Estimation of Indian Nuclear Arsenal.- Present and Future

[Indx TechStyle]

they are not glorifying our capabilities .................but they are doing Typical commie Anti -India propaganda .

But they are making me confident. If they are pi$$ed off, means things are getting sound and fine.

 

[sbm]

Yusuf, how confident are you of India's missile totals? I mean they are feasible but AFAIK production is at a low rate.

 

[Chinmoy]

Under Rajiv Gandhi, India was ready with H-Bomb to counter Pakistan's nukes

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com...nter-pakistans-nukes/articleshow/56743176.cms

 

[HariPrasad-1]

^^
If thermobaric weapons carry 100% fuel, then they are dependent on outside oxygen for sustained combustion & I am afraid they will be a dud or ineffective in water and air based missiles. Their best application would be in tanks, artillery & Surface-Surface missiles.

They are not for water. ............................

 

[samsaptaka]

Resurrecting this old thread to ask a question. Since all 3 of DRDO, IISC AND ISRO are present in challakere, Chitradurga KA, is it reasonable to assume that MIRV development is also happening in this facility ?

 

[Chinmoy]

Resurrecting this old thread to ask a question. Since all 3 of DRDO, IISC AND ISRO are present in challakere, Chitradurga KA, is it reasonable to assume that MIRV development is also happening in this facility ?

The right question to ask would be what is our design yield.

Developing and deploying MIRV is a minor thing. Major part is the warhead which would go into it.

 

[abhay rajput]

@WARREN SS let's discuss that topic here.
First of let be clear about two things one is proven and the other is unproven/claimed.
Now let's go back to 1998 - total yeild according to indian scientists - close to 50kt.
Foreign countries- as low as 15 - 30kt
Now look at north Korea 2017 test
Claimed yeild- close to 250kt
South korea/USA/China/india- between 100-300kt.
NK has proven nuclear bomb of atleast 100kt .
Now looks at us - We have proven nuclear bomb of at least 25 kt yeild.
Now problem is that our yeild is just too small to claim succesful H bomb test.
Now we claims that we have 200kt yeild boosted nukes but the problem here is that it's not proven . We aren't sure until we test it. It might be another unsuccessful test like in 1998. We surely don't want to find that in a war.
Now coming to what I believe - I personally have no doubt that we have 200kt yeild nukes but I doubt we had any H bomb . And without test it will not be proven bombs.
Now coming to our problems of deterrence. I believe our deterrence is fine for Pakistan but not for Chinese. Chinese have MT nukes for a long time . And we can't have deterrence with China with our 25kt proven bombs.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

@WARREN SS let's discuss that topic here.
First of let be clear about two things one is proven and the other is unproven/claimed.
Now let's go back to 1998 - total yeild according to indian scientists - close to 50kt.
Foreign countries- as low as 15 - 30kt
Now look at north Korea 2017 test
Claimed yeild- close to 250kt
South korea/USA/China/india- between 100-300kt.
NK has proven nuclear bomb of atleast 100kt .
Now looks at us - We have proven nuclear bomb of at least 25 kt yeild.
Now problem is that our yeild is just too small to claim succesful H bomb test.
Now we claims that we have 200kt yeild boosted nukes but the problem here is that it's not proven . We aren't sure until we test it. It might be another unsuccessful test like in 1998. We surely don't want to find that in a war.
Now coming to what I believe - I personally have no doubt that we have 200kt yeild nukes but I doubt we had any H bomb . And without test it will not be proven bombs.
Now coming to our problems of deterrence. I believe our deterrence is fine for Pakistan but not for Chinese. Chinese have MT nukes for a long time . And we can't have deterrence with China with our 25kt proven bombs.

Pokharan device was itself a miniaturized bomb of a 250kT model which produced at least 38kT per foreign sources.
It doesn't mean that India shouldn't do more tests. But reliability doesn't solely depends upon direct testing.

 

[abhay rajput]

Pokharan device was itself a miniaturized bomb of a 250kT model which produced at least 38kT per foreign sources.
It doesn't mean that India shouldn't do more tests. But reliability doesn't solely depends upon direct testing.

It does. Assumption is the mother of all failures. Most foreign estimate put the entire yeild close to 25kt. Not to mention drdo scientist who were part of preparation of test site have openly said that test was fizzled. Believe me if your above assumption is correct than p5 nation's wouldn't have conducted more nuke test after there first one. I know quite well that the yield can be scaled but first you have to test it which all other nations have done it except India. If your enemies doesn't know the yield of your nuclear weapons than there is no need of testing. Just simply claims we have made N bombs .

 

[Assassin 2.0]

Pokharan device was itself a miniaturized bomb of a 250kT model which produced at least 38kT per foreign sources.
It doesn't mean that India shouldn't do more tests. But reliability doesn't solely depends upon direct testing.

No one is interested in testing nukes after soviets shocked the planet with Tsar Bomba multiple schemes were bought in to protect earth from further nuclear bomb testings. Well i think that Pokharan was more of a power demonstration of capabilities and it was right move to do small nuclear test rather than shacking whole earth and polluting our own land.
Most of the nuclear tests conducted by Americans Russians and Chinese are done on super computer's which can provide how much effects these bombs will have.
NK and all are rouge power's P-5 countries are no longer in blowing earth with nuclear bombs but future testing is about new generation warheads and delivery systems.
If Americans do more nuclear test then india should also follow the track.

 

[AsuraKiller203]

No one is interested in testing nukes after soviets shocked the planet with Tsar Bomba multiple schemes were bought in to protect earth from further nuclear bomb testings.

More than 3000 nuclear tests were done after the soviets exploded czar bomba in 1961.

US continued testing nukes till 1992. China continued till 1994.
US and soviets have done 1000+ weapon tests each. Thats the official count, unofficially much more. Cant be all these countries are stupid or dont have computer simulations. They were decades ahead of us in computers when they thought it necessary to conduct 1000s of live tests rather than rely on computer simulations.

They have tested nukes in every possible configuration - near beaches, shallow water, deep water at varying depths, underground, above ground, in space, on all possible military assets such as ships, planes, ground formations and studied and noted their effects, built a library of optimum nuke effectiveness in real war scenarios. This is what is needed to be proficient in knowledge of nukes as weapons and without this, nobody is going to take you seriously.

Nuclear weapons' bad effects on nature and their potency was over hyped and exaggerated deliberately by powers to be because it served their interests. Initially in 1945, after US nuked Japan, it hyped up nukes to scare and dominate the soviets and stop their advance in europe. By 1950s when soviets mastered nukes, they hyped them up even more, and ran end-of-the-world nuclear holocaust propaganda and sponsored a lot of anti-nuclear movements within US to force US govt into arms reductions and other favorable treaties. Later, in 1960s and 70s, this belief of the mighty nuke enabled both US n USSR to milk small third world nations by running protection rackets. Nukes are generally much less powerful than people believe.

Indias lack of nuclear testing in the past was due to its inability and not its trust in good-enough simulations. We have plenty of unpopulated land and indian ocean to test wherever we want. Even israel got away with testing nukes in indian ocean in 1980s. The NPT came into force in 1995, Narasimha Rao govt tried to test nukes in 1994 so India would be included but couldnt test as Information got leaked to the US and they activated all the leverages to squeeze india into not testing. India tried to test nukes dozens of times between 1974 and 1998 but only 2 efforts succedded. That tells you we had have a leaky apparatus, questionable intelligence orgs, domestic compulsions and shaky geopolitical foundations. I agree with indias moral high ground that npt was deliverately created to keep india out and thus india wont sign it on principle. But principles dont win war. Thank god India did the ASAT test before they could keep india out of it.

Today, Indias internal and external positions are stronger and we could get away with much needed testing under right cirumstances. I trust the MSDJ leadership at the helm. We could wait till trump pulls out US from the treaties and use that excuse to test our nukes. Theres no rush but I think the Modi govt should test when risk/reward ratio from international reaction perspective is in our favor sometime this decade. It will gain us a lot of useful scientific knowledge and data that we can build on in the future.

 

[WARREN SS]

Now we claims that we have 200kt yeild boosted nukes but the problem here is that it's not proven . We aren't sure until we test it. It might be another unsuccessful test like in 1998. We surely don't want to find that in a war.
Now coming to what I believe - I personally have no doubt that we have 200kt yeild nukes but I doubt we had any H bomb . And without test it will not be proven bombs.

First Let Mew burst Myth Of More Nuclear Test. Conducting Nuclear test Its self are Primitive Idea Of cold war
today With Super computers You can easily Upgrade The Design Of the warhead
And Can Test Through Computer Simulations
Virtual Nuclear Testing

Virtual Nuclear Testing

Test Essential part Of Nuclear Weapons was the Theory of Coldwar It was Due Lack of Availability Of Super-computing technology in 40's And 50's

Which Availble Today in every major Fast Breeder Nuclear reactors

That is Why you have seen So much Test by Russians And USA in coldwar

You see Nuclear Test Basically a Practical Test of controlled Chain reaction That you Do in Your Nuclear reactors Everytime

So,What You need To Develop High Equality Nuclear reaction or Warhead

HEU or Highly Enriched Uranium And Tritium Source

Why Highly Enriched Uranium Is a Threat | NTI

www.nti.org

India Tritium production capability Demonstrated in 1998

Tritium from Power Plants gives India an H-bomb capability

Authoritative US reports put the USA's total tritium production since 1955 at 225 kg. After decay, it is now left with 75 kg of tritium, which is sufficient to take the country through the first quarter of the next millennium.
Even in low levels, tritium has been linked to developmental problems, reproductive problems, genetic and neurological abnormalities and other health problems. Additionally, there is evidence of adverse health effects on populations living near tritium facilities. Tritium contamination has been reported at the Savannah River site in ground water soil from operational releases and accidents. No figures are available relating to the Indian stockpile of tritium, however. The pilot plant at BARC was set up, according to well-placed sources in the department, in 1992.


India's Breakthrough

India has now acquired a unique place in the annals of tritium production. Lacking the 'big money' to go in for capital-intensive methods, India's economic position - combined with the hostile attitude it faced from the West following the country's refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Fissile Material cut-off Treaty - has taught Indian scientists to rely on economically viable indigenous methods. They therefore decided to extract tritium from moderator heavy water in power reactors, which is plentiful. This year India exported 100 tons of heavy water to South Korea.
India's three-stage nuclear planning has come in handy for the project:

• 
  
• in the first stage Indian power reactors use natural uranium;
• the second stage employs fast breeder reactors that will use plutonium from the first stage;
• finally, the third phase aims at using thorium, since India has abundant thorium reserves in the beach sands of Kerala and Orrisa.

The first stage uses reactors moderated by heavy water, and it is in these reactors that Indian scientists have struck a gold mine in tritium production.
The tritium build-up in these reactors increases with the number of years of plant operation. The pilot plant is called the detritiation plant because the process involves lowering tritium levels in heavy water, but the fact remains that the by-product is highly enriched tritium. The reason why BARC developed new technology was to reduce radioactive levels by lowering the tritium content in heavy water. The department set up a pilot plant to achieve this and struck pay dirt: enriched tritium at low cost which needed only additional detritiation plants to be added to the country's already-available nuclear infrastructure.
The BARC technology is all the more laudable in that it is 100 per cent indigenous and the first of its kind anywhere in the world, according to experts preferring to remain anonymous. Scientists at BARC's Chemical Engineering Group recently developed a wet-proof catalyst for LPCE (the process that yields highly enriched tritium from heavy water), but they refrained from talking about the defence implications of the project. They have called the facility a detritiation plant to avoid charges of stockpiling a strategic raw material crucial in the production of thermonuclear weapons.

POKHRAN2@20: Tritium triumph—How India perfected the hydrogen bomb

This story was first published in THE WEEK issue dated May 24, 1998

www.theweek.in

Tritium is just one of the the essential ingredients of the Swan Device - the Swan acts as the "primary" in a
two stage thermonuclear ("H") Bomb (see one below). The vast majority of nuclear weapons these days use
Tritium in two stage thermonuclear weapons with very few stand alone one stage fusion boosted fission
weapons.

See a Swan style Tritium using"Primary" in the W88 two-stage thermonuclear warhead fitted to US Trident
(SLBM) missiles.

Three examples of fusion boosted fission weapons that utilize Tritium. India may use/have used such
weapons on the way to developing two stage thermonuclear weapons.


Put simply Tritium makes nuclear weapons
explode better. SRS is the only source of Tritium in the US. Tritium also has more minor medical diagnostic uses.
To elucidate this concern I came upon The US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of the Inspector General
Audit Report (OAS-L-14-01) of November 18, 2013 http://energy.gov/ig/downloads/audit-report-oas-l-14-01
Management of Tritium within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) which is quite informative

Put more technically Tritium enhances the efficiency and yield of fission bombs and the fission stages of
hydrogen bombs in a process known as "boosting" as well as in external neutron initiators (triggers) for such
weapons.
Put even more technically boosted fission weapons can be stand alone but more commonly act as
"primaries". The high pressure and temperature environment at the center of an exploding fission
weapon compresses and heats a mixture of Tritium and Deuterium gas (heavy isotopes of Hydrogen).
The Hydrogen fuses to form Helium and free neutrons. The energy release from this fusion reaction is
relatively negligible, but each neutron starts a new fission chain reaction, speeding up the fission and
greatly reducing the amount of fissile material that would otherwise be wasted when expansion of the
fissile material stops the chain reaction. Boosting can more than double the weapon's fission energy
release.
A handy Indian reference reveals Tritium's progress in improving India’s fusion capability. India’s heavy water,
natural uranium reactors produce more bomb usable Tritium than common garden light-water-moderated reactors
(LWRs) http://www.ccnr.org/india_tritium.html
The US has had Tritium production worries since the 1990s. Hence the 2005 US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement
was concluded not only to benefit the US in terms of civilian cooperation but also make India a stopgap source of
Tritium for nuclear weapons.
Source

Indian Tritium Exports to the US?

A professional level blog on strategic matters, especially submarines (nuclear and conventional) in English, Hindi & most other major languages.

gentleseas.blogspot.com

To be Continued......

 

[WARREN SS]

Estimating India’s nuclear weapons-producing capacity

Estimating India’s nuclear weapons-producing capacity

If India were to dip into its stockpile of reactor-grade plutonium, then instead of dozens of nuclear weapons, it might be able to make hundreds or even thousands. How can we estimate its maximum capacity? By knowing how big India's stockpile is—and we do that by using this algorithm to plug in...

thebulletin.org

How many nuclear weapons India can make is an important question in South Asia, determining the foreign and military policies of a number of countries in the greater region, and a concern for the world at large.

But coming up with a reliable answer is tricky.

Most estimates, such as those of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, get the raw material for their reports on a given country—such as the endowment’s study, “A Normal Nuclear Pakistan”—by relying on a relative handful of sources, such as the yearbooks of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the International Panel on Fissile Materials, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, to name some common examples. Bearing in mind the relative paucity of original source material, a 2015 estimate by the Institute for Science and International Security concluded that India’s stockpile of fissile material was only sufficient to make approximately 75-to-125 nuclear weapons.

But two recent analyses have produced much larger estimates. In 2016, Syed Muhammad Ali estimated in his book Indian Unsafeguarded Nuclear Program: An Assessment that India has sufficient material and technical capacity to produce between 356 and 492 plutonium-based nuclear weapons. A year later, in a discussion paper for Harvard University’s Belfer Center, Mansoor Ahmed concluded that India has the capacity to produce up to 2,686 nuclear weapons.

What accounts for most of these dramatic differences, from the low double-digits to a high in the thousands? It is the possibility, all-too-easily discounted, that India could use civilian reactor-grade fissile materials in its nuclear weapons, and how efficient such an approach could be.

Experts claim there are good reasons to assume it is extremely unlikely for India to draw upon its civilian reactors to make fissile materials for its nuclear weapons. For one thing, it is difficult and expensive to reprocess the plutonium in the spent fuel from a civilian nuclear reactor for use as the vitals of a nuclear weapon. And “India in particular has historically had trouble achieving consistent operations in its reprocessing facilities,” as a Bulletin article titled “Fuzzy math on Indian nuclear weapons” noted in 2016. (The International Panel on Fissile Materials came to much the same conclusion in 2015, citing the long-term poor performance of India’s reprocessing plants at Kalpakkam and Tarapur.) And don’t forget that these are unsafeguarded reactors, which by definition means that IAEA inspections are not allowed—so the outside world cannot rule out the possibility that these reactors could be used for military purposes.

And reactor-grade plutonium, with its lower proportion of the desirable isotope of plutonium for nuclear weapons (plutonium 239), is much more likely to produce a much smaller explosive yield than wanted, or “fizzle,” thus requiring a larger volume of fissile material to reach critical mass. All in all, while it is possible to make a nuclear warhead from reactor-grade plutonium, these researchers think it is a much more complicated (and risky) approach than making a warhead from weapon-grade plutonium.

Yet, while the odds may be low, they are not zero.

And India does have an extraordinarily large stockpile of reactor-grade plutonium. (Ahmed estimates India has about five metric tons of reactor-grade plutonium that has already been separated, and another 10 metric tons in spent fuel awaiting separation.) Admittedly, this stockpile is most likely intended as fuel for India’s Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor, and not for nuclear weapons.

But what if, for whatever reasons, at some time in the future, under conditions we cannot foresee right now, that stockpile were to be repurposed? Purely as a thought experiment, how many nuclear weapons is it possible for India to produce from this supposedly second-rate collection of fissile material?

Using a different set of theoretical assumptions, and what we consider to be very credible mathematical formulas, we found that contrary to previous estimates, India has the capacity to produce many more nuclear weapons than generally assumed. We estimate that India could produce 1,044 nuclear weapons (914 plutonium-based and 130 uranium-based nuclear weapons), if one includes reactor grade materials from non-military programs in India, as well as that from the country’s weapon-grade nuclear material production program.

A new paradigm. To support these findings, we carefully examined every aspect of Indian unsafeguarded nuclear reactors and included important factors such as each reactor’s history, size, and amount of material produced over its working lifetime. We have considered the Reactor-Grade Plutonium (RGp), Weapon-Grade Plutonium (WGp), and Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) produced by these unsafeguarded facilities.

In addition to the calculations contained here, we have attached a link to an executable file based upon the Python computer programming language. (Python helps us to give instructions to computers in a language it understands.) This will allow readers to do their own calculations of the nuclear weapons-generating capacity of India—or any other nuclear state. All the reader needs to do is enter data such as how much reactor-grade plutonium is generated per year by a given nuclear reactor, the reactor’s power in megawatt electric, plutonium conversion factors, the length of time that the reactor has been in operation, and so forth—much of which is accessible online, through publicly available sources. As we demonstrate in the rest of this article, by entering this data, one can get a rough approximation of a nation’s capacity to make nuclear weapons using reactor-grade material. But it is important to note that to run this software the reader needs to download and install Python 3.6.0, and then enter the scripts from the Word files found elsewhere in this article, before plugging in the numbers.




Before we begin, however, we need to deal with the elephant in the room.

Can Reactor Grade Plutonium be used in nuclear weapons? There is a commonplace conception that Reactor Grade Plutonium (RGPu) cannot be used in nuclear weapons.

This argument is incorrect.

Reactor-grade plutonium can, in fact, be used in nuclear weapons, according to a 1997 report published by the US Energy Department, which said at the bottom of page 39 that “In short, reactor-grade plutonium is usable, whether by unsophisticated proliferators or by advanced nuclear weapon states.” (The report also said that “The possibility that either a state or a sub-national group would choose to use reactor-grade plutonium, should sufficient stocks of weapon-grade plutonium not be readily available, cannot be discounted.”) In addition, declassified US government documents such as the Energy Department’s FAQ titled “Additional Information Concerning Underground Nuclear Weapon Test of Reactor-Grade Plutonium” highlight that the United States itself had conducted a nuclear weapon test using reactor-grade plutonium back in the early 1960s. And an Indian nuclear scientist acknowledged to the magazine Economic and Political Weekly that India has conducted at least one nuclear test using reactor-grade plutonium.

And there is one other argument for factoring in India’s reactor-grade plutonium when trying to estimate the country’s capacity to build nuclear weapons: The historical record shows that India has long considered the potential of using reactor-grade plutonium in nuclear weapons. A 2015 study by David Albright of the Institute of Science and International Security said at the bottom of page 11: “Although generally India is not believed to use reactor-grade plutonium in nuclear weapons, Indian nuclear experts are reported to have evaluated this plutonium’s use in nuclear weapons and India may have decided to create a reserve stock of reactor-grade plutonium for possible use in nuclear weapons.”

And India has a large supply of this reactor-grade plutonium to draw upon. The biographer Ganeshan Venkataraman, an Indian condensed matter physicist himself, recounts some of India’s history regarding this stockpile in his book Bhaba, and His Magnificent Obsessions. In November 1954, Homi Jehangir Bhabha, widely considered the father of India’s nuclear program, presented his vision of the country’s nuclear fuel cycle. It would consist of three phases: In the first stage, India would build Canadian-designed reactors, which run on natural uranium, to produce plutonium. In the second stage, India would build reactors which could run on a combination of the plutonium produced from the first stage and locally available thorium to produce uranium 233. In the third stage, India would build fast breeder reactors that could run on the resulting uranium 233.

As events turned out, however, India has not been able to master this complex nuclear fuel cycle. But it has produced a large amount of reactor grade plutonium, which can be used in nuclear weapons when necessary.

As for how much reactor-grade plutonium would be necessary to provide the fissile material for a nuclear bomb, that depends in part on the quality of the spent fuel from the reactor that it is scavenged from. The percentage of plutonium in a reactor’s spent fuel depends on a number of factors—including reactor design, fuel type, burnup, and the amount of time that plutonium is exposed to fusion within the reactors—so this percentage is not fixed. (Burnup is a measure of how much energy is extracted from a nuclear fuel, and also a measure of fuel depletion.)

But as the IAEA’s Department of Safeguards has noted, “even highly burned reactor-grade plutonium can be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons capable of very substantial explosive yields.”

With these considerations in mind, let us take another look at that previously mentioned estimate by Syed Muhammad Ali—the one that said that India has the capacity to produce about 356-to-492 plutonium-based (including reactor grade plutonium) nuclear weapons—and recalculate.

First, we start with how much reactor-grade plutonium India is likely to have. In a 2005 article in Foreign Policy in Focus, Zia Mian and MV Ramana estimated that India may have produced a total of about 8,000 kilograms of reactor-grade plutonium up to that date, from power reactors not under safeguards.

[Click this Word file, Python Program for RGp and WGp, to download the scripts necessary to run the Python Coding programs for Reactor Grade Plutonium (RGp) and Weapon Grade Plutonium (WGp).]

Indian reactor data.
Next, let us assume that in converting from fertile to fissile material, we get a conversion factor of about 0.3—meaning loosely in lay terms that just under one-third of reactor-grade plutonium is converted into weapon-grade plutonium suitable for a nuclear bomb. (According to an FAQ on the website of the nonprofit organization Nuclear-Power.net—built entirely by a group of nuclear engineers—a light water reactor has an average conversion factor of 0.5. But to make our calculations more credible, we have gone with the more conservative 0.3 conversion factor.) This means that a stockpile of the size of India’s can produce approximately 2,400 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium (8,000 kilograms x 0.3 conversion factor = 2,400 kilograms).

RELATED:
Why do politicians keep breathing life into the false conspiracy theory that the coronavirus is a bioweapon?

Next, let us assume that 4 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium are needed as the fissile material for one nuclear bomb. (According to the Union of Concerned Scientists FAQ “How much is needed to build a bomb?” a modern, sophisticated implosion nuclear weapon design would require 2-to-4 kilograms of plutonium—which the previously cited paper from Harvard University’s Belfer Center and other sources indicate is a technological feat well within India’s capacity. To err on the side of caution, we will do the calculations with 4 kilograms of plutonium per weapon.) This means that about 600 nuclear weapons can be produced by India, using just its stockpile of reactor-grade plutonium alone, and excluding all other sources. (2,400 kilograms divided by 4 kilograms per bomb = 600 nuclear bombs.)

As can be seen, this figure is substantially more than the commonly accepted maximum number.

And even this 600 nuclear bomb figure is low. After all, it was calculated using the best estimate—8,000 kilograms—of India’s reactor-grade plutonium as of the year 2005.

It is now a full 13 years later, and India has obviously had time to produce much more of this material. So, we need to recalculate, from scratch.

The latest estimate of Indian reactor and reactor-grade plutonium is given below, assuming 0.7 capacity factor, 0.3 kilograms per metric ton plutonium conversion factor, 310 days per year reactor availability factor, and that 4 kilograms of plutonium are required for each nuclear weapon. The formula and calculation areas follows:

Total Plutonium in Kilograms = Reactor Power in Megawatts electric x Capacity Factor x Days Under Operation x Plutonium Conversion Factor x 0.001

Indian reactor-grade plutonium, in kilograms.
As can be seen, this means that India has enough reactor-grade plutonium on hand at this time to make 839 nuclear bombs from this material alone. But we are interested in India’s total nuclear weapons capacity, so we need to also include its capacity to produce weapon-grade plutonium.

Weapon-grade plutonium calculations. According to official government documents, India has two reactors producing weapon-grade plutonium: the 100 megawatt (thermal) CIRUS reactor and the 40 megawatt (thermal) Dhruva reactor. However, to estimate India’s weapon-grade plutonium, we need to convert Megawatt Thermal to Megawatt Electric. (Jordan Hanania and his team at the University of Calgary’s Energy Education department note that “Megawatts electric or MWe is one of the two values assigned to a power reactor, the other being megawatts thermal or MWt. Megawatts electric refers to the electricity output capability of the plant, and megawatts thermal refers to the input energy required.”) Given that 3,000 MWt is equal to 1,000 MWe, we need to convert those figures, as seen below.

[Click this link, Python Program for Calculating Nuke Weapon, to download the Word file containing the scripts necessary to run the Python Coding program for Calculating Nuclear Weapons-making Capacity from Weapon-Grade Uranium.]

India’s total weapon-grade plutonium-based capacity.
The calculation is as follows: Total Plutonium (kg) = Reactor Power in MWt x Capacity Factor x Days Under Operation x 0.001

From these results, we see that means that another 75 nuclear weapons can be added to India’s total weapon-producing capacity, so we need to add that to our previous figure.

Total Plutonium-based Nuclear Weapon-Making Capacity: 839 + 75 = 914 Nuclear Weapons

But while we now have an idea of India’s nuclear capacity using both reactor-grade and weapon-grade plutonium, there is still the matter of the country’s uranium-based nuclear weapons.

Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) calculations. India is also pursuing a uranium mining and leaching program using its unsafeguarded reactors. However, estimating Highly Enriched Uranium production is quite challenging. Unlike making the calculations for reactor-grade plutonium, HEU requires more classified data, which is unavailable in public domain—so analysts must guess the actual number of centrifuges in a particular plant, the enrichment capacity of each centrifuge (which is dependent on the diameter and height of each machine), the quality of the feed material, and whether the rotor is made of aluminum, maraging steel, or carbon fiber. None of these factors can be accurately estimated without intrusive inspections. Therefore, it is hard to know for sure exactly how much HEU it has acquired.

Consequently, we will not make our own assessment but instead use reports—from organizations such as ISIS, the International Panel on Fissile Materials, and South Asian Voices—that can help give an idea of the total, as they have already calculated the amount of HEU each individual source has produced. The average calculations and ranges for these figures are as follows:

Average calculations and ranges for numbers of India’s uranium-based nuclear weapons, to date.
That gives us an average total of 130 uranium-based nuclear bombs that have been produced by India up to today’s date.

When we add that to the previous figure of 914 for all weapons that India has the capacity to produce by using reactor-grade and weapon-grade plutonium, we come up with a grand total of 1,044 nuclear weapons.

What does it all mean? There are many estimates that have attempted to calculate India’s nuclear weapon-making capacity, but this study explores an often-overlooked aspect, using mathematical formulas and publicly available information about reactor-grade material. Using these parameters, our study finds that India has the capacity to produce many more nuclear weapons than commonly thought: 1,044 nuclear weapons (914 plutonium-based and 130 uranium-based nuclear weapons), obtained from different reactors.

Of course, there is a big difference between the possible theoretical capacity to do a thing—especially if it is difficult, expensive, labor-intensive, time-consuming, risky, and unorthodox—and actually doing it.

But as former White House Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction Gary Samore once told Foreign Policy magazine: “I believe that India intends to build thermonuclear weapons as part of its strategic deterrent against China.” According to the article: “It is unclear, he continued, when India will realize this goal of a larger and more powerful arsenal, but ‘they will.’ ”

 

[WARREN SS]

Pokhran 2 (Smiling budha)

The US Marine Intelligence maps showing the Indian test site, 1997.
http://www.india-today.com/itoday/17051999/books.html

Shakti I thermonuclear device Which was the underground Test Abdul Kalam also said that the thermonuclear bomb's yield was designed to be at 200 kilotons of TNT (840 TJ) but it had to reduced to 50 KT kilotons of TNT (190 TJ) to minimize seismic damage to villages near the test range; the closest village to the test range, Khetolai, was a mere 5 kilometres (3.1 mi) away
See the Image below

Also read
Fizzle' claim for thermonuclear test refuted

The government on Thursday strongly refuted claims that the 1998 test of a thermonuclear device had been a failure, with Principal Scientific Adviser R. Chidambaram telling The Hindu that those questioning the tests yield had an obligation to back up their charge with scientific evidence.

He was responding to the recent statement by a former defence scientist, K. Santhanam, that “the yield in the thermonuclear device test was much lower than what was claimed.” Mr. Santhanam, who cited only unspecified “seismic measurements and expert opinion from world over,” went on to say that this was the reason India should not sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

“If Mr. Santhanam has any scientific data to back up what he has claimed, I am sure BARC scientists would be more than happy to debate it,” said Dr. Chidambaram. “Without that, this kind of statement means nothing.”

Source:
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article10457.ece?homepage=true


The BARC approximated the blast yields at 58 kilotons of TNT (240 TJ) that were obtained at the site 3 km from the test shafts on 11 May 1998. The BARC described the tests as a "complete success, and it was determined that all the devices and their components had performed flawlessly."On 17 May 1998, Abdul Kalam and R. Chidambaram held a press conference to validate BARC's data to remove all doubts.

They have test data to Prove it
India currently has 3 types of nuclear weapons in its arsenal. These are:

(1) Thermonuclear Device

(2) Fusion boosted Fission Bomb ( 2 types - Weapon grade plutonium & Reactor grade Plutonium)

(3) Fission Plutonium Bomb (2 types - Low Yield & High Yield )

After the 58 kiloton Pokhran-II nuclear tests India received its first fusion boosted weapon device . Present-day thermonuclear weapons need plutonium or highly enriched uranium to set off the hydrogen-bomb part.Fusion produces 1 neutron for 14 MEV release of energy, while fission produces approximately 3-4 neutrons for 200 MEV release of energy. Ergo ,Fission is energy intensive whereas fusion is neutron intensive.

In an interview to the Federation of American Scientists Dr. R. Chidambaram (RC), Chairman, AEC & Secretary, DAE had clearly mentioned that a Thermonuclear weapon was indeed tested .

Press Conference

Shortly after POKHRAN II BARC published their radio-chemical analysis estimate of the S-1(Fusion Weapon) yield . The raw data has not been presented as it could reveal the specifics of the weapon design. However, it provides a qualitative method of determining the efficacy of the tests.

Page on barc.gov.in

Two controversies gathered storm after Pokhran 2(thanks largely to speculations made by commentators who were never even present during the tests) . First , the yield of the Thermonuclear explosion was lower than what was declared & Second , just 5 nuclear tests isn't enough to develop the nuclear weapons that India intends to develop .

Needless to say that individuals from BARC , MoD , IA etc are parties to a Non Disclosure Non Circumventing agreement and therefore they cannot disclose information that is defined as confidential . Therefore , the other individuals who are stating the Yield figures are basically speculating based probably on their own understanding of Nuclear weapon yield . As a reminder , the yield-to-weight ratio is the amount of weapon yield compared to the mass of the weapon.

Also , detractors used the Wallace Analysis to state that the yield was less . Now the formula that Wallace used was arbitrary in nature and therefore the appropriateness of this formula is debatable . The formula is dependent on two variables - seismic signal generated by the test and size of the crater formed. However, Scaling Laws clearly explains that since the scaling laws themselves are changing it is very difficult to use Scaling Laws to measure Shot Effects . While , it is possible that the actual yield of the Thermonuclear weapon was somewhat less than the figure of 45 kilo tons that was disclosed by GOI it is certainly not as low as the figures circulated by certain Western Analysts .

Use plural, India has thermonuclear bombs: Kakodkar

In other words,the S1 is the thermonuclear device that was tested . So , after the test, the S1 ( it's military designation will be different) became India's thermonuclear weapon.

NOW, Read the second controversy of INDIA not carrying out enough nuclear tests to get all the data required to design a Thermonuclear weapon , fact remains that with the advent of Scalable supercomputer clustering , nuclear explosions can be Simulated down to the molecular level. Therefore , India does not need to carry out as many nuclear tests as the P-5 members did in the 60s and 70s unless of course India wants to drastically change the physical and mathematical models that describe the nuclear explosion that is being simulated. This is because throwing more computing resources at a simulation whose fundamental equations are flawed will not improve the accuracy of the solution.


Field Evaluation Report of Nuclear test Site by Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC)

We can Do this by Modern Scalable supercomputer clustering With Simulation which are recorded in Param Supercomputer During 1998 Tests
Since We Developed So much in this field We Don't need Field Test Unless we have to Create or upgrade Are Design for higher yield Weapons Eg Above 1 Megaton


What Kakodkar said

In other words,the S1 is the thermonuclear device that was tested . So , after the test, the S1 ( it's military designation will be different) became India's thermonuclear weapon.
= Read the second controversy of INDIA not carrying out enough nuclear tests to get all the data required to design a Thermonuclear weapon , fact remains that with the advent of Scalable supercomputer clustering , nuclear explosions can be Simulated down to the molecular level. Therefore , India does not need to carry out as many nuclear tests as the P-5 members did in the 60s and 70s unless of course India wants to drastically change the physical and mathematical models that describe the nuclear explosion that is being simulated. This is because throwing more computing resources at a simulation whose fundamental equations are flawed will not improve the accuracy of the solution.


Now To Explain What Scalable supercomputer clustering Stand For

Treaties forbid the detonation of nuclear test weapons — which creates problems for national defense developers who need to efficiently certify the effectiveness of their arsenal. Luckily for them, a powerful new supercomputer is now able to replicate the physical impact of nuclear explosions — albeit digitally. And luckily for us, the resulting innovations may spill over to more constructive areas.


The number-crunching required to simulate an actual nuclear explosion is staggering. Computer scientists need to simulate molecular-scale reactions taking place over the course of milliseconds. To get this level of detail, researchers at Purdue and the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory had to coordinate over 100,00 machines. They also had to split multiple processes in parallel on separate machines in large computer clusters.

And as any computational scientist worth his grain of salt will tell you, once you start to scale this high, you are virtually guaranteed to experience failed error detection and bottlenecks in communication and computation — and this is exactly what started to happen. Initially, the researchers discovered that natural faults in the execution environment frequently resulted in errors, resulting in corrupted memory and failed communication between machines. The challenge, therefore, was in managing the scale.


Their solution: Scalable supercomputer clustering.

In their revised configuration, each machine in the supercomputer cluster contained several processors with each one running a "process" during a simulation. The researchers created an automated method for "clustering," or grouping the large number of processes into a smaller number of "equivalence classes" with similar traits. Grouping the processes into equivalence classes made it possible for them to quickly detect and pinpoint problems.


Their breakthrough marked an important step forward in the development of ultra-precise simulations. It is thought that the same simulation architecture used by these researchers could eventually be applied to such areas as climate modeling and studying the dynamic changes in a protein's shape.

The findings will be presented during the Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks from June 25-28 in Boston. Recent research findings were detailed in two papers last year, one presented during the IEEE Supercomputing Conference and the other during the International Symposium on High-Performance Parallel and Distributed Computing.



Also read

Reference
https://books.google.co.in/books?id=5CvhBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA96&lpg=PA96&dq=Scalable+supercomputer+clustering+in+nuclear+test&source=bl&ots=qh4JobePA0&sig=5OaEol1n5SRPhJuCIRHuJ9qAcw4&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj0jsSf29_OAhXMvY8KHQUkCm4Q6AEIJDAB#v=onepage&q=Scalable supercomputer clustering in nuclear test&f=fals





Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Stand For


This assessment has been seconded by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). In arecent research brief, SIRPI noted, “A new unsafeguarded gas centrifuge facility appears to be under construction at the Rare Metals Plant near Mysore. India’s expanded centrifuge enrichment capacity has been motivated by plans to build new naval propulsion reactors, but the potential excess capacity could also signify its intent to move towards thermonuclear weapons by blending the current plutonium arsenal with uranium secondaries.”

http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/is-india-building-thermonuclear-weapons/



The types of weapons India is believed to have available for its arsenal includeBased On Blog So Real Data may varied)

• a pure fission plutonium bomb with a yield of 12 kt;
• a fusion boosted fission bomb with a yield of 15-20 kt, made with weapon-grade ploutonium;
• a fusion boosted fission bomb design, made with reactor-grade plutonium;
• low yield pure fission plutonium bomb designs with yields from 0.1 kt to 1 kt;
• a thermonuclear bomb design with a yield of 200-300 kt.

Public information and trade estimates indicate following types of Indian RV warheads:

1. Mk-4: For light weight 17Kt Fusion Boosted Fission (FBF) warhead5. Mass6: ~180 Kg7.
2. Mk-5: For 50Kt FBF or 200Kt Thermo Nuclear (TN) warhead8. Mass: ~340 Kg
3. Mk-6: For 150Kt FBF warhead 9. Mass: ~550 Kg.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Most foreign estimate put the entire yeild close to 25kt.

No less than 38kT by any reliable source. "Most sources" suggest between 40-48kT.

It does. Assumption is the mother of all failures. Most foreign estimate put the entire yeild close to 25kt. Not to mention drdo scientist who were part of preparation of test site have openly said that test was fizzled. Believe me if your above assumption is correct than p5 nation's wouldn't have conducted more nuke test after there first one. I know quite well that the yield can be scaled but first you have to test it which all other nations have done it except India. If your enemies doesn't know the yield of your nuclear weapons than there is no need of testing. Just simply claims we have made N bombs .

Things aren't that simple. P5 in 60s, all were using analogoue systems unlike India in 2010s which has adopted a lot of simulation abilities since 80s.

And just because India is making SLBM of 60s in 2010s, won't change it. Just compare capabilities of their BMD in 60s and India's 2010s. Indian one is far more accurate and can use normal warheads than nuclear ones.

 

[abhay rajput]

No less than 38kT by any reliable source. "Most sources" suggest between 40-48kT.


Things aren't that simple. P5 in 60s, all were using analogoue systems unlike India in 2010s which has adopted a lot of simulation abilities since 80s.

And just because India is making SLBM of 60s in 2010s, won't change it. Just compare capabilities of their BMD in 60s and India's 2010s. Indian one is far more accurate and can use normal warheads than nuclear ones.

Sir ji simulation can do so much. Without real testing it will not be a proof. Personally I know quite well that we have 200kt bombs but these aren't "tested "and proven . And sometimes test fails too. Now just imagine if it were to failed and how will our deterrence looks then.? It's better to be on the safe side.

 

[Indx TechStyle]

Sir ji simulation can do so much. Without real testing it will not be a proof. Personally I know quite well that we have 200kt bombs but these aren't "tested "and proven . And sometimes test fails too. Now just imagine if it were to failed and how will our deterrence looks then.? It's better to be on the safe side.

Accuracy of simulation whether it's going to succeed depends upon quality of simulation. I reject your "still testing is real proof" argument as vague hereby.

 

[no smoking]

No less than 38kT by any reliable source. "Most sources" suggest between 40-48kT.

India herself claims the total yields between 56kt - 76kt.

US Lawrence liveremore estimated 17kt - 31kt.

Things aren't that simple. P5 in 60s, all were using analogoue systems unlike India in 2010s which has adopted a lot of simulation abilities since 80s.

And just because India is making SLBM of 60s in 2010s, won't change it. Just compare capabilities of their BMD in 60s and India's 2010s. Indian one is far more accurate and can use normal warheads than nuclear ones.

Not that simple. On BMD, India had get help from Russia/Israel who had been working on BMD system since last 70s or 80s, so India can skip lots of stages. The nuclear simulation, however, you simply can't trust anyone, you have to build up from bottom. Even if you want, no one will give up their data accumulated through so many direct tests.

 

[no smoking]

Accuracy of simulation whether it's going to succeed depends upon quality of simulation. I reject your "still testing is real proof" argument as vague hereby.

How do you know the quality of simulation? Verfication of REAL TEAST.

 

[abhay rajput]

Accuracy of simulation whether it's going to succeed depends upon quality of simulation. I reject your "still testing is real proof" argument as vague hereby.

Ofcourse ofcourse ofcourse.. if everything can be done through simulation then nothing will fail but things do ..