HAL Prachand - Light Combat Helicopter (LCH)

[Superdefender]

HAL LCH vs. Agusta Westland T129.
Winner - LCH

 

[Navnit Kundu]

So what, can those fly high like LCH?

Yes.

LCH has maximum service ceiling of 6500m, similarly Chinese Z10 also has a service ceiling of 6400m. Compared to these helicopters, the French https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurocopter_Tiger has a maximum ceiling of just 4000m and US Viper has a ceiling of 6000m and Cobra has just 3700m.

There is no doubt that HAL LCH is best in class, at the best price, and indigenous so it's sanction-proof.

 

[Superdefender]

http://en.avia.pro/blog/vertolyot-hal-lch-tehnicheskie-harakteristiki-foto

 

[Superdefender]

http://www.listnbest.com/11-worlds-advanced-military-attack-helicopters/

 

[kstriya]

http://www.listnbest.com/11-worlds-advanced-military-attack-helicopters/

Great to see an Indian bird being recognized as one of the best in the world.

 

[Superdefender]

The Indian Light Utility Helicopter Procurement: where does the HAL LUH stand?
As of this writing, the Indian Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) program is progressing towards completion. Four helicopters from four different nations and commercial conglomerations are in the bidding for this lucrative contract. In addition to the Bell 407, the Eurocopter Fennec and the Kamov Ka-226T, HAL’s own design, known by the generic title LUH, is in the fight to win the contract. The winner of the contract will provide the next generation helicopter to replace the ageing fleet of IAF Cheetah and Chetak helicopters in the coming years. And while most of the competitors bidding for this contract are basing their hopes on preexisting designs from their industries, the HAL proposal is new and untested. It has the advantage of following the highly successful Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) program. And the HAL design teams have certainly benefitted significantly from the experience, which they will now bring to bear on the LUH effort. But where does the LUH stand amongst its competitors? For that matter, where do the competitors stand amongst themselves?
The procurement of any military aircraft or helicopter type is a complicated process. And this analysis will not attempt to cover all possible areas pertaining to geo-politics, economics or the like. Instead, the focus of this analysis is on a preliminary aerodynamic and propulsive standpoint, especially for the extremely high-altitude conditions encountered in the Himalayan Mountains. The analysis is done using simulation tools that integrate payload capacities and typical rate-of-climb requirements with a preliminary rotary aerodynamics model and a simple propulsion module. When coupled with an atmospheric simulator for the Himalayas, the performance of each helicopter type can be predicted and compared. The rotary-aerodynamics module is advanced enough to predict the different performances of a single main rotor plus tail rotor system (such as that being used in the Bell, HAL and Eurocopter designs) or a contra-rotating rotor system as found for the Kamov design. Furthermore, the models allow for the performance analysis in ground effect conditions. Ground effect conditions are encountered when the helicopters are hovering very close to the ground and serves to work as a performance multiplier for power required in lifting a certain payload.
The analysis models used here do not compensate for transmission limitations for the power, which means that the analysis is idealized wherein power generated is power available. This works well for high-altitude conditions where power available is almost always less than transmission limits. The rate-of-climb (ROC; measured here in meters/second) is a true measure of the maneuvering capability of a helicopter. Typically, a ROC of 0.5 m/sec is used to evaluate service ceiling conditions. A ROC of 2.5 m/sec is typically the bare minimum for combat conditions. Of course, beyond a certain altitude, the helicopter may not be able to fly with the required payload, let alone providing additional power for high ROC. Rate-of-climb performance with a usable payload is of higher importance within the context of a light-utility helicopter than it is for medium and large transport helicopters. A utility helicopter is expected to perform a variety of roles under tough conditions where the maximum payload is less important than the maneuverability in the vertical plane.


The competitors (L to R): The Eurocopter Fennec, Kamov Ka-226T, HAL LUH, Bell 407GT
Design philosophies for the Himalayas
Of the four helicopter types involved, three belong to the single main-rotor design concept. These are the Fennec, LUH and Bell-407GT. All of these designs feature a main rotor and a tail rotor. The tail rotor designs all have a major power/aerodynamics drawback in that the tail rotor does not correspond to lifting payload and yet draws power away from the engines. This power requirement can vary in the range of 10-15% of total available power in some designs. The Ka-226T belongs to the contra-rotating design model and overcomes the tail rotor by having two contra-rotating rotors that cancel net rotor torque. Since both rotors contribute to vertical thrust, the losses from the tail rotor are theoretically recovered. However, two contra-rotating sets of blades in close proximity contribute to other rotor interference losses that serve to negate the advantages. Current analysis suggests that this loss is almost the same as tail rotor losses. However, the lack of the tail rotor serves additional practical advantages including a compact design, removal of a vulnerable boom, easier entry and exit of passengers (with less risk) and overall increase in maneuverability.
From the power standpoint, the LUH’s power-plant and drivetrain is the biggest variable at the time of writing of this article. While the Bell, Eurocopter and Kamov designs are essentially “stabilized” from a design standpoint, the HAL design remains a mystery in terms of performance. The first prototype has not yet flown. And varying sources at different times have quoted different power and weight numbers. HAL has been quoted in one of their presentations to state that the power limitations on the transmission of the LUH will be 750 KW at sea-level whereas the Shakti engine’s rated power is ideally 1,067 KW. The Shakti engine power output is well ahead of any of the equivalent engines in the competition, but the powertrain restrictions will decide how much potential of the engine has been extracted.
Similarly, another area of focus will be the overall weight of the LUH design. Numbers provided by the HAL during its presentations at Aero India 2015 point to an empty mass of the LUH to be 1,910 kg. When compared with the empty masses of its competitors, 1,220 kg (Fennec), 1,700 kg (Ka-226T) and 1,210 kg (Bell-407GT), the weight of the LUH is an immediate area of concern. One possibility is that the weight is a result of a much more powerful power system (Shakti engine) in the LUH. However, this is only balanced out if the resulting power from the engines transmitted to the rotors is much higher than the other designs. If only a 750 KW powertrain is extracted despite the 1,910 kg empty weight of the helicopter (as quoted by HAL in its official presentations), the resulting performance can be expected to be dismal. The HAL design team, drawing experience from the ALH and LCH efforts, will have to undergo a similar effort in weight-trimming and in improving the power-train restrictions of the LUH design. Further details will be obtained when the first prototype of the helicopter flies in 2015 or early 2016.
Performance in the high mountains
Two sets of hover performance numbers have been evaluated for the contending LUH designs. The first set is for conditions where the helicopter is hovering out of the ground effects (OGE) and the other set is for hover performance in ground effect conditions (IGE). The IGE performance is evaluated for the various contenders for a hover altitude of 2 meters. The performance is evaluated for all the helicopters at empty weight conditions (no fuel and no passengers) and the maximum allowable payload is restricted to 1,000 kg (internal or external). The rate of climb is evaluated for a given altitude based on available power once the maximum amount of payload has been lifted for that altitude. In other words, when a helicopter is able to lift the specified payload, all remaining power is assumed to be directed towards the rate of climb. In doing so, we focus more on payload lifting capacity rather than rate of climb. Consequently, if the helicopter is unable to lift the specified payload, then it will be assumed to have zero rate of climb potential while it is carrying what maximum payload it can carry for that altitude. The hover performance is evaluated at altitudes varying from 0 feet (sea-level) to 25,000 feet. Altitudes in the Himalayan Mountains regularly require flights above 10,000 feet and can be up to 22,000 feet in the Siachen Glacier.


The Bell-407 and Fennec perform similarly, which is not unexpected considering similar designs. But the Bell design is found to perform slightly better at higher altitudes (greater than 10,000 ft.) and this is attributed to its better rotor blade design. For example, at 20,000 feet altitude, the Bell-407 can lift ~100 kg more payload than the Fennec. Both these helicopters have a similar loss in performance versus altitude as ascertained from the slopes of their payload-altitude curves. When the requisite crew and fuel masses are added, the Fennec is unable to fly beyond 19,000 feet altitude. Similar limit for the Bell-407 is at 22,000 feet. The Bell-407 also has a better rate of climb compared with the Fennec and maintains that difference at higher altitudes. The Bell design also loses that ability at higher altitude limits than the Fennec (12,500 feet versus 10,000 feet, respectively). At sea-level, the Bell-407 can reach about 4.5 m/sec vertical rate of climb compared with 3.0 m/sec for the Fennec.
The Kamov model has visibly different performance owing to its fundamentally different design. A combination of high empty mass, contra-rotating rotors and higher available power means that the tail-off in performance for this design is different from the Bell and Eurocopter models. The performance of the Kamov design generally tails-off faster than its competitors at higher altitudes. This is attributed to the high rotor interference effects that increase the amount of power required to maintain a given payload. There is a substantial difference in hover performance between the Kamov design and others beyond 15,000 feet altitude and this difference only increases. When similar crew mass, fuel mass and rate-of-climb effects are added, the Kamov design’s payload capacity is negligible beyond 16,000 feet, which is much lower than that of the Fennec (19,000 feet) and the Bell-407 (22,000 feet). At sea-level, the Kamov design also has the lowest rate of climb power available and is unable to exceed 2.5 m/sec compared with much higher numbers for the Bell, Eurocopter and HAL designs. It also loses all available power for rate of climb at 9,000 feet altitude.
The HAL design’s performance varies between outstanding or dismal depending on what power transmission numbers are assumed. If the Shakti engine is fully utilized for its power, then the performance of the HAL design exceeds that of its competitors and can haul usable payloads up to an altitude of ~21,000 feet despite the much higher empty weight. It also has the highest rate of climb at sea-level (5.8 m/sec). The only other helicopter in the competition that comes close to it is the Bell-407 with a rate of climb of 4.5 m/sec. The trail-off in the available power for rate of climb is also the highest for the HAL design at 13,500 feet altitude.
The ground effect factor
Ground effect multipliers for the various designs are also different and offer differing improvements for the four designs. Once again, the Bell and Fennec designs are near identical in their IGE performance. The LUH, with a slightly higher main-rotor blade radius performs better. The Kamov design gains the best effects in IGE conditions on account of its twin-rotor system with large blades. It is the result of this improved performance in IGE that allows the Kamov design to match the Bell and Fennec designs in IGE hover up to an altitude of 17,000 ft. Beyond 20,000 ft, the IGE performance gains for the Kamov design are lost and leads to a general performance below that of the other competitors. All four helicopter designs perform significantly better in the ground effect conditions, with the HAL design performing best and the Bell-407 staying close to it. The Ka-226T and Fennec perform somewhat similar in ground effect and are behind the HAL and Bell designs. For example, at 20,000 feet altitude, the Fennec can lift ~340 kg more in ground effect than out of ground effect. Similarly, the Bell-407 can lift ~410 kg in ground effect than out of ground effect and the HAL design can lift almost 550 kg more in ground effect!



Conclusions
The first-flight of the HAL design in 2015 or 2016 will provide much insight into the successes (or failures) of the HAL design team to meet its competitors for the LUH contract. How much empty weight can be shaved off and how much more power can be provided to the main rotor will determine the performance of the design at high-altitude. Even if the prototype serves to advance a program of weight reduction (similar to that done for the LCH program), we will likely see a series of design improvements to increase performance as confidence in its design builds up. How fast that effort can be undertaken, how long the process will take and whether it will be successful or not, remains to be seen.
By: Dr. Vivek Ahuja
Posted 4th April 2015

Source Link: http://thebetacoefficient.blogspot.in

 

[Superdefender]

Why the LCH is a sports car compared to the lumbering Z-10
I often get asked the question: “Is the Indian LCH better than the Chinese Z-10?” An attempt to answer such a question verbally is difficult. It is preferable that one sees the numbers themselves. The Z-10 is two times heavier than the LCH when carrying the same payload in weapons, fuel and crew. The Z-10’s empty weight is 5,540 kg and the LCH even in its current overweight mode is about 2,800-3,000 kg. And yet the Z-10 is powered by the same net total power as the LCH (~2,000 KW for the Z-10 versus ~1,700 KW for the LCH). That’s a nasty combination in terms of performance, both at sea-level and at high altitudes. The effect of additional weight versus power required is non-linear for rotary flying machines.

But just how bad is it really for the Z-10?

(L to R): The Indian HAL LCH, Chinese Changhe Z-10 and the Russian Mi-35 (in Indian colors)
To answer that question, I present here a comparison study. We will take the LCH and the Z-10 and put an identical payload of 500 kg on them. We will run both helicopters through a simulation model where we subject them to altitude variations and see how it affects their rate-of-climb capabilities while in hover, out of Ground Effect conditions. The rate-of-climb (ROC, measured here in meters/second) is a true measure of the maneuvering capability of an attack helicopter. Typically, a ROC of 0.5 m/sec is used to evaluate service ceiling conditions. A ROC of 2.5 m/sec is typically the bare minimum for combat conditions. For a helicopter in high mountains to be truly maneuverable, it may need somewhere in the range of 2.5 to 8 m/sec vertical ROC equivalent in power capacity. Of course, beyond a certain altitude, the helicopter may not be able to fly with the 500 kg payload, let alone providing additional power for high ROC. So we will also see where those limits are for the LCH and the Z-10.
The focus of this analysis is on a preliminary aerodynamic and propulsive standpoint. The analysis is done using simulation tools that integrate payload capacities and typical rate-of-climb requirements with a preliminary rotary aerodynamics model and a simple propulsion module. When coupled with an atmospheric simulator for the Himalayas, the performance of each helicopter type can be predicted and compared. Furthermore, the models allow for the performance analysis in Ground Effect conditions. The Ground Effect conditions are encountered when the helicopters are hovering very close to the ground and serves to work as a performance multiplier with regard to power needed in lifting a certain payload.
The models do not compensate for transmission limitations for the power, which means that the analysis is idealized wherein power generated is power available. This is, of course, not encountered in practice, but works well for high-altitude conditions where power available is almost always less than the transmission limits. At lower altitudes, the performance of the various designs must be assumed to be ideal, rather than restricted from transmission and structural limitations. For example, the maximum rate-of-climb (ROC) values obtained from this simulator for sea-level (SL) conditions will typically be higher than what is allowed by other limitations. However, such removal of limitations is required in order to compare the various contenders at the same performance benchmarks.
Data for this analysis is obtained from the manufacturers via open-sources. No proprietary information is shared here. Unless where cited, the analysis results are to be considered proprietary of the author. See remarks for details.
LCH versus the Z-10:
The hover performance is evaluated at altitudes varying from 0 ft (SL) to 25,000 ft. Altitudes in the Himalayan Mountains regularly require flights above 10,000 ft and often up to 22,000 ft. The data is presented for the LCH and the Z-10 for payload and available maximum ROC capability versus altitude. A threshold ROC line is shown for the reference 8 m/sec combat ROC.

Notice how the sea-level performance of the LCH and the Z-10 are significantly different. The Z-10, with a 500 kg payload (not counting weapons and fuel) is able to generate a maximum vertical ROC capability of 3.6 m/sec. By comparison, at sea-level, the LCH is able to carry the 500 kg and is able to provide a power excess for a theoretical max ROC of 21 m/sec! Of course, this will not be allowed in reality. The LCH powertrain transmission limitations will bring that max ROC to about ~10 m/sec for structural safety reasons. Both helicopters are able to lift the 500 kg requirement at sea-level.
Now consider how the change in altitude affects both helicopters. The Z-10, trying to maintain the 500 kg payload, begins to tail-off its ROC capability from 3.6 m/sec at sea-level to 0 m/sec ROC at ~8,000 ft. Beyond 8,000 ft altitude, the Z-10 also cannot carry its 500 kg payload and the tail-off in that capacity is dramatic. The Z-10 cannot operate beyond 10,000 ft under any conditions.
The LCH, on the other hand, utilizes its light-weight structure to great effect. It can not only maintain the 500 kg payload for all altitudes from sea-level to the Himalayan mountain tops, the tail-off in the ROC does not drop below 8 m/sec until ~12,000 ft. The tail-off does not drop below the minimum 2.5 m/sec until ~19,000 ft. The LCH can fly, and fight, at all altitudes in the Himalayas.
Z-10 versus the Mi-35: The Pakistani Insight
You will notice that I put the Mi-35 performance numbers in the plot above for identical conditions. The reason for doing so is to illustrate why the Pakistanis went for the Mi-35 option when the spanking-new Z-10s were on the table. The Mi-35 performance for high-altitude conditions is dismal. This is a fact known in Indian Air Force circles for many years and has led to the genesis of the LCH. But as bad as the performance for the Mi-35 is in the mountains, it is still better than the Z-10. At sea-level, the Mi-35 can completely outperform the Z-10 for ROC capability. Its ROC tail-off at high altitude is at ~9,500 ft. Its payload tail-off is at ~12,500 ft. Both these numbers are better than that of the Z-10. Coupled with lower operating costs and generally rugged reliability, the Pakistani decision to pursue the Mi-35 becomes clearer. Additional geo-political and economic constraints may also apply, but are not discussed here.

By: Dr. Vivek Ahuja
Posted 4th April 2015


Source Link: http://thebetacoefficient.blogspot.in

 

[Indx TechStyle]

The Indian Light Utility Helicopter Procurement: where does the HAL LUH stand?
As of this writing, the Indian Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) program is progressing towards completion. Four helicopters from four different nations and commercial conglomerations are in the bidding for this lucrative contract. In addition to the Bell 407, the Eurocopter Fennec and the Kamov Ka-226T, HAL’s own design, known by the generic title LUH, is in the fight to win the contract. The winner of the contract will provide the next generation helicopter to replace the ageing fleet of IAF Cheetah and Chetak helicopters in the coming years. And while most of the competitors bidding for this contract are basing their hopes on preexisting designs from their industries, the HAL proposal is new and untested. It has the advantage of following the highly successful Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) program. And the HAL design teams have certainly benefitted significantly from the experience, which they will now bring to bear on the LUH effort. But where does the LUH stand amongst its competitors? For that matter, where do the competitors stand amongst themselves?
The procurement of any military aircraft or helicopter type is a complicated process. And this analysis will not attempt to cover all possible areas pertaining to geo-politics, economics or the like. Instead, the focus of this analysis is on a preliminary aerodynamic and propulsive standpoint, especially for the extremely high-altitude conditions encountered in the Himalayan Mountains. The analysis is done using simulation tools that integrate payload capacities and typical rate-of-climb requirements with a preliminary rotary aerodynamics model and a simple propulsion module. When coupled with an atmospheric simulator for the Himalayas, the performance of each helicopter type can be predicted and compared. The rotary-aerodynamics module is advanced enough to predict the different performances of a single main rotor plus tail rotor system (such as that being used in the Bell, HAL and Eurocopter designs) or a contra-rotating rotor system as found for the Kamov design. Furthermore, the models allow for the performance analysis in ground effect conditions. Ground effect conditions are encountered when the helicopters are hovering very close to the ground and serves to work as a performance multiplier for power required in lifting a certain payload.
The analysis models used here do not compensate for transmission limitations for the power, which means that the analysis is idealized wherein power generated is power available. This works well for high-altitude conditions where power available is almost always less than transmission limits. The rate-of-climb (ROC; measured here in meters/second) is a true measure of the maneuvering capability of a helicopter. Typically, a ROC of 0.5 m/sec is used to evaluate service ceiling conditions. A ROC of 2.5 m/sec is typically the bare minimum for combat conditions. Of course, beyond a certain altitude, the helicopter may not be able to fly with the required payload, let alone providing additional power for high ROC. Rate-of-climb performance with a usable payload is of higher importance within the context of a light-utility helicopter than it is for medium and large transport helicopters. A utility helicopter is expected to perform a variety of roles under tough conditions where the maximum payload is less important than the maneuverability in the vertical plane.


The competitors (L to R): The Eurocopter Fennec, Kamov Ka-226T, HAL LUH, Bell 407GT
Design philosophies for the Himalayas
Of the four helicopter types involved, three belong to the single main-rotor design concept. These are the Fennec, LUH and Bell-407GT. All of these designs feature a main rotor and a tail rotor. The tail rotor designs all have a major power/aerodynamics drawback in that the tail rotor does not correspond to lifting payload and yet draws power away from the engines. This power requirement can vary in the range of 10-15% of total available power in some designs. The Ka-226T belongs to the contra-rotating design model and overcomes the tail rotor by having two contra-rotating rotors that cancel net rotor torque. Since both rotors contribute to vertical thrust, the losses from the tail rotor are theoretically recovered. However, two contra-rotating sets of blades in close proximity contribute to other rotor interference losses that serve to negate the advantages. Current analysis suggests that this loss is almost the same as tail rotor losses. However, the lack of the tail rotor serves additional practical advantages including a compact design, removal of a vulnerable boom, easier entry and exit of passengers (with less risk) and overall increase in maneuverability.
From the power standpoint, the LUH’s power-plant and drivetrain is the biggest variable at the time of writing of this article. While the Bell, Eurocopter and Kamov designs are essentially “stabilized” from a design standpoint, the HAL design remains a mystery in terms of performance. The first prototype has not yet flown. And varying sources at different times have quoted different power and weight numbers. HAL has been quoted in one of their presentations to state that the power limitations on the transmission of the LUH will be 750 KW at sea-level whereas the Shakti engine’s rated power is ideally 1,067 KW. The Shakti engine power output is well ahead of any of the equivalent engines in the competition, but the powertrain restrictions will decide how much potential of the engine has been extracted.
Similarly, another area of focus will be the overall weight of the LUH design. Numbers provided by the HAL during its presentations at Aero India 2015 point to an empty mass of the LUH to be 1,910 kg. When compared with the empty masses of its competitors, 1,220 kg (Fennec), 1,700 kg (Ka-226T) and 1,210 kg (Bell-407GT), the weight of the LUH is an immediate area of concern. One possibility is that the weight is a result of a much more powerful power system (Shakti engine) in the LUH. However, this is only balanced out if the resulting power from the engines transmitted to the rotors is much higher than the other designs. If only a 750 KW powertrain is extracted despite the 1,910 kg empty weight of the helicopter (as quoted by HAL in its official presentations), the resulting performance can be expected to be dismal. The HAL design team, drawing experience from the ALH and LCH efforts, will have to undergo a similar effort in weight-trimming and in improving the power-train restrictions of the LUH design. Further details will be obtained when the first prototype of the helicopter flies in 2015 or early 2016.
Performance in the high mountains
Two sets of hover performance numbers have been evaluated for the contending LUH designs. The first set is for conditions where the helicopter is hovering out of the ground effects (OGE) and the other set is for hover performance in ground effect conditions (IGE). The IGE performance is evaluated for the various contenders for a hover altitude of 2 meters. The performance is evaluated for all the helicopters at empty weight conditions (no fuel and no passengers) and the maximum allowable payload is restricted to 1,000 kg (internal or external). The rate of climb is evaluated for a given altitude based on available power once the maximum amount of payload has been lifted for that altitude. In other words, when a helicopter is able to lift the specified payload, all remaining power is assumed to be directed towards the rate of climb. In doing so, we focus more on payload lifting capacity rather than rate of climb. Consequently, if the helicopter is unable to lift the specified payload, then it will be assumed to have zero rate of climb potential while it is carrying what maximum payload it can carry for that altitude. The hover performance is evaluated at altitudes varying from 0 feet (sea-level) to 25,000 feet. Altitudes in the Himalayan Mountains regularly require flights above 10,000 feet and can be up to 22,000 feet in the Siachen Glacier.


The Bell-407 and Fennec perform similarly, which is not unexpected considering similar designs. But the Bell design is found to perform slightly better at higher altitudes (greater than 10,000 ft.) and this is attributed to its better rotor blade design. For example, at 20,000 feet altitude, the Bell-407 can lift ~100 kg more payload than the Fennec. Both these helicopters have a similar loss in performance versus altitude as ascertained from the slopes of their payload-altitude curves. When the requisite crew and fuel masses are added, the Fennec is unable to fly beyond 19,000 feet altitude. Similar limit for the Bell-407 is at 22,000 feet. The Bell-407 also has a better rate of climb compared with the Fennec and maintains that difference at higher altitudes. The Bell design also loses that ability at higher altitude limits than the Fennec (12,500 feet versus 10,000 feet, respectively). At sea-level, the Bell-407 can reach about 4.5 m/sec vertical rate of climb compared with 3.0 m/sec for the Fennec.
The Kamov model has visibly different performance owing to its fundamentally different design. A combination of high empty mass, contra-rotating rotors and higher available power means that the tail-off in performance for this design is different from the Bell and Eurocopter models. The performance of the Kamov design generally tails-off faster than its competitors at higher altitudes. This is attributed to the high rotor interference effects that increase the amount of power required to maintain a given payload. There is a substantial difference in hover performance between the Kamov design and others beyond 15,000 feet altitude and this difference only increases. When similar crew mass, fuel mass and rate-of-climb effects are added, the Kamov design’s payload capacity is negligible beyond 16,000 feet, which is much lower than that of the Fennec (19,000 feet) and the Bell-407 (22,000 feet). At sea-level, the Kamov design also has the lowest rate of climb power available and is unable to exceed 2.5 m/sec compared with much higher numbers for the Bell, Eurocopter and HAL designs. It also loses all available power for rate of climb at 9,000 feet altitude.
The HAL design’s performance varies between outstanding or dismal depending on what power transmission numbers are assumed. If the Shakti engine is fully utilized for its power, then the performance of the HAL design exceeds that of its competitors and can haul usable payloads up to an altitude of ~21,000 feet despite the much higher empty weight. It also has the highest rate of climb at sea-level (5.8 m/sec). The only other helicopter in the competition that comes close to it is the Bell-407 with a rate of climb of 4.5 m/sec. The trail-off in the available power for rate of climb is also the highest for the HAL design at 13,500 feet altitude.
The ground effect factor
Ground effect multipliers for the various designs are also different and offer differing improvements for the four designs. Once again, the Bell and Fennec designs are near identical in their IGE performance. The LUH, with a slightly higher main-rotor blade radius performs better. The Kamov design gains the best effects in IGE conditions on account of its twin-rotor system with large blades. It is the result of this improved performance in IGE that allows the Kamov design to match the Bell and Fennec designs in IGE hover up to an altitude of 17,000 ft. Beyond 20,000 ft, the IGE performance gains for the Kamov design are lost and leads to a general performance below that of the other competitors. All four helicopter designs perform significantly better in the ground effect conditions, with the HAL design performing best and the Bell-407 staying close to it. The Ka-226T and Fennec perform somewhat similar in ground effect and are behind the HAL and Bell designs. For example, at 20,000 feet altitude, the Fennec can lift ~340 kg more in ground effect than out of ground effect. Similarly, the Bell-407 can lift ~410 kg in ground effect than out of ground effect and the HAL design can lift almost 550 kg more in ground effect!



Conclusions
The first-flight of the HAL design in 2015 or 2016 will provide much insight into the successes (or failures) of the HAL design team to meet its competitors for the LUH contract. How much empty weight can be shaved off and how much more power can be provided to the main rotor will determine the performance of the design at high-altitude. Even if the prototype serves to advance a program of weight reduction (similar to that done for the LCH program), we will likely see a series of design improvements to increase performance as confidence in its design builds up. How fast that effort can be undertaken, how long the process will take and whether it will be successful or not, remains to be seen.
By: Dr. Vivek Ahuja
Posted 4th April 2015

Source Link: http://thebetacoefficient.blogspot.in

We have another thread for LUH.
http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/...h-and-light-observation-helicopter-loh.73697/

 

[MKM]

http://www.listnbest.com/11-worlds-advanced-military-attack-helicopters/

This site is nothing more than a bakwas...
Both, helicopter's list & rifle's list are so much wrong.

 

[Bahamut]

The Indian Light Utility Helicopter Procurement: where does the HAL LUH stand?
As of this writing, the Indian Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) program is progressing towards completion. Four helicopters from four different nations and commercial conglomerations are in the bidding for this lucrative contract. In addition to the Bell 407, the Eurocopter Fennec and the Kamov Ka-226T, HAL’s own design, known by the generic title LUH, is in the fight to win the contract. The winner of the contract will provide the next generation helicopter to replace the ageing fleet of IAF Cheetah and Chetak helicopters in the coming years. And while most of the competitors bidding for this contract are basing their hopes on preexisting designs from their industries, the HAL proposal is new and untested. It has the advantage of following the highly successful Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) program. And the HAL design teams have certainly benefitted significantly from the experience, which they will now bring to bear on the LUH effort. But where does the LUH stand amongst its competitors? For that matter, where do the competitors stand amongst themselves?
The procurement of any military aircraft or helicopter type is a complicated process. And this analysis will not attempt to cover all possible areas pertaining to geo-politics, economics or the like. Instead, the focus of this analysis is on a preliminary aerodynamic and propulsive standpoint, especially for the extremely high-altitude conditions encountered in the Himalayan Mountains. The analysis is done using simulation tools that integrate payload capacities and typical rate-of-climb requirements with a preliminary rotary aerodynamics model and a simple propulsion module. When coupled with an atmospheric simulator for the Himalayas, the performance of each helicopter type can be predicted and compared. The rotary-aerodynamics module is advanced enough to predict the different performances of a single main rotor plus tail rotor system (such as that being used in the Bell, HAL and Eurocopter designs) or a contra-rotating rotor system as found for the Kamov design. Furthermore, the models allow for the performance analysis in ground effect conditions. Ground effect conditions are encountered when the helicopters are hovering very close to the ground and serves to work as a performance multiplier for power required in lifting a certain payload.
The analysis models used here do not compensate for transmission limitations for the power, which means that the analysis is idealized wherein power generated is power available. This works well for high-altitude conditions where power available is almost always less than transmission limits. The rate-of-climb (ROC; measured here in meters/second) is a true measure of the maneuvering capability of a helicopter. Typically, a ROC of 0.5 m/sec is used to evaluate service ceiling conditions. A ROC of 2.5 m/sec is typically the bare minimum for combat conditions. Of course, beyond a certain altitude, the helicopter may not be able to fly with the required payload, let alone providing additional power for high ROC. Rate-of-climb performance with a usable payload is of higher importance within the context of a light-utility helicopter than it is for medium and large transport helicopters. A utility helicopter is expected to perform a variety of roles under tough conditions where the maximum payload is less important than the maneuverability in the vertical plane.


The competitors (L to R): The Eurocopter Fennec, Kamov Ka-226T, HAL LUH, Bell 407GT
Design philosophies for the Himalayas
Of the four helicopter types involved, three belong to the single main-rotor design concept. These are the Fennec, LUH and Bell-407GT. All of these designs feature a main rotor and a tail rotor. The tail rotor designs all have a major power/aerodynamics drawback in that the tail rotor does not correspond to lifting payload and yet draws power away from the engines. This power requirement can vary in the range of 10-15% of total available power in some designs. The Ka-226T belongs to the contra-rotating design model and overcomes the tail rotor by having two contra-rotating rotors that cancel net rotor torque. Since both rotors contribute to vertical thrust, the losses from the tail rotor are theoretically recovered. However, two contra-rotating sets of blades in close proximity contribute to other rotor interference losses that serve to negate the advantages. Current analysis suggests that this loss is almost the same as tail rotor losses. However, the lack of the tail rotor serves additional practical advantages including a compact design, removal of a vulnerable boom, easier entry and exit of passengers (with less risk) and overall increase in maneuverability.
From the power standpoint, the LUH’s power-plant and drivetrain is the biggest variable at the time of writing of this article. While the Bell, Eurocopter and Kamov designs are essentially “stabilized” from a design standpoint, the HAL design remains a mystery in terms of performance. The first prototype has not yet flown. And varying sources at different times have quoted different power and weight numbers. HAL has been quoted in one of their presentations to state that the power limitations on the transmission of the LUH will be 750 KW at sea-level whereas the Shakti engine’s rated power is ideally 1,067 KW. The Shakti engine power output is well ahead of any of the equivalent engines in the competition, but the powertrain restrictions will decide how much potential of the engine has been extracted.
Similarly, another area of focus will be the overall weight of the LUH design. Numbers provided by the HAL during its presentations at Aero India 2015 point to an empty mass of the LUH to be 1,910 kg. When compared with the empty masses of its competitors, 1,220 kg (Fennec), 1,700 kg (Ka-226T) and 1,210 kg (Bell-407GT), the weight of the LUH is an immediate area of concern. One possibility is that the weight is a result of a much more powerful power system (Shakti engine) in the LUH. However, this is only balanced out if the resulting power from the engines transmitted to the rotors is much higher than the other designs. If only a 750 KW powertrain is extracted despite the 1,910 kg empty weight of the helicopter (as quoted by HAL in its official presentations), the resulting performance can be expected to be dismal. The HAL design team, drawing experience from the ALH and LCH efforts, will have to undergo a similar effort in weight-trimming and in improving the power-train restrictions of the LUH design. Further details will be obtained when the first prototype of the helicopter flies in 2015 or early 2016.
Performance in the high mountains
Two sets of hover performance numbers have been evaluated for the contending LUH designs. The first set is for conditions where the helicopter is hovering out of the ground effects (OGE) and the other set is for hover performance in ground effect conditions (IGE). The IGE performance is evaluated for the various contenders for a hover altitude of 2 meters. The performance is evaluated for all the helicopters at empty weight conditions (no fuel and no passengers) and the maximum allowable payload is restricted to 1,000 kg (internal or external). The rate of climb is evaluated for a given altitude based on available power once the maximum amount of payload has been lifted for that altitude. In other words, when a helicopter is able to lift the specified payload, all remaining power is assumed to be directed towards the rate of climb. In doing so, we focus more on payload lifting capacity rather than rate of climb. Consequently, if the helicopter is unable to lift the specified payload, then it will be assumed to have zero rate of climb potential while it is carrying what maximum payload it can carry for that altitude. The hover performance is evaluated at altitudes varying from 0 feet (sea-level) to 25,000 feet. Altitudes in the Himalayan Mountains regularly require flights above 10,000 feet and can be up to 22,000 feet in the Siachen Glacier.


The Bell-407 and Fennec perform similarly, which is not unexpected considering similar designs. But the Bell design is found to perform slightly better at higher altitudes (greater than 10,000 ft.) and this is attributed to its better rotor blade design. For example, at 20,000 feet altitude, the Bell-407 can lift ~100 kg more payload than the Fennec. Both these helicopters have a similar loss in performance versus altitude as ascertained from the slopes of their payload-altitude curves. When the requisite crew and fuel masses are added, the Fennec is unable to fly beyond 19,000 feet altitude. Similar limit for the Bell-407 is at 22,000 feet. The Bell-407 also has a better rate of climb compared with the Fennec and maintains that difference at higher altitudes. The Bell design also loses that ability at higher altitude limits than the Fennec (12,500 feet versus 10,000 feet, respectively). At sea-level, the Bell-407 can reach about 4.5 m/sec vertical rate of climb compared with 3.0 m/sec for the Fennec.
The Kamov model has visibly different performance owing to its fundamentally different design. A combination of high empty mass, contra-rotating rotors and higher available power means that the tail-off in performance for this design is different from the Bell and Eurocopter models. The performance of the Kamov design generally tails-off faster than its competitors at higher altitudes. This is attributed to the high rotor interference effects that increase the amount of power required to maintain a given payload. There is a substantial difference in hover performance between the Kamov design and others beyond 15,000 feet altitude and this difference only increases. When similar crew mass, fuel mass and rate-of-climb effects are added, the Kamov design’s payload capacity is negligible beyond 16,000 feet, which is much lower than that of the Fennec (19,000 feet) and the Bell-407 (22,000 feet). At sea-level, the Kamov design also has the lowest rate of climb power available and is unable to exceed 2.5 m/sec compared with much higher numbers for the Bell, Eurocopter and HAL designs. It also loses all available power for rate of climb at 9,000 feet altitude.
The HAL design’s performance varies between outstanding or dismal depending on what power transmission numbers are assumed. If the Shakti engine is fully utilized for its power, then the performance of the HAL design exceeds that of its competitors and can haul usable payloads up to an altitude of ~21,000 feet despite the much higher empty weight. It also has the highest rate of climb at sea-level (5.8 m/sec). The only other helicopter in the competition that comes close to it is the Bell-407 with a rate of climb of 4.5 m/sec. The trail-off in the available power for rate of climb is also the highest for the HAL design at 13,500 feet altitude.
The ground effect factor
Ground effect multipliers for the various designs are also different and offer differing improvements for the four designs. Once again, the Bell and Fennec designs are near identical in their IGE performance. The LUH, with a slightly higher main-rotor blade radius performs better. The Kamov design gains the best effects in IGE conditions on account of its twin-rotor system with large blades. It is the result of this improved performance in IGE that allows the Kamov design to match the Bell and Fennec designs in IGE hover up to an altitude of 17,000 ft. Beyond 20,000 ft, the IGE performance gains for the Kamov design are lost and leads to a general performance below that of the other competitors. All four helicopter designs perform significantly better in the ground effect conditions, with the HAL design performing best and the Bell-407 staying close to it. The Ka-226T and Fennec perform somewhat similar in ground effect and are behind the HAL and Bell designs. For example, at 20,000 feet altitude, the Fennec can lift ~340 kg more in ground effect than out of ground effect. Similarly, the Bell-407 can lift ~410 kg in ground effect than out of ground effect and the HAL design can lift almost 550 kg more in ground effect!



Conclusions
The first-flight of the HAL design in 2015 or 2016 will provide much insight into the successes (or failures) of the HAL design team to meet its competitors for the LUH contract. How much empty weight can be shaved off and how much more power can be provided to the main rotor will determine the performance of the design at high-altitude. Even if the prototype serves to advance a program of weight reduction (similar to that done for the LCH program), we will likely see a series of design improvements to increase performance as confidence in its design builds up. How fast that effort can be undertaken, how long the process will take and whether it will be successful or not, remains to be seen.
By: Dr. Vivek Ahuja
Posted 4th April 2015

Source Link: http://thebetacoefficient.blogspot.in

Sir Kamov has a modular fuselage,so its performance will vary with change of fuselage.

 

[PaliwalWarrior]

Sir Kamov has a modular fuselage,so its performance will vary with change of fuselage.

The calculation has been with equal.load for all

Pl.reread the article

 

[salute]

2:06 - hey how did you get up so high ,


.......................................................................................

 

[praneet.bajpaie]

2:06 - hey how did you get up so high ,


.......................................................................................

A couple of questions:

1) When has Japan shown interest in purchasing the LCH?

2) What does the narrator mean by "Scams coming out of India"?

 

[ezsasa]

A couple of questions:

1) When has Japan shown interest in purchasing the LCH?

2) What does the narrator mean by "Scams coming out of India"?

1) There were reports of Japan showing interest during the second half of 2015.

2) no need to be offended for each and every instance, the guy was commenting on sunglasses.

 

[sorcerer]

India’s LCH is more than a match to the American Apache Gunship

By :: USHINOR MAJUMDAR

On the eve of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s second trip to the US as PM in September last year, the Cabinet Committee on Security cleared the proposal to purchase 22 ‘assault helicopters’, or helicopter gunships, from Boeing for the Indian air force and the army. The decision had come as a surprise to experts then, for Boeing was offering a version of the Apache by way of direct sale. Moreover, this flew in the face of the Make In India policy.

Public sector Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has been manufacturing Light Combat Helicopters (LCH) and Light Utility Helicopters (LUH) for the army. Independent experts like Ashok Parthasarathy, former scientific and technology advisor to Indira Gandhi, felt HAL had the capacity to deliver assault helicopters to the IAF, but was ignored. Parthasarathy told Outlook that he had raised the issue in 2014 and 2015 “at the highest levels” of the Ministry of Defence. The state-owned aircraft manufacturer HAL’s proposal, he recalls, was received with great enthusiasm but was discarded for reasons he fails to fathom.

“HAL has considerable local, technological and industrial base in the area of designing and manufacturing helicopters,” says Parthasarathy. HAL, he points out, has designed, developed and prototyped the Tejas, India’s own Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). The IAF has placed an order for 140 Tejas fighter jets.

The Comptroller and Auditor-General (CAG) of India’s latest report, however, records how HAL’s delivery of indigenously-made helicopters flopped, with the Army discarding all 17 helicopters delivered to it.

Around the time the Apache sales were cleared, the government cleared a $400 million deal with Israel to purchase ‘Heron’ unmanned attack drones. This was while HAL was developing the Rustom-II, an attack drone of similar class.

Following the deal, Boeing declared it would manufacture the chopper’s fuselage in Hyderabad in partnership with the Tata group. Soon afterwards, the government followed this by easing FDI norms in the defence sector, but without mention of technology transfer. India being a top defence importer, the government has maintained that its intent was to promote indigenous manufacture with transfer of technology. Most of its executive decisions, however, seem to contradict this.

The question raised is why the Ministry of Defence bypassed the Make in India programme and decided to import the expensive hardware, rather than involve HAL and ensure transfer of technology.

The IAF required ‘gunships’ or assault helicopters to replace its aging Russian-made Mi-25 and Mi-35 choppers. It wanted 22 gunships and about nine heavy lift choppers. In 2008, the UPA-1 government floated a tender for the choppers and six companies placed bids. The deal was valued at around $1 billion. The tender was dropped after Boeing and Bell pulled out in 2009 and was re-issued later that year. Eurocopter, Augusta Westland and Sikorsky also opted out for various reasons.

In 2014, the government had a choice between Boeing, for its Apache A64D, an earlier version of which had first been used in Vietnam, and Mil’s Mi-28. The Boeing aircraft had been first tested during the ’70s and the Russian chopper a decade later.

`Some considered the Russian chopper to be superior in many ways and dismissed the Apache as a relic of the Vietnam War and the 1991 Iraq conflict.

The IAF and the MoD chose Boeing’s Apache for a direct procurement of 22 choppers. The view was that the Mi-28 lacked sufficient manoeuverability and it didn’t make the cut during trials. The direct military sale reportedly included no plans for manufacture, assembly or transfer of technology. It would also mean that the IAF would be dependent on Boeing for spares.

The issue of spares often plagues defence procurements. Priced much lower at first, prices for the spares are raised by 200-500 per cent once the procurement is made. Locating spares is another task—Indian agencies often have had to employ middlemen to locate and approach spares manufacturers.

The army’s army aviation corps had also demanded 39 similar assault choppers. However, no separate tender was issued for additional requirements and the government placed an order with Boeing on the same terms and conditions. That means an order for around 60 choppers through direct import, without any local manufacture, assembly or transfer of technology.

Parthasarthy claims that once he learnt of plans to import the large number of military choppers, he approached the then HAL chairman to ask if they could manufacture or at least assemble the helicopters here. HAL was already developing its light combat helicopters.

“HAL put together a proposal and I approached the MoD at its highest levels. This was around late 2014 or early 2015 and it fell in line with the government’s Make in India policy,” says Parthasarathy. “At the time, the decision for the 22 helicopters for the air force was still pending and the MoD promised to combine the air force and army orders. That would allow HAL to manufacture the 61 helicopters,” explains Parthasarthy.

This would have allowed HAL to build helicopters, get the technology and also be self-reliant on spares. But despite having given the impression that it was favourably disposed towards HAL, the ministry placed the order with Boeing for supplying the choppers between 2017 and 2020. MoD and Boeing did not respond to Outlook’s queries.

An editorial in the July 15 issue of the Economic and Political Weekly notes how essays written by experts at Western defence think tanks promote defence procurements to keep up with China and Pakistan, but exhort India to be “realistic about its domestic capacity to manufacture sophisticated combat aircraft”. The comment appears uncomfortably close, say defence experts, to considerations driving defence procurements that turn the government’s own initiatives into mere ‘jumla’.





Source:- Outlook India

http://www.defenceupdate.in/indias-lch-match-american-apache-gunship/

 

[Yumdoot]

Reminds me of Chuck Yeager losing his Beechcraft.
.
.
.
To a Naval fighter pilot.
.
.
.
While under protection of his hosts, that he himself trained.
.
.
.
On the best American fighter of the day and fighters supplied as muft ka maal from Chinese.
.
.
.
But that were still getting shot out of the skies continuously.
.
.
.
That too by an aircraft designed as a trainer (actually rejected by the oh-cho-advanced-migrant-hirer-Brits).
.
.
.
but build as fighter by Indians
.
.
.
at HAL.

 

[cannonfodder]

Any updates on weapons trial for LCH?? When is HAL targetting FOC and starting production?

I had read it has weapons test trials scheduled in July/Aug 2016 . Must be done by now if I am not wrong.

http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/indias-light-combat-helicopter-to-start-weapons-trials/

 

[abingdonboy]

Any updates on weapons trial for LCH?? When is HAL targetting FOC and starting production?

I had read it has weapons test trials scheduled in July/Aug 2016 . Must be done by now if I am not wrong.

http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/indias-light-combat-helicopter-to-start-weapons-trials/

Production will begin in 2018.

TD-4 (HAL funded) began flying a few moths back and IOC has been fast tracked.

 

[Adioz]

India’s LCH is more than a match to the American Apache Gunship

By :: USHINOR MAJUMDAR

On the eve of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s second trip to the US as PM in September last year, the Cabinet Committee on Security cleared the proposal to purchase 22 ‘assault helicopters’, or helicopter gunships, from Boeing for the Indian air force and the army. The decision had come as a surprise to experts then, for Boeing was offering a version of the Apache by way of direct sale. Moreover, this flew in the face of the Make In India policy.

Public sector Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has been manufacturing Light Combat Helicopters (LCH) and Light Utility Helicopters (LUH) for the army. Independent experts like Ashok Parthasarathy, former scientific and technology advisor to Indira Gandhi, felt HAL had the capacity to deliver assault helicopters to the IAF, but was ignored. Parthasarathy told Outlook that he had raised the issue in 2014 and 2015 “at the highest levels” of the Ministry of Defence. The state-owned aircraft manufacturer HAL’s proposal, he recalls, was received with great enthusiasm but was discarded for reasons he fails to fathom.

“HAL has considerable local, technological and industrial base in the area of designing and manufacturing helicopters,” says Parthasarathy. HAL, he points out, has designed, developed and prototyped the Tejas, India’s own Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). The IAF has placed an order for 140 Tejas fighter jets.

The Comptroller and Auditor-General (CAG) of India’s latest report, however, records how HAL’s delivery of indigenously-made helicopters flopped, with the Army discarding all 17 helicopters delivered to it.

Around the time the Apache sales were cleared, the government cleared a $400 million deal with Israel to purchase ‘Heron’ unmanned attack drones. This was while HAL was developing the Rustom-II, an attack drone of similar class.

Following the deal, Boeing declared it would manufacture the chopper’s fuselage in Hyderabad in partnership with the Tata group. Soon afterwards, the government followed this by easing FDI norms in the defence sector, but without mention of technology transfer. India being a top defence importer, the government has maintained that its intent was to promote indigenous manufacture with transfer of technology. Most of its executive decisions, however, seem to contradict this.

The question raised is why the Ministry of Defence bypassed the Make in India programme and decided to import the expensive hardware, rather than involve HAL and ensure transfer of technology.

The IAF required ‘gunships’ or assault helicopters to replace its aging Russian-made Mi-25 and Mi-35 choppers. It wanted 22 gunships and about nine heavy lift choppers. In 2008, the UPA-1 government floated a tender for the choppers and six companies placed bids. The deal was valued at around $1 billion. The tender was dropped after Boeing and Bell pulled out in 2009 and was re-issued later that year. Eurocopter, Augusta Westland and Sikorsky also opted out for various reasons.

In 2014, the government had a choice between Boeing, for its Apache A64D, an earlier version of which had first been used in Vietnam, and Mil’s Mi-28. The Boeing aircraft had been first tested during the ’70s and the Russian chopper a decade later.

`Some considered the Russian chopper to be superior in many ways and dismissed the Apache as a relic of the Vietnam War and the 1991 Iraq conflict.

The IAF and the MoD chose Boeing’s Apache for a direct procurement of 22 choppers. The view was that the Mi-28 lacked sufficient manoeuverability and it didn’t make the cut during trials. The direct military sale reportedly included no plans for manufacture, assembly or transfer of technology. It would also mean that the IAF would be dependent on Boeing for spares.

The issue of spares often plagues defence procurements. Priced much lower at first, prices for the spares are raised by 200-500 per cent once the procurement is made. Locating spares is another task—Indian agencies often have had to employ middlemen to locate and approach spares manufacturers.

The army’s army aviation corps had also demanded 39 similar assault choppers. However, no separate tender was issued for additional requirements and the government placed an order with Boeing on the same terms and conditions. That means an order for around 60 choppers through direct import, without any local manufacture, assembly or transfer of technology.

Parthasarthy claims that once he learnt of plans to import the large number of military choppers, he approached the then HAL chairman to ask if they could manufacture or at least assemble the helicopters here. HAL was already developing its light combat helicopters.

“HAL put together a proposal and I approached the MoD at its highest levels. This was around late 2014 or early 2015 and it fell in line with the government’s Make in India policy,” says Parthasarathy. “At the time, the decision for the 22 helicopters for the air force was still pending and the MoD promised to combine the air force and army orders. That would allow HAL to manufacture the 61 helicopters,” explains Parthasarthy.

This would have allowed HAL to build helicopters, get the technology and also be self-reliant on spares. But despite having given the impression that it was favourably disposed towards HAL, the ministry placed the order with Boeing for supplying the choppers between 2017 and 2020. MoD and Boeing did not respond to Outlook’s queries.

An editorial in the July 15 issue of the Economic and Political Weekly notes how essays written by experts at Western defence think tanks promote defence procurements to keep up with China and Pakistan, but exhort India to be “realistic about its domestic capacity to manufacture sophisticated combat aircraft”. The comment appears uncomfortably close, say defence experts, to considerations driving defence procurements that turn the government’s own initiatives into mere ‘jumla’.





Source:- Outlook India

http://www.defenceupdate.in/indias-lch-match-american-apache-gunship/

Is the LCH not in an entirely different weight class than the Apache?
LCH is (more than) a match for the PLA's Z-19.
Apache is (more than) a match for the PLA's Z-10.

 

[Adioz]

Chinese military equips all ground forces with new attack helicopters

BEIJING: China's military has equipped all of its ground forces with advanced WZ-10 combat helicopters which will be used to target battle tanks and air-to-air combat missions, a strategic move+ which could have implications for India+ .

Several WZ-10s have been delivered to an aviation brigade of the PLA's 13th Group Army under the Western Theatre Command, the People's Liberation Army's TV news channel reported.

This means that all of the Army's aviation units now have this advanced attack helicopter, state-run China Daily reported.

Senior Colonel Xu Guolin, deputy chief of the PLA Army's Aviation Equipment Bureau, told the news channel that all of the group armies will have at least one aviation brigade or regiment.

The helicopter was designed primarily for anti-tank missions, but now has a secondary air-to-air combat capability.

Wu Peixin, an aviation analyst in Beijing, said the PLA Army now has a strong force of dedicated combat helicopters thanks to the service of the WZ-10 and WZ-19, another attack helicopter that is less powerful than the WZ-10.

"The Army now needs more medium-lift, multipurpose helicopters such as the US Army's Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk," he said.

"This helicopter is capable of performing both combat operations and transport tasks."

Gao Zhuo, a military observer in Shanghai, said the PLA Army needs at least 3,000 helicopters, especially heavy-lift transport types and multipurpose models.

Meanwhile, the Chinese military has discounted media reports that China's stealth fighter J-20, currently undergoing trials, will be deployed in Tibet along the India-China border.

Reacting to reports that J-20 spotted at the Daocheng Yading Airport in Tibet, an article in the PLA website said that J-20 will be put into service soon but the 'China-India border is apparently not the ideal place for its deployment'.

"In addition, the world's highest airport there does not have a complete set of supporting facilities and such shortage will impede the function of J-20," it said.


"J-20 will not be deployed in Daocheng Yading airport as the airport is too close to the border, and it is vulnerable to India's first wave hit. If India is to deploy BrahMos missile on the China-India border, then the Daocheng Yading airport will likely to become its target," it said.




"Experts pointed out that for India, China is undoubtedly its largest opponent and therefore every move of the Chinese military will touch the nerve of Indian media," it said.
"India is not yet the biggest threat for China and though confrontation events along the border would occur from time to time, the overall situation is rather stable," it said.




"In this way, China does not put too much emphasis and focus targeting India. Chinese equipment deployment and drills along the border are mostly confirmatory, mainly to gain experience, improve high-altitude combat capability, and form deterrent ability," it said.

WE NEED LCH A.S.A.P.