner and intermediate classes from time to time.

 

[rishivashista13]

Yeah. He runs his school in his house only. Quite a lot of times he's away but mostly he's around. As of classes he instructs only the senior students and the teachers, but he does talk to beginner and intermediate classes from time to time.

You are lucky enough , so getting guidance and learning from shifu ji .

Sent from my Micromax Q380 using Tapatalk

 

[armyofhind]

You are lucky enough , so getting guidance and learning from shifu ji .

Sent from my Micromax Q380 using Tapatalk

Whats lucky about it bro, he runs a school in noida.. pay the fees.. get enrolled.