Indian Ballistic Missile Defense System

[Dark Sorrow]

Missile defence in south asia: Implications for the region(A Pakistani View) Contd.

Missile Defences and Pakistan’s Deterrent​

Pakistan has a well-developed ballistic missile programme. Since Pakistan’s main security threat comes from India, the primary purpose of Pakistan’s ballistic missile force is to provide reliable delivery systems for its nuclear warheads in order to deter an Indian conventional or WMD attack. Pakistan relies on a doctrine of minimum deterrence which is a dynamic concept, since credible minimum deterrence is determined to some extent by the adversary’s nuclear numbers,44 the state of their deployment, and also the presence of missile defences. Following the 1998 nuclear tests, Pakistan’s ambassador to the UN Munir Akram stated at the Conference on Disarmament that Pakistan had established a deterrent relationship with India but that the level would be determined in accordance with any escalatory steps taken by India. The concept of minimum deterrence, therefore, is not an absolute concept but is to be determined in relation to India’s nuclear capability45 and also the presence of missile defences. Pakistan relies heavily on its nuclear weapons capability and the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent as a hedge against a conventionally superior India – a ratio of 4:1 (and in some cases 5:1). Therefore, from Pakistan’s point of view, maintaining the credibility of its nuclear deterrence is imperative. India’s pursuit of missile defences threatens to disturb Pakistan’s deterrence equation.
Pakistan’s ballistic missile force plays an increasingly important role in Pakistan’s deterrence strategy. The mainstay of Pakistan’s first strike and deterrent capability is based on its Hatf, Ghauri and Shaheen series. The short-range Hatf I is a simple solid propellant missile with a range of 80-100 km. The Hatf III is a single-stage, solid propellant missile with a range of at least 300 km. Pakistan also has its Ghauri series where Ghauri I has a range of 1,500 km.47 Pakistan is developing and testing Ghauri II and Ghauri III missiles with reported ranges of 2,000 and 3,000 km, respectively. Pakistan is also developing the road-mobile IRBM Shaheen II with a reported range of 2,500 km.48 With the possible exception of the Hatf-I, Pakistan’s ballistic missile force is designed to deliver nuclear warheads. The Indian S-300 and Akash systems could intercept Pakistan’s SRBM and MRBM – the Hatf and Ghauri series – while the Antey-2500 could effectively intercept Pakistan’s IRBMs.

Pakistan’s Ballistic Missiles

Missile
Range/Payload
Status

Hatf-I
80-100 km/500 kg
Operational

Hatf-II
180 km/500 kg
Tested/Development

Hatf-III (Ghaznavi)
280-300 km/500 kg
Tested/Development

Shaheen-I
750 km/500 kg
Development/Tested

Ghauri I
1,500 km/700 kg
Development/Tested

Ghauri-II
2,000 km/700 kg
Development/Tested

Shaheen-II
2,000-2,500 km/1,000 kg
Development

Ghauri-III
3.000 km/? kg
Engine Tested/Development


The specific size, configuration, disposition, and possible deployment of Pakistan’s ballistic missile force are not entirely known at present. According to one estimate, India’s superiority to Pakistan is probably a 2 to 1 ratio in nuclear warheads and a 3 to 1 ratio in ballistic missiles.49 In nuclear-capable aircraft, the ratio is 3 to 1 in favour of India.50 Pakistan is estimated to have 30 to 50 nuclear warheads.
In a deployment scenario, Pakistan’s Ghauri and Shaheen can target all the major cities of India, while the same is true of Indian ballistic missiles, the Prithvi and Agni, in relation to Pakistan. The Indian Green Pine radars, when deployed, will have the capability to pick up the deployment of Pakistani missiles 300 km within the country’s territory. This would effectively provide India surveillance over the entire territory of Pakistan.52 Deployment of missile defence systems by India, like the Arrow, PAC-3, or Russian systems, combined with India’s superiority in nuclear warheads and missile numbers, could neutralise Pakistan’s Ghauri and Shaheen missiles. Since these systems also have the capability to intercept aircraft and cruise missiles, these would also seriously affect Pakistan Air Force’s ability to act as first strike force.
While the missile defence systems do not have a hundred percent success rate, and may be only effective against short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles, and somewhat against IRBMs, and aircraft, it will give India limited capability to neutralise a first strike by Pakistan. India’s missile defence capability alongside its pursuit of a nuclear triad can seriously affect Pakistan’s ability to maintain a minimum level of deterrence.
Many experts agree that the direct impact of BMD can undermine of the credibility of Pakistan’s deterrence, increasing the possibility of Indian interest in pre-emption. Maria Sultan, a Pakistani expert on South Asian nuclear arms control and disarmament issues, writes that BMD capability “would allow India to launch pre-emptive strikes, rendering Pakistan’s limited ballistic missile capability ineffective.” Khalid Banuri, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs, Strategic Plans Division, Chaklala, also believes that BMD capability would “provide an elated sense of security and prompt pre-emptive impulses from India.” The Congressional study by Feickert and Kronstadt says that Indian ABM capability can break the current state of deterrence between India and Pakistan. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, a Pakistani WMD expert, says the Indian BMD systems pose challenges to Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence capability by eroding strategic equilibrium and shifting balance of power in India’s favour. He says that according to real politic calculus, India is more likely to adopt adventurous policies against Pakistan behind the safety of missile shield.
At present, India and Pakistan’s nuclear deterrents are based on non-deployed nuclear capable missiles, a number of unassembled nuclear weapons, and capability to build additional nuclear weapons at a short notice. This non-weaponised deterrence has worked so far. However, an Indian ABM system has the potential to destabilise this nuclear balance by depriving Pakistan of an assured strike capability. In a crisis situation, India could launch a first strike on Pakistan and rely on its ABM systems to intercept any remaining missiles launched by Pakistan. Concern for such a situation could cause Pakistan to lower the nuclear threshold and adapt a “use it or lose it” strategy, calling for the early use of its nuclear forces in a conflict in order to penetrate India’s defences.57 While such a scenario might be an exaggeration, Pakistan will reassess its options and go for correcting the imbalance.

Pakistan’s Options​

With an Indian BMD system, Pakistan would be forced to respond in some way in order to ensure the integrity of its nuclear deterrent. Although it is difficult to gauge Pakistan’s response, it would depend on the type, size and shape of an Indian BMD. There are a number of options that Pakistan could possibly pursue. Pakistan could either go for its own defence systems or build up its offensive forces to overwhelm India’s defences.
Pakistan’s ability to produce its own missile defence systems is extremely limited both from technological point of view as well as from an economic one. Its prospects for acquiring the systems are also not very bright. The US, while showing eagerness to provide India with PAC-3 systems, has not shown any such inclination towards Pakistan. Russia is unlikely to provide its ABM systems to Pakistan since Indo-Russia relations have been strong for the past several decades, and Russia’s relations with Pakistan have been minimal. Since Pakistan does not recognise Israel nor has any diplomatic relations with it, acquisition of BMD systems from Israel is not an option for Pakistan. China is perhaps the only country that could provide Pakistan with such systems since the two countries have a history of defence cooperation, and Beijing is believed to be working on its own ABM capability.58 However, the high cost of such systems may prevent Pakistan from going for this option.
A less costly and more effective option for Pakistan could be a qualitative and quantitative improvement in its nuclear and missile forces and its strategy. The simplest solution for Pakistan would be to go for a larger number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems, especially ballistic missiles. This would entail an increase in the number of missiles both Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV-ed) and single warheads. Pakistan would also have to increase its fissile material production in order to have more warheads.59 The purpose of the numbers approach would be to saturate Indian defences. This would mean, for example, if India has the capability to intercept twenty-five missiles, Pakistan should have thirty.
Pakistan can also go for development of cruise missiles which are harder to defeat by missile defence systems. Pakistan has already taken steps in this direction by developing its Babar cruise missile. Babar is capable of carrying either conventional or nuclear warhead and has a range of 500 km. It can reportedly hit its target with pinpoint accuracy and can be fired from warships, submarines and aircrafts.60 Most important of all, it is designed to avoid radar detection and penetrate undetected through a defensive system. If all these claims prove to be true, Babar could be an invaluable asset against Indian missile defence systems.
Pakistan can opt for strategies like mobility, dispersion and concealment to enhance survivability of its nuclear force in case of pre-emptive strike. This can be done through mobile launchers, using different systems, and by introducing simultaneous launches under combat conditions from dispersed sites. Pakistan could disperse and store its missiles in hardened silos, could build dummy missile silos, and deploy dummy missiles as well.
Another option for Pakistan could be deployment. This could entail maintaining assembled form of missiles to reduce the reaction time. This could be taken a step further to the level of actually deploying the assembled missiles tipped with nuclear warheads. However, this approach has many inherent dangers and should be a last resort option. India may also go for deployment of nuclear-tipped missiles in response, which would increase the risk of nuclear war. Maintaining missiles on hair-trigger alert would also increase the chances of accidental war. An extremely short missile flight time of 3-11 minutes between India and Pakistan62 combined with conflict-prone history of South Asia could give rise to an extremely dangerous and unstable situation. This option would, therefore, be counter-productive and should only be adopted as a last resort.
Pakistan can also go for a triad of nuclear forces. At present, Pakistan has land- and air-based nuclear forces but no sea-based one. Although this approach would diversify Pakistan’s nuclear forces and may ensure survivability of nuclear capability, it would be too costly for Pakistan and not viable in the short term.
The drawback of the quantitative approach is that it would be costly and would engage Pakistan in an arms race with India. Pakistan can also pursue a qualitative approach to increase deterrence stability. This would include technological improve-ments in its offensive and defensive capabilities. These options could include improvements in the technical base of the delivery systems and associated technologies. Certain technologies can be developed to fog the enemy ABM systems and also to improve the penetration capacity of Pakistan’s delivery systems. Some of these technologies can be improvement in electronic warfare capacity to confuse and defeat Indian radar ability to home-in on incoming targets; manoeuvrings warheads to create problems for the interceptors; and adding decoys to the delivery systems.
In the short term, a mix of qualitative and quantitative improvements in Pakistan’s offensive capabilities might be a more viable solution for Pakistan. In the long term, Pakistan needs to acquire advance technologies, like perfecting cruise missile technology, reducing the conventional asymmetry between India and Pakistan, to neutralise the effects of Indian missile defence systems.
Moreover, Pakistan can also pursue a diplomatic course by suggesting an ABM treaty between India and Pakistan, or by negotiating a zero missile regime between the two countries. However, Pakistan’s proposal for a zero missile regime, along with many other nuclear restraint proposals has been rejected by India in the past. Still the diplomatic option needs to be simultaneously pursued. The success of this option would depend on the willingness of both the states to cooperate.


To be Continued.

 

[Dark Sorrow]

Missile defence in south asia: Implications for the region(A Pakistani View) Contd.

Missile Defences and China’s Deterrent​

Although China has never publicly discussed its nuclear doctrine since it became a nuclear power in 1964, Chinese leaders often stated that China decided to acquire nuclear weapons only as a response to repeated US and Soviet attempts to blackmail China with the possibility of nuclear attack in the 1950s and 1960s.65 This defensive philosophy underpins the Chinese approach to nuclear planning and force structure. China sees its policy as purely defensive and seeks to convey this with its promise never to attack another state first with nuclear weapons. This no-first-use policy means that its nuclear forces are to be used in retaliation only, and is a core tenet of China’s nuclear strategy.66 China pursues a policy of minimum deterrence. Uncertainty about the size and placement of China’s nuclear arsenal is considered critical to the effectiveness of this retaliatory policy.
China has a well-developed ballistic missile programme to support its minimum nuclear deterrence policy. Chinese ballistic missiles are seen as both conventional and nuclear delivery systems. China’s relatively small MRBM, IRBM, and ICBM forces serve as the primary delivery system for China’s nuclear arsenal developed solely for deterrence purposes against the powerful states like the US and Russia, and to caution other nuclear powers such as India against contemplating the threat or use of WMD against China.
China’s ballistic missiles range from 150 km SRBM to 8000 km ICBM, as well as SLBMs with 1000 km range.68 Although estimates of China’s nuclear arsenal vary from 180 to over 400 warheads, Jeffery Lewis, based upon US intelligence reports and other sources, places “a realistic estimate of China's nuclear arsenal at a total force of 30 nuclear warheads operationally deployed on ICBMs and another 50-100 on medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), for a total force of 80-130 nuclear weapons.”69 China is thought to possess 18 DF-5 ICBMs and 12 DF-4 ICBMs, and 50-100 DF-3 and DF-21 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). These deployed missiles are un-fueled and not mated with their warheads.

China’s Ballistic Missiles
Missile
Range/Payload
Status

M-7 (CSS-8)
150-230 km/190 kg
Operational

DF-11 (CSS-X-7)
300 km/800 kg
Operational

DF-15 (CSS-6)
600 km/500 kg
Operational

DF-21A (CSS-5, Mod 2)
1,800 km/2,000 kg
Operational

DF-21 (CSS-5, Mod 1)
2,500 km/600 kg
Operational

DF-3A (CSS-2)
2,800 km/2,150 kg
Operational

DF-4 (CSS-3)
5,500 km/2,200 kg
Operational

DF-31
8,000 km/700 kg
Tested/Development

DF-41
12,000 km/800 kg
Programme Cancelled?

DF-5A (CSS-4)
13,000 km/3,200 kg
Operational

Julang 1 (SLBM)
1,000 km/600 kg
Operational

Julang 2 (SLBM)
8,000 km/ 700 kg
Tested/Development

In the context of deterrence vis-à-vis India, China’s deployed nuclear arsenal of 50-100 MRBMs comprising its DF-3 and DF-21 missiles would be more than a match for India’s Prithvi and Agni missiles. India’s estimated nuclear arsenal of 45-9571 warheads would be far inferior to China’s 130-180 warhead estimate. China is a large country with strategic depth, any missiles deployed well within its territory would fall out of range of any missile defences India might deploy. Moreover, even if India does have a limited intercept capability against Chinese missiles, China’s missile numbers would be adequate to saturate any missile defence. China is also developing sea-based nuclear capability. A Chinese triad of nuclear forces and superiority in nuclear numbers vis-à-vis India means Delhi could not hope to have a second strike capability against China in the near future. It means that even with deployment of missiles defences India would not contemplate a first strike against China, neither would there be any temptation for military adventurism unlike in the case of India versus Pakistan. Therefore, in the short- to medium-term an Indian missile defence is not likely to affect Chinese deterrence.
However, China might see an Indian missile defence as a threat if it is seen as part of the network of missile defence that the US is promoting among its allies. China has already voiced opposition to the US missile defence plans, and many analysts see China’s strategic force modernisation programme as linked to US missile defence plans.72

China’s Response​

In the short to medium term, China might respond to Indian missile defences by changing its deployment strategy, by increasing the readiness of its missiles, and by producing more tactical nuclear weapons. China may respond by tripling or even quadrupling of its deployed missiles against India. China could enhance its targeting capability against India through the proposed MIRV/MRV capability that it is developing. However, placing multiple warheads on China's ballistic missiles would probably require Beijing to design and test a new warhead, which is currently prohibited by China's signature on the CTBT. China would also go for countermeasure technologies to defeat an Indian missile defence.
In the long term, China may even respond by increasing the number of nuclear warheads and by deploying missile defences of its own. In the past, China has shown interest in having missile defences of its own. In 1993, China was reported to have acquired over a hundred Russian S-300 and S-300V systems which included technology transfer as well. There were also some reports of Chinese acquisition of Patriot missile technology from Israel in early 1990s.73 China is also thought to have several defence research and development efforts underway.74 This means that in future China could develop and field limited missile defences of its own.


To be Continued.

 

[Dark Sorrow]

Missile defence in south asia: Implications for the region(A Pakistani View) Contd.

Implications for the Region​

An Indian BMD system – whatever its shape and size, whatever its operational shortcomings – will have a major political and psychological impact on both Pakistan and China. Both Pakistan and China would respond to an Indian BMD by bringing quantitative and qualitative changes in their nuclear forces, deployment postures, and perhaps go for missile defences of their own. India would in turn be affected by a buildup of offensive weapons and technologies by Pakistan and China, and would have to enhance its own capabilities in response. This action-reaction spiral is likely to give rise to a regional arms race.
China, India and Pakistan are enmeshed in a complex three-cornered interaction with great potential for instability. Each member of the nuclear-armed triangle has mounted a war on at least one of the others - China and India fought over their disputed Himalayan boundaries in 1962, and India and Pakistan have gone to war three times, in 1948, 1965 and 1971 and a limited war in 1999. All three states share “lines of actual control” apart from the international borders. In this scenario, the introduction of missile defences will play a destabilising role, disturbing existing patterns of deterrence. Although all three states pledge to minimum deterrence, leaders in all three capitals have also said that deterrence is not a static concept; the requirements of each state would, therefore, depend on what the others are doing or might seek to do.
The pursuit of missile defences by India would increase the chances of conflict between India and Pakistan. The deployment of missile defences, irrespective of whether they are effective or not, could create a false sense of security among political and military leadership of India and invite military adventurism or even a pre-emptive strike against Pakistan particularly.76 India and Pakistan have already fought over the issue of Kashmir. In a region where even small incidents like a terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in 2001 can become the reason for a massive buildup on Pakistani borders (since Pakistan was falsely accused of involvement in the attack), introduction of missile defences would increase India’s inclination towards a more aggressive posture with possible disastrous consequences for the security and stability of the region. Missile defence would also put Pakistan at a disadvantage in a conventional conflict, since it can easily intercept airplanes while surveillance and radar components of missile defence systems would put India at an advantage. Thus, missile defences would also accentuate the conventional imbalance between India and Pakistan.
Moreover, possible changes in the deployment posture of China and an actual deployment of Pakistani nuclear arsenal would decrease the nuclear threshold between the three nuclear powers in the region. With less escalation ladders and even less decision making time, the chances of miscalculation and accidental nuclear war would increase. The chances of a calculated nuclear exchange would also increase.
Missile defences will also have a negative impact on arms control efforts. Transfer of BMD technologies from Washington to New Delhi or from Tel Aviv to New Delhi would violate Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).Missile defence would undermine regional and global nuclear arms control initiatives and reverse the process of reducing the number of MIRVed warheads in nuclear stockpiles. It would generally weaken China’s support for the CTBT, the MTCR, and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations. India and Pakistan would also reconsider their support for FMCT in their pursuit of increased number of nuclear weapons. Improvement of warhead designs by Pakistan might necessitate nuclear testing, disturbing the nuclear test ban in effect between India and Pakistan,78 and would also lessen the chances of either India or Pakistan supporting the CTBT. China’s efforts to develop MIRVed warheads would also require testing. The net effect would weaken support for non-proliferation efforts in the region.
The effect of these developments would be to fuel an arms race between the three nuclear powers in the region. Perhaps not an arms race in the real sense of the word, but it would mean having definitely more offensive arms and technologies in the region.
Moreover, New Delhi’s deployment of missile defences is likely to jeopardise improved relations between India and China. It would have a negative impact on the peace process between India and Pakistan. India’s move to counter Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent could also make the resolution of the Kashmir dispute more remote and greatly increase the chances of conflict over the issue.
The social and economic development of the region would also be affected. A region that has high rate of poverty and is underdeveloped, increased spending on offensive and defensive weapons would further retard development and increase poverty. In addition, India’s social and economic development might be adversely affected if funding for missile defences is added to military expenditures. Pakistan would also have to increase its defence expenditure to compensate for qualitative and quantitative changes in its nuclear arsenal and forces. This would amount to unnecessary burden on economies of India and Pakistan, and diversion of resources from much-needed development.

Conclusion​

The idea of missile defences negates the very basis of deterrence. Deterrence works on the assumption that both sides remain vulnerable to nuclear attack and would, therefore, refrain from attacking the other side for fear of retaliation. If one adversary seeks to secure itself from attack through missile defences, the other side is bound to be left vulnerable and would try to pursue countermeasures to neutralise the defences. This scenario is also very much true in the context of India, Pakistan and China. Indian deployment of missile defences would affect Pakistan’s deterrence calculations to a large degree, and China’s to a lesser degree.
The introduction of missile defences in South Asia by India will not take place in a vacuum. China and Pakistan will respond and reassess their minimum nuclear deterrence requirements. Pursuit of missile defences is only going to give rise to an unnecessary and expensive arms race. In an already conflict prone region, missile defences are only going to bring more insecurity and instability, not only for Pakistan and China, but also for India itself.
Pakistan and China need to make a concerted diplomatic effort to prevent India from acquiring the missile defence systems. Failing this, both China and Pakistan need to calculate the minimum qualitative and quantitative requirements in order to restore the credibility of their nuclear deterrents. Islamabad and Beijing must not fall prey to an unchecked arms race of the type that ensued between the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War and led to the eventual collapse of the latter. Elements within India itself need to realise that pursuit of missile defences would be a costly affair, for systems with no proven capability of providing credible defence against ballistic missiles. Once the existing deterrence equations are disturbed, the possible outcomes cannot be entirely foreseen, or controlled, with possibly disastrous consequences for the region.


End

 

[nitesh]

Cross posting:

So the Maitri is out officially, now what:

The Telegraph - Calcutta (Kolkata) | Nation | Junked: France joint missile plan

 

[venom]

The Indian Ballistic Missile Defense Program is an initiative to develop and deploy a multi-layered Ballistic missile defense system to protect India from missile attacks.
It is a two tiered system consisting of two interceptor missiles, namely Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) missile for high altitude interception, and the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Missile for lower altitude interception. India became the fourth country to have successfully developed an Anti-ballistic missile system, after United States, Russia and Israel.

The two-tiered BMD System consists of the PAD, which will intercept missiles at exo-atmospheric altitudes of 50–80 km; and AAD Missile for interception at endoatmospheric altitudes of up to 30 km. The deployed system would consist of many launch vehicles, Radars, launch control centers (LCC) and Mission Control Center. All these are geographically distributed and connected by a secure communication network.

Mission control center (MCC) is the software intensive system of the Ballistic Missile Defense. It receives information from various sources like Radars, Satellites etc which is then processed by ten computers running simultaneously. MCC is connected to all other elements of the System through a WAN. MCC performs target classification, target assignment and kill assessment. It acts as a decision support system for the commander. It can also decide the number of interceptors required for the target for an assured kill probability.

MCC after performing all the functions, assigns the target to Launch Control Center (LCC) of a battery. Launch Control Center (LCC) starts computing the time to launch interceptor based upon information received from Radar. This is decided based on the data received from radar, on the speed, altitude and flight path of the target. LCC prepares the missile for launch in real time, carries out ground guidance computation.

After the interceptor is launched, it is provided target information from the radar through a datalink. When the Interceptors closes on to the Target ballistic missile, it activates the Active Radar Seeker to search for target missile and guides itself to intercept the target. Multiple PAD and AAD interceptors can be launched against a target for high kill probability.


Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) is an anti-ballistic missile developed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles outside atmosphere (Exoatmosphere). Based on the Prithvi missile, PAD is a two stage missile with a maximum interception altitude of 80 km. The first stage is a liquid fuelled motor that uses two propellants and oxidizers while second stage is solid fuelled..It has divert thrusters which can generate a lateral acceleration at more than 5 Gs at 50 km altitude. Guidance is provided by intertial navigation system, mid-course updates from long range tracking radar (LRTR) and active radar homing in the terminal phase.PAD has capability to engage 300 to 2,000 km class of ballistic missiles at a speed of Mach 5.

Long Range Tracking Radar is the target acquisition and fire control Radar for PAD Missile. It is an active phased array radar having capability to track 200 targets at a range of 600 km.The Prithvi Air Defense missile has been named as Pradyumna.

Further development led to the improvement of the interception range to 80 km from the 50 km range. The improved missile will utilize a gimbaled directional warhead, a technology that until now has only been used by the US and Russia. This technology allows for a smaller warhead to destroy the target missile.

Advanced Air Defence (AAD) is an anti-ballistic missile designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles in endoatmosphere at an altitude of 30 km. AAD is single stage, solid fuelled missile. Guidance is similar to that of PAD: Inertial Navigation System, midcourse updates from ground based radar and active radar homing in terminal phase. It is 7.5 metres tall, weighs around 1.2 tonnes and a diameter of less than 0.5 metres.
On 6 December 2007, AAD successfully intercepted a modified Prithvi-II missile acting as an incoming ballistic missile enemy target. The endo-atmospheric interception was carried out at an altitude of 15 km. The interceptor and all the elements performed in a copy book fashion validating the endo-atmospheric layer of BMD System. The launch was also shown through a video link at control room of DRDO Bhawan, Delhi.

The sequence of events of the test was as follows. At 11 a.m. the Prithvi missile lifted off from Launch Complex III at the Integrated Test Range (ITR) at Chandipur Orissa. Radars at Konark, Paradip detected the missile and were continuously tracking it. The target information was sent to Mission Control Centre (MCC) for further processing. MCC classifies the target, calcuates the trajectory of the missile and assigns the target to AAD Battery located on Wheeler Island, 70 km across the sea from Chandipur. AAD is launched when Prithvi reaches an apogee of 110 km. AAD with the help of midcourse updates and terminal seeker manoeuvres itself towards the target. AAD makes the direct hit at an altitude of 15 km and at a speed of Mach 4. Radars detected formation of a large number of tracks, signifying that the target had broken into multiple pieces. The thermal cameras located on Wheeler Island also picked up the direct hit through thermal images

Due to two successful interceptor missile tests carried out by India, the scientists have said that the AAD missile could be modified into a new surface-to-surface missile that could be possibly named as ‘Ashvin’. AAD intercepted a missile at 15 km from the surface of the earth, thus the missile could be used as a surface-to-surface missile.

Swordfish is a Indian Long range tracking radar specifically developed to counter ballistic missile threat. It will be a part of India's ballistic missile program. First testing of this radar is expected to begun in late January or early February 2009. Main aim of the test is to validate the capabilities of the indigenously developed Swordfish Long Range Tracking Radar (LRTR). "The missile to be hit will be fired from a longer distance than it was in the earlier test. DRDO will test whether the radar can track the incoming missile from that distance or not" said a member of the project.

Swordfish is an acknowledged derivative of the Israeli Green Pine long range radar, which is the critical component of that country's Arrow missile defence system.

Capabilities
Target acquisition and fire control radar for the BMD system.
Can Guide Exo-atmospheric interceptor missile PAD to hit its target in space at an altitude over 80 km from earth.
Detection range in excess of 400 km.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

India's BMD Plans & Encircling China

Closing Velocity: India's BMD Plans & Encircling China

India's BMD Plans & Encircling China


From an excellent article at Asia Times:

Beijing cannot be happy about India's anti-missile plans and what this might mean for China's long-term strategic interests in the region. More than anything else, it is the uncertainty of the outcome that is causing it such discomfort. The US seems determined to surround China with US-built anti-missile systems. Using North Korea as a valid excuse at first, the US anti-missile footprint could soon extend from Japan - including Japanese cruisers stationed offshore - and South Korea to Taiwan and India.

And:

In addition, any integration of India into the US global missile defense system, whether it involves interceptors, or the stationing of tracking infrastructure would profoundly affect China's own security.

"China sees this as part of US strategic encirclement of China. This is particularly sensitive for China since its northeast and northwest regions are currently blindspots for US radar systems," said Hagt. "That will disappear with Indian-American missile defense integration. The region would be 'thoroughly exposed', thus vastly decreasing China's 'strategic depth' advantage in this region. This, in essence, would be another 'Poland of the East' in terms of having another overseas missile defense base, this time pointed at China's heart."

Gee, that sounds familiar...

Meanwhile, at sea:

To counter the Asia-Pacific focus of the US Navy, China is reportedly planning to deploy ballistic missiles with non-nuclear warheads and special guidance systems to hit moving surface ships at sea in the western Pacific before they can get within range of Chinese targets. If China fielded such a weapon, one that could reliably sink or cause heavy damage to aircraft carriers and other major warships far from its shores, it would make a potential adversary think long and hard before sending naval forces to intervene in a crisis over Taiwan or any other regional conflict in which China was involved.

It's one thing to hit a large population center or fixed military installation with a ballistic missile. Heck, the Germans did this like clockwork over sixty years ago. But it's quite another challenge to hit a vessel swiftly plying the vast expanses of the Pacific at over 30 knots.

In any case, this potential maritime threat from China just reinforces the tactical need for Aegis BMD, regardless of what happens on the strategic ICBM front.

 

[venom]

Chinese Submarine Patrols Doubled in 2008

Chinese attack submarines sailed on more patrols in 2008 than ever before, according to information obtained by Federation of American Scientists from U.S. naval intelligence.

The information, which was declassified by U.S. naval intelligence in response to a Freedom of Information Act request from the Federation of American Scientists, shows that China’s fleet of more than 50 attack submarines conducted 12 patrols in 2008, twice the number of patrols conducted in 2007.

China’s strategic ballistic missile submarines have never conducted a deterrent patrol.

Highest Patrol Rate Ever

The 12 patrols conducted in 2008 constitute the highest patrol rater ever for the Chinese submarine fleet. They follow six patrols conducted in 2007, two in 2006, and zero in 2005. China has four times refrained from conducting submarine patrols since 1981, and the previous peaks were six patrols conducted in 2000 and 2007 (see Figure 1).

Figure 1:
Chinese Submarine Patrols 1981-2008
Chinese attack submarines conducted 12 patrols in 2008, double the number from 2007. Yet Chinese ballistic missile submarines have yet to conduct a deterrent patrol.

.

While the increase is submarine patrols is important, it has to be seen in comparison with the size of the Chinese submarine fleet. With approximately 54 submarines, the patrol rate means that each submarine on average goes on patrol once every four and a half years. In reality, the patrols might have been carried out by only a small portion of the fleet, perhaps the most modern and capable types. A new class of nuclear-powered Shang-class (Type-093) attack submarines is replacing the aging Han-class (Type-091).

Few of the details for assessing the implications of the increased patrol rate are known, nor is it known precisely what constitutes a patrol in order for U.S. naval intelligence to count it. A request for the definition has been denied. It is assumed that a patrol in this case involves an extended voyage far enough from the submarine’s base to be different from a brief training exercise.

In comparison with other major navies, twelve patrols are not much. The patrol rate of the U.S. attack submarine fleet, which is focused on long-range patrols and probably operate regularly near the Chinese coast, is much higher with each submarine conducting at least one extended patrol per year. But the Chinese patrol rate is higher than that of the Russian navy, which in 2008 conducted only seven attack submarine patrols, the same as in 2007.

Still no SSBN Patrols

The declassified information also shows that China has yet to send one of its strategic submarines on patrol. The old Xia, China’s first SSBN, completed a multi-year overhaul in late-2007 but did not sail on patrol in 2008.
Neither the Xia-class (Type-092) ballistic missile submarine (image) nor the new Jin-class (Type-094) have ever conducted a deterrent patrol.

.

The first of China’s new Jin-class (Type-094) SSBN was spotted in February 2008 at the relatively new base on Hainan Island, where a new submarine demagnetization facility has been constructed. But the submarine did not conduct a patrol the remainder of the year. A JL-2 missile was test launched Bohai Bay in May 2008, but it is yet unclear from what platform.

Two or three more Jin-class subs are under construction at the Huludao (Bohai) Shipyard, and the Pentagon projects that up to five might be built. How these submarines will be operated as a “counter-attack” deterrent remains to be seen, but they will be starting from scratch.

Chinese Submarine Patrols Doubled in 2008 « FAS Strategic Security Blog

 

[sayareakd]

US is doing is own enciircling of china and we should do our own bit with the small nations around china, i may also add that having bmd capabities is not enough we should take it to next level where we can protect our country from chines missiles, not only that we need to find funds for more ATVs.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

MissileThreat :: India Making Progress on Indigenous BMD

India Making Progress on Indigenous BMD

June 24, 2009 :: News

March 7 marked India's latest test of its anti-ballistic missile system. The test was one of three successful consecutive tests in recent years, and indicates a promising future for an indigenous BMD system. India's first test demonstrated the system's ability to intercept an incoming Prithvi-II missile at an altitude of 48 km with a two-stage Pradyumna interceptor; the second test was a successful intercept of a Prithvi-II at 15km by a single-stage interceptor; the third and most recent test demonstrated the capability of a new and more sophisticated Pradyumna to destroy its target at an altitude of 75 km.



This high success rate is especially impressive considering the much higher failure rates associated with India's trials of its short and medium-range ballistic missiles. The Indian government's Defense Research and Development Organization didn't publicly acknowledge the existence of a missile defense program until 2006, although at the time it was admitted that the program had been underway for quite some time. Even including these few years of secret development, India's missile defense program is progressing rapidly, with VK Saraswat—the current head of missile development at the DRDO—claiming that India's missile defense weapon testing could be complete by 2010. This speed seriously outstrips India's development of an offensive ballistic missile force.



In addition to speed, India's program shows signs of significant sophistication, especially compared to her possible regional adversaries. A case in point is China. While China's offensive ballistic missile program is more advanced than India's, it does not possess a comparable BMD capability. China's surface-to-air missiles could intercept ballistic missiles, but only up to an altitude of 30km. Furthermore, it is thought that China's BMD program falls far behind India's in the area of research and development, particularly in the area of software development and programming, key and indispensable components of any functional missile defense system.



As regional powers such as China and North Korea proceed with vigorous ballistic missile programs, it will be interesting to watch the progress of India's development of a potentially robust indigenous ballistic missile defense system. (Article)

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Indian BMD shield could be in service by 2011

Indian BMD shield could be in service by 2011

A third successful test-firing of India's new ballistic missile defence (BMD) system in early March has given Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) officials the confidence to claim that the system will offer an initial operating capability by 2011.

They told Jane's that the BMD system would be declared operational after six more test-firings, including an integrated trial in which two interceptors will be launched at an incoming ballistic missile: one to destroy it at an altitude of 40 km and the other to annihilate falling debris at a height of 15 km. Integrated trials will take place by the end of this year, with the remaining tests completed 12 months later, the DRDO declared.

Thereafter, it will be the government's decision to induct the system as a deterrent against incoming, short-range ballistic missiles over a 200 km2 area, DRDO's chief missile scientist Dr Vijay Kumar Saraswat stated.

Dr Saraswat said that during the latest trial on 6 March, a modified Prithvi Air Defence II (PAD II) two-stage hypersonic interceptor ballistic missile, fired from a mobile launcher at the integrated range on Wheeler Island, had intercepted and shot down a target missile at a height of 75 km within three minutes of being fired.

The incoming target, a nuclear-capable Dhanush (Bow) navalised version of the surface-to-surface Prithvi (Earth), was fired from a warship in the Bay of Bengal simulating the trajectory of neighbouring nuclear rival Pakistan's strategic Ghauri missile with a 1,500 km strike.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

India closer to deployment of BMD shield
TNN 6 March 2009, 04:58pm IST

NEW DELHI: The third successful test of the ballistic missile defence (BMD) system on Friday has put India into an exclusive club of countries
India closer to deployment of BMD shield
The third successful test of the BMD system has put India into an exclusive club of countries.
such as the US, Russia and Israel which are developing Star War kind of capabilities. ( Watch )

With this test, India reached another milestone towards making the home-grown BMD system operational by 2011-12.

The test was carried out from Wheeler Island in Orissa around 4.30 pm when the two-stage "exo-atmospheric" hypersonic interceptor missile fitted with advance systems hit the target at an altitude of 75 km.

A complex and expensive technology, the BMD system provides India an effective defence shield against both China and Pakistan fielding a wide variety of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.

Though these capabilities are a crucial necessity, a BMD system can be overwhelmed by a flurry of ballistic missiles. It's quite vulnerable to cruise missiles since they fly at low altitudes.

The two-tier BMD system being developed by DRDO, capable of tracking and destroying hostile missiles both inside (endo) and outside (exo) the earth's atmosphere, has already been tested two times — the exo-atmospheric test at 48-km altitude on November 27, 2006, and the endo-atmospheric at 15-km on December 6, 2007. The two tests had demonstrated India's
capabilities akin to the Israeli Arrow-2 BMD system and the US Patriot system.

After the third test, DRDO plans to test both the "exo" and "endo" interceptor missiles together in an integrated mode by September-October. In Phase-I, a BMD system capable of taking on "2,000-km class targets" is being developed. Phase-II, in turn, will be geared towards tackling threats from missiles up to 5,000-km, said sources.

DRDO chief controller for missiles, V K Saraswat, had earlier told TOI that the BMD system of Phase-I should be ready for deployment by 2011 or so, after several tests against a variety of missiles to ensure "a kill probability of 99.8%".

There have been some Israeli and French imprints in the ongoing development of India's BMD system. The crucial long-range tracking radars (LRTRs) used to detect and track the `enemy' missile as well as guide the interceptor to it, for instance, can be traced to the two Israeli Green Pine early-warning and fire control radars imported by India in 2001-2002.

Similarly, some guidance and other technologies
like IIR (imaging infra-red) seekers will require international collaboration in Phase-II.

 

[Pintu]

Great find LF, it is really pleasant to know that our indigenous BMD programme is on the right track to be implemented very soon , if we count the time gap from first test flight in 2006, it is satisfactory according to me have IOC in 2011.

Regards



PS: A request, LF please post the link of the last article.

 

[sayareakd]

LF what is imortant from stretigic point of view is the fact that we should test our BMD capabilites from ship, just like IN launch Dhanush missile, PAD and AAD can be launch from same kind of platform from sea.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

that will come with time Sayar,and Israelis will probably be involved and it may even be a possibility that this is being done in the Barak 8 project?

 

[youngindian]

Intel centres to keep tabs on China's missiles, navy

TNN 18 July 2009, 02:41am IST

NEW DELHI: Stung by China's aggressive posturing, including its deployment of missiles in Delingha near Tibet, and other increasingly hostile activities in India's neighbourhood, the Cabinet Committee on Security is considering
a proposal to set up separate centres for nuclear or missile intelligence and maritime security. In fact, with strong backing by National Security Advisor M K Narayanan, the CCS, which is still smarting under the Chinese `aggression', is all set to give the go-ahead to the proposal.

The inability of central intelligence agencies like RAW, DIA and IB in keeping a tab on recent deployment of intermediate range missiles like DF-4 and reports that Beijing might station ICBMs in the Delingha region seem to have alarmed authorities into action. The medium-range ballistic missiles which are already deployed in Delingha can hit targets that are almost 3,000 kilometres away. China has also built several launch pads for nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles in the same region.

"The entire northern India and parts of central India can be hit from there. The way these missiles have been deployed, they can only hit four countries -- Nepal, Pakistan, Myanmar and India. And because the other three countries are not potential adversaries of China, there is obviously deep concern here about China's intentions and you can say that this is one way of addressing this concern,'' said a source, adding that the separate centres for missile and maritime intelligence will initially comprise officers from central intelligence agencies. Till now, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) has worked as the nodal agency responsible for the functioning of all internal and external intelligence agencies.

A security official admitted that the need for separate missile intelligence centres was primarily because of China's expanding missile development programme. The new agency will not just gather information but also analyse information available with central agencies like DIA, RAW, IB and NTRO and recommend action to counter any adverse development.

"This agency, once it comes into being, will deal exclusively with nuclear and missile intelligence. The agencies carrying out this work now function under the JIC but the committee is not exclusively for missile and nuclear intelligence,'' he added. The new agency will function directly under the National Security Council and will be accountable for all inputs from the neighbouring region on developments related to missile and nuclear technology.

This proposal was first mooted by a joint task force on intelligence headed by former JIC chief S D Pradhan. Two other members of the task force are former IB director P C Haldar and scientist Roddam Narasimha. The task force was constituted at the behest of Narayanan himself and it has submitted its report to the government.

Similarly, a separate centre for maritime intelligence is also likely to be cleared by CCS. This centre will work as pivot around which all intelligence agencies involved in maritime security will function.

Intel centres to keep tabs on China's missiles, navy - India - NEWS - The Times of India

 

[LETHALFORCE]

India said mulling missile-shield work with U.S. | U.S. | Reuters

India said mulling missile-shield work with U.S.

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Lockheed Martin Corp, the Pentagon's No. 1 supplier, has been told India may be ready to look into possible U.S.-Indian collaboration on ballistic missile defense, a top company official said Wednesday.

"I would not be surprised if over the next couple of months we begin to have some exploratory discussions with various members of the government and with Indian industry," Richard Kirkland, Lockheed Martin's top executive on South Asia, said in a telephone interview with Reuters.

Indian missile-defense cooperation with the United States could complicate relations with China, Russia and Pakistan.

Until now, India's policy has been to develop its missile shield domestically, closing a potential multibillion-dollar market to Boeing Co, Lockheed, Raytheon Co and Northrop Grumman Corp -- the biggest players in the emerging ground, air, sea and space based U.S. missile defense system.

But this may be changing in line with a "watershed" Indian decision made formal last week to buy Lockheed's C-130J military transport aircraft, Kirkland said in a telephone interview.

India signed a deal with the United States on January 31 to buy six C-130Js worth about $1 billion, a shift from its previous heavy reliance on Russian transport planes.

"This kind of puts us in a new environment," James Clad, deputy assistant U.S. secretary of defense for South and Southeast Asia, said in an interview Tuesday of the C-130J deal. "With this sale, India is telling us it's ready to buy top-quality U.S. equipment on its merits."

More than 50 U.S. companies doing defense-related work are now represented in India, which is shaping up to be one of the world's biggest arms importers, Clad said.

The United States has been eager to boost strategic ties with India as a precaution against China's growing military power.

Nicholas Burns, the No. 3 U.S. State Department official, wrote in the November/December issue of the journal Foreign Affairs that that in reaching out to India, the United States was betting on democracy and market economics rather than "despotism and state planning," an apparent swipe at communist-ruled China.

Nathan Hughes, military analyst for Statfor, a private intelligence firm specialized in geopolitics and security, said any major expansion of U.S.-Indian strategic ties would anger archrival Pakistan; Russia, long a key military supplier; and China.

"The United States has lots of things India wants. Russia still provides the defense equipment that India needs," he said. "India just can't turn on a dime."

Kirkland said bolstering India's missile defenses could be done relatively quickly by "blending in", for instance, mobile radar and other sensors or command and control elements.

Washington already has held technical talks with New Delhi on missile-defense capabilities such as Lockheed/Raytheon Patriot Advanced Capability-3 antimissile batteries, said Richard Lehner, a spokesman for the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency.

Indian embassy officials did not respond to a request for comment.

Kirkland said he was "extraordinarily bullish" on Lockheed Martin's chances to win India's potential $10.2 billion market for 126 multirole fighter jets. He called it "the largest single competitive fighter purchase that has been around for 30 years" since a combined European F-16 purchase in the mid 1970s.

Lockheed is tailoring an F-16 Fighting Falcon proposal to meet Indian requirements, including an advanced radar known as active electronically scanned array, he said.

Proposals are due March 3. Also in the race are Boeing, which is offering its F/A-18 Super Hornet, Russia's MiG-35, France's Dassault Rafale, Sweden's Saab KAS-39 Gripen and the Eurofighter Typhoon, made by a consortium of British, German, Italian and Spanish companies.

Retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Jeffrey Kohler, until August the Pentagon's top arms-sale official, said the C-130J sale augured well for closer U.S.-Indian defense ties overall.

"I think every sale helps all U.S. companies looking to enter the Indian market," he said. "It helps build trust and confidence."

(Editing by Gary Hill)

 

[amitkriit]

Somebody said and I quote: "We must not summon Devil to ward off a wild animal". Anything ever bought from USA will surely come with lots of strings attached and most probably with lots of hidden cost in monetory and strategic terms. USA can plant it's agents deep inside our defence circles in disguise of such cooperations. We must learn from China and move towards sef-reliance, even if we have to face glitches to start with. Just have a look at Pakistan to get a hint.

 

[sayareakd]

we have to play safe with both China and US and take advantage of whole situation.

our BMD tech is sufficently matured

 

[SATISH]

Our BMD tech is matured?...wow...do the DRDO guys know that?...C'mon we havent even deployed a single BMD home grown missile yet. How can we say our system is matured? We have just had a few successful development trials. There is a lot more testing to be done to make our BMD system credible enough. We also need to have soft-kill capablities along with it. These are far away dreams. The user trials will tell later how credible the BMD really is. Till then we cannot speculate about our multi layered BMD.

 

[Terminator]

I dont believe our BMD capability is matured,couple of hits doesnt make it matured.Its amature and needs lots of kills more to be termed matured.Only three level tests have been done but unlike other western countries we induct missiles and other equipments within three tests or so