aditya g
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Superb post..... spot on.
.............It's evident what's the purpose of this "revelation".
1. An attempt to "disperse" the perceived political malai lest PM and GoI get all the credit in public eyes- as it's happening many places. The Hindu knows it so do their political and overseas overlords.
2. An attempt to do an equal-equal. This also happened in the past, nevermind that they were local events when the forces that went in were completely on their own.
3. If this document is real and not recreation of the events by The Hindu, it's frightening that they had unprecedented access to confidential GoI documents during UPA regime. One can only wonder how many more such documents they've laid their hands during that time and how many have they cached, to be revealed when the time comes.
Someone should ask those attempting to do an equal-equal, what was the political cover for the troops that went in for these strikes? Did the then GoI simply wash its hands off the affair and bhagwaan na kare, if these missions had gone wrong, were they prepared to deal with the ramifications? I think we'll find that the answer is probably not.
This is what made the present surgical strikes so different. @Immanuel (hats off mate for you early and very accurate portrayals of these ops without giving away the operational details) pointed this out and this was subsequently clarified by senior officers and personnel.
1. IA and PARA SF in particular have a long and decorated history of covert ops across the LoC (and I assume probably IB as well). But while, MOST of the previous ops were isolated suppressed localised badla strikes (Op Ginger is a classical example) that targeted isolated and remote TSPA outposts. The 29/09 strikes were on a completely different scale and yet stayed under the radar. These operations that targeted a wide swathe of terror camps along a 250km frontier. The objectives went far beyond avenging Uri. The objectives were to not only to avenge Uri but also deal a crippling blow to the piglet delivery services (or PDS if you will) along the LoC. Those halaaled included handlers, ideologues, tanzeemis and coordinators. Way above the esclataory ladder than was concentrated upon by the previous strikes. The piglets were of the view that they were safe till they reached the LoC, afterwards they were to be fidaayeen anyway. They may not have been afraid of dying, but their handlers and immediate supervisors definitely were. It is these senior piglets that have been targeted by these Ops. They'll be forced to adapt, evolve and look over their shoulders.
2. Our men, who included SFs, Ghataks and possibly Garuds (that itself is a marvel of coordinated action, to bring together different commands in a synchronised fashion such that their actions had a devastating cumulative effect), were backed up by satellites, by helicopter gunships ready to move in if called upon and by massed artillery.
3. IAF sorties, not only along LoC, but along IB as well and IN navy commencing their exercises also kept up the pressure on Bakis. They activated their air assets anticipating a vicious punch. The punch landed with ferocity of a typhoon, but not from where they were expecting- they were bracing for a punch in the face, but a devastating blow landed on their gonads. This explains the amount of taqleef and the likes of Just lying, pissing all over the forum.
4. These tell us that the political leadership was well prepared to escalate had the things not turned out as perfectly as they did- once again hats off to our troops for the textbook precision with which they executed the Ops and the piglets. I am sure in the years to come this will be added to the legends of the Paras and to the training models of special ops not just in India but around the world.
This is why Congress and The Hindu's attempt to do an equal-equal are deplorable and malevolent. One can clearly seen that the strikes have left a deep impact on the psyche of not just piglets, but many politicos as well.