Bhadra, you are losing your cool. And people see that. And then they form an opinion about your capacity for discussion and understanding.
Nonetheless here are a few genuine points that I could find. Mostly these are theoretical issues and I believe DRDO does figure in the answer to these questions.
Bhadra - "And India is safe after nuclear armament .... it should carry out conventional forces disbarment. Why to have that ITBP boy at border ... as it is the moment Chinese soldiers are seen somewhere near LAC, India will throw her nuclear weapons at them ..."
Regards the possibility you raise of sending the ITBP Jawan home:
My take is that he today fulfills the same role that Angad did in the court of Ravana. Angad was not there to fight. He was there to represent a bigger force. But to understand why it is so you will have to understand the Himalayas first and accept the overwhelming existence of it.
Himalayas are a terrain that is largely difficult to understand for a person from the plains, which I presume you are. In Himalayas sight can easily go right upto a horizon that is much much longer than in the plains. And yet all the while you can be completely oblivious of what is happening just on the reverse side of the mountain you stand on. Stretched to a plane, Himalayas will probably cover the whole of the plains of India. And the mountains make you hear sounds and see sights, that are not there near you. In such a terrain even large armies (if not trained) can be simply lost (a large number of pilgrims lost after the Kedarnath deluge never were seen and they could never make it out). Alternatively if the armies are very well trained then they can make themselves untraceable/unreachable for long periods (Kargil). Energy gets sapped something like four times faster and despite that you cannot cover long distances with full load, unlike in the plains. Patrolling parties often miss the intrusions by the other side. Fighting if it happens has to be arranged for, like in your own example of Nathu La 67 where both sides knew already where the other was and one side kept up the hammering like a gold jeweler and the other side hammered ultimately like an Iron smith. Mere stationing of even half our army over there makes little impact by itself. That is why we need to equip them differently and equip them better. Yes, under such a situation it makes little sense to rely solely on a foot soldiers. One man or even a bunch are simply too fragile for the terrain itself against which you will have to put 90% of your efforts, driving towards your chosen goal. And these thing apply to both sides in a conflict. There really is nothing to stop the Chinese from doing several Kargils to us in the Himalayas. Only they themselves do not know how to manage after the IA gets into the act and uses the same terrain to cut off their intruders. It is only the people from the plains on both sides who imagine riding tanks in small flat lands that exist in Himalayas. Beyond Himalayas and into Tibet its plain again but the border is the real intimidating part with virtually nil lateral connectivity.
The Nukes that BARC made and the missiles that DRDO made are not there to ensure that no fighting ever happens. They are there to ensure that the ladder to total destruction can be rode easily and thus when the two sides sit across the table negotiating peace there is no confusion in anybody’s mind, bearing irrelevant ‘what ifs’. Questions like :
- What if we hold out a little longer? or
- What if we get those two features? or
- What if we encircle over there before we negotiate? or
- What if we genocide a few million more at the rate of a few tens of thousands per day for so many days?
Do not remain relevant and cannot stop a negotiation.
You either mount the challenge or you get out. These kind of weapons bring the control issues right to the front seat instead of relegating them behind a bunch of small lalchi people. Fortunately for us IA has a culture for fighting well pointed, well directed and well controlled wars. But that is not the case with the two other sides that we face. They need to be enabled for our kind of understanding of war. These beeg weapons help achieve that. Off course they too have their beeg weapons, but then they don’t need beeg weapons to be dastardly. Their acts come from within their own tentative, unsure minds. And it always helps an unsure mind find certainty, if he sees difficulties on a certain path. He will ignore the difficult path.
It is actually the IA Generals that had the maximum inputs in the formulation of a deterrent strategy and managing deterrence around the Indian Subcontinent. IA was the first to handle these weapons. Rhetorically in the vein you are voicing your arguments, it too can asked, why IA bothered to handle these weapons if they saw no ‘use’ for them in their duties.
Both BARC and DRDO are merely trudging along the path already chalked out by IA several years back.
Bhadra - "Why did Kargil happen so brazenly ?
Then why Indian Parliament was attacked ?
Why did Mumbai happened."
Regards why these terrorist attacks or small skirmishes take place, my take is that these happen because the other side can no longer act the way they did till 62 and 71. They are essentially admitting that this is the hardest they can now hit. They having already considered the circumstances and possibilities. That is why we need to block for good these paths also.
And I admit DRDO has little capacity/role here. Probably just some surveillance equipment, is what they can manage to design or indigenize, that too if they are asked to do it and with a ton of other things to care for before they even embark on these. Also most of this surveillance equipment is already off the shelf available.
The best way to tackle these would be build-up NTRO into a US-NSA styled organization and provide more resources to RAW, Military Intel, IB, SSB etc.
