India-Pakistan LoC/IB Skirmishes in the Aftermath of August 5 2019

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Lancer

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Even tho Chinese boost 1962 war and their win but ultimately forget the larger picture. The war changed the whole strategic emblem of india at least for this century . China is our biggest advisory And india will do everything in its power to undermine Chinese efforts in Asia
Chinese love to undermine India in the articles but at the same time fears India led Quad initiatives.
We throughly fucked them up just a couple years after the '62 War at Nathu La and Cho La. And the lessons of '62 served us well in terms of becoming more war ready for 65 and 71 too.

Trumped them at Sumdurong Chu thanks to Sundarji, and at Doklam as well.
 

MIDKNIGHT FENERIR-00

VICTORIOUM AUT MORS
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The Coming Crisis Along the Iran-Pakistan Border

Qassem Soleimani’s killing will have trickle down effects that could ramp up Baloch militancy in both countries.


By Muhammad Akbar Notezai
March 17, 2020


In this June 1, 2014 photo, an Iranian border guard patrols Iran’s Dogharoun border with Afghanistan, near Taibad in eastern Iran.
Credit: AP Photo/Vahid Salemi

The killing of Qassem Soleimani at the beginning of 2020 created uncertainty over Iran’s role not only in the Middle East, but in South Asia as well. As the head of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) — the unit responsible for external military and covert operations — Soleimani extensively increased Iran’s sphere of influence in the region.

Pakistan, for its part, expressed “deep concern” over potential rising U.S.-Iran tensions in the aftermath of Soleimani’s killing. Pakistan’s concern is understandable. As Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi stated, geography inexorably links Pakistan’s security with stability in the Middle East. This is particularly the case in relation to Iran, due to the nearly 600 mile border shared with Iran along Pakistan’s Balochistan province. With turbulent Iran-Pakistan strategic relations over the latter’s increasing tilt toward Saudi Arabia, the Balochistan border has also been a site of conflict, with each side lambasting the other for providing sanctuaries to militant groups in their respective provinces.

Soleimani’s death is likely to increase militancy for two reasons. First, his successor, Ismail Qaani, is focused on Iran’s eastern border and on drug cartel movement in the border region. This is highly likely to escalate the tension in the region in the coming years. Second, Baloch Sunni militancy is rearing its head, and Qaani, having been looking after Iran’s priorities in the region, is likely to respond to this trend with more force than his predecessor, Soleimani.

In the end, however, the rising militancy along the border cannot be attributed to either Soleimani or Qaani as individuals. Instead, Iran has increasingly shifted its priorities in the region that makes up its border with Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Both Pakistan and Iran have provinces dominated by Baloch ethnic groups: Balochistan in Pakistan and Sistan and Baluchestan province in Iran. Their respective provinces are sparsely populated and undeveloped, which has led to nationalist movements on each side of the border, and security concerns that had once been a source of Pakistan-Iran cooperation. Today, Pakistan is battling the same Baloch nationalism, while similar tendencies in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan province have transformed into Sunni militancy directed against the Shia Iranian state.

While Pakistan and Iran historically had shared interests in combating militant groups in Balochistan, today the region has become a space where cross-border militancy can easily aggravate tensions. After a suicide car bombing claimed by the Sunni Baloch militant group Jaish ul-Adl (the “Army of Justice”) killed 27 IRGC members in Sistan and Baluchestan in February 2019, Iran criticized Islamabad for failing to crack down on the group and allowing it to find shelter in Pakistan’s Balochistan province. Iran’s Tasnim News Agency reported that Brigadier General Pakpour, a commander of the IRGC, claimed at a ceremony held to honor the victims of the attacks that three of the assailants responsible for the February 23 killings were Pakistani citizens. Iran considers Jaish ul-Adl a proxy of Saudi Arabia and Soleimani at the time lambasted Pakistan, demanding concrete action from Islamabad and blaming Pakistan’s increasingly close connection with Saudi Arabia for the violence.

Pakistan has vehemently denied the charges and offered to cooperate with Iran in investigating the attacks.

Islamabad itself is also concerned about the security situation along its border with Iran, arguing that Iran has harbored militants hostile to Pakistan across the border. Pakistan, for instance, lodged strong protests following the Ormara massacre in Balochistan’s Gwadar district in April 2019, in which 14 people, including members of Pakistan’s security forces, were killed by a group alleged to have trained in Iran. Some reports even suggested the attack was tied to Soleimani as revenge for the earlier bombing that killed IRGC members. The arrest of Kulbhushan Jadhav in 2016 — an Indian naval officer charged with spying in Pakistan — also created uncertainty over the border regions, since by some accounts he entered through Iran.

mortars into remote border towns on the Pakistani side, under the pretext of those towns harboring Sunni Baloch militants. Meanwhile drug traffickers from the border regions have poured into Iran and clashed with Iranian security forces. Over the years, Iran has pressured Pakistani authorities to fence the border, which Pakistan has recently agreed to. However, given the simmering militancy in the region and slow progress on the fence, it is unlikely this will do much to improve the security challenges.

Under Soleimani, the Quds Force’s main concern regarding Pakistan was the recruitment of Pakistani Shias to fight in Syria to protect the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Iran is said to have increased its footprint in Quetta, the provincial capital of Balochistan, as part of its efforts to recruit Pakistan Shias to join the Zainabiyoun Brigade militia group in Syria. These Shia Muslims pass through illegal border points in Balochistan to reach Iran without Islamabad’s knowledge. From there, they would be dispatched to Syria by the IRGC and Quds Force to fight the rebels opposed to Assad’s regime.

However, Soleimani’s successor Ismail Qaani could adopt a very different – and more dangerous — strategy for the region. Qaani has reportedly looked after Iranian priorities in the east, such as drug trafficking in the border region and aiding Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance in its fight against the Taliban. Under Qaani’s leadership, the Quds Force is likely to foment trouble not only in Middle East but also in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This development has serious implications for the security situation in Afghanistan as well as Iran’s relationship with Pakistan.

Qaani, no doubt, will be closely watching militancy in the region. Meanwhile, the Quds Force under his leadership is likely to increase its influence in across its eastern border with Pakistan.

To Iran, the region comprising Iranian Balochistan and the border region with Pakistan and Afghanistan is of high significance. The port town of Chabahar, situated just 72 kilometers from Pakistan’s Gwadar port town in Balochistan, including the strait of Hormuz, is especially important to Iran’s strategic calculations. But the same region is also Iran’s Achilles heel. If militancy escalates, it will likely involve the Baloch Sunni population of Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan province. That is why Iran wants to crush militancy in the border region, and that is going to have repercussions for the whole region.

Under Qaani’s leadership, Iran seems to be pushing its influence in the region. Although the situation is not in Iran’s favor right now, the tide is shifting. Besides Pakistan, Iran’s interests in the area are also intertwined with Afghanistan, and Iran will gain more space once U.S. troops there withdraw. That process is already beginning under a recent U.S.-Taliban peace agreement.

Neither Pakistan nor Iran can afford an environment of escalated tension in the region, which is why it is high time for the two countries to normalize the situation in their backyard. If Pakistan and Iran continue to ignore the situation and get involved in a blame game — as they are doing right now — the situation will get out of hand, inviting a troubled future. If current trends continue, that is going to be the fate of this region.
 
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VICTORIOUM AUT MORS
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The Coming Crisis Along the Iran-Pakistan Border

Qassem Soleimani’s killing will have trickle down effects that could ramp up Baloch militancy in both countries.


By Muhammad Akbar Notezai
March 17, 2020


In this June 1, 2014 photo, an Iranian border guard patrols Iran’s Dogharoun border with Afghanistan, near Taibad in eastern Iran.
Credit: AP Photo/Vahid Salemi

The killing of Qassem Soleimani at the beginning of 2020 created uncertainty over Iran’s role not only in the Middle East, but in South Asia as well. As the head of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) — the unit responsible for external military and covert operations — Soleimani extensively increased Iran’s sphere of influence in the region.

Pakistan, for its part, expressed “deep concern” over potential rising U.S.-Iran tensions in the aftermath of Soleimani’s killing. Pakistan’s concern is understandable. As Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi stated, geography inexorably links Pakistan’s security with stability in the Middle East. This is particularly the case in relation to Iran, due to the nearly 600 mile border shared with Iran along Pakistan’s Balochistan province. With turbulent Iran-Pakistan strategic relations over the latter’s increasing tilt toward Saudi Arabia, the Balochistan border has also been a site of conflict, with each side lambasting the other for providing sanctuaries to militant groups in their respective provinces.

Soleimani’s death is likely to increase militancy for two reasons. First, his successor, Ismail Qaani, is focused on Iran’s eastern border and on drug cartel movement in the border region. This is highly likely to escalate the tension in the region in the coming years. Second, Baloch Sunni militancy is rearing its head, and Qaani, having been looking after Iran’s priorities in the region, is likely to respond to this trend with more force than his predecessor, Soleimani.

In the end, however, the rising militancy along the border cannot be attributed to either Soleimani or Qaani as individuals. Instead, Iran has increasingly shifted its priorities in the region that makes up its border with Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Both Pakistan and Iran have provinces dominated by Baloch ethnic groups: Balochistan in Pakistan and Sistan and Baluchestan province in Iran. Their respective provinces are sparsely populated and undeveloped, which has led to nationalist movements on each side of the border, and security concerns that had once been a source of Pakistan-Iran cooperation. Today, Pakistan is battling the same Baloch nationalism, while similar tendencies in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan province have transformed into Sunni militancy directed against the Shia Iranian state.

While Pakistan and Iran historically had shared interests in combating militant groups in Balochistan, today the region has become a space where cross-border militancy can easily aggravate tensions. After a suicide car bombing claimed by the Sunni Baloch militant group Jaish ul-Adl (the “Army of Justice”) killed 27 IRGC members in Sistan and Baluchestan in February 2019, Iran criticized Islamabad for failing to crack down on the group and allowing it to find shelter in Pakistan’s Balochistan province. Iran’s Tasnim News Agency reported that Brigadier General Pakpour, a commander of the IRGC, claimed at a ceremony held to honor the victims of the attacks that three of the assailants responsible for the February 23 killings were Pakistani citizens. Iran considers Jaish ul-Adl a proxy of Saudi Arabia and Soleimani at the time lambasted Pakistan, demanding concrete action from Islamabad and blaming Pakistan’s increasingly close connection with Saudi Arabia for the violence.

Pakistan has vehemently denied the charges and offered to cooperate with Iran in investigating the attacks.

Islamabad itself is also concerned about the security situation along its border with Iran, arguing that Iran has harbored militants hostile to Pakistan across the border. Pakistan, for instance, lodged strong protests following the Ormara massacre in Balochistan’s Gwadar district in April 2019, in which 14 people, including members of Pakistan’s security forces, were killed by a group alleged to have trained in Iran. Some reports even suggested the attack was tied to Soleimani as revenge for the earlier bombing that killed IRGC members. The arrest of Kulbhushan Jadhav in 2016 — an Indian naval officer charged with spying in Pakistan — also created uncertainty over the border regions, since by some accounts he entered through Iran.

mortars into remote border towns on the Pakistani side, under the pretext of those towns harboring Sunni Baloch militants. Meanwhile drug traffickers from the border regions have poured into Iran and clashed with Iranian security forces. Over the years, Iran has pressured Pakistani authorities to fence the border, which Pakistan has recently agreed to. However, given the simmering militancy in the region and slow progress on the fence, it is unlikely this will do much to improve the security challenges.

Under Soleimani, the Quds Force’s main concern regarding Pakistan was the recruitment of Pakistani Shias to fight in Syria to protect the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Iran is said to have increased its footprint in Quetta, the provincial capital of Balochistan, as part of its efforts to recruit Pakistan Shias to join the Zainabiyoun Brigade militia group in Syria. These Shia Muslims pass through illegal border points in Balochistan to reach Iran without Islamabad’s knowledge. From there, they would be dispatched to Syria by the IRGC and Quds Force to fight the rebels opposed to Assad’s regime.

However, Soleimani’s successor Ismail Qaani could adopt a very different – and more dangerous — strategy for the region. Qaani has reportedly looked after Iranian priorities in the east, such as drug trafficking in the border region and aiding Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance in its fight against the Taliban. Under Qaani’s leadership, the Quds Force is likely to foment trouble not only in Middle East but also in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This development has serious implications for the security situation in Afghanistan as well as Iran’s relationship with Pakistan.

Qaani, no doubt, will be closely watching militancy in the region. Meanwhile, the Quds Force under his leadership is likely to increase its influence in across its eastern border with Pakistan.

To Iran, the region comprising Iranian Balochistan and the border region with Pakistan and Afghanistan is of high significance. The port town of Chabahar, situated just 72 kilometers from Pakistan’s Gwadar port town in Balochistan, including the strait of Hormuz, is especially important to Iran’s strategic calculations. But the same region is also Iran’s Achilles heel. If militancy escalates, it will likely involve the Baloch Sunni population of Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan province. That is why Iran wants to crush militancy in the border region, and that is going to have repercussions for the whole region.

Under Qaani’s leadership, Iran seems to be pushing its influence in the region. Although the situation is not in Iran’s favor right now, the tide is shifting. Besides Pakistan, Iran’s interests in the area are also intertwined with Afghanistan, and Iran will gain more space once U.S. troops there withdraw. That process is already beginning under a recent U.S.-Taliban peace agreement.

Neither Pakistan nor Iran can afford an environment of escalated tension in the region, which is why it is high time for the two countries to normalize the situation in their backyard. If Pakistan and Iran continue to ignore the situation and get involved in a blame game — as they are doing right now — the situation will get out of hand, inviting a troubled future. If current trends continue, that is going to be the fate of this region.

Porkis using Attack Helicopters and Junk Fighter-17s in Targeting the Local Balochi Population.
 

Waanar

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well done baloch freedom fighters..............
View attachment 44996
Can we have a Baloch militancy focused thread?
Look, I love the Baloch, and I love these posts. I don't want em to get lost amidst the constant noise of ceasefire and mortars.
It's taste is something I want to savor, in solace and without any adulteration. Make a thread focused on em and post these news there. They are making enough noise to warrant that..
 

ezsasa

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Very hard to plan strategically when your enemies have the same weapons.
almost Everything we buy from Russia ; China buys first. We wait after
long delays to receive when next generation is out.
and that realisation is probably the reason, DRDO is going full steam ahead these days on indigenous missile tech. i don't they ever churned out so many new missile systems and tech as they did in last 5 years.
 

ArgonPrime

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They out number us on majority everything. They have more ships than India, they have more Aircraft than India and they have equal amount of soldiers but huge Amount of weapons and Armored Vehicles than India. China has a strong industrial and technological base that can shift on moments notice to a war economy under the orders of the communist party. We don’t have that.
The LAC, for the most part, is not at all conducive for large scale mechanized warfare, so the numerical advantage they enjoy over us in terms of tanks and AFVs now won't count for all that much really. The biggest problem for us, in my opinion, is the lack of a sizable missile force, like the PLA's Second Artillery Corps for example. We need to build up our numbers in terms of medium-range tactical missiles on a fast track basis.
 

AMCA

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They out number us on majority everything. They have more ships than India, they have more Aircraft than India and they have equal amount of soldiers but huge Amount of weapons and Armored Vehicles than India.
Stop this YouTubeish thing of number vs number comparison. They cannot mobilise their entire army against India so this number vs number thing is useless. All we need is to counter their current deployments in Tibet and Xinjiang area.
This was discussed in detail on this very forum during dhoklam stand-off with china. Check out me reply from LoC thread

https://defenceforumindia.com/forum...ernational-border.79817/page-324#post-1412163


The Strategic Postures of China and India: A Visual Guide
| March 2020
Policy prescriptions following from this analysis have been published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. See Frank O'Donnell and Alexander K. Bollfrass, "India is Building Nuclear Submarines and ICBMs. That’s a $14 Billion Mistake," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 26, 2020.

Downloads and Resources:

Tables and maps embedded in full below.

Background
Fueled by aggressive rhetoric from both capitals, Indian and Chinese ground forces engaged in a standoff between June and August 2017. The Doklam crisis, as it became known, stimulated introspection among officials and experts in both states about the future of their relationship. Politically, both strategic communities largely concluded that the peaceful resolution of border disputes is now less likely, forecasting more rivalry than cooperation. Militarily, Indian discussions on the strength of its military position against China in their disputed ground frontier areas have converged on the view that China holds the conventional and nuclear edge over India in this domain.1

Based on our analysis of data on the location and capabilities of Indian and Chinese strategic forces and related military units, we conclude that this assessment of the balance of forces may be mistaken and a poor guide for Indian security and procurement policies. We recommend that instead of investing in new nuclear weapons platforms that our analysis suggests are not likely to be required to deter China, New Delhi should improve the survivability of its existing forces and fill the gap in global arms control leadership with an initiative on restraint and transparency.

China and India’s deliberately opaque strategic postures make objective assessments difficult. To overcome that problem, this brief introduces a new data compilation, consisting of a variety of published intelligence documents, private documents sourced from regional states, and interviews with experts based in China, India, and the United States. This data is combined with open-source force estimates to provide the most comprehensive public assessment of the location and capabilities of Chinese and Indian strategic forces. The appendix provides a link to an interactive map of Chinese and Indian nuclear and conventional air and ground forces, including descriptions of some simplifications and estimates necessary to display the forces on a map. Our analysis focuses on strategic military strike concentrations as they are postured against one other, excluding border patrol forces, as of January 2018. This makes it possible to examine the strengths and weaknesses of each side’s forces.

What does this data tell us? We assess that India has key under-appreciated conventional advantages that reduce its vulnerability to Chinese threats and attacks. India appears to have cause for greater confidence in its military position against China than is typically acknowledged in Indian debates, providing the country an opportunity for leadership in international efforts toward nuclear transparency and restraint.

Indian strategists have not focused on this opportunity, in part because they draw pessimistic conclusions regarding China. For example, one Indian expert has observed that “India’s ground force posture and strength is not really comparable to that of China in their border regions. China has better military infrastructure, capabilities, and logistics.”2 A former commander of the Indian Army Northern and Central commands, which are tasked with defense against China, wrote during the Doklam standoff that he expected the episode to end in a barrage of Chinese missile strikes to expel Indian forces from the area and settle the dispute on Chinese terms.3

Even India’s comparative optimists, a minority, do not sound hopeful. A retired Indian Army brigadier close to internal discussions on China policy has observed that “even as conventional asymmetry prevails, it is being largely undermined by Indian strides in infrastructural build up, force modernisation and new raisings.”4

The next sections assess the nuclear forces India and China have arrayed against each other, followed by conventional forces relevant to a potential conflict.

5 The land- and sea-based elements are operated by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force, which executes nuclear strike orders issued by the Central Military Commission under Xi Jinping’s chairmanship.

Sea-based missiles do not have a fixed location. However, China’s land-based missile bases can be geo-located. Including only the nuclear forces and locations most relevant to targeting India, the map below shows that the bases are concentrated in the far north, with three DF-21 bases in the country’s south.6

In all, an estimated 104 Chinese missiles could strike all or parts of India. These include about a dozen DF-31A and six to twelve DF-31 missiles capable of reaching all Indian mainland targets. Another dozen DF-21s hold New Delhi at risk. The remaining missiles can target sections of India’s northeast and east coast.7 Moreover, as China deploys more road-mobile missiles over time, it will become easier to move further missiles from China’s interior to new survivable positions within range of India.

Figure 1: Map of China’s Nuclear Strike Range




[paste:font size="4"]9 As in China, nuclear warheads are held at separate locations from delivery vehicles in peacetime, although there are reports of pre-mating of some Indian missiles to warheads through canisterization.10 A nuclear strike order would be issued by the Political Council of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) and executed through the NCA Executive Council and military Strategic Forces Command.11

India’s professed goal has always been to field a credible second-strike capability. This assured retaliation doctrine depends on the creation of sufficient doubt in the adversary’s calculus that a disarming first strike would succeed.

India seeks to ensure the survivability of its forces through adequate force dispersal, distributing its forces across several bases and along several vectors (air, land, and sea), while seeking to ensure the secrecy of their locations.12 This existing approach probably does create doubt in Chinese strategic planning that it could militarily entirely erase India’s ability to reach Chinese targets.

Unsurprisingly, the bulk of India’s missile forces are located closer to Pakistan than China.13 We estimate that around ten Agni-III launchers can reach the entire Chinese mainland. Another eight Agni-II launchers could reach central Chinese targets. An estimated two squadrons of Jaguar IS and one squadron of Mirage 2000H fighters, totaling around 51 aircraft, are assessed to be tasked with nuclear missions.14 These aircraft could most likely reach Tibetan airspace equipped with nuclear gravity bombs. However, it is near certain that they would be identified and tracked by air defenses before proceeding deeper into China from Tibet. The potential early surprise achievable in Tibet-centric missions would no longer be possible for missions elsewhere in China, as Chinese air defenses would be alerted in the additional time necessary for Indian aircraft to transit Tibet.

Figure 2: Map of India’s Nuclear Strike Range





[paste:font size="4"]16 The total available Army strike forces near China’s border areas are assessed to be around 225,000 personnel. This incorporates the roughly 3,000 personnel attached to a T-72 tank brigade stationed in Ladakh and the estimated 1,000 personnel attached to a Brahmos cruise missile regiment in Arunachal Pradesh. For the Army, this total near China’s border areas is divided into about 34,000 troops in the Northern Command; 15,500 troops in the Central Command; and 175,500 troops in the Eastern Command.17

The Indian Air Force (IAF) has an estimated 270 fighters and 68 ground attack aircraft across its three China-facing commands.18 It is also expanding its network of Advanced Landing Grounds (ALGs), which constitute small air bases in forward locations to provide staging grounds and logistics hubs for aircraft strike missions.19 In the Western Air Command, the IAF possesses around 75 fighters and 34 ground attack aircraft, besides 5 ALGs close to Chinese Tibetan areas. The Central Air Command features around 94 fighters, 34 ground attack aircraft, and one ALG. The Eastern Air Command hosts around 101 fighters and 9 ALGs. Crucially, the IA and IAF forces described above are all permanently close to China’s border, shortening their mobilization time and limiting the prospects of a successful Chinese cross-border advance.

[paste:font size="3"]
Chinese conventional forces
We estimate a total of 200,00-230,000 Chinese ground forces under the Western Theater Command, and Tibet and Xinjiang Military Districts. 20 However, this apparent numerical near-equivalence with that of Indian regional ground forces is misleading. Even in a war with India, a significant proportion of these forces will be unavailable, reserved either for Russian taskings or for countering insurrection in Xinjiang and Tibet. The majority of forces are located further from the Indian border, posing a striking contrast with the majority of forward-deployed Indian forces with a single China defense mission.

The new joint Western Theater Command is estimated to hold around 90,000-120,000 troops, principally divided into the 76th and 77th Group Armies. These Group Armies are headquartered toward the interior of Western China, in Chongqing and Baoji respectively.21 Because of ongoing unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang, the Western Theater Command’s ground operational authority does not extend to these regions. Instead, a special PLA Army-directed Military District (MD) has been created for each of these regions.22 In Tibet, the region closest to Indian border areas, the PLA presence is judged to number just 40,000 troops. More numerous forces are located in the Xinjiang region north of Tibet, totaling around 70,000.23 This means that China is regularly operating with a permanent Indian conventional force advantage along its border areas. In the event of a major standoff or conflict with India, it would have to rely upon mobilization primarily from Xinjiang and secondarily from the Western Theater Command forces deeper in China’s interior. By contrast, Indian forces are already largely in position.

The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) also suffers from a numerical disparity to the IAF in the border region. Unlike the tripartite organizational division of Chinese ground forces facing India, the Western Theater Command has assumed control of all regional strike aircraft.24 In total, this amounts to around 157 fighters and a varied drone armory. This includes an estimated 20 GJ-1/WD-1K precision strike UAVs, 12 WD-1 ground attack and reconnaissance UAVs, 12 WD-1 precision strike UAVs, and 8 EA-03 reconnaissance and electronic warfare UAVs.25 A proportion of these are reserved for Russia-centric missions. By comparison, as noted earlier, the Indian Eastern Air Command can field around 101 fighters against China alone. China also uses eight airbases and airfields relevant to India strike missions, although a majority are civilian airports that can be commandeered in wartime.26

Other comparative weaknesses permeate the PLAAF’s posture against India. On a strict comparison of available 4th generation fighters, authoritative assessments hold that China’s J-10 fighter is technically comparable to India’s Mirage-2000, and that the Indian Su-30MKI is superior to all theater Chinese fighters, including the additional J-11 and Su-27 models.27 China hosts a total of around 101 4th-generation fighters in the theater, of which a proportion must be retained for Russian defense, while India has around 122 of its comparable models, solely directed at China.

The high altitude of Chinese air bases in Tibet and Xinjiang, plus the generally difficult geographic and weather conditions of the region, means that Chinese fighters are limited to carrying around half their design payload and fuel. In-flight refueling would be required for PLAAF forces to maximize their strike capacity.28 China had only inducted 15 such tanker aircraft nationally as of 2017, meaning only a handful of its forces will benefit from this solution.29 Against these underpowered fighters, IAF forces will launch from bases and airfields unaffected by these geographic conditions, with maximum payload and fuel capabilities.30

The most significant PLAAF forward air bases and airfields near Indian border areas—which will be pivotal in combat operations—are located at Hotan, Lhasa/Gonggar, Ngari-Gunsa, and Xigaze. Each hosts regular PLAAF detachments, and these are the nearest facilities to Indian targets in Kashmir, northern India, and northeast India.31 They are vulnerable to a dedicated Indian offensive. Ngari-Gunsa and Xigaze reportedly have no hardened shelters or blast pens for their aircraft, which sit in the open.32 Lhasa/Gonggar has recently developed hardened shelters able to protect up to 36 aircraft, while Hotan reportedly hosts “two aircraft shelters” of unknown capacity.33 An Indian early initiative to destroy or incapacitate these four bases—and achieve air superiority over them—would compel China to rely more upon aircraft from its rear-area bases, exacerbating its limited fuel and payload problems. Moreover, China lacks the redundancy and related force survivability compared to India in their comparative numbers of regional air bases. In sum, India has a stronger regional air position, with “a large number of airfields in the east and west, so even if some airfields are down, operations can continue from other locations.”34

PLAAF training and experience shortcomings that are not shared by the IAF amplify China’s air disadvantage.35 Recent PLAAF exercises with unscripted scenarios have found that pilots are excessively reliant upon ground control for tactical direction. In unanticipated combat scenarios, this dependence on explicit control tower guidance becomes extreme, while “ground commands” are simultaneously often unable “to keep up with the complex and changeable air situation.”36 This suggests that PLAAF combat proficiency may be significantly weaker than often estimated.

A comprehensive study found that scenarios with combat conditions where “some of the key first-line airfields were destroyed” would be especially concerning for Chinese strategists.37 Progressive base hardening in the eastern US-facing PLAAF facilities has reduced this risk in that area.38 A lack of similar measures in the India-facing west suggests that Indian destruction or temporary incapacitation of some of the four above air bases would further exacerbate these PLAAF operational inflexibilities and weaknesses. By contrast, recent conflicts with Pakistan give the current IAF a level of institutional experience in actual networked combat.

Recognizing this dilemma, instead of a regional aircraft offensive, Chinese strategic planners envision early long-range missile strikes against Indian air bases in the event of conflict. However, India benefits from the greater number and redundancy of regional air bases, and the daunting number of Chinese missiles that would be required to truly incapacitate relevant IAF forces. A former IAF official, referring to the high number of disparate targets per air base, the requirement for at least two missiles per target, and the ability of base officials to repave the blast crater with quick-drying concrete within six hours, has articulated the operational problem:

“To keep one airfield shut for 24 hours, the PLAAF will require 220 ballistic missiles. This will not make any difference to IAF operations in the east or in the west since the IAF has a large number of other operational airfields to operate from. If the PLAAF attacks just three airfields, it will require 660 ballistic missiles per day for attacking the runway and taxi track alone. China’s stock of 1,000-1,200 MRBMs/SRBMs will be over in less than two days when attacking just three airfields, with no other major target systems like C2 centres or air defence units being addressed.”39
This analysis was authored before India began its process of integrating runway replacement fiberglass mats into its base defense systems, meaning it was likely calculated upon a previous “labour-intensive,” civilian-heavy method of runway repaving, as described by a former Indian Air Marshal.40 However, India is presently inducting these fiberglass mats and associated paving equipment, which will further reduce its runway reconstitution timeframe.41 It is therefore unlikely that the numerous PLAAF disadvantages detailed above can be overcome by China’s superior missile forces. This is critical beyond the air competition itself: “In any India-China conflict, the PLA cannot launch an attack without the support of the PLAAF.”42

To address its force shortfalls in the event of war, China could surge air and ground forces from its interior toward the border. However, what our analysis suggests is that the IAF’s superiority would mean that critical logistical routes—such as air bases and military road and rail links—could be cut by bombing or standoff missile strikes, limiting the extent to which China’s position could be reinforced.43 Such a Chinese surge would also attract attention from the United States, which would alert India and enable it to counter-mobilize its own additional forces from its interior.

Ammunition shortfalls have been a limiting factor for Indian conventional force operations in the past, especially for the Indian Army. India’s official audit agency assessed in 2016 that India lacked sufficient reserves in around 85 out of 170 critical ammunition categories for a scenario of an intense 10-day war.44 Since then, New Delhi has bolstered its stockpiles, and continues to reduce this operational constraint.45

China could permanently station forces similar to or larger than India’s nearer to the border. An Indian counter-buildup would surely follow.
In total, India is in a stronger conventional position vis-à-vis China than much of the analysis on this topic concludes.




Strategic Postures





 

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VICTORIOUM AUT MORS
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Russia using lot of middlemen Ukraine,Serbia, China etc... to get their weapons to Pakistan.
So they can fool Indians and not lose their 2nd largest defense market.
I am pretty sure the Tanks were Russian not the Upgrades. I am pretty sure the Porkis bought the Tanks second hand from Ukraine or Serbia then upgraded them using either one of the countries. The Majority of Tanks will be used by the Porki Paramilitary Forces to combat Freedom Movements going on in KPK and Balochistan and also defending Iran and Afghan Border. The Porki Dogs are too poor to buy state of the Art Weapons for Armed Forces inculding tanks so they are buying Second Hand Obsolete Weapons from Eastern European Former Soviet Client States like Ukraine and Serbia and also upgrading there Old Ass Chinki Tanks used back in 1965 and 1971.

Serbia sells 282 T-55 tanks to Pakistan?




An article on In News is reporting that Serbia has reportedly agreed to modernize and sell 282 obsolete T-55 tanks to Pakistan. According to the article, the contract is worth tens of millions of dollars and that the proceeds from the sale will be used by Serbia to purchase new weapons. The Chief of the Defense Technology in the Ministry of Defence, Major General Bojan Zrnic indirectly confirmed the sale, saying “It is true that there was an agreement in principle for the sale of 282 tanks from the arsenal of retired and obsolete military equipment, but I do not want to talk about with which country and the army this deal was made. It would not be appropriate because the contract has not been signed. What can I say is that the offer is extremely favorable for the Army of Serbia as the tanks will not be sold in its current state, they will be modernized first. This task will be entrusted to our defense industry.” No details are given in the article as to what sort of modifications the Serbians will be making on these vehicles in order to modernize them. It is probably safe to assume the modernization will be similar to their T-55H variant.
 
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Stop this YouTubeish thing of number vs number comparison. They cannot mobilise their entire army against India so this number vs number thing is useless. All we need is to counter their current deployments in Tibet and Xinjiang area.
This was discussed in detail on this very forum during dhoklam stand-off with china. Check out me reply from LoC thread

https://defenceforumindia.com/forum...ernational-border.79817/page-324#post-1412163


The Strategic Postures of China and India: A Visual Guide
| March 2020
Policy prescriptions following from this analysis have been published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. See Frank O'Donnell and Alexander K. Bollfrass, "India is Building Nuclear Submarines and ICBMs. That’s a $14 Billion Mistake," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 26, 2020.

Downloads and Resources:

Tables and maps embedded in full below.

Background
Fueled by aggressive rhetoric from both capitals, Indian and Chinese ground forces engaged in a standoff between June and August 2017. The Doklam crisis, as it became known, stimulated introspection among officials and experts in both states about the future of their relationship. Politically, both strategic communities largely concluded that the peaceful resolution of border disputes is now less likely, forecasting more rivalry than cooperation. Militarily, Indian discussions on the strength of its military position against China in their disputed ground frontier areas have converged on the view that China holds the conventional and nuclear edge over India in this domain.1

Based on our analysis of data on the location and capabilities of Indian and Chinese strategic forces and related military units, we conclude that this assessment of the balance of forces may be mistaken and a poor guide for Indian security and procurement policies. We recommend that instead of investing in new nuclear weapons platforms that our analysis suggests are not likely to be required to deter China, New Delhi should improve the survivability of its existing forces and fill the gap in global arms control leadership with an initiative on restraint and transparency.

China and India’s deliberately opaque strategic postures make objective assessments difficult. To overcome that problem, this brief introduces a new data compilation, consisting of a variety of published intelligence documents, private documents sourced from regional states, and interviews with experts based in China, India, and the United States. This data is combined with open-source force estimates to provide the most comprehensive public assessment of the location and capabilities of Chinese and Indian strategic forces. The appendix provides a link to an interactive map of Chinese and Indian nuclear and conventional air and ground forces, including descriptions of some simplifications and estimates necessary to display the forces on a map. Our analysis focuses on strategic military strike concentrations as they are postured against one other, excluding border patrol forces, as of January 2018. This makes it possible to examine the strengths and weaknesses of each side’s forces.

What does this data tell us? We assess that India has key under-appreciated conventional advantages that reduce its vulnerability to Chinese threats and attacks. India appears to have cause for greater confidence in its military position against China than is typically acknowledged in Indian debates, providing the country an opportunity for leadership in international efforts toward nuclear transparency and restraint.

Indian strategists have not focused on this opportunity, in part because they draw pessimistic conclusions regarding China. For example, one Indian expert has observed that “India’s ground force posture and strength is not really comparable to that of China in their border regions. China has better military infrastructure, capabilities, and logistics.”2 A former commander of the Indian Army Northern and Central commands, which are tasked with defense against China, wrote during the Doklam standoff that he expected the episode to end in a barrage of Chinese missile strikes to expel Indian forces from the area and settle the dispute on Chinese terms.3

Even India’s comparative optimists, a minority, do not sound hopeful. A retired Indian Army brigadier close to internal discussions on China policy has observed that “even as conventional asymmetry prevails, it is being largely undermined by Indian strides in infrastructural build up, force modernisation and new raisings.”4

The next sections assess the nuclear forces India and China have arrayed against each other, followed by conventional forces relevant to a potential conflict.

5 The land- and sea-based elements are operated by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force, which executes nuclear strike orders issued by the Central Military Commission under Xi Jinping’s chairmanship.

Sea-based missiles do not have a fixed location. However, China’s land-based missile bases can be geo-located. Including only the nuclear forces and locations most relevant to targeting India, the map below shows that the bases are concentrated in the far north, with three DF-21 bases in the country’s south.6

In all, an estimated 104 Chinese missiles could strike all or parts of India. These include about a dozen DF-31A and six to twelve DF-31 missiles capable of reaching all Indian mainland targets. Another dozen DF-21s hold New Delhi at risk. The remaining missiles can target sections of India’s northeast and east coast.7 Moreover, as China deploys more road-mobile missiles over time, it will become easier to move further missiles from China’s interior to new survivable positions within range of India.

Figure 1: Map of China’s Nuclear Strike Range




[paste:font size="4"]9 As in China, nuclear warheads are held at separate locations from delivery vehicles in peacetime, although there are reports of pre-mating of some Indian missiles to warheads through canisterization.10 A nuclear strike order would be issued by the Political Council of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) and executed through the NCA Executive Council and military Strategic Forces Command.11

India’s professed goal has always been to field a credible second-strike capability. This assured retaliation doctrine depends on the creation of sufficient doubt in the adversary’s calculus that a disarming first strike would succeed.

India seeks to ensure the survivability of its forces through adequate force dispersal, distributing its forces across several bases and along several vectors (air, land, and sea), while seeking to ensure the secrecy of their locations.12 This existing approach probably does create doubt in Chinese strategic planning that it could militarily entirely erase India’s ability to reach Chinese targets.

Unsurprisingly, the bulk of India’s missile forces are located closer to Pakistan than China.13 We estimate that around ten Agni-III launchers can reach the entire Chinese mainland. Another eight Agni-II launchers could reach central Chinese targets. An estimated two squadrons of Jaguar IS and one squadron of Mirage 2000H fighters, totaling around 51 aircraft, are assessed to be tasked with nuclear missions.14 These aircraft could most likely reach Tibetan airspace equipped with nuclear gravity bombs. However, it is near certain that they would be identified and tracked by air defenses before proceeding deeper into China from Tibet. The potential early surprise achievable in Tibet-centric missions would no longer be possible for missions elsewhere in China, as Chinese air defenses would be alerted in the additional time necessary for Indian aircraft to transit Tibet.

Figure 2: Map of India’s Nuclear Strike Range





[paste:font size="4"]16 The total available Army strike forces near China’s border areas are assessed to be around 225,000 personnel. This incorporates the roughly 3,000 personnel attached to a T-72 tank brigade stationed in Ladakh and the estimated 1,000 personnel attached to a Brahmos cruise missile regiment in Arunachal Pradesh. For the Army, this total near China’s border areas is divided into about 34,000 troops in the Northern Command; 15,500 troops in the Central Command; and 175,500 troops in the Eastern Command.17

The Indian Air Force (IAF) has an estimated 270 fighters and 68 ground attack aircraft across its three China-facing commands.18 It is also expanding its network of Advanced Landing Grounds (ALGs), which constitute small air bases in forward locations to provide staging grounds and logistics hubs for aircraft strike missions.19 In the Western Air Command, the IAF possesses around 75 fighters and 34 ground attack aircraft, besides 5 ALGs close to Chinese Tibetan areas. The Central Air Command features around 94 fighters, 34 ground attack aircraft, and one ALG. The Eastern Air Command hosts around 101 fighters and 9 ALGs. Crucially, the IA and IAF forces described above are all permanently close to China’s border, shortening their mobilization time and limiting the prospects of a successful Chinese cross-border advance.

[paste:font size="3"]
Chinese conventional forces
We estimate a total of 200,00-230,000 Chinese ground forces under the Western Theater Command, and Tibet and Xinjiang Military Districts. 20 However, this apparent numerical near-equivalence with that of Indian regional ground forces is misleading. Even in a war with India, a significant proportion of these forces will be unavailable, reserved either for Russian taskings or for countering insurrection in Xinjiang and Tibet. The majority of forces are located further from the Indian border, posing a striking contrast with the majority of forward-deployed Indian forces with a single China defense mission.

The new joint Western Theater Command is estimated to hold around 90,000-120,000 troops, principally divided into the 76th and 77th Group Armies. These Group Armies are headquartered toward the interior of Western China, in Chongqing and Baoji respectively.21 Because of ongoing unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang, the Western Theater Command’s ground operational authority does not extend to these regions. Instead, a special PLA Army-directed Military District (MD) has been created for each of these regions.22 In Tibet, the region closest to Indian border areas, the PLA presence is judged to number just 40,000 troops. More numerous forces are located in the Xinjiang region north of Tibet, totaling around 70,000.23 This means that China is regularly operating with a permanent Indian conventional force advantage along its border areas. In the event of a major standoff or conflict with India, it would have to rely upon mobilization primarily from Xinjiang and secondarily from the Western Theater Command forces deeper in China’s interior. By contrast, Indian forces are already largely in position.

The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) also suffers from a numerical disparity to the IAF in the border region. Unlike the tripartite organizational division of Chinese ground forces facing India, the Western Theater Command has assumed control of all regional strike aircraft.24 In total, this amounts to around 157 fighters and a varied drone armory. This includes an estimated 20 GJ-1/WD-1K precision strike UAVs, 12 WD-1 ground attack and reconnaissance UAVs, 12 WD-1 precision strike UAVs, and 8 EA-03 reconnaissance and electronic warfare UAVs.25 A proportion of these are reserved for Russia-centric missions. By comparison, as noted earlier, the Indian Eastern Air Command can field around 101 fighters against China alone. China also uses eight airbases and airfields relevant to India strike missions, although a majority are civilian airports that can be commandeered in wartime.26

Other comparative weaknesses permeate the PLAAF’s posture against India. On a strict comparison of available 4th generation fighters, authoritative assessments hold that China’s J-10 fighter is technically comparable to India’s Mirage-2000, and that the Indian Su-30MKI is superior to all theater Chinese fighters, including the additional J-11 and Su-27 models.27 China hosts a total of around 101 4th-generation fighters in the theater, of which a proportion must be retained for Russian defense, while India has around 122 of its comparable models, solely directed at China.

The high altitude of Chinese air bases in Tibet and Xinjiang, plus the generally difficult geographic and weather conditions of the region, means that Chinese fighters are limited to carrying around half their design payload and fuel. In-flight refueling would be required for PLAAF forces to maximize their strike capacity.28 China had only inducted 15 such tanker aircraft nationally as of 2017, meaning only a handful of its forces will benefit from this solution.29 Against these underpowered fighters, IAF forces will launch from bases and airfields unaffected by these geographic conditions, with maximum payload and fuel capabilities.30

The most significant PLAAF forward air bases and airfields near Indian border areas—which will be pivotal in combat operations—are located at Hotan, Lhasa/Gonggar, Ngari-Gunsa, and Xigaze. Each hosts regular PLAAF detachments, and these are the nearest facilities to Indian targets in Kashmir, northern India, and northeast India.31 They are vulnerable to a dedicated Indian offensive. Ngari-Gunsa and Xigaze reportedly have no hardened shelters or blast pens for their aircraft, which sit in the open.32 Lhasa/Gonggar has recently developed hardened shelters able to protect up to 36 aircraft, while Hotan reportedly hosts “two aircraft shelters” of unknown capacity.33 An Indian early initiative to destroy or incapacitate these four bases—and achieve air superiority over them—would compel China to rely more upon aircraft from its rear-area bases, exacerbating its limited fuel and payload problems. Moreover, China lacks the redundancy and related force survivability compared to India in their comparative numbers of regional air bases. In sum, India has a stronger regional air position, with “a large number of airfields in the east and west, so even if some airfields are down, operations can continue from other locations.”34

PLAAF training and experience shortcomings that are not shared by the IAF amplify China’s air disadvantage.35 Recent PLAAF exercises with unscripted scenarios have found that pilots are excessively reliant upon ground control for tactical direction. In unanticipated combat scenarios, this dependence on explicit control tower guidance becomes extreme, while “ground commands” are simultaneously often unable “to keep up with the complex and changeable air situation.”36 This suggests that PLAAF combat proficiency may be significantly weaker than often estimated.

A comprehensive study found that scenarios with combat conditions where “some of the key first-line airfields were destroyed” would be especially concerning for Chinese strategists.37 Progressive base hardening in the eastern US-facing PLAAF facilities has reduced this risk in that area.38 A lack of similar measures in the India-facing west suggests that Indian destruction or temporary incapacitation of some of the four above air bases would further exacerbate these PLAAF operational inflexibilities and weaknesses. By contrast, recent conflicts with Pakistan give the current IAF a level of institutional experience in actual networked combat.

Recognizing this dilemma, instead of a regional aircraft offensive, Chinese strategic planners envision early long-range missile strikes against Indian air bases in the event of conflict. However, India benefits from the greater number and redundancy of regional air bases, and the daunting number of Chinese missiles that would be required to truly incapacitate relevant IAF forces. A former IAF official, referring to the high number of disparate targets per air base, the requirement for at least two missiles per target, and the ability of base officials to repave the blast crater with quick-drying concrete within six hours, has articulated the operational problem:

“To keep one airfield shut for 24 hours, the PLAAF will require 220 ballistic missiles. This will not make any difference to IAF operations in the east or in the west since the IAF has a large number of other operational airfields to operate from. If the PLAAF attacks just three airfields, it will require 660 ballistic missiles per day for attacking the runway and taxi track alone. China’s stock of 1,000-1,200 MRBMs/SRBMs will be over in less than two days when attacking just three airfields, with no other major target systems like C2 centres or air defence units being addressed.”39
This analysis was authored before India began its process of integrating runway replacement fiberglass mats into its base defense systems, meaning it was likely calculated upon a previous “labour-intensive,” civilian-heavy method of runway repaving, as described by a former Indian Air Marshal.40 However, India is presently inducting these fiberglass mats and associated paving equipment, which will further reduce its runway reconstitution timeframe.41 It is therefore unlikely that the numerous PLAAF disadvantages detailed above can be overcome by China’s superior missile forces. This is critical beyond the air competition itself: “In any India-China conflict, the PLA cannot launch an attack without the support of the PLAAF.”42

To address its force shortfalls in the event of war, China could surge air and ground forces from its interior toward the border. However, what our analysis suggests is that the IAF’s superiority would mean that critical logistical routes—such as air bases and military road and rail links—could be cut by bombing or standoff missile strikes, limiting the extent to which China’s position could be reinforced.43 Such a Chinese surge would also attract attention from the United States, which would alert India and enable it to counter-mobilize its own additional forces from its interior.

Ammunition shortfalls have been a limiting factor for Indian conventional force operations in the past, especially for the Indian Army. India’s official audit agency assessed in 2016 that India lacked sufficient reserves in around 85 out of 170 critical ammunition categories for a scenario of an intense 10-day war.44 Since then, New Delhi has bolstered its stockpiles, and continues to reduce this operational constraint.45

China could permanently station forces similar to or larger than India’s nearer to the border. An Indian counter-buildup would surely follow.
In total, India is in a stronger conventional position vis-à-vis China than much of the analysis on this topic concludes.




Strategic Postures




India is having asymmetrical advantage over China due to terrain and training. Though they have more firepower than us still it would not be easy for them to defeat us opposite to what their fanboys claim their generals know that they will lose more soldiers due to geographic disadvantage. would love to see the same study in IOR.
 

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VICTORIOUM AUT MORS
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The LAC, for the most part, is not at all conducive for large scale mechanized warfare, so the numerical advantage they enjoy over us in terms of tanks and AFVs now won't count for all that much really. The biggest problem for us, in my opinion, is the lack of a sizable missile force, like the PLA's Second Artillery Corps for example. We need to build up our numbers in terms of medium-range tactical missiles on a fast track basis.
I was Comparing India and China on the size of there Armed Forces. In didn’t include Geographic, Terrain or Training in my Comparison. In one on One Comparison they outnumber us in almost every category. Yes Artillery and Missiles are a Huge Weakness but it also our strong suite as well. Out of all the Projects created by our Defense Agencies most successful ones have always have been the Artillery or Missile Projects like Dhanush, ATAGS, Akash and the Agni Series ICBMs etc. if we tried we can easily fix the artillery Disparity in our Northern and Eastern Areas Facing China.
 

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VICTORIOUM AUT MORS
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Kashmir’s Global Jihadists

BY KASHMIR LIFE ON NOVEMBER 30, 2015
COVER STORY, SECURITY

Kokernag’s Ashraf Dar, the key Al-Qaeda operative whom an American drone killed in Waziristan, was not Kashmir’s first global warrior. The trend took off at the peak of Communist invasion on Kabul sending a major flock to fight and die in Jalalabad and Khost. Bilal Handoo discovers the characters who fought in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kabul and now, probably in Syria

Srinagar’s Basant Bagh was bustling when a ninth-standard student left home in one fine summer day of 1986 for Jihad in deadly terrains of Afghanistan. Elections were still a year away from rigging and guns were still two years away from rattling. But the boy deeply influenced by Iqbal’s poetry followed his own roadmap to the ‘holy war’.

Ashiq Hassan Khan chose the day when Kashmiris from both parts had thronged to Peer Mitha Shrine nestled on Line of Control in Leepa Valley to celebrate the 8-day annual Urs. Before leaving home, he had done his homework well. He knew during the Ursweek, the borders become porous and security softens.

After trekking miles when he finally reached the shrine, he lost his ‘Kabul compass’. For three days, devotees would see him sitting distraught in the shrine lawn. Amid his moment of anguish, he would watch Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs turning up in hordes to offer a pinch of sugar at Peer Mitha shrine as customary token of their faith.

It was then a son of Ali Mohammad Jinnah’s erstwhile driver saw him. Learning that the boy has lost his way, he took him home. That man was Mukhtyar Ahmad, whose father Khawaja Abdul Ganaie from Srinagar’s Zaina Kadal had fled to Pakistan in 1947, settled in Muzaffarabad’s Garhi Dupatta and eventually rose to become Jinnah’s driver.

The family treated Ashiq well, enrolled him in a local school and dreamed to marry him off one day with their granddaughter. But the Jihad in Pakistan’s ‘strategic depth’ was making boy restless. It seemed as if Kabul was calling everybody in.

Back home, Ashiq’s family was clueless about his whereabouts. He had left in a huff without giving anyone a whiff about his intentions. The same fact was driving his family mad. A year passed in this agony before a postman knocked at their door and handed over a letter to them with a ‘different’ stamp.

“Assalamualaikum…” the letter read, “I pray to Allah for your akhirah… Keep worship Allah… Inshallah, I will meet you hereafter…”

Khans’ were stunned to read these lines from their barely 15-year-old son. Then his father, Ghulam Hassan Khan, a driver, realised that his elder son had abandoned home for fighting the USSR, where he unknowingly rubbed shoulders with Kathwari’s son.


Ashraf Dar

The destiny of Kashmiri-born American furniture tycoon, Farooq Kathwari took a radical shift when his 19-year-old son decided to walk into Afghanistan’s war-turf to participate in American-sponsored Afghan-Soviet war.

But before joining the war, Irfan Kathwari was ‘normal’. His father from a privileged Kashmiri family was living an ‘American dream’. He had made it big in US after attending New York University, working on Wall Street and making a fortune as an America’s successful furniture group, Ethan Allen Interiors Inc. He rose to become one of the most successful Muslim businessmen in America and one of its best 50 CEO’s.

His son, however, belonged to a different cult. Irfan’s pals saw him swiftly transforming from a long haired, funky boy who loved to drive his papa’s BMW to a traditional Muslim in Afghanistan, reaffirming his “love for Allah”. He took leave from Harvard Medical School to join the Mujahideen in Kabul. The question everybody sought answers for, was: What motivated the son of one of America’s wealthiest business tycoons to become a Muhajid?

Perhaps his uncle, Rafiq Khatwari – a scribe, poet and lensman, was the only person who could clear the smokescreen.

Rafiq is on records to claim that his family had a longstanding tradition of activism in Kashmir. After returning to Srinagar from Muzaffarabad in 1960, where they had stuck in 1947, Rafiq says, he and Irfan’s father were jailed for several months for student activism. “That was the family tradition that influenced my nephew Irfan.”

By nineties, Rafiq saw Irfan spending most of his time at a mosque in America. Then, Iraq had invaded Kuwait, and soon Uncle Sam dropped smart bombs over Baghdad. During that period, Irfan enrolled himself at King Faisal University in Islamabad. A few weeks later, Rafiq remembers, Irfan wrote that he and his new classmates had crossed the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in a Toyota pick up several times without being stopped.

Later, a photo portrays Irfan wearing long shirt, kameez, loose pants, shalwar. Stroking his curly beard, the photo shows him without any weapon. “Love of Allah,” he wrote in a letter to his parents, “is the only love I have ever known.” Rafiq recalls that Irfan’s mother was pruning roses under a gunmetal sky in their backyard in America, the day the call came.

“My nephew is buried in a mass grave in the desolation of Afghanistan,” Rafiq writes in a piece My Nephew the Jihad Fighter. “My brother and sister-in-law, who believe that their son was killed in a freak accident fighting the Soviets, are, of course, entitled to find solace in any idea that helps them come to terms with their sorrow.”


Abdullah Bangroo with his group during Afghan -Soviet war.

Like Kathwari, Khan didn’t know the fate of his son in the beginning even after receiving a few letters from him. But as his neighbourhood – Maisuma – became a hotbed of rebellion by the dawn of momentous 1989, Khan met a man from Srinagar’s Hyderpora, who eventually became his messenger.

That Jama’at-e-Islami ideologue running a local seminary in Hyderpora was the default foot-soldier of pro-Pakistan local group in mid-eighties. He would raise slogans and hoist Pakistan flags to express his protest against Indian establishment in Kashmir. Then events like Maqbool Bhat’s hanging, torching incident of Kashmiri driver by soldiers over fare demand, molestation attempt of a Yousmarg farm girl by a patrolling party and series of burning incidents believed to be the brainchild of Hindu right-wingers made the man restive.

It was then he met the two men who became one of the pioneers of gun struggle in Kashmir – Abdullah Bangroo and Maqbool Ilahi. The man they met was a steel fabric shop owner of Hyderpora, Abdul Ghaffar Bhat, who later became prominent with his nom de guerre, Hanief Hyderi.

The three of them (Bhat, Ilahi and Bangroo) floated a group that sent a word to many clerics, leaders in 1985: “Do something to counter the Jagmohan’s decree!” The newly-inducted Governor Jagmohan Malhotra had then shot a bizarre ban on livestock slaughter on eve of Janmashtmi. Qazi Nissar was the only cleric who responded. He turned up in Islamabad’s square with two lambs, slaughtered them in protest, and thus created ‘Qazi Nissar moment’.

The group later became one of the first groups to crossover to Muzaffarabad in 1988. A year later, they were getting ready to step into “Azad Kashmir” again. But before leaving, Hassan Khan, the Basant Bagh driver, told Hyderi at Maisuma, “You may meet my son there. He is staying with a Kashmiri family there in Garhi Dupatta. He left home in 1986 for Afghan Jihad. Tell him, his parents are proud of him…”


Hanief Hydari

But in other Kashmir, the things weren’t the same again. With the fall of Zia regime, Benazir Bhutto, the former classmate of Rajiv Gandhi, had shut down all training camps. Then, Hyderi saw how the incoming Kashmiris were pushed back. But the five member group, comprising Bangroo, Ilahi, Ghulam A Gojri, Ayub Bangroo and Hyderi chose Afghanistan over Kashmir.

They were sent to Jalalabad, where they were greeted by famous warlord and Hezb-e-Islami chief, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and the Sher-e-Panjshir, Ahmad Shah Massoud. Hekmatyar, an engineer and a craze for Kashmiri militants, was delighted to see the first armed group from Kashmir stepping into Afghanistan. “I am happy that Kashmiris have finally picked up guns,” Hyderi heard Hekmatyar. “Let this war end, we are coming to Kashmir to fight for your rights…”

In Afghanistan, the group was taught the war strategies of legendary military commander, Saladin Ayubi – the one who conquered the Jerusalem, before sent to fight soviet army at Khost front. Hyderi shortly saw bodies flying up, raining smithereens over battlefield when stuck by soviet missiles. He saw the ground littered with human bodies and body parts. The group would gather those bits and pieces and hand over to the locals for burial.

Hyderi trained in anti-aircraft guns and rocket-propelled grenades was shortly sent in Eastern Afghanistan before an escort force for Arab militants at Jalalabad camp. Later he learned that an estimated five hundred Kashmiri militants were fighting with Mujahideen when the strategic Jalalabad was snatched from Najibullah’s control. Even J&K police has identified around 20 youth who died while fighting erstwhile Red Army before they left Afghanistan in 1989.


Bangroo during afghan war.

After six months in Afghanistan, when Hyderi returned to Muzaffarabad, another war was about to break out, thus calling thousands of Muslims across the globe, the Jihad in Bosnia.

For some Kashmiris who were in the middle of turmoil themselves, the very thought of Bosnia was unsettling. The war was part of the breakup of Yugoslavia following the Slovenian and Croatian secessions from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991.The political representatives of the Bosnian Serbs supported by the Serbian government of Slobodan Milošević and the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) rejected the referendum. To wrestle territorial control, they mobilized their forces inside the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

By 1992, war spread, accompanied by the ethnic cleansing of the Bosnian Muslim and Croat population. Events like the Siege of Sarajevo and the Srebrenica Massacre later became iconic of the conflict, forcing NATO to intervene in 1995. The war didn’t end before consuming around 100,000 lives, outraging the modesty of 50,000 women (mainly Bosniak Muslims) and displacing over 2.2 million people. The grim war numbers made it the most devastating conflict in Europe since World War II.

Like myriad men then, the Bosnian war also distressed the Kashmiri poet in English language, Agha Shahid Ali. He sent his mentor James Merrill a draft of a political poem rhyming stanzas about the war, asking him to be “brutally frank” in his critique. Feeling that Ali had used too many off rhymes, Merrill told him, “While there isn’t much you can do about Bosnia, you can improve this poem.”

But what the poet couldn’t do, the pilot did.

The ‘legendary’ Kashmiri pilot Nadeem Khatib left Srinagar for Sarajevo and fought the war that had pushed Muslims to the margins.


Nadeem Khatib

Son of an erstwhile chief engineer of Srinagar’s Rawalpora, Nadeem educated in city’s best Christian school, Tyndal Biscoe and later graduated in geology, geography and economics. He shortly realised his childhood dream by becoming a pilot. But more than flying machines, his mind, as per his close friends, was getting drifted in Muslim world conflicts.

The best friend of JKLF’s first boss, Ashfaq Majeed Wani, Nadeem remained on the edges when militancy broke out. The transformation took place after his affluent family sent him outside the state to learn ‘flying’. But Nadeem left the commercial pilot’s training midway, returned home, and eventually left for the South East School of Aeronautics, Georgia to train as professional pilot.

That was the time when Bosnia had become a slaughter house for Muslims. “Such thoughts were badly disturbing him,” says Nadeem’s close friend. “He then went to Bosnia to participate in the war.” The prominent pro-freedom activist Shakeel Bakshi endorses the views of Nadeem’s friend. “Yes,” he says, “Nadeem did participate in Bosnian war. He was in Sarajevo and other places, fighting Serb oppression on Bosnian Muslims.” As per Bakshi, several Kashmiris did participate in the war, “but they are tight-lipped for the fear of reprisals”.

Back home, none had an idea, that Nadeem, a prominent member of the Srinagar Golf Club, has become a global jihadist. In 1995, as the Bosnian war was officially declared over, he returned home with his pilot’s licence. He shortly left for US again to complete a jet pilot’s course from an institute in Atlanta. He continued work there as a commercial pilot besides instructor before a caller from London informed his family, “He is dead!”

Later, it came to light that Nadeem had left US to join al-Badr training camp in Pakistan. He had crossed over to Kashmir where he was killed at Buthal village in Udhampur’s Gool area in a gunfight with BSF on February 21, 1999. He was 32.

After his death, his letter reached to his parents, who didn’t know Nadeem had joined militancy, “I am going at the call of Allah and doing what Allah has made our farz (duty). I am aware this might hurt, but duty to Allah comes first…” Ten days after his death, his body was exhumed by his family, brought to Srinagar, buried in Martyrs Graveyard at Eidgah.

“In US, his thoughts were inflamed after reading Syed Qutub Shaheed,” says Nadeem’s friend. “He would say that his vision has been finally cleared.”


Militants in early 90s.

After returning Muzaffarabad fromAfghanistan, Hyderi was informed of establishment’s planning to create Hizbul Mujahideen. Then, militancy was dominated by JKLF, a nominally secular outfit. With Benazir ruling, the plan was to facilitate the rise of Hizb, affiliated to Jamaat-e-Islami. It would decisively shift the insurgency to an Islamist, pro-Pakistan ideology. Hyderi was too inept to understand the changing equations on the ground.

But before he could step back to Kashmir, Sheikh Abdul Rehman, Amir Zila Jama’at-e-Islami Muzaffarabad told Hyderi one day, “A boy from Kashmir is here to meet you. Do talk to him in Kashmiri, he will feel at home.”

Hyderi met the boy, who turned out to be none other than the driver Hassan Khan’s son, Ashiq. The boy smilingly told him, “I just overheard your presence in the area. And that’s why I have come to meet you.” Hyderi hugged the boy and told him that his father is his good friend. “Everybody misses you back home. But tell me, how did you reach here?”

The boy narrated his whole journey – how he treaded treacherous terrains, reached the Peer Mitha Shrine, met the Kashmiri family besides his perpetual cravings for Kabul. “So, why don’t you come over and meet my new family here,” Ashiq insisted. “No, boy! Not this time. I am in a rush. Will meet you soon, Inshallah!”

In that summer of 1989, Hyderi was back in Kashmir with a group of 10 other fighters. By November that year, as ISI failed to mould JKLF into pro-Pakistan ideology, it recruited JKLF cadre to set up a new organisation, al-Badr. Abdullah Bangroo, Maqbool Illahi, Hyderi and others were part of it. The outfit was later renamed as Hizbul Mujahideen. Soon the Pattan school master, Ahsan Dar was appointed its chief, while Abdullah Bangroo alias Khalid-ul-Islam became his military advisor.

In a short span of time, Hizb’s armed cadres swelled in thousands. The outfit’s first major strike is believed to be a key political assassination. By 1991, major groups, including Tehreek-e-Jihad Islami led by Abdul Majid Dar, the Hizb negotiator with New Delhi, merged with HM. And then on November 11, 1991, Mohammad Yusuf Shah aka Syed Salahuddin took over Hizb operation, replacing Ahsan Dar. The move marked the takeover of Hizb by Jama’at-e-Islami, a relationship that the two couldn’t sustain for long.

Hyderi who remained underground and silent witness to the shift in Hizb’s rank and file decided to quit the outfit by 1993 and crossed LoC to understand the madness behind the method of divided house. But he ended up floating a new organisation, Jammu and Kashmir Refugees Welfare Association, in “Azad Kashmir” to advocate for the former militants. During his advocacy campaign, the world including a Kashmiri studying medicine in Russia was witnessing Russian aggression on Muslim-dominated Chechnya.

Chechen rebels

Zubair from South Kashmir landed in Russia when Russian President Vladimir Putin established direct rule of Chechnya in May 2000. For the politically conscious youth well-versed with world conflicts, Putin’s move appeared mere dictatorial move.

As Putin appointed Akhmad Kadyrov interim head of the pro-Moscow government in Grozny (Chechnya’s capital) and granted the Chechen Republic a significant degree of autonomy, the Chechen separatists rebelled. Shortly Kadyrov was assassinated in a bomb blast thus making his pro-Moscow son Ramzan Kadyrov Chechnya’s de facto ruler.

Not far away, in Russian city of Saint Petersberg, Zubair was taking keen interest in Guerrilla phase in Chechnya than medicine.

The centuries old Chechen-Russia conflict had escalated in 1990s after the Soviet Union disintegrated. The Chechen separatists declared independence in 1991. Three years later, the First Chechen War broke out. In 1999, the fighting restarted and concluded the next year with Russian security forces establishing control over Grozny.

By 2003, the sober son of South Kashmir’s landlord family was in the southern Chechnya, fighting against Russian military convoys along with natives. He returned home after the 2004 Beslan School Siege that saw the rebels capturing over 1,100 people as hostages. “Chechnya was always the holy war for me,” says Zubair, now a prosperous orchardist. “I came back after realising that war against the empire must not be a broken war on ideological lines. That is crisis. A decade ago, I only walked out of that crisis gripping Chechnya.”


Ashraf Dar

Interestingly, Kashmir’s presence inglobal jihad might not be on higher scale, but the footprints are glaring. In 2007, a Bandipora boy, Aijaz A Malla died in Afghanistan while fighting against America’s “war on terror”. Hailing from Bandipora’s Patushahi village, Malla vanished from his home in 2001, joined Pakistan-based Harkat ul-Mujahideen and subsequently became the first Kashmiri to participate in the Taliban-led jihad in Afghanistan. As per police records, Malla was just 11-year-old at the time. “I am again going to fight the infidels in Afghanistan,” Malla told his family days before his death, “and do not know if I will come back alive. Pray for me.”

Like Malla, the 15-year-old Muhammad Ashraf Dar of Nagam village of Islamabad’s Kokernag also left home for the global jihadin 2001. After remaining in touch with his family till 2014 winter, Ashraf alias Umar Kashmiri of al-Qaeda outfit was killed in a US drone attack on January 5, 2015.

And now when the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is becoming a new symbol of “global jihad”, it is said one Srinagar youth has “joined” it. The car-enthusiast who was pursuing masters in Business Management from Australia is the first Kashmiri to “join” IS in Syria in 2013.


Aerial view of “Azad Kashmir”.

Back in “Azad Kashmir”, life for Hyderi was akin to exile. He was getting restless over the turn of events. In his moment of unease, he once went to a tea shop in Garhi Dupatta with his associates. There, he saw a photograph, leaving him shocked.

In that “Shaheed” captioned photograph, he saw a known smiling face. Moments later, as his memory flashed, he blurted out, “Allah u Akbar!” That was Ashiq, the Basant Bagh boy.

To address his ‘aching’ curiosity, he asked the shopkeeper, Mukhtyar, the man who took Ashiq home from the shrine, how the boy died. After learning that the man was Hyderi, the shopkeeper hugged him, cried aloud, before telling him, “Ashiq was martyred on his third Jihad trip to Afghanistan.” Like Farooq Kathwari’s son, Ashiq too was buried in some mass grave in Kabul.

Later a letter sent by Mukhtyar broke the news to Ashiq’s family in Srinagar, “your son has attained martyrdom while fighting the holy war in Afghanistan…”

Today, as his toothless, humped and greyed father stands near his 2014 flood-ravaged house in Basant Bagh, he expresses strange longing and pride for his son. A few miles away, Hyderi who returned to Kashmir in 2006 has confined himself within four walls. He is now in the middle of what he calls a “different Jihad“. He is writing a book on his eventful past, and the “wrongs in between”.
 
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