India Strikes Against Pakistani Terrorism 2019

[tsunami]

Wow, a Paki actually acting reasonably & asking to check all sides' sources!!!
That's something you don't see everyday...

I don't why he was banned from this thread.......

 

[rocky0290]

Look at all of their faces!

 

[aghamarshana]

Qureshi crying.......U Evil Yindoooz, u put uz on FATF Blacklist.

 

[sorcerer]

Qureshi crying.......U Evil Yindoooz, u put uz on FATF Blacklist.

Blame it on India and these pigs are devoid of responsibilities..
This is the reason why pakis will implode soon under its own denial

 

[sorcerer]

Look at all of their faces!

Staring contest between porks

 

[tomato]

Look at all of their faces!

Bubble of their supremacy is about to burst!!

 

[Punya Pratap]

Pakistan believes that post-Pulwama situation has worked to its advantage, or is at least a stalemate Published April 2, 2019 | By admin SOURCE: ENS India-Pakistan relations are at the nastiest since 1947. Media hype has created a sense amongst the general public that belligerence could be a normal way of life. In times like these, it is important to have greater clarity about the thinking on either side. Of course what complicates matters, especially when it comes to having the real feel of things, is the lack of dialogue and direct access. Broadly speaking, three kinds of claims have resonance in New Delhi. First, post-Pulwama, Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan’s popularity has gone down. The pressure from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Pakistan’s poor economic capacity and having Nawaz Sharif in jail are burdens for the new prime minister. Nothing could be further from the truth. Pakistan, like the rest of South Asia, knows the art of cushioning national security decisions from economic and social pressures. The flow of money through borrowing seems to sustain Islamabad. Short of an economic crash, things will work for Khan. Like all wars, the current hostility between the two countries has also strengthened right-wing and status-quo oriented political forces. It has boosted the popularity of Imran Khan and his generals. Like India, the crisis has brought the nation together. Even the PML-N supporters, irrespective of how they express themselves on social media or closed WhatsApp groups, were supportive of the military in Punjab. The people of the country’s largest — also the most important — province have been, for decades, exposed to a pro-military national security narrative. This narrative is too deeply ingrained in them to change their minds. The battle in Punjab is between Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan — and not the armed forces. In any case, Islamabad’s public relations machinery has worked to garner domestic support for Khan. The ordinary people, who are generally unaware of state policies, bought into Khan’s carefully-crafted image of a “cooler” South Asian leader who is ready to reconcile and solve problems through dialogue. Pakistan’s media campaign has been much better in presenting this perspective. This was even conceded by the Indian delegation that came recently to London to present its perspective. There are rumours of tension between Khan and the military’s top brass. But the differences, if any, do not portend that the military intends to remove Khan. Apparently, there are differences over the handling of Nawaz Sharif because of the interest in, certain quarters, of getting a share in the approximately $1 billion stashed away in a Southeast Asian bank. Interestingly, those negotiating these funds seem least interested in getting back the money for the country. Khan may not be part of that plan. Such rumours will increase as the day for appointing a new army chief — or extending the incumbent’s tenure — approaches. General Qamar Bajwa is due to retire in November. Second, the FATF is a concern and has led to some arrests. Khan has also indicated his intent to clean up the country of jihadi elements. However, his control over the overall jihad policy remains questionable. The Pakistan-based jihadi groups are considered the first line of defence, more reliable and effective compared to the ordinary folk. This was the position taken during an interaction with the civil society organised by the then army chief, General Jahangir Karamat, in 1997. Third, there will be no change in policy because Pulwama did not prove to be Kargil. If anything, it proved to be the reverse. In 1999, Pakistan’s temporary territorial gain was criticised, both nationally and internationally. There was even a division within the armed forces as the navy and the air force were not part of the plan. Internationally, there was condemnation, and no help came from Pakistan’s all-weather friend, China. The post-Pulwama situation in Pakistan can be compared with the 2002 military standoff. Notwithstanding the country’s numerous internal problems, the fear of intervention or a national crisis tends to transform Pakistan and bring together disparate elements in it — a strength that Delhi has not managed to ascertain. Consequently, despite redefining the threshold for conflict, India did not carry the moment — the results did not impress people in Pakistan or those abroad. The photographs of the attack on Balakot or stories of shooting down of an F-16 fighter jet could not convince the world. Instead, the Pakistan Air Force managed to shoot down an Indian MiG-21. The recovery of the debris, including the aircraft’s entire arsenal, suggested that the pilot did not seek any target before going down. The subsequent capture of the pilot made for a better show of force from Pakistan. Theoretically, it is harder for Delhi to link Pulwama with Pakistan compared to the 26/11 attack on Mumbai. During the Mumbai attack, calls between the attackers and their handlers across the border were picked up immediately by other intelligence and communication networks. The issue here is not whether Jaish-e-Mohammad operates in Pakistan or if it propagates the message of jihad, but if the outfit was involved in the attack without internal help — the attacker was from Kashmir. The understanding in Pakistan is that the post-Pulwama situation has actually worked to its advantage — or is a stalemate. The situation today is comparable to the Rann of Kutch operation in 1965, or the 1965 war. As far as the diplomatic war is concerned, that will be long and protracted. The fact that the European Union had a re-look at its report on the human rights atrocities in Kashmir — which was completed before Pulwama but got sidelined — means that conflict escalation could have benefits for Islamabad. Treating the situation in Kashmir primarily as an insurgency is likely to add to Delhi’s burden — not that of Islamabad’s. In any case, the one thing that could be gathered from an interaction with an Indian panel speaking on the crisis in London was that Delhi did not have a sustainable plan on Kashmir. Greater use of force may not be a solution. Kashmir cannot be treated like the Golan Heights or Gaza. Since nation-states value territory, it is equally essential to understand what makes the population tick

idrw.org .Read more at India No 1 Defence News Website http://idrw.org/pakistan-believes-t...-to-its-advantage-or-is-at-least-a-stalemate/ .

 

[sorcerer]

Bubble of their supremacy is about to burst!!

Why all are their hands on the table..
Mafi manging? Begging...
Staged pic....
Or may be a precaution that nobody is going for the gun..and shoot each other like they did in pindi the other night.

 

[maomao]

Pakistan believes that post-Pulwama situation has worked to its advantage, or is at least a stalemate Published April 2, 2019 | By admin SOURCE: ENS India-Pakistan relations are at the nastiest since 1947. Media hype has created a sense amongst the general public that belligerence could be a normal way of life. In times like these, it is important to have greater clarity about the thinking on either side. Of course what complicates matters, especially when it comes to having the real feel of things, is the lack of dialogue and direct access. Broadly speaking, three kinds of claims have resonance in New Delhi. First, post-Pulwama, Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan’s popularity has gone down. The pressure from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Pakistan’s poor economic capacity and having Nawaz Sharif in jail are burdens for the new prime minister. Nothing could be further from the truth. Pakistan, like the rest of South Asia, knows the art of cushioning national security decisions from economic and social pressures. The flow of money through borrowing seems to sustain Islamabad. Short of an economic crash, things will work for Khan. Like all wars, the current hostility between the two countries has also strengthened right-wing and status-quo oriented political forces. It has boosted the popularity of Imran Khan and his generals. Like India, the crisis has brought the nation together. Even the PML-N supporters, irrespective of how they express themselves on social media or closed WhatsApp groups, were supportive of the military in Punjab. The people of the country’s largest — also the most important — province have been, for decades, exposed to a pro-military national security narrative. This narrative is too deeply ingrained in them to change their minds. The battle in Punjab is between Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan — and not the armed forces. In any case, Islamabad’s public relations machinery has worked to garner domestic support for Khan. The ordinary people, who are generally unaware of state policies, bought into Khan’s carefully-crafted image of a “cooler” South Asian leader who is ready to reconcile and solve problems through dialogue. Pakistan’s media campaign has been much better in presenting this perspective. This was even conceded by the Indian delegation that came recently to London to present its perspective. There are rumours of tension between Khan and the military’s top brass. But the differences, if any, do not portend that the military intends to remove Khan. Apparently, there are differences over the handling of Nawaz Sharif because of the interest in, certain quarters, of getting a share in the approximately $1 billion stashed away in a Southeast Asian bank. Interestingly, those negotiating these funds seem least interested in getting back the money for the country. Khan may not be part of that plan. Such rumours will increase as the day for appointing a new army chief — or extending the incumbent’s tenure — approaches. General Qamar Bajwa is due to retire in November. Second, the FATF is a concern and has led to some arrests. Khan has also indicated his intent to clean up the country of jihadi elements. However, his control over the overall jihad policy remains questionable. The Pakistan-based jihadi groups are considered the first line of defence, more reliable and effective compared to the ordinary folk. This was the position taken during an interaction with the civil society organised by the then army chief, General Jahangir Karamat, in 1997. Third, there will be no change in policy because Pulwama did not prove to be Kargil. If anything, it proved to be the reverse. In 1999, Pakistan’s temporary territorial gain was criticised, both nationally and internationally. There was even a division within the armed forces as the navy and the air force were not part of the plan. Internationally, there was condemnation, and no help came from Pakistan’s all-weather friend, China. The post-Pulwama situation in Pakistan can be compared with the 2002 military standoff. Notwithstanding the country’s numerous internal problems, the fear of intervention or a national crisis tends to transform Pakistan and bring together disparate elements in it — a strength that Delhi has not managed to ascertain. Consequently, despite redefining the threshold for conflict, India did not carry the moment — the results did not impress people in Pakistan or those abroad. The photographs of the attack on Balakot or stories of shooting down of an F-16 fighter jet could not convince the world. Instead, the Pakistan Air Force managed to shoot down an Indian MiG-21. The recovery of the debris, including the aircraft’s entire arsenal, suggested that the pilot did not seek any target before going down. The subsequent capture of the pilot made for a better show of force from Pakistan. Theoretically, it is harder for Delhi to link Pulwama with Pakistan compared to the 26/11 attack on Mumbai. During the Mumbai attack, calls between the attackers and their handlers across the border were picked up immediately by other intelligence and communication networks. The issue here is not whether Jaish-e-Mohammad operates in Pakistan or if it propagates the message of jihad, but if the outfit was involved in the attack without internal help — the attacker was from Kashmir. The understanding in Pakistan is that the post-Pulwama situation has actually worked to its advantage — or is a stalemate. The situation today is comparable to the Rann of Kutch operation in 1965, or the 1965 war. As far as the diplomatic war is concerned, that will be long and protracted. The fact that the European Union had a re-look at its report on the human rights atrocities in Kashmir — which was completed before Pulwama but got sidelined — means that conflict escalation could have benefits for Islamabad. Treating the situation in Kashmir primarily as an insurgency is likely to add to Delhi’s burden — not that of Islamabad’s. In any case, the one thing that could be gathered from an interaction with an Indian panel speaking on the crisis in London was that Delhi did not have a sustainable plan on Kashmir. Greater use of force may not be a solution. Kashmir cannot be treated like the Golan Heights or Gaza. Since nation-states value territory, it is equally essential to understand what makes the population tick

idrw.org .Read more at India No 1 Defence News Website http://idrw.org/pakistan-believes-t...-to-its-advantage-or-is-at-least-a-stalemate/ .

LOL hahhahahaha what load of BS, the Author from ENS is a paki fanboy or an Indian communist / liberal? Looks like Gandhi syndrome hitting pakistanis or this is just another obtuse BS write-up by a low caliber wannabe Intellectual who is devoid of any knowledge of history or military strategy!

 

[cyclops]

Bubble of their supremacy is about to burst!!

The only bubble that remains(thanks to the perpetual brainwashing by PA) to be burst is that of the napakistani populace, the paki military bubble was thoroughly burst in every single Indo-napak wars.

 

[aarav]

Pakistan believes that post-Pulwama situation has worked to its advantage, or is at least a stalemate Published April 2, 2019 | By admin SOURCE: ENS India-Pakistan relations are at the nastiest since 1947. Media hype has created a sense amongst the general public that belligerence could be a normal way of life. In times like these, it is important to have greater clarity about the thinking on either side. Of course what complicates matters, especially when it comes to having the real feel of things, is the lack of dialogue and direct access. Broadly speaking, three kinds of claims have resonance in New Delhi. First, post-Pulwama, Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan’s popularity has gone down. The pressure from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Pakistan’s poor economic capacity and having Nawaz Sharif in jail are burdens for the new prime minister. Nothing could be further from the truth. Pakistan, like the rest of South Asia, knows the art of cushioning national security decisions from economic and social pressures. The flow of money through borrowing seems to sustain Islamabad. Short of an economic crash, things will work for Khan. Like all wars, the current hostility between the two countries has also strengthened right-wing and status-quo oriented political forces. It has boosted the popularity of Imran Khan and his generals. Like India, the crisis has brought the nation together. Even the PML-N supporters, irrespective of how they express themselves on social media or closed WhatsApp groups, were supportive of the military in Punjab. The people of the country’s largest — also the most important — province have been, for decades, exposed to a pro-military national security narrative. This narrative is too deeply ingrained in them to change their minds. The battle in Punjab is between Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan — and not the armed forces. In any case, Islamabad’s public relations machinery has worked to garner domestic support for Khan. The ordinary people, who are generally unaware of state policies, bought into Khan’s carefully-crafted image of a “cooler” South Asian leader who is ready to reconcile and solve problems through dialogue. Pakistan’s media campaign has been much better in presenting this perspective. This was even conceded by the Indian delegation that came recently to London to present its perspective. There are rumours of tension between Khan and the military’s top brass. But the differences, if any, do not portend that the military intends to remove Khan. Apparently, there are differences over the handling of Nawaz Sharif because of the interest in, certain quarters, of getting a share in the approximately $1 billion stashed away in a Southeast Asian bank. Interestingly, those negotiating these funds seem least interested in getting back the money for the country. Khan may not be part of that plan. Such rumours will increase as the day for appointing a new army chief — or extending the incumbent’s tenure — approaches. General Qamar Bajwa is due to retire in November. Second, the FATF is a concern and has led to some arrests. Khan has also indicated his intent to clean up the country of jihadi elements. However, his control over the overall jihad policy remains questionable. The Pakistan-based jihadi groups are considered the first line of defence, more reliable and effective compared to the ordinary folk. This was the position taken during an interaction with the civil society organised by the then army chief, General Jahangir Karamat, in 1997. Third, there will be no change in policy because Pulwama did not prove to be Kargil. If anything, it proved to be the reverse. In 1999, Pakistan’s temporary territorial gain was criticised, both nationally and internationally. There was even a division within the armed forces as the navy and the air force were not part of the plan. Internationally, there was condemnation, and no help came from Pakistan’s all-weather friend, China. The post-Pulwama situation in Pakistan can be compared with the 2002 military standoff. Notwithstanding the country’s numerous internal problems, the fear of intervention or a national crisis tends to transform Pakistan and bring together disparate elements in it — a strength that Delhi has not managed to ascertain. Consequently, despite redefining the threshold for conflict, India did not carry the moment — the results did not impress people in Pakistan or those abroad. The photographs of the attack on Balakot or stories of shooting down of an F-16 fighter jet could not convince the world. Instead, the Pakistan Air Force managed to shoot down an Indian MiG-21. The recovery of the debris, including the aircraft’s entire arsenal, suggested that the pilot did not seek any target before going down. The subsequent capture of the pilot made for a better show of force from Pakistan. Theoretically, it is harder for Delhi to link Pulwama with Pakistan compared to the 26/11 attack on Mumbai. During the Mumbai attack, calls between the attackers and their handlers across the border were picked up immediately by other intelligence and communication networks. The issue here is not whether Jaish-e-Mohammad operates in Pakistan or if it propagates the message of jihad, but if the outfit was involved in the attack without internal help — the attacker was from Kashmir. The understanding in Pakistan is that the post-Pulwama situation has actually worked to its advantage — or is a stalemate. The situation today is comparable to the Rann of Kutch operation in 1965, or the 1965 war. As far as the diplomatic war is concerned, that will be long and protracted. The fact that the European Union had a re-look at its report on the human rights atrocities in Kashmir — which was completed before Pulwama but got sidelined — means that conflict escalation could have benefits for Islamabad. Treating the situation in Kashmir primarily as an insurgency is likely to add to Delhi’s burden — not that of Islamabad’s. In any case, the one thing that could be gathered from an interaction with an Indian panel speaking on the crisis in London was that Delhi did not have a sustainable plan on Kashmir. Greater use of force may not be a solution. Kashmir cannot be treated like the Golan Heights or Gaza. Since nation-states value territory, it is equally essential to understand what makes the population tick

idrw.org .Read more at India No 1 Defence News Website http://idrw.org/pakistan-believes-t...-to-its-advantage-or-is-at-least-a-stalemate/ .

Written by Ayesha Siddiqui ,Paki op Ed writer

 

[Jameson Emoni]

Bubble of their supremacy is about to burst!!

Pakistan as a threat has never worried me too much because there is a simple military solution to Pakistan problem. However, the large fifth column in India is a cause of serious concern. I do really hope that India's security apparatus will find a way to neutralize this fifth column before irreparable damage is done.

 

[Shiv sagar]

https://m.hindustantimes.com/india-...ays-qureshi/story-7ZK8Sg3xmpn5JAuGfU2JyN.html
"Pakistan could be blacklisted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) due to “lobbying by India”, Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi said as he estimated that the country could suffer USD 10 billion loss annually if it remains in the watchdog’s grey list"
A usd 10 billion loss .....wow that's astonishing. Waiting for Qureshi's calculations ....after getting blacklisted...

 

[Arsalan123]

I don't why he was banned from this thread.......

They unban me.thanks for unban.my post circulating on indian defence forums.lol

 

[Butter Chicken]

हम पाकिस्तान पर हम इतना दबाव बनाएँगे, इतनी कार्यवाही करेंगे कि, पाकिस्तान को अपनी धरती पर आतंकवाद को पनपने से रोकना ही होगा: श्री @rajnathsingh

 

[Darth Malgus]

They unban me.thanks for unban.my post circulating on indian defence forums.lol

Your famous on twitter as well.....

 

[aghamarshana]

https://m.hindustantimes.com/india-...ays-qureshi/story-7ZK8Sg3xmpn5JAuGfU2JyN.html
"Pakistan could be blacklisted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) due to “lobbying by India”, Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi said as he estimated that the country could suffer USD 10 billion loss annually if it remains in the watchdog’s grey list"
A usd 10 billion loss .....wow that's astonishing. Waiting for Qureshi's calculations ....after getting blacklisted...

$10bn is their annual defence budget....Noose tightens around their neck,let's see how their nation feels it.
I wonder how they buy their spares! Best time for BLF fighters to do some jugaad and inflict more pain to Pakjabis. HRD definitely takes a toll,and we need that only. The longer they remain uneducated radicals,the better for us. As Modi said,they'll die their own death.

 

[rocky0290]

Bubble of their supremacy is about to burst!!

Deep down they already knew about their so called supremacy!it's the general public who's bubble has to be burst but that too is next to impossible as from their childhood they have studied in the madrassas and distorted history!

 

[rocky0290]

Why all are their hands on the table..
Mafi manging? Begging...
Staged pic....
Or may be a precaution that nobody is going for the gun..and shoot each other like they did in pindi the other night.

Simply to portray to the general public about their professionalism and etiquettes.As we all know how much they stress on the optics is evident here.

 

[Chinmayanand]

On Feb 13, paki terror hit Iran.
On Feb14 , it hit India .
On Feb 15, it hit US in Afghanistan.

Americans are enjoying what India is doing to porkistan since US does not like to hit porkistan for whatever reasons.

It seems that there is a tacit understanding that Modi will take the military route & Trump will do the heavy lifting in UN , FATF & at other places.

India to punish porkistan militarily while US to do diplomatic and financial chitrol.

Even the Baloch attack on Chinese engineers can not come without the blessings of Big Boys. Game up for CPEC & Sino-Pak gangbang of Baloch people and Balochistan's natural resources. Decision has been made and die has been cast.

Porkistan ka Allah Hafiz honewala hai .