Indian nuclear submarines

[utubekhiladi]

4 sub of arihant class is to much once it is fully tested we sould go for subs with more missile tubes, present 4 are insufficent, we need 12 tube sub to have workable deterance in place, let enemy feel the heat if they tried to mess with us.

12 tube sub will be bigger in size..

will 6-8 tubes be enough?

 

[sayareakd]

need to think from the point of view of two front war, now ask your self will this be sufficent. Think of best and prepare for worst.

 

[noob101]

4 sub of arihant class is to much once it is fully tested we sould go for subs with more missile tubes, present 4 are insufficent, we need 12 tube sub to have workable deterance in place, let enemy feel the heat if they tried to mess with us.

I think that the the newer models of of the Arihant class boats are going to be progressively larger with more tubes.

The SSGN concept is a lot more useful in case of a war... For example, In case of a major war with Pakistan Arihant could surface somewhere out of Karachi and launch 20 conventional missiles at the harbor crippling the PN and effect a blockade. It would be an effective safer way than going in with an air strike. Follow on models would be should be able to carry Nirbhay and deeper penetrating missiles to hit air fields and other installations..... While SSBN are very important as they serve in the deterrence role, unless there is a nuclear war they are hardly useful, considering India no first strike policy so more SSGN would be a better option in my opinion...

 

[Galaxy]

We need something in range of 6,000 KM for deterrence against China. K-4 missiles with 3,500Km range from Bay of Bengal/IOR won't reach highly Han populated and Industrial belt of Chinese east coast.

For Pakistan, K-15 is more than enough !!

 

[sayareakd]

SSBN like sub is national asset as it is act as deterrence. Attack subs are naval assets, specially a nuclear attack sub. Both have different objectives.

 

[asianobserve]

this is a picture of launch tube from inside arihant. look closely and see what u find this pic was provided by saya sir

Launch tube for missiles or commandos? The handles make this silo looks like an escape hatch or access in coning tower... just my thoughts.

 

[sayareakd]

Launch tube for missiles or commandos? The handles make this silo looks like an escape hatch or access in coning tower... just my thoughts.

ours is multipurpose nuclear submarine.

 

[niharjhatn]

ours is multipurpose nuclear submarine.

Probably you are both right... might be for maintainance crew or something?

Guide railing system?

Who knows

 

[bhramos]

Sea Trials of INS Arihant next month | idrw.org
++

.

what is the use of Gold or steel plated infront of the sub, will it reduce the stealth features of the sub!!!!!!

 

[sayareakd]

what is the use of Gold or steel plated infront of the sub, will it reduce the stealth features of the sub!!!!!!

it shows how much we paid for this ATV. (it only reflecting yellow light therefore giving impression of gold)

 

[bhramos]

it shows how much we paid for this ATV. (it only reflecting yellow light therefore giving impression of gold)

i said same, gold or steel. but never saw similar plate on other submarines.
so whats its use???

 

[sayareakd]

i said same, gold or steel. but never saw similar plate on other submarines.
so whats its use???

o

must had something to do with sonar.

front looks similar to this

 

[bhramos]

o

must had something to do with sonar.

front looks similar to this

thanks mate, it could be what you said.....
but never observed Kilo that clearly as now.......

 

[noob101]

i said same, gold or steel. but never saw similar plate on other submarines.
so whats its use???

I thought that all submarines are coated specialized rubber material to reduce sonar signature

 

[ace009]

A sub shaped like a cucumber and covered in rubber - hmmmm what does that remind me of?





(A male body part - in case you missed it ... )

 

[pmaitra]

^^

You must be a Tea Party member.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

WHAT

NAVAL DOCTRINE –– AN ANALYSIS An IDC Analysis (With inputs from Sayan Majumdar) New Delhi, 04 July 2004 The recently announced Naval Doctrine envisages the adoption of a submerged nuclear missile deterrent, to launch the so called 'second strike capability'. Our researcher Sayan Majumdar speculates on the totality of the technology, systems, combat units, communications and integration with the National Command Authority, required to make such a capability a reality"¦.. Submerged Nuclear Deterrent November 15, 1960 was a Red Letter day for the United States Navy (USN) and for the world naval community. USS George Washington, the first nuclear powered Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) of the USN began its operational patrol on that day. USS George Washington was armed with solid-fuel Polaris A-1 submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) that could be launched from under water. The SSBNs have since matured into submerged mobile silos as they are reasonably well protected from pre-emptive strike and thus ideal instruments for nuclear deterrence. These submarines cannot be eliminated in a first strike, yet their hydra-headed SLBMs can inflict devastating reprisals on a rogue nuclear aggressor. The present force of the USN consists of Ohio Class SSBNs armed with Trident II D-5 SLBMs with ranges in excess of 7,000 km that increases the sea room in which they can hide and still keep their targets within range. Their accuracy is as good as land based inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM) thanks to stellar inertial navigation system (INS). The Naval Doctrine recently propounded by the Indian Navy has correctly stressed the use of submarines both conventional and nuclear powered, in conjunction with the stated nuclear "retaliatory second strike" capability. A significant proportion of the valuable military and industrial targets of India's potential adversaries lie near their coastlines making them highly vulnerable to naval strikes. It is quite likely that an indigenous Indian nuclear submarine referred to as advanced technology vessel (ATV) will be in operation by about 2006, to be followed later by sister submarines, to boost India's nuclear "second strike capability". The weaponry of the ATV needs to be selected carefully and also the focus should shift to underwater Very Low Frequency/Extremely Low Frequency (VLF/ELF) and laser communications for effective coordination of these ATVs with the National Command Authority (NCA). Earlier media reports had indicated the ATV to be a version of the Russian Charlie Class nuclear powered cruise missile armed submarine (SSGN), but it is unlikely that the Indian Navy will choose such an older basic technology for operations at the turn of millennium, especially when advanced technology is available from Russia and France. Another option is stated to be a modified variant of the massive Project 949A Antey Oscar II Class SSGN. A customised development of Russian Project 885 Yasen/Graney Class Nuclear powered Attack Submarine (SSN) also referred to as Severodvinsk Class, which is a further derivative of the Project 971 Akula Class SSN and features a significant cruise missile capability with eight vertical launch tubes aft of the sail, appears to be yet another choice. Although a SSN, the dimensions of Severodvinsk Class approach the dimensions of the French Le Redoutable Class ballistic missile submarines. The hull is made of low magnetic steel, with spherical bow sonar and canted torpedo tubes. In any case the ATV project is demanding simultaneous development and integration of advanced technologies in the fields of nuclear propulsion, missiles, missile guidance, "cold launch" from submerged submarine and precise navigation and position fixing techniques. The exact nature of our ATV will only become apparent after it enters service but the Sagarika (Oceanic) SLBM or submarine launched cruise missiles (SLCM), due to enter service with the Indian Navy should have a range of at least 2.000 km and provide greater operational sea room and ability to operate far from the enemy coast. Near enemy coastlines ATV will be vulnerable to enemy conventional powered hunter-killer submarines (SSK) equipped with air-independent propulsion (AIP). If a SLBM or SLCM of decent range can be developed the ATV will retain the choice of operating in certain heavily defended patrol areas of Arabian and South China Seas and in the Indian Ocean, while keeping the potential targets within range. The Soviet Navy followed this "Bastion Concept" during Cold War days with relative success against the formidable anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces of the United States Navy and her allies. Escorts and Weapons The ATV will require escorts and the induction of Project 971M Akula II Class SSN like Gephard from Russia seems possible. The naval officials should ensure integration of the latest range of sensors and weapon systems available from Russia and elsewhere. Structurally these submarines have the latest technologies; they are very quiet in comparison to other Russian vessels and significantly are the product of advanced Russian research on marine animals, notably dolphins. It can be assumed that these submarines "by default" will carry a formidable array of potent torpedoes and the Indo-Russian BrahMos Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM). However every effort should be made to retain the capacity of firing the submarine launched Raduga RK-55 Granit (SS-N-21 Sampson) Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM) twelve of which are carried by Russian Navy Akulas and are fired from standard 533 mm torpedo tubes. LACMs especially submarine launched, are invaluable assets of any major navy, and tactically may be used in decimating enemy overland communications, command and control centres and powerful air defence installations –– before launching extensive barrage air attacks followed by ground invasion. If the Russian LACM is not available because of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) restrictions, efforts should be made to develop an indigenous LACM of fair range and capacity, or re-engineer and enhance the capability of BrahMos ASCM. The BrahMos developments indeed seem to be approaching that direction with 900 km and 1400 km "Super BrahMos" variants. This aspect will enhance the Indian Navy's capability to influence the "air-land" battle and since this naval application is likely to appeal to politicians and stretegic planners as well, the Navy will be able to press for increased budget in return. As the ATVs will represent a cohesive cluster of strategic capability –– with perhaps 12 to 16 SLBMs or SLCMs –– there will be unacceptable damage if one unit is lost. Thus nuclear-warhead armed SLCMs should be distributed on SSNs and major surface combatants for distribution of our strategic capability and to complicate the tasks of our adversaries. The Indian Navy could also opt for the exceptionally high speed (200 Knots) Russian Shkval (Squall) rocket propelled 'torpedo' which is capable of destroying even super-carriers with a couple of hits and provides the targeted vessels very little chance to perform evasive manoeuvres. This 'torpedo' may also be used as a "revenge" weapon, which may be fired along the bearing of an incoming enemy torpedo. The Russians have meanwhile disclosed the existence of non-nuclear tipped Shkval-E for the export market. Action Information System It is generally regarded that the underwater acoustic sensor suite and combat action information system of United States and West European submarines are superior to their Russian contemporaries. Hopefully the Indian Navy is set to "absorb" the key technologies of the Franco-Spanish Scorpene Class SSKs, which includes innovations inspired directly by France's new-generation nuclear attack and ballistic missile submarines. It is difficult to ascertain the completion status of the Akula II Class submarines for the Indian Navy, but it may be possible to retrofit the Franco-Spanish technology especially the sonar and other acoustic sensor suite and automated action information/combat management system, to the subsequent units of the ATV and Akulas if these are found to be superior. Propulsion We envisage that gradually the nuclear powered submarines will predominate over conventional types in the IN. If future units of Scorpene class can accommodate a small nuclear Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR), it is most welcome. The French are expert in developing small yet reliable marine reactors of exceptional standard leading to the development of small 2,670 ton Rubis and Amethyste Class nuclear attack submarines. The Indian Navy however should retain a decent portion of conventional attack "hunter-killer" submarines with AIP for efficiency of operations on the continental shelf region and insertion of Special Forces on enemy beachheads. Security of Bases Although submerged submarines are relatively invulnerable, the submarines while in bases are susceptible to pre-emptive strike and sabotage. Special facilities are required for ballistic missile submarines and this makes their location easily identifiable and well known. Surveillance devices such as satellites and electronic monitoring enable the arrival and departure of ballistic missile submarines to be closely observed. The departures of ballistic missile armed submarines are accompanied by easily identifiable behavior of the escort vessels as the submarines are checked up for acoustic and magnetic signatures and clip-in towed arrays are fitted. Again British ballistic missile submarines have to leave their Scottish base at Faslane through "narrows" at Rhu just north of Helensburgh in full public view. The French Force Oceanique Stretegeque (FOST) ballistic missile submarines face similar problems while leaving Ile Longue Naval Base at Brest Bay. Naturally radical steps are taken for security of naval bases. The Gremikha SSBN Base at Kola peninsula of Russia has huge SSBN "pens" blasted out of granite rocks of the adjacent cliffs to ensure the survival of the Typhoon Class ballistic missile submarines. The other base at Zapadnaya Lista is also closely guarded. Again highly trained dolphins guard the USN SSBN bases of Bangor in Washington State and King's Bay at Georgia. These animate sonar of these dolphins far exceeds any artificial set. In addition to radical measures the Indian Navy also should plan to secure rights for using overseas bases for proper strategic distribution of assets and operational flexibility. Communications The Indian Navy had anticipated the importance of Very Low Frequency (VLF) underwater transmissions long ago. As part of an ambitious naval modernisation program, during the mid-1980s the Indian Navy had constructed a VLF broadcasting station in Tamil Nadu. Although not publicly declared, it was reported that the United States actively collaborated in the project, which was completed in September 1986. The operational VLF facility can primarily be used by the Indian Navy to communicate with its SSKs with trailing communication buoys at periscope depth of 10 to 20 metres. When nuclear ATVs become operational, the VLF facility will permit Indian National Command Authority to issue launch orders to submerged subs at periscope depth. VLF waves propagate almost a quarter of the globe away and are generally immune to atmospheric disturbances caused by nuclear detonations. Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) waves on the other hand can penetrate to the operational "patrol depth" of the SSBNs but huge overland infrastructure needs to be built up with 80 km long antennae. On the negative side, the small bandwidth of VLF transmission limits the rate of transmission of data, usually allowing only the operation of slow Teletype messages. Moreover the large terrestrial and static VLF facility would be vulnerable to enemy strikes and even if the VLF facility is shifted deep underground in "hardened" shelters, the communication antennae would be located above ground and will remain vulnerable. Thus an airborne VLF transmitter similar to the USN Take Charge And Move Out (TACAMO) should be seriously considered for procurement and induction. A powerful 200KW transmitter provides the VLF transmissions in TACAMO. The United States Navy utilizes an EC-130A/Q Hercules with a trailing wire antennae 10km long with a drogue parachute at the end. During transmission the aircraft flies in a continuous tight circle, which results in over 70 percent of the wire hanging straight down and acting as a relatively efficient vertical antennae. Presently the E-6 Mercury is the airborne platform of the United States TACAMO Communications System. It provides survivable communication links between the United States National Command Authority (NCA) and Strategic Forces. Long range, air refuelable E-6 is a derivative of the commercial Boeing 707 aircraft equipped with four CFM-56-2A-2 high bypass ratio fan/jet engines with thrust reversers. The weapon system is Electro Magnetic Pulse (EMP) hardened. Mission range is over 6000 nautical miles. E-6B fulfils both TACAMO and Airborne National Command Post (ABNCP) missions. The E-6 ABNCP modification program was established to upgrade TACAMO operational capabilities by incorporating a subset of United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOMM) EC-135 ABNCP equipment into the E-6 aircraft. The modified aircraft have the designation changed from E-6A to E-6B. The E-6B modified an E-6A by adding battle staff positions and other specialised equipment. The E-6B is a dual-mission aircraft capable of fulfilling either the E-6A mission or the airborne strategic command post mission ("Looking Glass"?) and is equipped with an Airborne Launch Control System (ALCS). The ALCS is capable of launching United States ICBMs. The E-6B is capable of performing both the TACAMO and ABNCP missions. This modification enables USSTRATCOM to perform current and projected TACAMO and ABNCP operational tasking and the E-6B provides survivable Command, Control and Communications (C3) force management communications for the NCA via multiple frequency band communications. Attention has now shifted to laser based underwater communications. There is an optical window in the blue-green part of the laser spectrum, which enables transmission to penetrate the ocean to substantial distances. Power requirements are considerable and the system at least presently cannot be installed in artificial satellites. Thus as a tactical improvisation the laser is made to be ground based, preferably mobile, in perfect conjunction with a space based mirror with adaptive optics being used to produce a cohesive beam. Significantly, data transfer rate will be 300 times greater than ELF system although the "rerouted" laser may not penetrate to the same depth. Conclusion The effective combination of nuclear powered ballistic missile armed and coventional attack submarines coupled with underwater VLF/ELF and laser communications will make our sea based nuclear deterrent optimally effective. The challenge lies in front of our national leadership and defence scientists to "secure" the proper systems either indigenously or import them from established sources.

NAVAL DOCTRINE –– AN ANALYSIS An IDC Analysis (With inputs from Sayan Majumdar)

New Delhi, 04 July 2004 The recently announced Naval Doctrine envisages the adoption of a submerged nuclear missile deterrent, to launch the so called 'second strike capability'. Our researcher Sayan Majumdar speculates on the totality of the technology, systems, combat units, communications and integration with the National Command Authority, required to make such a capability a reality"¦.. Submerged Nuclear Deterrent November 15, 1960 was a Red Letter day for the United States Navy (USN) and for the world naval community. USS George Washington, the first nuclear powered Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) of the USN began its operational patrol on that day. USS George Washington was armed with solid-fuel Polaris A-1 submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) that could be launched from under water. The SSBNs have since matured into submerged mobile silos as they are reasonably well protected from pre-emptive strike and thus ideal instruments for nuclear deterrence. These submarines cannot be eliminated in a first strike, yet their hydra-headed SLBMs can inflict devastating reprisals on a rogue nuclear aggressor. The present force of the USN consists of Ohio Class SSBNs armed with Trident II D-5 SLBMs with ranges in excess of 7,000 km that increases the sea room in which they can hide and still keep their targets within range. Their accuracy is as good as land based inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM) thanks to stellar inertial navigation system (INS). The Naval Doctrine recently propounded by the Indian Navy has correctly stressed the use of submarines both conventional and nuclear powered, in conjunction with the stated nuclear "retaliatory second strike" capability. A significant proportion of the valuable military and industrial targets of India's potential adversaries lie near their coastlines making them highly vulnerable to naval strikes. It is quite likely that an indigenous Indian nuclear submarine referred to as advanced technology vessel (ATV) will be in operation by about 2006, to be followed later by sister submarines, to boost India's nuclear "second strike capability". The weaponry of the ATV needs to be selected carefully and also the focus should shift to underwater Very Low Frequency/Extremely Low Frequency (VLF/ELF) and laser communications for effective coordination of these ATVs with the National Command Authority (NCA). Earlier media reports had indicated the ATV to be a version of the Russian Charlie Class nuclear powered cruise missile armed submarine (SSGN), but it is unlikely that the Indian Navy will choose such an older basic technology for operations at the turn of millennium, especially when advanced technology is available from Russia and France. Another option is stated to be a modified variant of the massive Project 949A Antey Oscar II Class SSGN. A customised development of Russian Project 885 Yasen/Graney Class Nuclear powered Attack Submarine (SSN) also referred to as Severodvinsk Class, which is a further derivative of the Project 971 Akula Class SSN and features a significant cruise missile capability with eight vertical launch tubes aft of the sail, appears to be yet another choice. Although a SSN, the dimensions of Severodvinsk Class approach the dimensions of the French Le Redoutable Class ballistic missile submarines. The hull is made of low magnetic steel, with spherical bow sonar and canted torpedo tubes. In any case the ATV project is demanding simultaneous development and integration of advanced technologies in the fields of nuclear propulsion, missiles, missile guidance, "cold launch" from submerged submarine and precise navigation and position fixing techniques. The exact nature of our ATV will only become apparent after it enters service but the Sagarika (Oceanic) SLBM or submarine launched cruise missiles (SLCM), due to enter service with the Indian Navy should have a range of at least 2.000 km and provide greater operational sea room and ability to operate far from the enemy coast. Near enemy coastlines ATV will be vulnerable to enemy conventional powered hunter-killer submarines (SSK) equipped with air-independent propulsion (AIP). If a SLBM or SLCM of decent range can be developed the ATV will retain the choice of operating in certain heavily defended patrol areas of Arabian and South China Seas and in the Indian Ocean, while keeping the potential targets within range. The Soviet Navy followed this "Bastion Concept" during Cold War days with relative success against the formidable anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces of the United States Navy and her allies. Escorts and Weapons The ATV will require escorts and the induction of Project 971M Akula II Class SSN like Gephard from Russia seems possible. The naval officials should ensure integration of the latest range of sensors and weapon systems available from Russia and elsewhere. Structurally these submarines have the latest technologies; they are very quiet in comparison to other Russian vessels and significantly are the product of advanced Russian research on marine animals, notably dolphins. It can be assumed that these submarines "by default" will carry a formidable array of potent torpedoes and the Indo-Russian BrahMos Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM). However every effort should be made to retain the capacity of firing the submarine launched Raduga RK-55 Granit (SS-N-21 Sampson) Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM) twelve of which are carried by Russian Navy Akulas and are fired from standard 533 mm torpedo tubes. LACMs especially submarine launched, are invaluable assets of any major navy, and tactically may be used in decimating enemy overland communications, command and control centres and powerful air defence installations –– before launching extensive barrage air attacks followed by ground invasion. If the Russian LACM is not available because of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) restrictions, efforts should be made to develop an indigenous LACM of fair range and capacity, or re-engineer and enhance the capability of BrahMos ASCM. The BrahMos developments indeed seem to be approaching that direction with 900 km and 1400 km "Super BrahMos" variants. This aspect will enhance the Indian Navy's capability to influence the "air-land" battle and since this naval application is likely to appeal to politicians and stretegic planners as well, the Navy will be able to press for increased budget in return. As the ATVs will represent a cohesive cluster of strategic capability –– with perhaps 12 to 16 SLBMs or SLCMs –– there will be unacceptable damage if one unit is lost. Thus nuclear-warhead armed SLCMs should be distributed on SSNs and major surface combatants for distribution of our strategic capability and to complicate the tasks of our adversaries. The Indian Navy could also opt for the exceptionally high speed (200 Knots) Russian Shkval (Squall) rocket propelled 'torpedo' which is capable of destroying even super-carriers with a couple of hits and provides the targeted vessels very little chance to perform evasive manoeuvres. This 'torpedo' may also be used as a "revenge" weapon, which may be fired along the bearing of an incoming enemy torpedo. The Russians have meanwhile disclosed the existence of non-nuclear tipped Shkval-E for the export market. Action Information System It is generally regarded that the underwater acoustic sensor suite and combat action information system of United States and West European submarines are superior to their Russian contemporaries. Hopefully the Indian Navy is set to "absorb" the key technologies of the Franco-Spanish Scorpene Class SSKs, which includes innovations inspired directly by France's new-generation nuclear attack and ballistic missile submarines. It is difficult to ascertain the completion status of the Akula II Class submarines for the Indian Navy, but it may be possible to retrofit the Franco-Spanish technology especially the sonar and other acoustic sensor suite and automated action information/combat management system, to the subsequent units of the ATV and Akulas if these are found to be superior. Propulsion We envisage that gradually the nuclear powered submarines will predominate over conventional types in the IN. If future units of Scorpene class can accommodate a small nuclear Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR), it is most welcome. The French are expert in developing small yet reliable marine reactors of exceptional standard leading to the development of small 2,670 ton Rubis and Amethyste Class nuclear attack submarines. The Indian Navy however should retain a decent portion of conventional attack "hunter-killer" submarines with AIP for efficiency of operations on the continental shelf region and insertion of Special Forces on enemy beachheads. Security of Bases Although submerged submarines are relatively invulnerable, the submarines while in bases are susceptible to pre-emptive strike and sabotage. Special facilities are required for ballistic missile submarines and this makes their location easily identifiable and well known. Surveillance devices such as satellites and electronic monitoring enable the arrival and departure of ballistic missile submarines to be closely observed. The departures of ballistic missile armed submarines are accompanied by easily identifiable behavior of the escort vessels as the submarines are checked up for acoustic and magnetic signatures and clip-in towed arrays are fitted. Again British ballistic missile submarines have to leave their Scottish base at Faslane through "narrows" at Rhu just north of Helensburgh in full public view. The French Force Oceanique Stretegeque (FOST) ballistic missile submarines face similar problems while leaving Ile Longue Naval Base at Brest Bay. Naturally radical steps are taken for security of naval bases. The Gremikha SSBN Base at Kola peninsula of Russia has huge SSBN "pens" blasted out of granite rocks of the adjacent cliffs to ensure the survival of the Typhoon Class ballistic missile submarines. The other base at Zapadnaya Lista is also closely guarded. Again highly trained dolphins guard the USN SSBN bases of Bangor in Washington State and King's Bay at Georgia. These animate sonar of these dolphins far exceeds any artificial set. In addition to radical measures the Indian Navy also should plan to secure rights for using overseas bases for proper strategic distribution of assets and operational flexibility. Communications The Indian Navy had anticipated the importance of Very Low Frequency (VLF) underwater transmissions long ago. As part of an ambitious naval modernisation program, during the mid-1980s the Indian Navy had constructed a VLF broadcasting station in Tamil Nadu. Although not publicly declared, it was reported that the United States actively collaborated in the project, which was completed in September 1986. The operational VLF facility can primarily be used by the Indian Navy to communicate with its SSKs with trailing communication buoys at periscope depth of 10 to 20 metres. When nuclear ATVs become operational, the VLF facility will permit Indian National Command Authority to issue launch orders to submerged subs at periscope depth. VLF waves propagate almost a quarter of the globe away and are generally immune to atmospheric disturbances caused by nuclear detonations. Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) waves on the other hand can penetrate to the operational "patrol depth" of the SSBNs but huge overland infrastructure needs to be built up with 80 km long antennae. On the negative side, the small bandwidth of VLF transmission limits the rate of transmission of data, usually allowing only the operation of slow Teletype messages. Moreover the large terrestrial and static VLF facility would be vulnerable to enemy strikes and even if the VLF facility is shifted deep underground in "hardened" shelters, the communication antennae would be located above ground and will remain vulnerable. Thus an airborne VLF transmitter similar to the USN Take Charge And Move Out (TACAMO) should be seriously considered for procurement and induction. A powerful 200KW transmitter provides the VLF transmissions in TACAMO. The United States Navy utilizes an EC-130A/Q Hercules with a trailing wire antennae 10km long with a drogue parachute at the end. During transmission the aircraft flies in a continuous tight circle, which results in over 70 percent of the wire hanging straight down and acting as a relatively efficient vertical antennae. Presently the E-6 Mercury is the airborne platform of the United States TACAMO Communications System. It provides survivable communication links between the United States National Command Authority (NCA) and Strategic Forces. Long range, air refuelable E-6 is a derivative of the commercial Boeing 707 aircraft equipped with four CFM-56-2A-2 high bypass ratio fan/jet engines with thrust reversers. The weapon system is Electro Magnetic Pulse (EMP) hardened. Mission range is over 6000 nautical miles. E-6B fulfils both TACAMO and Airborne National Command Post (ABNCP) missions. The E-6 ABNCP modification program was established to upgrade TACAMO operational capabilities by incorporating a subset of United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOMM) EC-135 ABNCP equipment into the E-6 aircraft. The modified aircraft have the designation changed from E-6A to E-6B. The E-6B modified an E-6A by adding battle staff positions and other specialised equipment. The E-6B is a dual-mission aircraft capable of fulfilling either the E-6A mission or the airborne strategic command post mission ("Looking Glass"?) and is equipped with an Airborne Launch Control System (ALCS). The ALCS is capable of launching United States ICBMs. The E-6B is capable of performing both the TACAMO and ABNCP missions. This modification enables USSTRATCOM to perform current and projected TACAMO and ABNCP operational tasking and the E-6B provides survivable Command, Control and Communications (C3) force management communications for the NCA via multiple frequency band communications. Attention has now shifted to laser based underwater communications. There is an optical window in the blue-green part of the laser spectrum, which enables transmission to penetrate the ocean to substantial distances. Power requirements are considerable and the system at least presently cannot be installed in artificial satellites. Thus as a tactical improvisation the laser is made to be ground based, preferably mobile, in perfect conjunction with a space based mirror with adaptive optics being used to produce a cohesive beam. Significantly, data transfer rate will be 300 times greater than ELF system although the "rerouted" laser may not penetrate to the same depth. Conclusion The effective combination of nuclear powered ballistic missile armed and coventional attack submarines coupled with underwater VLF/ELF and laser communications will make our sea based nuclear deterrent optimally effective. The challenge lies in front of our national leadership and defence scientists to "secure" the proper systems either indigenously or import them from established sources.

 

[JAISWAL]

This an old article which I read today.
Don't know if already posted.
It will be in 3 parts.
.
.
The Indian Strategic Nuclear Submarine Project An Open Literature Analysis
.
.
The Indian SSN Project: An Open Literature Analysis
.
.
PART-1
.
Introduction
Since 1971 Indian scientists
have been trying to produce a
compact nuclear powerplant
(reactor) suitable for use in a
submarine. That desire was
complemented by a plan for
uranium enrichment facilities
employing centrifuge technology.
(2)As recently pointed out by Eric
Arnett some observers have
speculated that the purpose of
the nuclear submarine program
"is intended to provide an
invulnerable launching platform
for nuclear weapons."
(3)He makes the following
further observation concerning
the early nature of the program:
"The history and implications of
SSN's for Indian maritime
strategy suggest that the US
presence in the Indian Ocean
was a stronger motivation for the
SSN programme. Further, even
in the 1950's, SSN's were seen by
Indian naval planners as a way
of establishing presence as far
away as Indonesian and Chinese
waters."
(4)Even thought mentioned as a
second strike weapon for use
against Pakistan it is believed that
the primary purpose of the
nuclear submarine programme is
to serve as a deterrent to China.
(5)An analyst at the Canadian
Institute for International Peace
and Security (CIIPS) has noted :
"Analysis of India's defense
priorities in the Indian Ocean
points to a long-term strategy of
meeting a potential Chinese
incursion into the Indian Ocean
at the key check points in the
east - the Strait of Malacca. An
assessment of India's maritime
force structure reveals that New
Delhi is seeking to attain a sea-
denial capability in the Indian
Ocean.
(6)It was recently pointed out
that even thought India has no
territorial claims on ASEAN
territory, it does have border
disputes with China on its
northern borders. Any naval
confrontation between the two
would most certainly involve the
use of submarines.
(7)As part of the price for
becoming a member of ASEAN
and participating in further
Asian-Europe summits pressure
has been exerted upon India to
drop plans for development of a
nuclear submarine capability.
This pressure has been
supported by the members of
the European Union.
This report will attempt to
provide both technical and
political details of the events and
activities surrounding the
nuclear-powered submarine
project or as it is more
commonly known the Advanced
Technology Vessel (ATV).
Advanced conventional
alternatives will also be briefly
discussed.
..................for full article please visit the website above.........

 

[JAISWAL]

Overview
"In 1963 the Indian
government approved the
creation of a submarine force for
the Indian Navy. This decision,
which again seems at odds with
the general strategic challenge
facing India in 1963, rested on
assessments prepared by the
Indian Navy of naval forces
operating as far afield as China
and Indonesia."
"In India, it was initially hoped
that submarines would be
available as part of the Western
military assistance package. In
1963, India requested
submarines of recent design
from the United Kingdom.
However, it was offered only the
loan of a World War II vintage
vessel then being used as a
target submarine for fleet
training. The vessel had actually
outlived even this function and
was shortly due to be scrapped.
India subsequently investigated
Soviet attitudes towards
supplying naval vessels. In
August 1964 Defense Minister
Chavan announced an
agreement in principle to buy six
submarines from the Soviet
Union. The contract to buy the
submarines was signed in
November 1964."
"An Indian delegation visited the
Soviet Union in August/
September 1965 to finalize the
financial and technical aspects of
this deal and to discuss the
transfer of Soviet coastal defense
vessels. Payment for the
submarines was to be in rupees,
while new facilities would be
constructed for the
replenishment, repair and
maintenance of Soviet
submarines. facilities for the
repair and maintenance of Soviet
vessels were established at the
Garden Reach workshops in
Calcutta."
(9)"In December 1968 the arrival
of submarines of Soviet origin
was announced as part of a new
plan for naval expansion and
modernization by Chief of Naval
Staff Admiral A.K. Chatterji. The
decision to buy 6 Foxtrot Class
submarines from the Soviet
Union was a new departure in
naval strategy which indicated
the pattern of Indian naval
thinking, particularly as it related
to technology change. Chatterji
was one influential voice arguing
that the growing vulnerability of
surface ships inevitably led to the
development of submarines and
air forces. Chatterji was also of
the belief that India should seek
to build nuclear-powered
submarines by the late 1980's."
(10)"The delivery of INS Chakra,
a Soviet produced Charlie Class
nuclear-powered submarine
(SSN), to India in January 1988
was one development that has
focused increased attention on
Indian naval programmes. While
India has operated a submarine
fleet since the late 1960's, this
development has been
interpreted as a major change in
Indian capabilities and evidence
of India's intention to develop its
naval superiority among the
countries around the Indian
ocean."
"The origins of the SSN
programme reach back almost
twenty years. As noted earlier,
the purchase of an SSN fleet was
an option discussed in the mid
1960's but dismissed as
unrealistic. However, the
discussion concluded that in the
long term India should aim to
build submarines, but that in the
immediate future that would not
be possible. The discussion
included the possibility that India
would at some point want to
build a nuclear-propelled
submarine, euphemistically called
the 'advanced-technology
vessel'. In December 1983,
answering questions in the Indian
Parliament, Defense Minister
Venkataraman said: I have
already said that we keep our
options in this matter, if
necessary we will go in for it. But
then a nuclear-powered
submarine is different from the
nuclear submarine with nuclear
warheads. I have already said
that we are not going to use
atomic energy for anything but
peaceful purposes. Therefore,
we will use it for power.... it will
be only for propulsion."
"The shipbuilding expertise,
shore-based support facilities
and the manpower needed to
build and operate nuclear
submarines could not be
acquired quickly. The Soviet
Union was apparently reluctant
to transfer either nuclear-
powered submarines themselves
or the technology required for
their construction in India. In
1980 and 1982 the only
submarines offered seem to have
been refurbished Foxtrot Class.
As a result, India began
evaluating possible alternative
conventionally powered
submarines to replace the
Foxtrot submarines in service. At
this point it was already decided
that at least some units of the
design which was chosen would
be built in India, and that the
ultimate objective of producing
nuclear-powered submarines
would not be sacrificed. From
the mid 1970's, a number of
submarine designs were under
consideration from Western
Europe and the Soviet Union.
European countries involved
were France, the FRG, Italy, The
Netherlands and Sweden, with
the FRG and Sweden the clearly
favoured options by 1980."
"Indian officials were looking for
a design which could offer a
chance to learn the production
and operating skills relevant to
nuclear-powered submarines.
The Type-209 design offered by
the West German company HDW
met some of these criteria. In
1981 HDW won the order based
a 'stretched' and heavier version
of the Type-209 weighing 1500
tonnes (and consequently
designated the Type-1500). West
Germany also gained an
advantage in negotiations by
offering as a package a new
generation of torpedoes supplied
by the West German company
AEG. The initial order covered
the sale of two submarines to be
built in Kiel and included an
option to produce up to four
subsequently in India. The
signature of the contract was
held up, as officials in the FRG
were unhappy about a clause in
the contract, insisted upon by
India, which would guarantee
deliveries of spare parts in
wartime. However, the option on
the production of the
submarines at Mazagon Docks in
Bombay was exercised in
December 1981. Construction
began in early 1982 and the
West German-built vessels were
delivered in 1986-7. production
of the submarines has run into
problems, finally getting
underway in 1984, and delivery
of the first of these (originally
expected in 1988) was delayed
until 1991."
(11)"India's first indigenously-
constructed diesel-electric
submarine, the INS Shalki, a
license-produced Type 209 Class
1500, was commissioned on 7
February, 25 years after the Navy
established the first submarine
squadron. The Shalki was built at
the East Yard of Mazagon Dock
Ltd. (MDL). Construction stated
in 1984, and it was launched in
September 1989."
"Fabrication of the Shalki taxed
MDL's capabilities to the limit,
resulting in a 20 per cent cost
over-run, and delivery of the
submarine was 15 months late,
according to P.K. Mukherjee,
general manager of MDL's East
Yard. The Shalki has cost the
Indian navy some Rs1.8 billion
($450 million)."
"Unlike many other technology
transfer projects involving the
construction of submarines to
Western designs, the Shalki was
fabricated entirely in India, and
was not simply assembled from
partially outfitted hull sections or
"work packages" supplied by a
Western shipyard. Raw materials
such as high-strength HY-80 steel
and pipes were imported but
were cut, formed and welded in
India."
"With the commissioning of the
Shalki, India now has a fleet of
18 diesel-electric submarines -
seven elderly Foxtrots, eight
modern Kilo-class built in the
Soviet Union, and three Type 209
Class 1500's. One of India's more
elderly Foxtrots, the INS
Khanderi, has now been
decommissioned, but the navy
plans to rely on the more
modern Foxtrot-types in its
inventory - the Vela class - for
several years yet, during which
time the overall number of
submarines in India's inventory
will decrease."
"India now has three submarine
squadrons under the Western
Naval Command and two under
the Eastern Naval Command.
The remaining Type 209 Class
1500 being built in India, The INS
Shankul, is expected to be
launched by the end of the first
quarter of 1992 and to be
commissioned in 1993. Two
earlier Type 209's, the Shishumar
and the Shankush were
purchased direct from Germany.
Two more Type 209's to have
been built in India were
cancelled."
Allegations of kickbacks have
surfaced. It has been alleged
that Indian officials accepted
kickbacks from the German
company HDW.
"Thus the cost of establishing a
submarine-building facility in
India - some Rs440 million ($110
million) - is likely to have been
amortized over the cost of just
two submarines, until such time
as the Indian navy commences
work on its next generation of
submarine. This is likely to be an
Indian design, quite possibly a
nuclear submarine according to
Admiral Laxminarayan Ramdas,
chief of the Indian naval staff,
who has announced publicly that
the navy is working on the
design of a nuclear powerplant.
Such a design is, however,
unlikely to be ready until the
year 2000."
(12)"In early 1984 there were
reports of discussions with the
Soviet Union on the supply of
more advanced, possibly
nuclear-powered, vessels and
the training of Indian crews in
the Soviet Union. By late 1984,
the Soviet Union was apparently
prepared to offer India
submarines of more modern
design in considerable numbers.
Vice Admiral Tahiliani, then Vice
Chief of Naval Staff, took a
leading role in talks in Moscow
in September 1984, after which
official sources stated that the
defense relationship had taken
on 'a new dimension'. This has
subsequently been interpreted to
have meant that the Soviet
Union agreed not only to supply
more modern types of
conventional submarine, but also
to allow India access to nuclear-
powered submarines. The formal
agreement to lease a nuclear-
powered submarine from the
Soviet Union was signed in
1985."
"In mid 1987 reports began to
surface about Indian negotiations
with the Soviet Union to transfer
one or more nuclear
submarines. Indian sources
indicated that India had started a
nuclear submarine reactor
program of its own at BARC a
decade before but with
unsatisfactory results.
Consequently, India decided to
import the capability from the
Soviet Union, initially in the form
of Soviet nuclear-powered
submarines, with Indian personal
already in training in the Soviet
Union to handle the equipment.
In early January 1988, All-India
Radio announced that the Soviet
Union had 'leased' a nuclear-
powered submarine to India with
India taking delivery in the Soviet
port of Vladivostok."
"By selling reactor technology to
India, the Soviet Union may get a
foothold in a strategically
sensitive Indian domain. This
would be particularly so if along
with a supply of power reactors,
the Soviet Union also provided
technical and design assistance
to make Indian production of its
own submarine reactors feasible.
The lease of SSN's would give
India early operating experience
with such reactors. The 'lease'
arrangement may be a
convenient way of guaranteeing
return to the Soviet Union of the
submarine reactor fuel. At the
same time, other motives may be
part of the appeal of this
arrangement. The price that
India is paying to lease these
submarines is considerable
(estimated Rs3,000 crores for 4
to 5 submarines). Moreover, as
India Today (31 December 1987)
speculates Soviet nuclear-
powered submarines operated
by India in the Indian Ocean
could complicate US Naval
surveillance of Soviet submarines
in that region.
(13)The Los Angeles Times
published an article in February
1988 in which western analysts
contradict many of the claims
made by the Indian navy
concerning the submarine lease.
The Indian navy first claimed that
the submarine was an old Victor
I class, but western analysts said
published photographs clearly
identify the Chakra as a Charlie
class designed to carry eight
cruise missiles.
The article further states that
Pakistan reacted to the lease by
trying to purchase Canadian
hybrid nuclear powered
submarines.
The offical US government
response has been one of
concern. However military
analysts have voiced a different
view. According to one "India
wants to take over the mantle of
the British raj. They are buidling
a big modern navy. It is natural
that they would consider nuclear
propulsion."
"The 1988 submarine deal has
ended and future procurement
of nuclear-powered submarines
appear unlikely. A number of
reports have surfaced that India
had taken delivery of a second
Soviet SSN as a replacement for
the first submarine. (14)Reports
have appeared that radiation
problems on the submarine were
responsible for the death of one
Indian scientist on board the
submarine. These radiation
problems may have ben the
main cause of the cancellation of
the contract with the Soviet
Union. The nuclear submarine
leased from the Soviet Union has
been returned, probably to save
the annual cost of the lease,
which amounts to Rs120 crores."
"The plan to develop an SSN
force in India has not run
smoothly, and highlights the
enormous technological barriers
for a developing country in
operating this kind of system. To
begin with, the shore-based
facilities needed for nuclear
submarines are significantly more
complex than those for
conventional submarines
because of the need for reactor
maintenance. There is currently
no harbour facility in India
capable of handling radioactive
materials, and the submarine
reactor is shut down when the
vessel is in port. India has built a
Soviet-designed facility called the
Special Safety Service at
Vishakhapatnam, designed to
monitor the health of people
working on the INS Chakra and
detect any radiation leak
emanating from the submarine."
"In 1988 it appeared that the
Indian navy had reached a
plateau in terms of new orders
for naval vessels. Existing
contracts will lead to further
deliveries over the next few
years. However, the existing
focus seems to be on integrating
the new equipment into the
Navy. This has been explicitly
elaborated by the Chief of Naval
Staff, Admiral Nadkarni, who has
stressed in interviews that while
such long-term goals as the
creation of a third fleet remain
on the agenda, there is no
prospect that these will be
pursued in the immediate
future."
"Continued acquisition and
development of a nuclear
submarine capability is further
evidence of India's intention to
develop its naval superiority
further among the countries
around the Indian Ocean."
(15)In early 1996 the ATV project
was reported to be frozen.
Pressure from the United States
and financial problems facing the
Indian navy were reported as the
main reason for the freeze.
(16)As previously stated in the
introduction it has been reported
that ASEAN wants India to stop
work on the ATV as a condition
for entry into ASEAN and for
India to be invited to future Asia-
Europe summits. The European
Union is also behind the
demands put up by ASEAN.
These terms were shared with
the Indian Foreign Minister
Pranab Mukherjee during the
recent visit to New Delhi by
European Union foreign
ministers.
(17)By mid 1996 India had
already spent $285.7 million to
develop a nuclear submarine.
DRDO officials have estimated
that the submarine will be
completed in five years and will
require an additional $714.3
million in financing to complete
the project.
(18)DRDO is also reportedly
seeking design assistance from
former engineers and defense
workers of the former Soviet
Union. Several Russian naval
engineers are reported to have
been in India since 1991.

 

[JAISWAL]

that above artical is very well written and it is also very long so please go to website to read that full artical.
.
Source-- The Indian Strategic Nuclear Submarine Project An Open Literature Analysis