[Q
The 'upgrade' has been on for some years now ..... status "will be upgraded".
It is akin to the Dhanush program.
Unfortunately, the limitation of thinking of people in general and fanboys in particular, is precisely portrayed here on this thread, with the recent spate of abuses and half cocked opinions being spewed.
@Aditya Ballal Whenever you post a tweet of mine, kindly take the trouble to understand the context that it has been made in.
Coming to this particular write up by Lt Gen Ajai Singh, who actually spearheaded the project. Vested interests have dissected the write up without understanding the implications.
Let's see the most pertinent aspect from Lt Gen Ajai Singh's write up:
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This extract is the most important aspect from his write up. There were no illusions within the army over the induction of the Arjun MBT being a work in progress. This was also the time when the Army went in for INSAS in a big way, inspite of certain shortfalls already present, with the assurance that the same shall be 'ironed out' with user feedback (the period is 1997 onwards). We all know, how that has subsequently played out. Anyone who harbours an illusion that the weapon is one of the most effective ones in real live combat, needs a serious re-check. Otherwise, one of the best weapons, as per me, for firing ranges - great accuracy. But did I carry it in actual combat zone? No.
Also understand that the 90s was the era wherein the collapse of USSR had left India in an unenviable position of having a poor economy, badly exposed diplomatically, raging insurgency in J&K, and a Pakistan that was reaping the benefits of having been on the "winning side" of the cold war. With acute shortages in terms of the budgetary support to armed forces, the forces were trying to achieve commonality and push forward indigenous products that could 'evolve' over time.
If people would be kind enough to recall, India had, at this time, M-46 Catapaults, which were hybrids of Soviet M-46 (130 mm) Gun with the mainstay of the Indian Army - the Vijayants. By 90s, the T-72s were the mainstay of the Indian Army, and as such, the aim was to have a common chasis to create a hybrid SPG. And so, as under:
View attachment 104721
Note very carefully. The Army rejected all the four. By this time, T-72s were being made indigenously in India. The army's philosophy shifted to Project ARJUN, and the willingness of Army to induct them quickly was exemplified when Army, of it's own volition, took up PROJECT BHIM.
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Look how 'tedious' were the army trials and how 'grudging' was army to induct the equipment. Please note the timelines & 'expertise' roped in.
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Side Note: Your's truly can tell you quite confidently that by the year 1999, HVF had already botched up production of Arjun MBT and the peak pressure of Pakistan within the Kashmir Valley coupled to difficult economic conditions (tanks were mothballed, large numbers of T-72s were in dire need of overhauling, shortage of basic stuff like engines and tyres for vehicles, were common till 1997, reduced flying hours for training of IAF pilots a norm) and the Pakistani purchase of T-80UD tanks from Ukraine, pushed both IA and GoI into a panic mode of an imminent Pakistani move (US was actively backing Pakistan over Kashmir at the time) into Kashmir Valley (1999, we did see it played out a bit).
An example from an old write up:
View attachment 104732
Of course view like u/m, was widely held:
View attachment 104736
So, back to Project BHIM, note the dates (and actions undertaken by GoI to support an indigenous product, of which, Army was still keen):
View attachment 104737
And the
coup d'grace:
One of the observations over army's actions
View attachment 104740
