Indian Army: News and Discussion

Automatic Kalashnikov

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In his memoir Four Stars of Destiny, Naravane recounts Singh's direction as well as a flurry of phone calls between the defence minister, external affairs minister, the national security advisor and the chief of defence staff that night on the sensitive situation

After Singh's call, Naravane says a hundred different thoughts "flashed through" his mind.

"I conveyed the criticality of the situation to the RM (Raksha Mantri), who said he would get back to me, which he did, by about 2230 hours," writes Naravane.

"He said that he had spoken to the PM and that it was purely a military decision. Jo ucchit samjho woh karo (Do whatever you deem is appropriate)."

"I had been handed a hot potato. With this carte blanche, the onus was now totally on me. I took a deep breath and sat silently for a few minutes. All was quiet save for the ticking of the wall clock," he says.

"I was in my den at Army House, with the map of J and K and Ladakh on one wall, Eastern Command on another. They were unmarked maps, but as I looked at them, I could visualise the location of each and every unit and formation. We were ready in all respects, but did I really want to start a war?" he writes.

In the memoir, Gen Naravane reflects on his thought process that night.

"The country was in bad shape, reeling under the Covid pandemic. The economy was faltering, global supply chains had broken down. Would we be able to ensure a steady supply of spares, etc., under these conditions, in case of a long-drawn-out action?"

"Who were our supporters in the global arena, and what about the collusive threat from China and Pakistan? A hundred different thoughts flashed through my mind," he writes.

"This was no war game being played in a sand model room of the Army War College, but a life and death situation."

Naravane says after a few moments of quiet reflection, he called up Northern Army Commander Lt Gen YK Joshi.

"'We cannot be the first ones to fire,' I told him, as it would provide the Chinese with an excuse, a casus belli, to escalate and paint us as the aggressors."

"Even at Mukhpari (on the Kailash Range) the previous day, it had been the PLA who had fired first (being only two rounds by the PLA and three rounds by us, it had escaped the attention of the media)," he writes.

Naravane says he felt that the Army should maintain this stance.

"Instead, I told him to move a troop of our tanks right to the forward slopes of the Pass and depress their guns so that the PLA would be staring down the barrels of our guns," he writes.

"This was done forthwith and the PLA tanks, which had by then reached within a few hundred metres of the top, stopped in their tracks," he says.

"Their light tanks would have been no match for our medium tanks. It was a game of bluff and the PLA blinked first."

Naravane writes the PLA moved troops from Moldo to the area of Chuti Changla towards the South Bank of the Pangong Tso on the intervening night of August 29-30.

By evening itself, they moved forward some troops in the area of the Kailash Range, he says.

By the evening of the 30th, the Indian Army was in a strong position both on the North and South Bank of Pangong Tso as well as the Kailash Range.

"The PLA reaction was not long in coming. On the 30th evening itself, they moved forward some troops in the area of the Kailash Range, stopping about 500 metres short of our locations and started digging in," he says.

Naravane says the PLA locations were at lower heights and directly under our observation.

"As such, they were of no threat to us, but if they were to come up in strength and try to outflank or surround our localities, then we would have to take action. The situation was tense and nearing breaking point," he says.

Naravane says the daylight hours of August 31 saw a lot of movement on the PLA side, even as the Army consolidated its own position.

Towards the afternoon, movement of PLA armour was also observed in the area of their garrison at Moldo. Seeing this, our tanks at Tara Base were also ordered to move up to Rechin La, he says.

Naravane says mobilisation of PLA troops was seen in some other locations as well.

"At 2015 hours on the evening of 31 August, Jo (Joshi) rang me up, quite worried. He reported that four tanks supported by infantry had slowly started moving up the track towards Rechin La," he says.

"They had fired an illuminating round but this had had no effect. I had clear orders not to open fire, 'till cleared from the very top'. A flurry of calls followed, between the RM, EAM, NSA, CDS and myself over the next half-hour," he adds.

"To each and every one my question was, 'What are my orders?' At 2110 hours, Northern Command again rang up, the tanks had continued moving ahead and were now less than a km from the top.

"I rang up the RM again at 2125 hours, with the latest and once more asked for clear directions. The situation was tense. Telephone lines were buzzing."

Meanwhile, there had been an exchange of Hot Line messages and the PLA Commander, Maj Gen Liu Lin, suggested that both sides should stop any further move and that the two local commanders should meet at the pass at 0930 hours the next morning.

Naravane says he called up Defence Minister Singh and NSA Ajit Doval at 2200 hours to share this news.

"I had hardly put the phone down when Jo (Northern Army Commander Joshi) rang up once again at 2210 hours.

"He said that the tanks had started moving up again and were now only about 500 metres away," he says.

Naravane says Joshi recommended that the only way to stop the PLA was by opening up with our own medium artillery, which he said was ready and waiting.

"My position was critical...," he says as he explains how the situation was handled.
why were these guys over a phone call? shouldn't they be in a war room or at the PM's residence?
 

Blademaster

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why were these guys over a phone call? shouldn't they be in a war room or at the PM's residence?
US and the 5 eyes probably heard everything since US basically owns all the electronic hardware that Indian leaders use to communicate. That is how they penetrated deeply into Russian top leadership and military leadership and basically overheard all their entire war planning and was able to tell Ukraine how to resist Russia effectively.
 

Love Charger

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No, I didn't write it. I feel like I was curious about the painkillers used in India.
It's not morphine or fentanyl.
It is morphine , there are stories of soldiers who have used it .
Like of major general ian cardozo, who in 1971 war with Pakistan stepped on a land mine.
He leg was badly injured, so he due to non availability of morphine or pethidine, he himself cut his own leg with a khukri knife issued to him .
Later on he was treated and is still alive.
 

KaiGenji

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It is morphine , there are stories of soldiers who have used it .
Like of major general ian cardozo, who in 1971 war with Pakistan stepped on a land mine.
He leg was badly injured, so he due to non availability of morphine or pethidine, he himself cut his own leg with a khukri knife issued to him .
Later on he was treated and is still alive.
That's very brave. However, it is easy to understand why anti-personnel landmines are prohibited under international treaties.
 

Soldier355

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Armenia buys Indian Akash air defense systems. Armenia and India have entered into an agreement to purchase Indian Akash air defense systems; the contract is valued at $720 million. The Akash air defense system began to be developed in 1983 by the Defense Research and Development Laboratory; production of the air defense system began in 2008 by Bharat Dynamics Ltd. At the moment, two types of Akash air defense systems are produced in India - a basic one with a destruction range of up to 30 kilometers and an upgraded one with a destruction range of up to 70 km. Which of these two types of air defense systems Armenia ordered is still unknown. The Akash air defense system can be mounted on a T-72 or BMP-3 wheeled or tracked chassis. The Akash air defense system includes: - a launcher with three anti-aircraft missiles, - a multifunctional radar "Rajendra" capable of detecting targets at a range of up to 60 kilometers, as well as a control point. The complex's radar with a phased array antenna allows simultaneous tracking of up to 64 targets and guidance of up to 12 missiles. The air defense system is equipped with missiles with a warhead weighing about 60 kilograms and a flight speed of 1000 m/s. The air defense system can hit targets at altitudes of up to 19 kilometers.

 

Raj Malhotra

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In his memoir Four Stars of Destiny, Naravane recounts Singh's direction as well as a flurry of phone calls between the defence minister, external affairs minister, the national security advisor and the chief of defence staff that night on the sensitive situation

After Singh's call, Naravane says a hundred different thoughts "flashed through" his mind.

"I conveyed the criticality of the situation to the RM (Raksha Mantri), who said he would get back to me, which he did, by about 2230 hours," writes Naravane.

"He said that he had spoken to the PM and that it was purely a military decision. Jo ucchit samjho woh karo (Do whatever you deem is appropriate)."

"I had been handed a hot potato. With this carte blanche, the onus was now totally on me. I took a deep breath and sat silently for a few minutes. All was quiet save for the ticking of the wall clock," he says.

"I was in my den at Army House, with the map of J and K and Ladakh on one wall, Eastern Command on another. They were unmarked maps, but as I looked at them, I could visualise the location of each and every unit and formation. We were ready in all respects, but did I really want to start a war?" he writes.

In the memoir, Gen Naravane reflects on his thought process that night.

"The country was in bad shape, reeling under the Covid pandemic. The economy was faltering, global supply chains had broken down. Would we be able to ensure a steady supply of spares, etc., under these conditions, in case of a long-drawn-out action?"

"Who were our supporters in the global arena, and what about the collusive threat from China and Pakistan? A hundred different thoughts flashed through my mind," he writes.

"This was no war game being played in a sand model room of the Army War College, but a life and death situation."

Naravane says after a few moments of quiet reflection, he called up Northern Army Commander Lt Gen YK Joshi.

"'We cannot be the first ones to fire,' I told him, as it would provide the Chinese with an excuse, a casus belli, to escalate and paint us as the aggressors."

"Even at Mukhpari (on the Kailash Range) the previous day, it had been the PLA who had fired first (being only two rounds by the PLA and three rounds by us, it had escaped the attention of the media)," he writes.

Naravane says he felt that the Army should maintain this stance.

"Instead, I told him to move a troop of our tanks right to the forward slopes of the Pass and depress their guns so that the PLA would be staring down the barrels of our guns," he writes.

"This was done forthwith and the PLA tanks, which had by then reached within a few hundred metres of the top, stopped in their tracks," he says.

"Their light tanks would have been no match for our medium tanks. It was a game of bluff and the PLA blinked first."

Naravane writes the PLA moved troops from Moldo to the area of Chuti Changla towards the South Bank of the Pangong Tso on the intervening night of August 29-30.

By evening itself, they moved forward some troops in the area of the Kailash Range, he says.

By the evening of the 30th, the Indian Army was in a strong position both on the North and South Bank of Pangong Tso as well as the Kailash Range.

"The PLA reaction was not long in coming. On the 30th evening itself, they moved forward some troops in the area of the Kailash Range, stopping about 500 metres short of our locations and started digging in," he says.

Naravane says the PLA locations were at lower heights and directly under our observation.

"As such, they were of no threat to us, but if they were to come up in strength and try to outflank or surround our localities, then we would have to take action. The situation was tense and nearing breaking point," he says.

Naravane says the daylight hours of August 31 saw a lot of movement on the PLA side, even as the Army consolidated its own position.

Towards the afternoon, movement of PLA armour was also observed in the area of their garrison at Moldo. Seeing this, our tanks at Tara Base were also ordered to move up to Rechin La, he says.

Naravane says mobilisation of PLA troops was seen in some other locations as well.

"At 2015 hours on the evening of 31 August, Jo (Joshi) rang me up, quite worried. He reported that four tanks supported by infantry had slowly started moving up the track towards Rechin La," he says.

"They had fired an illuminating round but this had had no effect. I had clear orders not to open fire, 'till cleared from the very top'. A flurry of calls followed, between the RM, EAM, NSA, CDS and myself over the next half-hour," he adds.

"To each and every one my question was, 'What are my orders?' At 2110 hours, Northern Command again rang up, the tanks had continued moving ahead and were now less than a km from the top.

"I rang up the RM again at 2125 hours, with the latest and once more asked for clear directions. The situation was tense. Telephone lines were buzzing."

Meanwhile, there had been an exchange of Hot Line messages and the PLA Commander, Maj Gen Liu Lin, suggested that both sides should stop any further move and that the two local commanders should meet at the pass at 0930 hours the next morning.

Naravane says he called up Defence Minister Singh and NSA Ajit Doval at 2200 hours to share this news.

"I had hardly put the phone down when Jo (Northern Army Commander Joshi) rang up once again at 2210 hours.

"He said that the tanks had started moving up again and were now only about 500 metres away," he says.

Naravane says Joshi recommended that the only way to stop the PLA was by opening up with our own medium artillery, which he said was ready and waiting.

"My position was critical...," he says as he explains how the situation was handled.
Lt Gen Sagat Singh on Chinese border in 1967 vs the weak response of dwadling import loving China expert Generals whining after retirement

and Maj Gen Hanut Singh:-




As per the new drill, in case of a Chinese intrusion, the unit or formation concerned, would tactically deploy a company or more in vicinity of the Chinese and warn them thrice in hindi that they have intruded into Indian territory. In case the Chinese did not withdraw, the senior officer present should order opening fire on the Chinese till such time they vacated Indian territory. The General also empowered NCOs to order opening fire in case a situation was developing that warranted opening fire.

General Hanut laid down one caveat while giving out these instructions to his command. He said under no circumstance, will the enemy be allowed to open fire first because our hesitation in opening fire on earlier occasions, had always resulted in high casualties to our troops. 17 Mountain Division will fire first and inflict maximum damage on the enemy in case our territory was violated. He also went on to state that in case the Chinese opened fire first and inflicted casualties on our troops and it was established that the senior officer present had hesitated in ordering fire, he would court martial that person for cowardice. Brigade commanders were authorized to order opening up of Artillery fire. General Hanut was not going to wait for instructions from a dithering and hesitant political and military hierarchy.

 

prateikf

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Lt Gen Sagat Singh on Chinese border in 1967 vs the weak response of dwadling import loving China expert Generals whining after retirement

and Maj Gen Hanut Singh:-




As per the new drill, in case of a Chinese intrusion, the unit or formation concerned, would tactically deploy a company or more in vicinity of the Chinese and warn them thrice in hindi that they have intruded into Indian territory. In case the Chinese did not withdraw, the senior officer present should order opening fire on the Chinese till such time they vacated Indian territory. The General also empowered NCOs to order opening fire in case a situation was developing that warranted opening fire.

General Hanut laid down one caveat while giving out these instructions to his command. He said under no circumstance, will the enemy be allowed to open fire first because our hesitation in opening fire on earlier occasions, had always resulted in high casualties to our troops. 17 Mountain Division will fire first and inflict maximum damage on the enemy in case our territory was violated. He also went on to state that in case the Chinese opened fire first and inflicted casualties on our troops and it was established that the senior officer present had hesitated in ordering fire, he would court martial that person for cowardice. Brigade commanders were authorized to order opening up of Artillery fire. General Hanut was not going to wait for instructions from a dithering and hesitant political and military hierarchy.

Nice article of brave men. The correct thing to do for the commanding general was to evict the Chinese once the intrusion was detected in 2020. His referring the matter to his Superior’s and ultimately to Delhi for orders which he knew would never come proved to be wrong since it’s his sacred duty to resist and defend Indian territory from foreign intrusions.
 

Cheran

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1703777184938.png


Para-Military forces to switch to ‘Sandes App’ for all official communications and document sharing, WhatsApp not to be used for security concerns

'Sandes' application is an open source-based indigenous instant messaging platform developed by NIC, Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India to facilitate instant messaging communication in Government organisations.

“We have suggested CISF, CRPF, SSB, and ITBP to switch to the new app for all kinds of official communication and sharing of documents. The app doesn’t share data with third parties, and data safety is one of its key features,” the officer said.

Currently, Sandes is integrated with NIC email, DigiLocker and e-office. At present, full features of the Sandes app are available only to government-verified users.


Employees of Government organisations need to contact the Nodal officer of their Ministry/ Department for verification.

*

Hope it has been tested thoroughly for all scenarios.
 

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