http://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20101103/edit.htm#7
Revving up the airborne force multiplier
Vijay Mohan
Plans are formulated, future scenarios envisioned, policy papers drafted and issues debated, but on-ground implementation, more often then not, gets bogged down in turf battles, financial constraints, bureaucratic wrangles, indecisiveness and other detrimental factors so commonly associated with the procurement of weapons.
This also seems to be the case with
Army Aviation Corps (AAC), in existence for almost a quarter of a century., but still to take off as a full-fledged combat arm that can effectively provide the complete ambit of air support to ground formations or facilitate rapid troop redeployment within a tactical battle zone.
Air power is the dominating force in the battlefield, not only being the eyes and ears of commanders, but also adding a devastating punch to formations' firepower and enhancing logistic capability. Army's aviation units have the advantage of firepower, speed and flexibility, greatly enhancing the field formations' combat effectiveness and the ability to strike in the enemy's depth with little forewarning.
The much-needed expansion and restructuring of the Corps been floundering over the years and the bulk of its assets - the Cheetah and Chetak helicopters -- are obsolete. Acquisition of 197 utility helicopters to replace the aging fleet, the contenders for which include Kamov, Eurocopter and Agusta-Westland, remains mired in technical and bureaucratic muddle.
AAC was raised in 1986 with transfer of the Air Observation Posts from the Regiment of Artillery to form a new corps. It has now 35 Recce and Observation Flights forming 11 squadrons. The only contemporary machine in its inventory is the HAL-made Dhruv, with the French-origin Cheetah and Chetak being of 60s and 70s vintage. Some Cheetahs were upgraded to the Lancer configuration, giving them a marginally enhanced operational capability. It has no medium-lift helicopters or fixed-wing assets.
Tasks envisioned for army aviation are onerous. These are engagement of fixed and mobile targets and fire support to ground forces, reconnaissance and observation, electronic and visual surveillance, provision of airborne command posts, monitoring nuclear, chemical and biological environment, casualty evacuation, communications and logistic support and airlift of troops.
Most of the vital tasks, at present, are carried out by the air force, which maintains and operates attack as well as medium helicopters like Mi-25/35 and Mi-8/17. Some IAF Chetaks also have anti-armour capabilities.
At the conceptual and operation levels, the IAF and AAC are vastly different. The IAF, perceiving itself as an emerging aerospace force through exploiting the realm of outer atmosphere for achieving military objectives, is a strategic force, trained and oriented for missions beyond borders and operations across the entire spectrum of conflict covering the total theatre(s) of war.
On the other hand, AAC is concerned with tactical operations within limited geographical areas and is primarily intended as force-multipliers for field commanders and give them the desired punch and operational flexibility within their area of responsibility. AAC was also conceived to free air force assets to concentrate on achieving the larger strategic objectives.
Given the size of the Army --
six operational commands, 13 corps, three armoured divisions, 32 infantry divisions, two artillery divisions and eight independent armoured brigades, ACC's strength of 200-odd helicopters is, as reiterated often by experts, grossly inadequate.
Besides numbers, deficiencies AAC suffers from include lack of all-weather and night capability, absence of dedicated attack helicopters so vital for fire support, negligible tactical airlift capability and non-availability of electronic surveillance equipment.
Further, the army's involvement in counter-insurgency, anti-terrorist operations and low-intensity conflict had placed added demands on the AAC, but with little wherewithal to meet them. Material and technical constraints notwithstanding, men of the ACC have performed commendably in all operational environments.
Mid and long-term perspective plans to restructure and expand its aviation corps have been drawn up, which include raising aviation brigades at the command and corps level, with each strike formation having its own independent air assets for attack, surveillance and communications.
A special operations squadron is also stated to be on the cards for dedicated air support to the Special Forces or extraordinary missions. Next is a electronic warfare flight to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum for battlefield superiority.
Restructuring is to be backed with new acquisitions,
including the proposed 197 utility helicopters, additional squadrons of Dhruvs, including its armed version, medium lift choppers like the Mi-17, tactical battle field support helicopters and, in the long run, light fixed wing aircraft for surveillance and communications. Improvements in its capabilities are focused at achieving all-weather day and night capability, precision strike capability, ability to rapidly induct and de-induct troops and enhancing logistic support capability in high altitude areas. Besides induction of new generation aircraft, it would also require a close look at issues like manpower, training, infrastructure, technical support and maintenance.
As the security environment remains in a flux, the challenge before the AAC is two-fold - have the capability to execute its mandate in a fast-paced convectional war fought in a network centric environment in the back drop of a nuclear threat, and secondly, have the ability to support ground forces in low intensity war or anti-terrorist operations in a varied terrain including mountains, jungles and built-up areas. It would also not be out of place to mention that India's security interests are not just limited to the sub-continent, but encompass central Asia and the Indian Ocean Region and, if experts are to be believed, necessitate force projection and expeditionary operations that would require aerial assets.
If the AAC, so vital for battlefield dominance, is to meet its envisioned charter then there must be a holistic approach and a concerted effort to restructure the force in consonance with the emerging security paradigm and suitably equip it with state-of-the art weapons and logistic platforms.
. Getting serious, I think that IAF should have only transport helicopters for troop deployments, evacuation and disaster relief while all the attack helos should go to IA since IA is likely to use the gunships for CAS in the theater.
