India-China 2020 Border conflict

[Knowitall]

Quick LAC update by Nitin. Thread.

Matlab now the situation on ground is fixed for the next few months?

 

[ezsasa]

Lost in translation: U.S. amends 2+2 transcript, days after protest by MEA

MEA had denied that Rajnath Singh had referred to ‘reckless aggression’ from China

www.thehindu.com

MEA had denied that Rajnath Singh had referred to ‘reckless aggression’ from China

Days after a protest by the Indian government, the U.S. State Department agreed to amend its version of Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s comments at the “2+2” Indo-U.S. meeting on October 27. According to the original U.S. version, released by both the State Department and the US Department of Defense, Mr. Singh was quoted as saying that India is challenged by “reckless aggression on our northern borders”, in what appeared to be the first reference by an Indian official, in talks with another country, to what the government has so far maintained was a “bilateral issue” with China at the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

============================================================

Why are babuz so shit scared of AnGeRiNG CHiNa?

it’s time our foreign affairs reporters learn that these are not old days where body language/subtle hints be the primary focus of our discourse. It’s the actions that need to be watched now, not the words. Plenty of money has been spent to show our commitment and plenty of resources are being invested to handle China. One missing line ain’t gonna change that fact.

that’s what they have been doing for decades, because they had run out of ideas. these idiots always find ways to leave a bad taste after a diplomatic event. And these stupid tidbits are used an inputs by the “globalist” foreign policy experts to create doubts on Indian foreign policy in their articles.

Dear DFI boys and girls, let the rest of the world be stupid, atleast let us be smart to recognise narratives detrimental to India.

 

[Swiftfarts]

it’s time our foreign affairs reporters learn that these are not old days where body language/subtle hints be the primary focus of our discourse. It’s the actions that need to be watched now, not the words. Plenty of money has been spent to show our commitment and plenty of resources are being invested to handle China. One missing line ain’t gonna change that fact.

that’s what they have been doing for decades, because they had run out of ideas. these idiots always find ways to leave a bad taste after a diplomatic event. And these stupid tidbits are used an inputs by the “globalist” foreign policy experts to create doubts on Indian foreign policy in their articles.

Dear DFI boys and girls, let the rest of the world be stupid, atleast let us be smart to recognise narratives detrimental to India.

who appoint these journalist ? you will never see Chinese or western journalist doing such nautanki. india Media is the biggest filth out there ever. You wont find such crap in DD news, Rajya sabha reporting. But they to are going that way.

 

[ganesh177]

I stand by my stance, have never made irresponsible statements: Ayaz Sadiq

I stand by my stance, have never made irresponsible statements: Ayaz Sadiq

"I am standing by my stance and you will see in future, I have many secrets. I had been heading the National Security Committee."

www.dawn.com

 

[Deadtrap]

India as de-facto defence ally of US a strategic gamble: Chinese scholars

China has been keeping a close eye on the 2+2 dialogue, for, according to Chinese scholars, there has been a definite ‘China focus’ to the dialogue.



With the signing of the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation (BECA) on 27 October 2020, India and the United States has concluded all four-foundational agreements to bolster military to military cooperation. It took India 18 years to ink these agreements, for the first, General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) was concluded in 2002, followed by the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016, and the Communications, Compatibility and Security Arrangement (COMCASA) in 2018. The agreements pave way for intelligence sharing, greater technological cooperation in military areas, interoperability of armed forces, accessing each other’s military facilities, transfer of specialised equipment for weapon systems such as C-17, C-130 and P-8Is, and finally exchanging geospatial information for precision strike capabilities, among other things. The two sides also signed the Maritime Information Sharing Technical Arrangement (MISTA) for enhancing cooperation between the Indian and the US Navies. The signing of these agreements is of strategic importance in the face of China’s aggression along India’s northern borders.


This is the third India-US 2+2 ministerial dialogue. The first two were held in 2018 (New Delhi) and 2019 (Washington), respectively. It replaced the earlier India-US Strategic and Commercial Dialogue that elevated the erstwhile India-US strategic dialogue in 2015. The new ministerial dialogue involving Foreign and Defence Ministers/Secretaries of both sides is aimed at enhancing strategic coordination and maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. The first dialogue was unilaterally postponed twice in April and July 2018 by the US owing to “unavoidable reasons”. Chinese scholarship on India at that time speculated that the real reason behind the US decision was India’s oil and arms imports from Iran and Russia, respectively. They had also cited Donald Trump’s displeasure with India, and India imposing up to 100% tariffs on imports from the United States in retaliation to the US tariffs. Long Xingchun, a senior researcher at the Chahar Institute had opined that “there was a long-standing deep rooted mistrust between India and the US. On the one hand, the US is wielding the stick of ‘protectionism’ against India, and on the other, by unfolding its ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’, the US wants India to make a choice between China and the US. Given the choice, China was more ‘reliable’.”


China has been keeping a close eye on the proceedings of the 2+2 dialogue, for, like the preceding dialogues, according to Chinese scholars, there has been a definite “China focus” to the dialogue. They have pronounced India as a defence “ally” or a “de facto ally” of the US. Wang Shida of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations holds such views and argues that India’s “non-alignment” has evolved into a policy of “multi-faceted alliance” that envisages cooperation or conflict with different countries on varied issues. Zhao Gancheng, a researcher at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, posits that the “United States has always wanted to draw India into the circle of its non-NATO allies. Now, both have forged increasingly closer defence cooperation, it can be said that the timetable for materialising a military alliance has been accelerated.” Lin Minwang, deputy director of the Centre for South Asian Studies of Fudan University, asserts that “having completed the process of signing these foundational agreements, India has officially become the US’s defence ‘ally’,” implying that “India has firmly tied its defence and security to the ‘chariot’ of the United States”. He also holds that the United States is more “enthusiastic” than a “hesitant” India for such a cooperation: “On the one hand, India can indeed get assistance from the United States for enhancing its capabilities including the missile precision; however, on the other hand, the control of Indian defence systems is likely to slip into US hands, thus losing its strategic autonomy. Nonetheless, if the two sides have announced the conclusion of the agreement, it demonstrates that India has made up its mind.”



Some analysts believe that since Trump is finding it hard to garner support through raking up domestic issues, therefore, he has dispatched his “confidants” to the “Indo-Pacific” so as to enlist the last-minute support for his candidacy. However, Yuan Zheng, deputy director of the American Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences argues that to link the 2+2 dialogue with the US presidential election is a bit far-fetched. They also argue that through defence cooperation with the US, Narendra Modi too is releasing some of the pressures emanating from economic recession and the pandemic in India. In the words of Lin Minwang, the pandemic and border standoff have provided “justification for ‘strategic convergence’ between India and the United States”. Lin calls it India’s “strategic gamble” and a “high-risk” strategic path, showing a high degree of opportunism and pragmatism. He holds that stronger India-US defence partnership will “inevitably bear the price of weakening India-Russia and India-Iran relations”.


It could be discerned that the kind of understanding and equilibrium that was established between India and China after the restoration of diplomatic relations in the late 1970s was on the premise that both were developing countries at an equal stage of economic development, therefore, both must exploit their economic potentials and complementarities and put aside contentious issues like border, Tibet and others. The notion that there was enough space for both to develop simultaneously was the buzzword, which lasted until China became the second largest economy of the world in 2010. However, in the wake of four decades of reforms, while China narrowed its asymmetries with the US, India’s economic and defence asymmetries with China grew wider. This resulted in China believing that it has emerged as the sole challenger to the established hegemon, with the balance of power tilting highly in its favour in Asia, hence, it no longer deems it important to adhere to the understanding of yesteryears with India, least to talk about power sharing and looking at India as another pole in Asia. Although China still harps about multipolarity, if it cannot accept a multipolar Asia, the talk of multi-polarity becomes pointless. The Narendra Modi government shedding the ambivalence of a Congress-led regime and going ahead to conclude all foundational agreements could also be seen in this light.



It is perhaps from this thinking that Chinese scholars such as Zhang Guihong of the Institute of International Studies, Fudan University believe that “India is the best choice for the US to balance China”. The scholar also argues that China on the one hand needs to strengthen its economic engagement with India, while on the other allay India’s security concerns as regards the Kashmir issue, China’s relations with Pakistan and other smaller states in South Asia. Doklam, abolition of Article 370, and especially the Galwan military standoff that is in its sixth month now, demonstrate that China has cared little for India’s sensitivities, so much so China has questioned Ladakh being part of India. In such a situation, China wanting India to address its security concerns as regards Tibet, Taiwan, East Turkistan, South China Sea etc., issues would be unrealistic, albeit there remain risks. Even though many in China look at India gradually becoming a front state of the US for China’s containment, but India believes that there is no room for a third party to get involved in its bilateral issues. Conversely, India’s political and strategic community has increasingly come to believe that it is China which is containing India and undermining her regional and global aspirations through its pivot to Asia.

https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/...nce-ally-us-strategic-gamble-chinese-scholars

 

[fire starter]

India as de-facto defence ally of US a strategic gamble: Chinese scholars

China has been keeping a close eye on the 2+2 dialogue, for, according to Chinese scholars, there has been a definite ‘China focus’ to the dialogue.



With the signing of the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation (BECA) on 27 October 2020, India and the United States has concluded all four-foundational agreements to bolster military to military cooperation. It took India 18 years to ink these agreements, for the first, General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) was concluded in 2002, followed by the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016, and the Communications, Compatibility and Security Arrangement (COMCASA) in 2018. The agreements pave way for intelligence sharing, greater technological cooperation in military areas, interoperability of armed forces, accessing each other’s military facilities, transfer of specialised equipment for weapon systems such as C-17, C-130 and P-8Is, and finally exchanging geospatial information for precision strike capabilities, among other things. The two sides also signed the Maritime Information Sharing Technical Arrangement (MISTA) for enhancing cooperation between the Indian and the US Navies. The signing of these agreements is of strategic importance in the face of China’s aggression along India’s northern borders.


This is the third India-US 2+2 ministerial dialogue. The first two were held in 2018 (New Delhi) and 2019 (Washington), respectively. It replaced the earlier India-US Strategic and Commercial Dialogue that elevated the erstwhile India-US strategic dialogue in 2015. The new ministerial dialogue involving Foreign and Defence Ministers/Secretaries of both sides is aimed at enhancing strategic coordination and maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. The first dialogue was unilaterally postponed twice in April and July 2018 by the US owing to “unavoidable reasons”. Chinese scholarship on India at that time speculated that the real reason behind the US decision was India’s oil and arms imports from Iran and Russia, respectively. They had also cited Donald Trump’s displeasure with India, and India imposing up to 100% tariffs on imports from the United States in retaliation to the US tariffs. Long Xingchun, a senior researcher at the Chahar Institute had opined that “there was a long-standing deep rooted mistrust between India and the US. On the one hand, the US is wielding the stick of ‘protectionism’ against India, and on the other, by unfolding its ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’, the US wants India to make a choice between China and the US. Given the choice, China was more ‘reliable’.”


China has been keeping a close eye on the proceedings of the 2+2 dialogue, for, like the preceding dialogues, according to Chinese scholars, there has been a definite “China focus” to the dialogue. They have pronounced India as a defence “ally” or a “de facto ally” of the US. Wang Shida of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations holds such views and argues that India’s “non-alignment” has evolved into a policy of “multi-faceted alliance” that envisages cooperation or conflict with different countries on varied issues. Zhao Gancheng, a researcher at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, posits that the “United States has always wanted to draw India into the circle of its non-NATO allies. Now, both have forged increasingly closer defence cooperation, it can be said that the timetable for materialising a military alliance has been accelerated.” Lin Minwang, deputy director of the Centre for South Asian Studies of Fudan University, asserts that “having completed the process of signing these foundational agreements, India has officially become the US’s defence ‘ally’,” implying that “India has firmly tied its defence and security to the ‘chariot’ of the United States”. He also holds that the United States is more “enthusiastic” than a “hesitant” India for such a cooperation: “On the one hand, India can indeed get assistance from the United States for enhancing its capabilities including the missile precision; however, on the other hand, the control of Indian defence systems is likely to slip into US hands, thus losing its strategic autonomy. Nonetheless, if the two sides have announced the conclusion of the agreement, it demonstrates that India has made up its mind.”



Some analysts believe that since Trump is finding it hard to garner support through raking up domestic issues, therefore, he has dispatched his “confidants” to the “Indo-Pacific” so as to enlist the last-minute support for his candidacy. However, Yuan Zheng, deputy director of the American Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences argues that to link the 2+2 dialogue with the US presidential election is a bit far-fetched. They also argue that through defence cooperation with the US, Narendra Modi too is releasing some of the pressures emanating from economic recession and the pandemic in India. In the words of Lin Minwang, the pandemic and border standoff have provided “justification for ‘strategic convergence’ between India and the United States”. Lin calls it India’s “strategic gamble” and a “high-risk” strategic path, showing a high degree of opportunism and pragmatism. He holds that stronger India-US defence partnership will “inevitably bear the price of weakening India-Russia and India-Iran relations”.


It could be discerned that the kind of understanding and equilibrium that was established between India and China after the restoration of diplomatic relations in the late 1970s was on the premise that both were developing countries at an equal stage of economic development, therefore, both must exploit their economic potentials and complementarities and put aside contentious issues like border, Tibet and others. The notion that there was enough space for both to develop simultaneously was the buzzword, which lasted until China became the second largest economy of the world in 2010. However, in the wake of four decades of reforms, while China narrowed its asymmetries with the US, India’s economic and defence asymmetries with China grew wider. This resulted in China believing that it has emerged as the sole challenger to the established hegemon, with the balance of power tilting highly in its favour in Asia, hence, it no longer deems it important to adhere to the understanding of yesteryears with India, least to talk about power sharing and looking at India as another pole in Asia. Although China still harps about multipolarity, if it cannot accept a multipolar Asia, the talk of multi-polarity becomes pointless. The Narendra Modi government shedding the ambivalence of a Congress-led regime and going ahead to conclude all foundational agreements could also be seen in this light.



It is perhaps from this thinking that Chinese scholars such as Zhang Guihong of the Institute of International Studies, Fudan University believe that “India is the best choice for the US to balance China”. The scholar also argues that China on the one hand needs to strengthen its economic engagement with India, while on the other allay India’s security concerns as regards the Kashmir issue, China’s relations with Pakistan and other smaller states in South Asia. Doklam, abolition of Article 370, and especially the Galwan military standoff that is in its sixth month now, demonstrate that China has cared little for India’s sensitivities, so much so China has questioned Ladakh being part of India. In such a situation, China wanting India to address its security concerns as regards Tibet, Taiwan, East Turkistan, South China Sea etc., issues would be unrealistic, albeit there remain risks. Even though many in China look at India gradually becoming a front state of the US for China’s containment, but India believes that there is no room for a third party to get involved in its bilateral issues. Conversely, India’s political and strategic community has increasingly come to believe that it is China which is containing India and undermining her regional and global aspirations through its pivot to Asia.

https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/...nce-ally-us-strategic-gamble-chinese-scholars

 

[Cheran]

I stand by my stance, have never made irresponsible statements: Ayaz Sadiq

I stand by my stance, have never made irresponsible statements: Ayaz Sadiq

"I am standing by my stance and you will see in future, I have many secrets. I had been heading the National Security Committee."

www.dawn.com

This is/will cause(d)ing a lot of butt hurt among moogalistas, imranistas (dimran goo girls) , jhollaholes & associated darbaris

Matlab now the situation on ground is fixed for the next few months?

Looks like it but we still have the period "Nov 4 to Nov 11" ref. US elections.

 

[Lancer]

Well, this would definitely be a good time to settle things once and for all


[Pakistan has officially annexed Gilgit Baltistan]

 

[Sentimental Patriot]

Well, this would definitely be a good time to settle things once and for all


[Pakistan has officially annexed Gilgit Baltistan]

Here is a Pakistani news media story on it, apparently they have given GB "interim provincial status"

PM Imran Khan announces granting Gilgit-Baltistan provisional provincial status

ISLAMABAD: Prime Minister Imran Khan announced granting the provisional-provincial status to Gilgit-Baltistan on Sunday as he arrived in the area to attend its 73rd Independence Day celebrations.

www.geo.tv

 

[Haldilal]

Here is a Pakistani news media story on it, apparently they have given GB "interim provincial status"

PM Imran Khan announces granting Gilgit-Baltistan provisional provincial status

ISLAMABAD: Prime Minister Imran Khan announced granting the provisional-provincial status to Gilgit-Baltistan on Sunday as he arrived in the area to attend its 73rd Independence Day celebrations.

www.geo.tv

Ya'll Nibbiars Himmat nahi hai paki mullahs mein Chine ki bhi path rahi hai re Nibbas

 

[Sentimental Patriot]

Ya'll Nibbiars Himmat nahi hai paki mullahs mein Chine ki bhi path rahi hai re Nibbas

They probably finally realised that their worldwide PR campaign failed and so just did what they were always planning to do.

 

[Knowitall]

Well, this would definitely be a good time to settle things once and for all


[Pakistan has officially annexed Gilgit Baltistan]

If this is true India must immediately start mobilizing and prepare to end this once and for all.

With snow on the other side chinese actions will be limited we can concentrate on this.

We simply cannot allow this.

 

[Villager]

Here is a Pakistani news media story on it, apparently they have given GB "interim provincial status"

PM Imran Khan announces granting Gilgit-Baltistan provisional provincial status

ISLAMABAD: Prime Minister Imran Khan announced granting the provisional-provincial status to Gilgit-Baltistan on Sunday as he arrived in the area to attend its 73rd Independence Day celebrations.

www.geo.tv

I think we should de-recognise Pakistan as a sovereign nation and re-recognise Pakistan as a brokeaway provinces of Indian territory. He is looking good in the traditional woolen hat.

 

[Villager]

If this is true India must immediately start mobilizing and prepare to end this once and for all.

If we are capable, we should but I am not sure if we will do anything. Anything we do will be taken notice of by the Americans and they will advise us to act according to their interest and we will probably do as they ask. Whether we take armed action or not is another matter but we must takeaway Pakistan's legal sovereign status and along with it also change Tibet and Xinjiang status.

 

[Shashank Nayak]

This is/will cause(d)ing a lot of butt hurt among moogalistas, imranistas (dimran goo girls) , jhollaholes & associated darbaris


Looks like it but we still have the period "Nov 4 to Nov 11" ref. US elections.

And the best result of this was that China revealed its cards too early.. China concluded that it cant count on fattu Pakis to contain India.. and had to take off its mask of a disinterested party, and engage India directly.. Mard e momin khujli in doing Pulwama on India, will make their Master China's life miserable in the medium to long term... Or was it someone's plan to make China reveal its cards too early..

 

[shade]

If this is true India must immediately start mobilizing and prepare to end this once and for all.

With snow on the other side chinese actions will be limited we can concentrate on this.

We simply cannot allow this.

I feel bad saying this everytime but kuch na hoga.

I think we should de-recognise Pakistan as a sovereign nation and re-recognise Pakistan as a brokeaway provinces of Indian territory. He is looking good in the traditional woolen hat.

This so much lol.
As it is muh diplomacy and muh talks are useless with these snakes.
fucking Paki Emb. here is a den of ISI spies.

 

[Haldilal]

I think we should de-recognise Pakistan as a sovereign nation and re-recognise Pakistan as a brokeaway provinces of Indian territory. He is looking good in the traditional woolen hat.

Ya Rebels Scums.

 

[AZTEC]

Ya Rebels Scums.
View attachment 64984

You forgot to add "Ya'll Nibbiars".

 

[utubekhiladi]

Deescalation Hogaya kya?

 

[Haldilal]

You forgot to add "Ya'll Nibbiars".