Who is George Perkovich, Is George Perkovich pro-india or anti india wrt india developing nuclear weapons?
Global Think tank discussions on India & neighbourhood
- Thread starter ezsasa
- Start date
- Joined
- Jul 12, 2014
- Messages
- 31,929
- Likes
- 148,121
don't recall reading any of his literature, will have to look into it. he seems to be a democrat .
Swesh
Senior Member
- Joined
- Jan 12, 2020
- Messages
- 3,520
- Likes
- 12,179
Dr Mukulika Banerjee
Dr Mukulika Banerjee's profile at the LSE Department of Anthropology
www.lse.ac.uk
Know more about this hindu hater
Swesh
Senior Member
- Joined
- Jan 12, 2020
- Messages
- 3,520
- Likes
- 12,179
@SilentlAssassin265Dr Mukulika Banerjee
Dr Mukulika Banerjee's profile at the LSE Department of Anthropology
Know more about this hindu hater
Swesh
Senior Member
- Joined
- Jan 12, 2020
- Messages
- 3,520
- Likes
- 12,179
George Perkovich
- Joined
- Jul 12, 2014
- Messages
- 31,929
- Likes
- 148,121
critical commentary on happiness index by ORF.
=======
The unbearable sadness of “being happy”: Biases in the World Happiness Report
The World Happiness Report is a reminder of Oscar Wilde’s classic short story, The Happy Prince, who never witnessed true sorrow during his lifetime due to confinement in the four walls of his palace. The analogy is not at all distant; this report is far away from the realities of the Global South and is clearly based on an occidental definition of “happiness”. This annual report, devised by the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) and based on Gallup World Poll data that ranks countries based on their level of “happiness”, has been criticised in various corners and that too for valid reasons. For example, a UCLA report on the methods of World Happiness Index (WHI) titled “The Unhappy Quest for a Happiness Index” talks about some of the major methodological shortcomings. These shortcomings have resulted in biases in measurements and, eventually, in the rankings of the economies. This essay discusses at least seven points of departure from the core hypothesis of the report resulting from built-in biases that have tilted this entire ranking exercise in favour of the Global North.
Seven points of departure from the core hypothesis
The first point of departure lies with the cultural bias due to an occidental delineation of “happiness” that often does not apply to the developing and underdeveloped world. The survey questions are way too biased towards Western concepts of happiness, which may not apply to other cultures. For example, the survey asks, “Did you smile or laugh a lot yesterday?”. However, a particular group of people from specific cultures might not necessarily “laugh or smile a lot” when happy, rendering the methodology culturally biased. Furthermore, for a diverse country such as India, with so many different cultures, adequate measures must be taken to ensure proper representation of cultural groups in the survey, which is not the case. Hence, “culture” is a sticking point for behavioural definitions of happiness. To address this issue, the survey questions could be adapted to reflect the cultural values of different countries better. Anirudh Krishna earlier pointed this out in his definition of development, where he talked about the “stages of progress” (SOP) approach. While occidental definitions of development and poverty are straitjacket definitions based on their own metrics, Krishna’s approach clearly shows that development needs to be construed from a community perspective. The same applies to “happiness”. Therefore, the sheer standardisation of the definition of “happiness” goes against the spirit of respecting cultural diversity.
Thirdly, we observe a clear bias in the choice of the sample frame. The report is based on a survey of individuals in each country, but the sample size is relatively small. This can lead to biased results, especially in countries with large populations. The report states that it utilises the largest available sample but needs to clarify if the collected sample is adequate for robust and unbiased measures of the happiness index. Hence, it must consider increasing the sample size or using more advanced statistical methods. For a sizeable heterogeneous nation, a stratified random sampling process is of utmost need to conclude on the perception existing at a macro-scale. A complex and diverse system like India cannot be compared to a small island nation like Seychelles unless the sample frame is proper, represented, and adequate.
The fourth point of departure lies with the year-to-year changes in methodology that make comparing results from different years impossible. For example, the 2023 report uses a new variable corresponding to Institutional Trust, which isn’t present in the 2020 version of the report. This, in turn, makes it difficult to compare results from different years. To keep a certain level of parity, it must consider using a more consistent methodology over time, or at least provide guidelines to facilitate comparisons across years.
Sixth, the biggest flaw that this report has indulged in is through interpreting aspirations as “unhappiness”. The developing world is definitely going to be more aspirational and deserves to be so. However, that does not necessarily make them “unhappy”. In certain parts of Europe, degrowth as a philosophy has been talked about as the very next stage of their civilisation. This entails contraction from the existing development trajectory. Shall this be attributed to “dissatisfaction”, or shall this be looked at as “over-satiation”?
So, what purpose does this report serve? To us, almost nothing. In fact, the only nation in the world that looks at every developmental or political intervention through the canons of Gross National Happiness, i.e., Bhutan, is missing from the entire list. Undoubtedly, the Bhutanese parameters of happiness and the parameters considered here are different. This again brings us back to the previous question: Is this exercise worth it? Does this reflect reality? Or is this again a report to manifest the superiority of the Global North over the Global South on the basis of its own chosen parameters? If that is the case, for once, let happiness be delineated through the lens of the Global South, and see who stands where.
=======
The unbearable sadness of “being happy”: Biases in the World Happiness Report
The World Happiness Report is a reminder of Oscar Wilde’s classic short story, The Happy Prince, who never witnessed true sorrow during his lifetime due to confinement in the four walls of his palace. The analogy is not at all distant; this report is far away from the realities of the Global South and is clearly based on an occidental definition of “happiness”. This annual report, devised by the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) and based on Gallup World Poll data that ranks countries based on their level of “happiness”, has been criticised in various corners and that too for valid reasons. For example, a UCLA report on the methods of World Happiness Index (WHI) titled “The Unhappy Quest for a Happiness Index” talks about some of the major methodological shortcomings. These shortcomings have resulted in biases in measurements and, eventually, in the rankings of the economies. This essay discusses at least seven points of departure from the core hypothesis of the report resulting from built-in biases that have tilted this entire ranking exercise in favour of the Global North.
Seven points of departure from the core hypothesis
The first point of departure lies with the cultural bias due to an occidental delineation of “happiness” that often does not apply to the developing and underdeveloped world. The survey questions are way too biased towards Western concepts of happiness, which may not apply to other cultures. For example, the survey asks, “Did you smile or laugh a lot yesterday?”. However, a particular group of people from specific cultures might not necessarily “laugh or smile a lot” when happy, rendering the methodology culturally biased. Furthermore, for a diverse country such as India, with so many different cultures, adequate measures must be taken to ensure proper representation of cultural groups in the survey, which is not the case. Hence, “culture” is a sticking point for behavioural definitions of happiness. To address this issue, the survey questions could be adapted to reflect the cultural values of different countries better. Anirudh Krishna earlier pointed this out in his definition of development, where he talked about the “stages of progress” (SOP) approach. While occidental definitions of development and poverty are straitjacket definitions based on their own metrics, Krishna’s approach clearly shows that development needs to be construed from a community perspective. The same applies to “happiness”. Therefore, the sheer standardisation of the definition of “happiness” goes against the spirit of respecting cultural diversity.
The second point of departure lies with the response bias resulting in subjectivity. The report relies on self-reported data, which can be subject to biases and inaccuracies. Various perception-based surveys often account for this bias through the incorporation of a random disturbance term. However, if the question is kept open-ended, the possibility of response bias resulting in subjectivity increases. This has precisely been the case in this report. For example, the survey asks – “Did you experience the following feelings during a lot of the day yesterday? How about Enjoyment?”. How does one obtain an objective response that can render itself to cardinal and ordinal measurement metrics with such questions? Creating an index based on perceptions that are again contingent upon open-ended questions is clearly flawed. The bigger flaw lies with coming to conclusions with such faulty measurements. Whereas the index could have considered incorporating more objective measures of happiness, such as social and economic well-being measures, it has not done so.
Thirdly, we observe a clear bias in the choice of the sample frame. The report is based on a survey of individuals in each country, but the sample size is relatively small. This can lead to biased results, especially in countries with large populations. The report states that it utilises the largest available sample but needs to clarify if the collected sample is adequate for robust and unbiased measures of the happiness index. Hence, it must consider increasing the sample size or using more advanced statistical methods. For a sizeable heterogeneous nation, a stratified random sampling process is of utmost need to conclude on the perception existing at a macro-scale. A complex and diverse system like India cannot be compared to a small island nation like Seychelles unless the sample frame is proper, represented, and adequate.
The fourth point of departure lies with the year-to-year changes in methodology that make comparing results from different years impossible. For example, the 2023 report uses a new variable corresponding to Institutional Trust, which isn’t present in the 2020 version of the report. This, in turn, makes it difficult to compare results from different years. To keep a certain level of parity, it must consider using a more consistent methodology over time, or at least provide guidelines to facilitate comparisons across years.
Fifth, the entire analysis has failed to control for the geopolitical factors that have crept into the comparative static framework, thereby, rendering another layer of bias to the analysis. Countries with higher economic and political power tend to score higher on the index, which may not accurately reflect the happiness levels of their citizens. The indicators must also investigate the country’s wealth distribution to understand the happiness disparity across the nation and apply more nuanced measures of happiness that consider all citizens’ experiences. The index focuses on a limited set of factors to measure happiness. It ignores other important factors such as job security, social mobility, income inequality, access to education, and a broad number of measures in healthcare. This leads to an incomplete and often inaccurate description of the factors defining “happiness” and can lead to skewed results, favouring a specific group of countries.
Sixth, the biggest flaw that this report has indulged in is through interpreting aspirations as “unhappiness”. The developing world is definitely going to be more aspirational and deserves to be so. However, that does not necessarily make them “unhappy”. In certain parts of Europe, degrowth as a philosophy has been talked about as the very next stage of their civilisation. This entails contraction from the existing development trajectory. Shall this be attributed to “dissatisfaction”, or shall this be looked at as “over-satiation”?
Seventh, questions can always be raised about the treatment of missing data in the report on two grounds: a) imputing missing values using predicted values from regression models assumes that the relationships between the factors are consistent across all countries, which may not always be accurate; b) extrapolating time series data to impute missing values assumes that the trends will continue as they have in the past, which may not hold true in the future. Since the authors have used the imputed values to generate country rankings, there is always a risk that imputation methods could introduce biases or errors in the analysis. These factors require further scrutiny of the imputation methodology and raise questions about the ranking itself.
So, what purpose does this report serve? To us, almost nothing. In fact, the only nation in the world that looks at every developmental or political intervention through the canons of Gross National Happiness, i.e., Bhutan, is missing from the entire list. Undoubtedly, the Bhutanese parameters of happiness and the parameters considered here are different. This again brings us back to the previous question: Is this exercise worth it? Does this reflect reality? Or is this again a report to manifest the superiority of the Global North over the Global South on the basis of its own chosen parameters? If that is the case, for once, let happiness be delineated through the lens of the Global South, and see who stands where.
- Joined
- Jul 12, 2014
- Messages
- 31,929
- Likes
- 148,121
use this thread for higher level discussions at strategic level, not local events/incidents.
check the opening post on this thread.
Swesh
Senior Member
- Joined
- Jan 12, 2020
- Messages
- 3,520
- Likes
- 12,179
IPS Officer exposes Harvard's anti-India Drive
It appears that many so-called global institutions of repute have been blatantly encouraging anti-India narrative. Indian billionaires who often shell out mi...
- Joined
- Jul 12, 2014
- Messages
- 31,929
- Likes
- 148,121
nope, your post would go here.Short but relevant here I guess @ezsasaIPS Officer exposes Harvard's anti-India Drive
It appears that many so-called global institutions of repute have been blatantly encouraging anti-India narrative. Indian billionaires who often shell out mi...youtube.com
this thread is for experts/policy analysts who study geopolitics and policy for years and decades. what's happening in internet discourse is that every ram rahim robert can become "expert" if he/she makes enough YT videos or writes opeds or social media posts. this thread is not for those people/incidents.
- Joined
- Jul 12, 2014
- Messages
- 31,929
- Likes
- 148,121
Pentagon assessment for taiwan invasion by eleven could be as early as 2027
========
Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption: Interim report launch
Former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and former Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James discuss a new report on the challenges the United States faces in maintaining its technological and military advantage over its adversaries and what adaptations Congress, the Pentagon, and the defense sector should make to increase the pace of innovation adoption.
========
Commission on Defense Innovation Adoption: Interim report launch
Former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and former Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James discuss a new report on the challenges the United States faces in maintaining its technological and military advantage over its adversaries and what adaptations Congress, the Pentagon, and the defense sector should make to increase the pace of innovation adoption.
Swesh
Senior Member
- Joined
- Jan 12, 2020
- Messages
- 3,520
- Likes
- 12,179
Episode 5: Kautilya: India’s Forerunner to Machiavelli?
Kautilya lived in India from 375 to 283 BC. He ranks alongside Sun Tzu as one of the great early sages who wrote about the relations between polities, and thus also about wars between them. Kaushik Roy, Guru Nanak Chair Professor at Jadavpur University, India, joins Beatrice and Paul to discuss...
rusi.org
Kautilya lived in India from 375 to 283 BC. He ranks alongside Sun Tzu as one of the great early sages who wrote about the relations between polities, and thus also about wars between them. Kaushik Roy, Guru Nanak Chair Professor at Jadavpur University, India, joins Beatrice and Paul to discuss his work.
Kautilya’s approach to strategy included an understanding of inter-polity relations that assumed that one’s ‘enemy’s rear-enemy’ would be a good ally against the shared enemy: in other words, ‘make friends with your enemy’s enemy’. Meanwhile, insurgents would get support from other polities, and aggressors could be just, or just greedy. He thus paired ‘realist’ views with moral elements.
Also referred to as Chanakya or Vishnugupta, Kautilya was adviser to two successive emperors of the Mauryan Empire in India. He was thus not only a theoretician but also had considerable political influence. His main body of work is the Arthashastra, an ancient Sanskrit treatise on statecraft, political science, economic policy and military strategy. While one is hard-pushed to argue that he had a lasting influence on the following millennia of political or strategic thinking in India, his views are worth pondering, as they cast fresh light on strategy and on relations between states.
Kaushik Roy is Guru Nanak Chair Professor in the Department of History, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India and a Global Fellow at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway. He obtained his PhD from the Centre for Historical Studies, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
The views or statements expressed by guests are their own and their appearance on the podcast does not imply an endorsement of them or any entity they represent. Views and opinions expressed by RUSI employees are those of the employees and do not necessarily reflect the view of RUSI.
: Kautilya: India’s Forerunner to Machiavelli?
with Professor Kaushik Roy
Beatrice Heuser: Thank you Paul and hello from Hamburg.
Kautilya who lived in India from 375 to 283 BCE, ranks with Sunzi as one of the great early sages who wrote about the relations between polities and thus also about the wars between them. His main oeuvre is the Arthaśhāstra. Somewhat confusingly, he is also referred to as Chanakaya Vishnugupta. But let us stick to Kautilya here. Kautilya was advisor to two successive emperors of the Maurya Empire in India. Indeed, if I understand it correctly, he helped the first of them ascend to the throne. He is thus, not only a theoretician, but also had political influence.
Kaushik Roy is Guru Nanak Chair Professor in the Department of History, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India. He is also a Global Fellow at Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), Norway. He has been attached to this Institute in different capacities for about a decade. At present, he is engaged in PRIO’s ‘Warring with Machines’ project. Previously, he has taught at Visva Bharati University at Santiniketan,West Bengal India and also at Presidents College, Kolkata, India. He obtained his PhD from the Centre for Historical Studies, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has worked extensively on the wars of pre-modern, early modern and present eras.
Roy, Kautilya suggests that one should cultivate an “enemy’s rear-enemy”, in other words, make friends with your enemy’s enemy.(1)Kautilya is, therefore, often described as a “Realist”, i.e., somebody taking the most cynical view of international relations. What polities were there on the Indian Subcontinent, and were relations between them really that ruthlessly inimical?
Kaushik Roy: Okay. Now, Kautilya, his name comes from [the Sanskrit word] kutila, which means “the evil one.” So, there is an argument one can make that he is the father of “Realist” philosophy in international relations.
I mean if his operating range could be taken as the 3rd Century BCE, then he predates Machiavelli by quite a long time.(2) Kautliya also speaks of the power game, which is well into what is called the power theory of international relations.
Now basically, there are two traditions as regards Kautilya: one argues that Kautilya is a saint who later became a minister and helped Chandaragupta Maurya to found the Maurya Empire. And when Megasthenes(3) visited India, he had retired from Pataliputra, the capital of the Maurya Empire. Kautilya’s theory had a lot of influence on the succeeding empires in the history of India, the Gupta empire and later on to modern times, the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] government [which has been ruling since 2014] also, undertook extensive studies of Kautliya to see how they can be used in modern military affairs and present-day international relations.
But, the internal evidence of the Arthaśhāstra, Kautilya’s magnum opus (which has 15 chapters of which six are very important) points to the fact that they [the six important chapters] are written at a certain period of time, when the Maurya Empire was founded, in the 3rd Century BCE, and they have the stamp of a single author.
So, we can say that the core of the Arthaśhāstra was prepared by one person, Chanakya or Vishnugupta, whom we call kutila or Kautilya.
Panchatantra [exact date is unknown but between the 2nd Century BCE and 5th Century CE], was also influenced by Kautilya. The Panchatantra went from India to the Islamic caliphate through the channel of Muslim invasion, and also influenced Aesop’s Fables of Europe. So, Kautilya was ,as famous, if not more, like Sun Tzu, or Clausewitz(5). But very few in the Western world know about him, because Sanskrit is very difficult, and old Sanskrit is very difficult to decipher and read, and there are many different transcripts of Kautilya.
Royal United Services Institute
Kautilya lived in India from 375 to 283 BC. He ranks alongside Sun Tzu as one of the great early sages who wrote about the relations between polities, and thus also about wars between them. Kaushik Roy, Guru Nanak Chair Professor at Jadavpur University, India, joins Beatrice and Paul to discuss his work.
Play the episode
Read the transcript
Episode 5: Kautilya: India’s Forerunner to Machiavelli?
with Professor Kaushik Roy
Beatrice Heuser: Thank you Paul and hello from Hamburg.
Kautilya who lived in India from 375 to 283 BCE, ranks with Sunzi as one of the great early sages who wrote about the relations between polities and thus also about the wars between them. His main oeuvre is the Arthaśhāstra. Somewhat confusingly, he is also referred to as Chanakaya Vishnugupta. But let us stick to Kautilya here. Kautilya was advisor to two successive emperors of the Maurya Empire in India. Indeed, if I understand it correctly, he helped the first of them ascend to the throne. He is thus, not only a theoretician, but also had political influence.
Kaushik Roy is Guru Nanak Chair Professor in the Department of History, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India. He is also a Global Fellow at Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), Norway. He has been attached to this Institute in different capacities for about a decade. At present, he is engaged in PRIO’s ‘Warring with Machines’ project. Previously, he has taught at Visva Bharati University at Santiniketan, West Bengal India and also at Presidents College, Kolkata, India. He obtained his PhD from the Centre for Historical Studies, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has worked extensively on the wars of pre-modern, early modern and present eras.
He is a prolific author, and his publications include: A Global History of Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies [Routledge, 2022]: Battle for Malaya: The Indian Army in Defeat, 1941–1942 (Indiana University Press, 2019): Hinduism and the Ethics of Warfare in South Asia: From Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge University Press, 2012), and Brown Warriors of the Raj: on the Recruitment and Command in the Sepoy Army, 1859-1913 (Manohar, 2008).
Dr. Roy, Kautilya suggests that one should cultivate an “enemy’s rear-enemy”, in other words, make friends with your enemy’s enemy.(1)Kautilya is, therefore, often described as a “Realist”, i.e., somebody taking the most cynical view of international relations. What polities were there on the Indian Subcontinent, and were relations between them really that ruthlessly inimical?
Kaushik Roy: Okay. Now, Kautilya, his name comes from [the Sanskrit word] kutila, which means “the evil one.” So, there is an argument one can make that he is the father of “Realist” philosophy in international relations. I mean if his operating range could be taken as the 3rd Century BCE, then he predates Machiavelli by quite a long time.(2) Kautliya also speaks of the power game, which is well into what is called the power theory of international relations.
Now basically, there are two traditions as regards Kautilya: one argues that Kautilya is a saint who later became a minister and helped Chandaragupta Maurya to found the Maurya Empire. And when Megasthenes(3) visited India, he had retired from Pataliputra, the capital of the Maurya Empire. Kautilya’s theory had a lot of influence on the succeeding empires in the history of India, the Gupta empire and later on to modern times, the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] government [which has been ruling since 2014] also, undertook extensive studies of Kautliya to see how they can be used in modern military affairs and present-day international relations.
On the other hand, there is the other argument that Kautilya is a mythical person, and actually there is a corpus of political thought which evolved gradually in ancient India and given the name of Kautilya. We also know that such a debate also exists about Sunzi, whether he was a historical person or not a historical person.(4)But, the internal evidence of the Arthaśhāstra, Kautilya’s magnum opus (which has 15 chapters of which six are very important) points to the fact that they [the six important chapters] are written at a certain period of time, when the Maurya Empire was founded, in the 3rd Century BCE, and they have the stamp of a single author.
So, we can say that the core of the Arthaśhāstra was prepared by one person, Chanakya or Vishnugupta, whom we call kutila or Kautilya.
In fact, the Panchatantra [exact date is unknown but between the 2nd Century BCE and 5th Century CE], was also influenced by Kautilya. The Panchatantra went from India to the Islamic caliphate through the channel of Muslim invasion, and also influenced Aesop’s Fables of Europe. So, Kautilya was ,as famous, if not more, like Sun Tzu, or Clausewitz(5). But very few in the Western world know about him, because Sanskrit is very difficult, and old Sanskrit is very difficult to decipher and read, and there are many different transcripts of Kautilya.
Beatrice Heuser: You did say you thought he had an influence not only on the Arab world but also on Europe. So, if it was not the manuscripts themselves that were legible, how/when did it reach Europe for the first time?
Kaushik Roy: It reached Europe in the 19th Century. What I am saying is that Kautilya’s work, the Arthaśhāstra, influenced the Panchatantra, which influenced Islamic West Asia. It also influenced what you call Aesop’s Fables. In that indirect way we can trace it, but the trajectory of the history of ideas is very murky. But basically, the Arthaśhāstra, deals with what Kautilya categorises as the modern terminology of the grand strategist. So, the Arthaśhāstra, deals with several layers. One is the grand strategy. Another is military strategy. And third he deals with tactics.
Now about grand strategy, Kautilya says that policy, niti or rashtraniti, (state policy), is an amalgamation of politics, finance, diplomacy, and military. In other words, the military represents force in Hinduism or in Sanskrit, danda, now that comes last. So, first politics, then you have foreign policy, then you have finance, and finally you have the military
At the grand strategic level, Kautilya says, somewhat similar to that of Sunzi, first resort to diplomacy, if necessary, armed diplomacy, deterrence, coercion. Only if all of this fails, then you use force. But Kautilya warns that use of force is anitya, uncertain, is dangerous. It is not certain what that strategic output will be. So, Kautilya advises the vijigishu (the would-be ruler or emperor) that the use of brute force always results in strategic bankruptcy.
Now, in Kautilya’s format, there are three types of war: Conventional war; Unconventional war, that is insurgency, and finally; Limited war. In conventional war, he says that the aim is to smash the enemy, and that is dangerous. Better to fight a limited war, grab some territories, make him subordinate to the hegemonic ruler, and then establish alliances, multiple alliances, with other states to create a hegemonic empire.
Now Kautilya also speaks of unconventional war, to assassinate kings, use poison, use spies. In fact, Kautilya can be called a spy master: single spies, double spies, triple spies, they all are in the arsenal of Kautilya’s Arthaśhāstra for how to conduct unconventional war
Beatrice Heuser: I found it very interesting just how Kautilya is interested in ruses and espionage, but also in agents of influence. And there seem to be quite a lot of sections when he attributes to women all the roles of subversion and creating quarrels between different leaders by insinuating that one of them was making unchaste proposals to them, et cetera. So apparently he had armies of women spies and agents of influence.(6)
Kaushik Roy: I know Kautilya, like other Brahmans, did not suffer from so-called gender bias. He said men and women could be used in tandem for conducting unconventional warfare. Kautilya says, that there should be spies in the shape of mendicants, religious leaders. There should spies in the form of traders, there should female spies.
There are two types of female spies. One is those who are young and beautiful, who will try to get close to the foreign power’s leadership, and try to extract information from them or try to assassinate them, poison them or force them, encourage them to change alliances. And also killer spies, both male and female. There is another type of spies, who are not merely tactical, but Kautilya said they would deal with strategic and operational issues; they are bhikshus - female mendicants - stationed in particular areas of the foreign territories for quite a long time and try to interact with the people of foreign territories and gather information about the conditions of the foreign countries: their economic conditions; their political conditions; what the people are thinking. And, Kautilya also says that they should be used to spread misinformation and disinformation.
Beatrice Heuser: So really, all the hybrid warfare thinking goes back to Kautilya if not even earlier.
Paul O’Neill: It is interesting to see how we are getting the diplomatic, the information, the military and the economic levers of power in Kautilya's work, even in the 3rd Century BCE.
His tenure covers quite a lot of different kinds of state. He starts off, I think, where India is resisting the armies of Alexander [the Great]. So, there is a resistance element. He then seeks to overthrow the Nanda dynasty. Then build an empire, the Maurya Empire. And then of course there comes the point at which you have the Mauryan Empire and the Seleucid Empire that have to come to an accommodation. How does he change his approach, or his theories about the kind of warfare, the kind of state security apparatus needed to manage those different types of state?
Royal United Services Institute
Menu
Podcasts
Talking Strategy
TALKING STRATEGY PODCASTS
Episode 5: Kautilya: India’s Forerunner to Machiavelli?
Beatrice Heuser and Paul O’Neill
7 March 2023
32 Minute Listen
SHARE
Kautilya lived in India from 375 to 283 BC. He ranks alongside Sun Tzu as one of the great early sages who wrote about the relations between polities, and thus also about wars between them. Kaushik Roy, Guru Nanak Chair Professor at Jadavpur University, India, joins Beatrice and Paul to discuss his work.
Play the episode
Read the transcript
Episode 5: Kautilya: India’s Forerunner to Machiavelli?
with Professor Kaushik Roy
Beatrice Heuser: Thank you Paul and hello from Hamburg.
Kautilya who lived in India from 375 to 283 BCE, ranks with Sunzi as one of the great early sages who wrote about the relations between polities and thus also about the wars between them. His main oeuvre is the Arthaśhāstra. Somewhat confusingly, he is also referred to as Chanakaya Vishnugupta. But let us stick to Kautilya here. Kautilya was advisor to two successive emperors of the Maurya Empire in India. Indeed, if I understand it correctly, he helped the first of them ascend to the throne. He is thus, not only a theoretician, but also had political influence.
Kaushik Roy is Guru Nanak Chair Professor in the Department of History, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India. He is also a Global Fellow at Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), Norway. He has been attached to this Institute in different capacities for about a decade. At present, he is engaged in PRIO’s ‘Warring with Machines’ project. Previously, he has taught at Visva Bharati University at Santiniketan, West Bengal India and also at Presidents College, Kolkata, India. He obtained his PhD from the Centre for Historical Studies, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has worked extensively on the wars of pre-modern, early modern and present eras.
He is a prolific author, and his publications include: A Global History of Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies [Routledge, 2022]: Battle for Malaya: The Indian Army in Defeat, 1941–1942 (Indiana University Press, 2019): Hinduism and the Ethics of Warfare in South Asia: From Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge University Press, 2012), and Brown Warriors of the Raj: on the Recruitment and Command in the Sepoy Army, 1859-1913 (Manohar, 2008).
Dr. Roy, Kautilya suggests that one should cultivate an “enemy’s rear-enemy”, in other words, make friends with your enemy’s enemy.(1)Kautilya is, therefore, often described as a “Realist”, i.e., somebody taking the most cynical view of international relations. What polities were there on the Indian Subcontinent, and were relations between them really that ruthlessly inimical?
Kaushik Roy: Okay. Now, Kautilya, his name comes from [the Sanskrit word] kutila, which means “the evil one.” So, there is an argument one can make that he is the father of “Realist” philosophy in international relations. I mean if his operating range could be taken as the 3rd Century BCE, then he predates Machiavelli by quite a long time.(2) Kautliya also speaks of the power game, which is well into what is called the power theory of international relations.
Now basically, there are two traditions as regards Kautilya: one argues that Kautilya is a saint who later became a minister and helped Chandaragupta Maurya to found the Maurya Empire. And when Megasthenes(3) visited India, he had retired from Pataliputra, the capital of the Maurya Empire. Kautilya’s theory had a lot of influence on the succeeding empires in the history of India, the Gupta empire and later on to modern times, the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] government [which has been ruling since 2014] also, undertook extensive studies of Kautliya to see how they can be used in modern military affairs and present-day international relations.
On the other hand, there is the other argument that Kautilya is a mythical person, and actually there is a corpus of political thought which evolved gradually in ancient India and given the name of Kautilya. We also know that such a debate also exists about Sunzi, whether he was a historical person or not a historical person.(4)But, the internal evidence of the Arthaśhāstra, Kautilya’s magnum opus (which has 15 chapters of which six are very important) points to the fact that they [the six important chapters] are written at a certain period of time, when the Maurya Empire was founded, in the 3rd Century BCE, and they have the stamp of a single author.
So, we can say that the core of the Arthaśhāstra was prepared by one person, Chanakya or Vishnugupta, whom we call kutila or Kautilya.
In fact, the Panchatantra [exact date is unknown but between the 2nd Century BCE and 5th Century CE], was also influenced by Kautilya. The Panchatantra went from India to the Islamic caliphate through the channel of Muslim invasion, and also influenced Aesop’s Fables of Europe. So, Kautilya was ,as famous, if not more, like Sun Tzu, or Clausewitz(5). But very few in the Western world know about him, because Sanskrit is very difficult, and old Sanskrit is very difficult to decipher and read, and there are many different transcripts of Kautilya.
Beatrice Heuser: You did say you thought he had an influence not only on the Arab world but also on Europe. So, if it was not the manuscripts themselves that were legible, how/when did it reach Europe for the first time?
Kaushik Roy: It reached Europe in the 19th Century. What I am saying is that Kautilya’s work, the Arthaśhāstra, influenced the Panchatantra, which influenced Islamic West Asia. It also influenced what you call Aesop’s Fables. In that indirect way we can trace it, but the trajectory of the history of ideas is very murky. But basically, the Arthaśhāstra, deals with what Kautilya categorises as the modern terminology of the grand strategist. So, the Arthaśhāstra, deals with several layers. One is the grand strategy. Another is military strategy. And third he deals with tactics.
Now about grand strategy, Kautilya says that policy, niti or rashtraniti, (state policy), is an amalgamation of politics, finance, diplomacy, and military. In other words, the military represents force in Hinduism or in Sanskrit, danda, now that comes last. So, first politics, then you have foreign policy, then you have finance, and finally you have the military
At the grand strategic level, Kautilya says, somewhat similar to that of Sunzi, first resort to diplomacy, if necessary, armed diplomacy, deterrence, coercion. Only if all of this fails, then you use force. But Kautilya warns that use of force is anitya, uncertain, is dangerous. It is not certain what that strategic output will be. So, Kautilya advises the vijigishu (the would-be ruler or emperor) that the use of brute force always results in strategic bankruptcy.
Now, in Kautilya’s format, there are three types of war: Conventional war; Unconventional war, that is insurgency, and finally; Limited war. In conventional war, he says that the aim is to smash the enemy, and that is dangerous. Better to fight a limited war, grab some territories, make him subordinate to the hegemonic ruler, and then establish alliances, multiple alliances, with other states to create a hegemonic empire.
Now Kautilya also speaks of unconventional war, to assassinate kings, use poison, use spies. In fact, Kautilya can be called a spy master: single spies, double spies, triple spies, they all are in the arsenal of Kautilya’s Arthaśhāstra for how to conduct unconventional war.
Beatrice Heuser: I found it very interesting just how Kautilya is interested in ruses and espionage, but also in agents of influence. And there seem to be quite a lot of sections when he attributes to women all the roles of subversion and creating quarrels between different leaders by insinuating that one of them was making unchaste proposals to them, et cetera. So apparently he had armies of women spies and agents of influence.(6)
Kaushik Roy: I know Kautilya, like other Brahmans, did not suffer from so-called gender bias. He said men and women could be used in tandem for conducting unconventional warfare. Kautilya says, that there should be spies in the shape of mendicants, religious leaders. There should spies in the form of traders, there should female spies.
There are two types of female spies. One is those who are young and beautiful, who will try to get close to the foreign power’s leadership, and try to extract information from them or try to assassinate them, poison them or force them, encourage them to change alliances. And also killer spies, both male and female. There is another type of spies, who are not merely tactical, but Kautilya said they would deal with strategic and operational issues; they are bhikshus - female mendicants - stationed in particular areas of the foreign territories for quite a long time and try to interact with the people of foreign territories and gather information about the conditions of the foreign countries: their economic conditions; their political conditions; what the people are thinking. And, Kautilya also says that they should be used to spread misinformation and disinformation.
Beatrice Heuser: So really, all the hybrid warfare thinking goes back to Kautilya if not even earlier.
Paul O’Neill: It is interesting to see how we are getting the diplomatic, the information, the military and the economic levers of power in Kautilya's work, even in the 3rd Century BCE.
His tenure covers quite a lot of different kinds of state. He starts off, I think, where India is resisting the armies of Alexander [the Great]. So, there is a resistance element. He then seeks to overthrow the Nanda dynasty. Then build an empire, the Maurya Empire. And then of course there comes the point at which you have the Mauryan Empire and the Seleucid Empire that have to come to an accommodation. How does he change his approach, or his theories about the kind of warfare, the kind of state security apparatus needed to manage those different types of state?
Kaushik Roy: There are two books. One is the book on thoughts (diplomacy). And another book is on conventional warfare. Or you might say that these books are really chapters [of the Arthaśhāstra]. First, I will take the military aspect, and then I will deal with the broader political aspects and the diplomatic aspect.
About the military aspects, Kautilya says first take up the issue of the army. initially the Indians before 500 BCE used to fight only with infantry (paiks), and hastis (elephants). But the Macedonian invasion showed the importance of cavalry. Paurava (or Porus) was defeated at the Battle of Hydaspes by the Companion Cavalry [of Alexander III], and especially the role played by the Central Asian horse-archers who were employed by Alexander, whom he had hired after defeating the satraps of Bactria and Sogdiana. So, Kautilya says that the twofold army - infantry and elephants - should be changed to a fourfold army. And the other two branches would be: one, cavalry, and second, more important, chariots.
Now about cavalry, he emphasizes training. What is more important, Kautilya talks about combined training of even small units. That a composite unit should include some infantry soldiers, some chariots, some elephants and of course some cavalry. The other important element which Kautilya introduces is the strategic role played by forts. Kautilya says if the army is defeated and is withdrawn, then there should be strong forts, not in the interior of the country, but at the borders.
Episode 5: Kautilya: India’s Forerunner to Machiavelli?
Kautilya lived in India from 375 to 283 BC. He ranks alongside Sun Tzu as one of the great early sages who wrote about the relations between polities, and thus also about wars between them. Kaushik Roy, Guru Nanak Chair Professor at Jadavpur University, India, joins Beatrice and Paul to discuss...
rusi.org
Swesh
Senior Member
- Joined
- Jan 12, 2020
- Messages
- 3,520
- Likes
- 12,179
Beatrice Heuser: I think that is very interesting that you are talking about the interior and the exterior of a country. Because one of the things that emerges from Kautilya is how he links internal troubles with external powers. The internal trouble means that your insurgents etc. may have the support of external forces, which gives some support to my theory that you very rarely have insurgencies that are purely domestic: there tends to be this international element to them, very well elaborated by Kautilya.
Kaushik Roy: Exactly. And that brings us back to the issue of hybrid warfare. You know, before the 1980s, from Clausewitz onwards, my understanding is that Western theorists have made a clear-cut compartmentalised division between conventional war and unconventional war, what you call insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. Kautilya says that such a division is non-existent in practice, and that theory should accommodate practice. Kautilya speaks of a grey line, or a continuum, where at one end you have high intensity conventional war, at another end you have politically-motivated assassinations, small cells of assassins and spies operating on enemy territory. If I may use the term of Thomas X. Hammes’s [the concept of] fifth-generation warfare(7) or hybrid warfare. And then, finally, limited conventional war and unconventional war.
So, Kautilya has a model. Kautilya says that it would be wrong for the ministers to think there is a clear war and peace; there is no clear-cut division between high intensity war and low intensity war. There is a continuum, and states follow a dual policy. That means at one level, you have a peace treaty with the neighbouring country, at another level, simultaneously, you are encouraging disaffection and rebellion (bopa) in the enemy country. Thirdly, you are at the same time, giving money and ideological and moral aid to the enemies of your enemy.
Beatrice Heuser: This is why I think people say that he is so Machiavellian his approach. But what is really, really important there is that all you said illustrates the fact that the West has an unduly binary approach to war, or has this very strong binary approach, whereas many other cultures, and Kautilya is an excellent example, Sunzi is an excellent example, do not share that. And this shows in a way how difficult it is for the West to operate in other cultures where this binary approach does not exist.
Kaushik Roy: I think the binary approach is inapplicable in the case of India, or ancient India, and probably to some extent China, because the binary approach to strategic affairs, as you probably know better, came up in Europe because of the Peace of Westphalia,(8)and the small nation states operating within Europe. While in India you have various races, various tribes. You have tribes, you have settled agriculturists, you have pastoral nomads and semi pastoral nomads, you have migratory people. You have a varied ecology in a big country where a uniform administration is not possible, because people are speaking different dialects, also different religions. So, in this multi-ethnic, multi-cultural country, to build up an empire, according to Kautilya, you need a multi-dimensional strategy, which also includes various levels of war making and peace-making.
And because it is such a big country, it is also vulnerable to foreign influence, foreign pressure, both military and economic. So here, Kautilya speaks of his Six-fold Strategy: the Mandala theory.(9) You know the most important thing that he said? That in the international state system, no country can be isolated; you are a family member. And so, he operates what he calls the Mandala policy – a circle of states. He says India is at the core, just as the Chinese might say they are. Then the states which are bordering India, by their natural location, have to be enemies because there will be border conflicts. So, they would be enemies. But those countries which are at the border of the enemy countries, they are our allies. So, we have amitra (enemy) then mitra (ally). Then those enemy’s enemies, who are our friends, they have enemies; so, they might join hands with India’s enemies. So, these circles, from the hub of this wheel go outwards and outwards and outwards [in alternating rings].
Beatrice Heuser: You see this also in Southeast Asia where of course the influence of Sanskrit writing was very important. The Mandala idea is very much one that dominates Southeast Asian politics, practically through the 19th century CE, and it really is most easily imaginable as concentric circles with you at the centre, and then adversaries around you because you have border conflicts with them, and then your enemies’ enemies in another circle around them, are your natural allies. Very interesting.
Paul O’Neill: To what extent was that Mandala idea a [static] simplification? Because when [Kautilya] decides to overthrow the Nanda dynasty, he seeks help from the Himalayan king, and promises half the kingdom that they inherit. So, clearly my enemy's enemy is my friend in that context. But then there is some suggestion that having taken over the Nanda dynasty, then he has the man [the Himalayan king] assassinated. So, is it a gradual expansion, and therefore it changes the nature of the countries bordering yours or the regions or the states bordering yours? And so, as you grow, those who had been your enemies, now become your friends and those who had been your friends, now become your enemies; a much more fluid model than a rather static map-based assessment of where friends and enemies might reside?
Kaushik Roy: Actually there are two aspects or levels. At one level, Kautilya says that the Mandala theory must be used by a small state to gain hegemony within the subcontinent. Once that state establishes an ekarat, an empire, within the subcontinent, then the Mandala theory could be pushed further with the foreign states to create an amity of alliances and to prevent any hostile alliance emerging against India. And then, that stable big state should be used to balance the power equation.
But Kautilya warns the ruler, the vijigishu, that once you have conquered India and established a big empire, meaning from the Kabul/Kandahar line in Afghanistan in the west, to the borders of Yunnan/Burma in the east, from the Himalayas and Karakorum in the north to Cape Comorin in the south. Then, Kautilya says that you have reached the natural limits. Do not try to expand further because of geography. You have the deserts of Persia on one side, arid wastes of Central Asia, and you have oceans bordering in the South and West and East [of India], and further East, you have jungles of Burma. Then, Kautilya says that the stable big empire should make use of Mandala, but with a different perspective. That is to prevent the emergence of any hostile influence or alliance among the bordering, foreign countries.
Let me give one example. In the later days of the Maurya Empire, the Seleucid Empire(10) was breaking up. You have the Indo-Bactrian Empire of Bactria and Sogdiana. You have the Seleucid Empire, along Iran and Iraq. So, the Maurya Empire had enmity with the Indo-Bactrian Kingdom, which was attacking India (Punjab), but had a positive relationship with the Seleucid Empire. So, the Maurya Empire established a diplomatic alliance with the Seleucid empire, which had enmity with the Indo-Bactrian Kingdom as it is established on the two provinces Bactria and Sogdiana, which had become independent of the Seleucid Empire. Before that, when the Seleucids attacked India, then Chandragupta Maurya maintained good relations with [Ptolemic] Egypt, the enemy of the Seleucids. So, this is the Mandala theory implemented in practice.
Beatrice Heuser: Why was he [Kautilya] actually placed so well to pontificate on war? He was not an active soldier of any sorts, and yet he gives us, in very large parts of his work, very detailed, very practical prescriptions, about the conduct of war. This is the same accusation that is normally levelled against Machiavelli, of course, if they say he is not really a soldier, how can he talk about all these things?
And perhaps linked with that, something I will come to in a moment. Did he have, a priestly dimension?
Kaushik Roy: Kautilya was not a soldier. He was from the princely class, intellectual class. He never served in the army. He never commanded the army. But Kautilya speaks about war, and military theories and tactics to be followed. There is one tradition in India (the Upanishads) that speaks of peace. In reaction to that, Kautilya speaks of use of war in statecraft. So, Kautilya is reacting to the idealist philosophy of that time. Buddhist philosophy particularly of that time speaks of peace and disbanding the army. So, Kautilya is also speaking against that. So, within this matrix of ideas, Kautilya is one pole, and the other pole is the Upanishads/Buddhist tradition.
But the important thing is that Kautilya never gives primacy to the army and warfare in his whole gamut of ideas. Kautilya provides us with a list that is very important. The list shows the salaries and the positions of the various officers in the empire. At the top is the Minister for Finance and Foreign Affairs. And the Minister of War comes at the fourth or fifth position. And the General, senapati, his position, economically and culturally and socially, is much, much lower. This goes back to your early query about the role of Brahmanism in Kautilya’s theory of ideas. Idealistically, ancient society has four layers: first come the Brahmans, the intellectual class; then Kshatriyas, rulers or generals; third the Vaishyas (business) class and fourth come the Shudras who are the cultivators [working class]. Kautilya says that this division of society must be maintained. The Kshatriyas, the soldiers and generals, they should always be subordinated to the Brahmans, who were the intellectuals, who were the priestly class, and who provided most of the ministers and civil administrators. And they would be at the top, and the army should be subordinated. Kautilya also says – and here is a modern relevance - that the senapati should not be called to the Royal Council.
Interestingly in present-day India, even now, the chief of the services of army, navy and air force, and also the chairman of the chief of staff committee, they are not formal members of the cabinet committee for political affairs, the highest policy making body. They could only come if the Prime Minister agrees. In fact, they could also not meet the Prime Minister without the President's approval. So, that is quite a strong civil-military relationship: civilian above, the military below. And all these could be traced back to the Kautilyan tradition that the army should be subordinated to the policy-making body and politicians. And the Brahmans should make policy, not the senapatis. Their attention and focus should be on the tactical aspect.
Paul O’Neill: The point about the stratification of society you have just mentioned, Professor, is interesting because I understand that he was also quite an advocate of the idea of societal support. So, he introduced rights or support for pregnant women, for the elderly, for the disabled, for people who were less able to care for themselves.
Was that driven by a desire to see a stable society that might be then less prone to the kind of espionage, the interference, the hybrid warfare attacking his own dynasty? Or was that driven largely by his religious perspective as a Brahman and therefore this sense of some kind of fairness or equity?
Kaushik Roy: Kautilya was speaking of a welfare state, not because he was a liberal humanist, but for instrumental reasons. Kautilya warns the ruler, ‘Don’t over tax the peasants, then there will be a rebellion, bopa, and then the foreign powers would intervene’. And here Kautilya has the historical example of the Nandas. The Nanda Empire collapsed because the rulers overtaxed the peasantry: 50% taxation. Kautilya says that taxation of the gross produce of the land should never exceed 20%. An undertaxed peasantry who is content is better than discontented peasantry. So, Kautilya’s agrarian taxation policy had an influence throughout history, especially among the Hindu kingdoms.
Now, Kautilya also says that it is much more financially ruinous to police the countryside with costly coercive machinery, that results in the militarization of the society. Better, give some carrots to the people lower down. And here Kautilya makes a break with the Brahmanical tradition of Manu and all those other theories. Kautilya says that even the poor who belong to the lowest level, the Shudras, the state should look after them.
It had an influence on Ashoka(11) who built roads, inns, rest houses, places for watering the horses, free food for poor people, in some localities, in pursuit of the policy of keeping the people happy so that there would not be insurgencies within the realm, especially in the countryside.
Beatrice Heuser: You seem to portray him as so utilitarian. But let me just end perhaps with a quotation that could come straight out of a European medieval text on how to prepare yourself for a Just War, suggesting that one should “fast and practice penance before going into battle”, being “desirous of getting into heaven” if somebody lost their lives.(12)We also have another embryonic idea of Just War: Kautilya distinguished between a “just conqueror” - perhaps that's just the translation I saw - “a demon-like conqueror”, or a “greedy conqueror”; advising a weak king to seek the protection of a just conqueror,(13)or, one might say, advising a weak power to seek the protection of a benevolent hegemon. But this whole idea of justice, is that something that is also there in his thinking, and not just a purely utilitarian streak?
Kaushik Roy: Although Kautilya is a “Realist”, there are elements of ethics in it. For example, he divides the whole conduct of war into: dharmayuddha and kutayuddha. Dharma was not at that time used as a word for religion, that came much later, during the medieval times. Dharma means ‘way of life’, conducting a just way of life. In dhamrayuddha only the enemy’s combat army should be destroyed, and especially the women, the children, the fruit trees, the edible crops, they should not be destroyed. In fact, there is a passage in Megasthenes who says he is shocked to see that in India, when the soldiers march, they do not destroy the crops in the field, and they do not disturb the tillers of the land. So, that is the ethical tradition. But Kautilya warns that the strategic situation might change when the state is on the receiving side, and it is not winning the conventional war, the enemy is coming. Then, you have to harass the enemy’s countryside, then you have to destroy the livestock of the people, you have to follow a scorched earth policy.
But Kautilya warns that ends do not always justify the means. There should be a balance. You know, there are like 10 commandments of Mao: no rape; no molestation; no kidnapping; no entry into private houses, etc. They should be strictly followed. It is not for humanitarian, it is not public relations, policy. So, there is an ethical aspect in Kautilyan thinking.
Beatrice Heuser: Fascinating. I think you've given us all a lot more interest in reading the texts. Thank you very much for shedding light on this extraordinarily complex character with this extraordinarily complex thinking, which seemed to have anything from very ethical to mostly utilitarian.
Thank you very much for joining us today, Dr. Kaushik Roy.
1) Kautilya, Arthaśhāstra Book XII, Concerning a Powerful Enemy, Chap. 3.
2) Talking Strategy, Season 2, Episode 6, Arming the Citizens: Machiavelli’s Quest for Virtue, with Professor Maurizio Viroli.
3) Megasthenes (350-290 BCE) was a Greek historian, diplomat and Indian ethnographer, who described Mauryan India in his book Indica, which only now exists in fragments.
4) Talking Strategy, Season 2, Episode 1, Classical Chinese Strategic Thought: Sunzi, with Dr Peter Lorge.
5) Talking Strategy, Season 1, Episode 6, Carl von Clausewitz; the Father of Strategic Studies with Professor Beatrice Heuser.
6)Arthaśhāstra, Book XI, The Conduct of Corporations, Chap. 1.
7) Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, Zenith Press, 2006.
8) The Peace of Westphalia is the term used for two treaties signed in the Westphalian cities of Osnabrück and Munster in 1648 that brought to an end the Thirty Years War in Europe (1618-1648) between Catholic and Protestant powers and their allies.
9)Arthaśhāstra, Book VII, The End of the Six-fold Policy.
10) The Seleucid Empire was founded by Seleucus I Nicator (358-281BCE), a Macedonian general in Alexander the Great’s Army when the Macedonian Empire ended in the power struggles on Alexander’s death.
11) Also known as Ashoka the Great, who was a ruler of the Maurya Empire during c. 268to 232 BCE.
12)Arthaśhāstra, Book X, Relating to War, Chap. III: „"It is declared in the Vedas that the goal which is reached by sacrificers after performing the final ablutions in sacrifices in which the priests have been duly paid for is the very goal which brave men are destined to attain." About this there are the two verses
‘Beyond those places which Bráhmans, desirous of getting into heaven, attain together with their sacrificial instruments by performing a number of sacrifices, or by practising penance are the places which brave men, losing life in good battles, are destined to attain immediately.
Let not a new vessel filled with water, consecrated and covered over with darbha grass be the acquisition of that man who does not fight in return for the subsistence received by him from his master, and who is therefore destined to go to hell.’
Astrologers and other followers of the king should infuse spirit into his army by pointing out the impregnable nature of the array of his army, his power to associate with gods, and his omnisciency; and they should at the same time frighten the enemy. The day before the battle, the king should fast and lie down on his chariot with weapons. He should also make oblations into the fire pronouncing the mantras of the Atharvaveda, and cause prayers to be offered for the good of the victors as well as of those who attain to heaven by dying in the battle-field. He should also submit his person to Bráhmans.“
13)Arthaśhāstra, Book XII, Concerning a Powerful Enemy, Chap. 1.
I suggest these scholars read a 1964 paper by George Modelski:
"Kautilya: Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu World Author(s): George Modelski
Source: The American Political Science Review,Vol. 58, No. 3 (Sep., 1964), pp. 549-560"
Kaushik Roy: Exactly. And that brings us back to the issue of hybrid warfare. You know, before the 1980s, from Clausewitz onwards, my understanding is that Western theorists have made a clear-cut compartmentalised division between conventional war and unconventional war, what you call insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. Kautilya says that such a division is non-existent in practice, and that theory should accommodate practice. Kautilya speaks of a grey line, or a continuum, where at one end you have high intensity conventional war, at another end you have politically-motivated assassinations, small cells of assassins and spies operating on enemy territory. If I may use the term of Thomas X. Hammes’s [the concept of] fifth-generation warfare(7) or hybrid warfare. And then, finally, limited conventional war and unconventional war.
So, Kautilya has a model. Kautilya says that it would be wrong for the ministers to think there is a clear war and peace; there is no clear-cut division between high intensity war and low intensity war. There is a continuum, and states follow a dual policy. That means at one level, you have a peace treaty with the neighbouring country, at another level, simultaneously, you are encouraging disaffection and rebellion (bopa) in the enemy country. Thirdly, you are at the same time, giving money and ideological and moral aid to the enemies of your enemy.
Beatrice Heuser: This is why I think people say that he is so Machiavellian his approach. But what is really, really important there is that all you said illustrates the fact that the West has an unduly binary approach to war, or has this very strong binary approach, whereas many other cultures, and Kautilya is an excellent example, Sunzi is an excellent example, do not share that. And this shows in a way how difficult it is for the West to operate in other cultures where this binary approach does not exist.
Kaushik Roy: I think the binary approach is inapplicable in the case of India, or ancient India, and probably to some extent China, because the binary approach to strategic affairs, as you probably know better, came up in Europe because of the Peace of Westphalia,(8)and the small nation states operating within Europe. While in India you have various races, various tribes. You have tribes, you have settled agriculturists, you have pastoral nomads and semi pastoral nomads, you have migratory people. You have a varied ecology in a big country where a uniform administration is not possible, because people are speaking different dialects, also different religions. So, in this multi-ethnic, multi-cultural country, to build up an empire, according to Kautilya, you need a multi-dimensional strategy, which also includes various levels of war making and peace-making.
And because it is such a big country, it is also vulnerable to foreign influence, foreign pressure, both military and economic. So here, Kautilya speaks of his Six-fold Strategy: the Mandala theory.(9) You know the most important thing that he said? That in the international state system, no country can be isolated; you are a family member. And so, he operates what he calls the Mandala policy – a circle of states. He says India is at the core, just as the Chinese might say they are. Then the states which are bordering India, by their natural location, have to be enemies because there will be border conflicts. So, they would be enemies. But those countries which are at the border of the enemy countries, they are our allies. So, we have amitra (enemy) then mitra (ally). Then those enemy’s enemies, who are our friends, they have enemies; so, they might join hands with India’s enemies. So, these circles, from the hub of this wheel go outwards and outwards and outwards [in alternating rings].
Beatrice Heuser: You see this also in Southeast Asia where of course the influence of Sanskrit writing was very important. The Mandala idea is very much one that dominates Southeast Asian politics, practically through the 19th century CE, and it really is most easily imaginable as concentric circles with you at the centre, and then adversaries around you because you have border conflicts with them, and then your enemies’ enemies in another circle around them, are your natural allies. Very interesting.
Paul O’Neill: To what extent was that Mandala idea a [static] simplification? Because when [Kautilya] decides to overthrow the Nanda dynasty, he seeks help from the Himalayan king, and promises half the kingdom that they inherit. So, clearly my enemy's enemy is my friend in that context. But then there is some suggestion that having taken over the Nanda dynasty, then he has the man [the Himalayan king] assassinated. So, is it a gradual expansion, and therefore it changes the nature of the countries bordering yours or the regions or the states bordering yours? And so, as you grow, those who had been your enemies, now become your friends and those who had been your friends, now become your enemies; a much more fluid model than a rather static map-based assessment of where friends and enemies might reside?
Kaushik Roy: Actually there are two aspects or levels. At one level, Kautilya says that the Mandala theory must be used by a small state to gain hegemony within the subcontinent. Once that state establishes an ekarat, an empire, within the subcontinent, then the Mandala theory could be pushed further with the foreign states to create an amity of alliances and to prevent any hostile alliance emerging against India. And then, that stable big state should be used to balance the power equation.
But Kautilya warns the ruler, the vijigishu, that once you have conquered India and established a big empire, meaning from the Kabul/Kandahar line in Afghanistan in the west, to the borders of Yunnan/Burma in the east, from the Himalayas and Karakorum in the north to Cape Comorin in the south. Then, Kautilya says that you have reached the natural limits. Do not try to expand further because of geography. You have the deserts of Persia on one side, arid wastes of Central Asia, and you have oceans bordering in the South and West and East [of India], and further East, you have jungles of Burma. Then, Kautilya says that the stable big empire should make use of Mandala, but with a different perspective. That is to prevent the emergence of any hostile influence or alliance among the bordering, foreign countries.
Let me give one example. In the later days of the Maurya Empire, the Seleucid Empire(10) was breaking up. You have the Indo-Bactrian Empire of Bactria and Sogdiana. You have the Seleucid Empire, along Iran and Iraq. So, the Maurya Empire had enmity with the Indo-Bactrian Kingdom, which was attacking India (Punjab), but had a positive relationship with the Seleucid Empire. So, the Maurya Empire established a diplomatic alliance with the Seleucid empire, which had enmity with the Indo-Bactrian Kingdom as it is established on the two provinces Bactria and Sogdiana, which had become independent of the Seleucid Empire. Before that, when the Seleucids attacked India, then Chandragupta Maurya maintained good relations with [Ptolemic] Egypt, the enemy of the Seleucids. So, this is the Mandala theory implemented in practice.
Beatrice Heuser: Why was he [Kautilya] actually placed so well to pontificate on war? He was not an active soldier of any sorts, and yet he gives us, in very large parts of his work, very detailed, very practical prescriptions, about the conduct of war. This is the same accusation that is normally levelled against Machiavelli, of course, if they say he is not really a soldier, how can he talk about all these things?
And perhaps linked with that, something I will come to in a moment. Did he have, a priestly dimension?
Kaushik Roy: Kautilya was not a soldier. He was from the princely class, intellectual class. He never served in the army. He never commanded the army. But Kautilya speaks about war, and military theories and tactics to be followed. There is one tradition in India (the Upanishads) that speaks of peace. In reaction to that, Kautilya speaks of use of war in statecraft. So, Kautilya is reacting to the idealist philosophy of that time. Buddhist philosophy particularly of that time speaks of peace and disbanding the army. So, Kautilya is also speaking against that. So, within this matrix of ideas, Kautilya is one pole, and the other pole is the Upanishads/Buddhist tradition.
But the important thing is that Kautilya never gives primacy to the army and warfare in his whole gamut of ideas. Kautilya provides us with a list that is very important. The list shows the salaries and the positions of the various officers in the empire. At the top is the Minister for Finance and Foreign Affairs. And the Minister of War comes at the fourth or fifth position. And the General, senapati, his position, economically and culturally and socially, is much, much lower. This goes back to your early query about the role of Brahmanism in Kautilya’s theory of ideas. Idealistically, ancient society has four layers: first come the Brahmans, the intellectual class; then Kshatriyas, rulers or generals; third the Vaishyas (business) class and fourth come the Shudras who are the cultivators [working class]. Kautilya says that this division of society must be maintained. The Kshatriyas, the soldiers and generals, they should always be subordinated to the Brahmans, who were the intellectuals, who were the priestly class, and who provided most of the ministers and civil administrators. And they would be at the top, and the army should be subordinated. Kautilya also says – and here is a modern relevance - that the senapati should not be called to the Royal Council.
Interestingly in present-day India, even now, the chief of the services of army, navy and air force, and also the chairman of the chief of staff committee, they are not formal members of the cabinet committee for political affairs, the highest policy making body. They could only come if the Prime Minister agrees. In fact, they could also not meet the Prime Minister without the President's approval. So, that is quite a strong civil-military relationship: civilian above, the military below. And all these could be traced back to the Kautilyan tradition that the army should be subordinated to the policy-making body and politicians. And the Brahmans should make policy, not the senapatis. Their attention and focus should be on the tactical aspect.
Paul O’Neill: The point about the stratification of society you have just mentioned, Professor, is interesting because I understand that he was also quite an advocate of the idea of societal support. So, he introduced rights or support for pregnant women, for the elderly, for the disabled, for people who were less able to care for themselves.
Was that driven by a desire to see a stable society that might be then less prone to the kind of espionage, the interference, the hybrid warfare attacking his own dynasty? Or was that driven largely by his religious perspective as a Brahman and therefore this sense of some kind of fairness or equity?
Kaushik Roy: Kautilya was speaking of a welfare state, not because he was a liberal humanist, but for instrumental reasons. Kautilya warns the ruler, ‘Don’t over tax the peasants, then there will be a rebellion, bopa, and then the foreign powers would intervene’. And here Kautilya has the historical example of the Nandas. The Nanda Empire collapsed because the rulers overtaxed the peasantry: 50% taxation. Kautilya says that taxation of the gross produce of the land should never exceed 20%. An undertaxed peasantry who is content is better than discontented peasantry. So, Kautilya’s agrarian taxation policy had an influence throughout history, especially among the Hindu kingdoms.
Now, Kautilya also says that it is much more financially ruinous to police the countryside with costly coercive machinery, that results in the militarization of the society. Better, give some carrots to the people lower down. And here Kautilya makes a break with the Brahmanical tradition of Manu and all those other theories. Kautilya says that even the poor who belong to the lowest level, the Shudras, the state should look after them.
It had an influence on Ashoka(11) who built roads, inns, rest houses, places for watering the horses, free food for poor people, in some localities, in pursuit of the policy of keeping the people happy so that there would not be insurgencies within the realm, especially in the countryside.
Beatrice Heuser: You seem to portray him as so utilitarian. But let me just end perhaps with a quotation that could come straight out of a European medieval text on how to prepare yourself for a Just War, suggesting that one should “fast and practice penance before going into battle”, being “desirous of getting into heaven” if somebody lost their lives.(12)We also have another embryonic idea of Just War: Kautilya distinguished between a “just conqueror” - perhaps that's just the translation I saw - “a demon-like conqueror”, or a “greedy conqueror”; advising a weak king to seek the protection of a just conqueror,(13)or, one might say, advising a weak power to seek the protection of a benevolent hegemon. But this whole idea of justice, is that something that is also there in his thinking, and not just a purely utilitarian streak?
Kaushik Roy: Although Kautilya is a “Realist”, there are elements of ethics in it. For example, he divides the whole conduct of war into: dharmayuddha and kutayuddha. Dharma was not at that time used as a word for religion, that came much later, during the medieval times. Dharma means ‘way of life’, conducting a just way of life. In dhamrayuddha only the enemy’s combat army should be destroyed, and especially the women, the children, the fruit trees, the edible crops, they should not be destroyed. In fact, there is a passage in Megasthenes who says he is shocked to see that in India, when the soldiers march, they do not destroy the crops in the field, and they do not disturb the tillers of the land. So, that is the ethical tradition. But Kautilya warns that the strategic situation might change when the state is on the receiving side, and it is not winning the conventional war, the enemy is coming. Then, you have to harass the enemy’s countryside, then you have to destroy the livestock of the people, you have to follow a scorched earth policy.
But Kautilya warns that ends do not always justify the means. There should be a balance. You know, there are like 10 commandments of Mao: no rape; no molestation; no kidnapping; no entry into private houses, etc. They should be strictly followed. It is not for humanitarian, it is not public relations, policy. So, there is an ethical aspect in Kautilyan thinking.
Beatrice Heuser: Fascinating. I think you've given us all a lot more interest in reading the texts. Thank you very much for shedding light on this extraordinarily complex character with this extraordinarily complex thinking, which seemed to have anything from very ethical to mostly utilitarian.
Thank you very much for joining us today, Dr. Kaushik Roy.
1) Kautilya, Arthaśhāstra Book XII, Concerning a Powerful Enemy, Chap. 3.
2) Talking Strategy, Season 2, Episode 6, Arming the Citizens: Machiavelli’s Quest for Virtue, with Professor Maurizio Viroli.
3) Megasthenes (350-290 BCE) was a Greek historian, diplomat and Indian ethnographer, who described Mauryan India in his book Indica, which only now exists in fragments.
4) Talking Strategy, Season 2, Episode 1, Classical Chinese Strategic Thought: Sunzi, with Dr Peter Lorge.
5) Talking Strategy, Season 1, Episode 6, Carl von Clausewitz; the Father of Strategic Studies with Professor Beatrice Heuser.
6)Arthaśhāstra, Book XI, The Conduct of Corporations, Chap. 1.
7) Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century, Zenith Press, 2006.
8) The Peace of Westphalia is the term used for two treaties signed in the Westphalian cities of Osnabrück and Munster in 1648 that brought to an end the Thirty Years War in Europe (1618-1648) between Catholic and Protestant powers and their allies.
9)Arthaśhāstra, Book VII, The End of the Six-fold Policy.
10) The Seleucid Empire was founded by Seleucus I Nicator (358-281BCE), a Macedonian general in Alexander the Great’s Army when the Macedonian Empire ended in the power struggles on Alexander’s death.
11) Also known as Ashoka the Great, who was a ruler of the Maurya Empire during c. 268to 232 BCE.
12)Arthaśhāstra, Book X, Relating to War, Chap. III: „"It is declared in the Vedas that the goal which is reached by sacrificers after performing the final ablutions in sacrifices in which the priests have been duly paid for is the very goal which brave men are destined to attain." About this there are the two verses
‘Beyond those places which Bráhmans, desirous of getting into heaven, attain together with their sacrificial instruments by performing a number of sacrifices, or by practising penance are the places which brave men, losing life in good battles, are destined to attain immediately.
Let not a new vessel filled with water, consecrated and covered over with darbha grass be the acquisition of that man who does not fight in return for the subsistence received by him from his master, and who is therefore destined to go to hell.’
Astrologers and other followers of the king should infuse spirit into his army by pointing out the impregnable nature of the array of his army, his power to associate with gods, and his omnisciency; and they should at the same time frighten the enemy. The day before the battle, the king should fast and lie down on his chariot with weapons. He should also make oblations into the fire pronouncing the mantras of the Atharvaveda, and cause prayers to be offered for the good of the victors as well as of those who attain to heaven by dying in the battle-field. He should also submit his person to Bráhmans.“
13)Arthaśhāstra, Book XII, Concerning a Powerful Enemy, Chap. 1.
I suggest these scholars read a 1964 paper by George Modelski:
"Kautilya: Foreign Policy and International System in the Ancient Hindu World Author(s): George Modelski
Source: The American Political Science Review,Vol. 58, No. 3 (Sep., 1964), pp. 549-560"
- Joined
- Jul 12, 2014
- Messages
- 31,929
- Likes
- 148,121
-doesn't look like U.S is planning to give more than the pledged 100 million $ aid for the current year.
-should admire pakis to upsell their position even during such a bleak time, in this case a million $ funded EV bike as per one of the panelists. have watched so many of this type of panel discussions on India for years and it's rare for Indian/NRI analyst on panel to do such an upsell even on successes we already have. of course things have changed a bit now.
-in the diaspora panel, one guy says "America should join CPEC".
=======
The Future of US-Pakistan Relations
-should admire pakis to upsell their position even during such a bleak time, in this case a million $ funded EV bike as per one of the panelists. have watched so many of this type of panel discussions on India for years and it's rare for Indian/NRI analyst on panel to do such an upsell even on successes we already have. of course things have changed a bit now.
-in the diaspora panel, one guy says "America should join CPEC".
=======
The Future of US-Pakistan Relations
Last edited:
- Joined
- Jul 12, 2014
- Messages
- 31,929
- Likes
- 148,121
-commentary on state of play
-nothing much to disagree with.
-Raja mohan says chinese influence in central asia will increase.
-towards the end a bit of mirchi to liberal world order.
=========
The Russia-Ukraine War: Geopolitical Implications for Asia (28 Apr 2023)
About the Panel Discussion
The Russia-Ukraine war, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, has gone on for more than a year with major implications for the world economy, global balance of power and the international order. While some of these implications are already apparent, others are yet to be fully realised. The war’s impact on Asia is one area that deserves closer examination. The war has affected Asian geopolitics, particularly in terms of the relationships between the various countries in the region. For example, China’s support for Russia during the conflict has led to unease among the great powers and anxiety among the other Asian countries about China’s intentions. India’s refusal to condemn Russian aggression has also been a matter of debate.
What implications does the war have for the conflicts and territorial contestations in the region? As the war continues to rage on, it is likely that its impact on the region will only become more apparent, making it a topic of debate for policymakers and analysts in the region and beyond.
-nothing much to disagree with.
-Raja mohan says chinese influence in central asia will increase.
-towards the end a bit of mirchi to liberal world order.
=========
The Russia-Ukraine War: Geopolitical Implications for Asia (28 Apr 2023)
About the Panel Discussion
The Russia-Ukraine war, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, has gone on for more than a year with major implications for the world economy, global balance of power and the international order. While some of these implications are already apparent, others are yet to be fully realised. The war’s impact on Asia is one area that deserves closer examination. The war has affected Asian geopolitics, particularly in terms of the relationships between the various countries in the region. For example, China’s support for Russia during the conflict has led to unease among the great powers and anxiety among the other Asian countries about China’s intentions. India’s refusal to condemn Russian aggression has also been a matter of debate.
What implications does the war have for the conflicts and territorial contestations in the region? As the war continues to rage on, it is likely that its impact on the region will only become more apparent, making it a topic of debate for policymakers and analysts in the region and beyond.
- Joined
- Jul 12, 2014
- Messages
- 31,929
- Likes
- 148,121
- largely factual recalling of sequence of events and implications
- the lady was at a loss of words when asked "is India a target of non-state actors in foreign media?". the factual answer is a big YES.
- surprising bit for me is towards the end, the moderator who is from a murican university asks if there is a way to normalise sino-India relationship. so we don't know if this whole conversation was about getting updates or the old white saviour complex.
========
Sino-Indian Relations in the 21st Century
- the lady was at a loss of words when asked "is India a target of non-state actors in foreign media?". the factual answer is a big YES.
- surprising bit for me is towards the end, the moderator who is from a murican university asks if there is a way to normalise sino-India relationship. so we don't know if this whole conversation was about getting updates or the old white saviour complex.
========
Sino-Indian Relations in the 21st Century
- Joined
- Jul 12, 2014
- Messages
- 31,929
- Likes
- 148,121
Richard is basically talking points similar to PM Modi's talking points:
Rights vs Obligations - Rights vs Duties
Sovereignty-Territorial integrity
Get involved - Jan Bhageedhari
========
A Conversation With CFR President Richard Haass
Rights vs Obligations - Rights vs Duties
Sovereignty-Territorial integrity
Get involved - Jan Bhageedhari
========
A Conversation With CFR President Richard Haass
