Point 1 is absolutely correct, post WW2 it was the Japanese citizens who understood that the best way to slap the west and Anglo Saxons was to teach them who is the king in there own game. They literally dominated the economy since 1970s to 2000 with there Index creating records compared to NASDAQ. Some say the whole reason for Japanese Empire to attack pearl harbor was because of the ill treatment of the Japanese by the EIC (East Indian Company) and there destabilization of Japanese culture such as Animal Flesh eating, beef etc.
A very good documentary.
Point 4, classic case of woke culture influence on a women trying to be man.
That's definitely not a secret, it's just been buried by the Americunt victor WW2 propaganda. Pearl Harbor was nowhere near a "innocent bystander attacked out of the blue" incident just like the sinking of the Lusitania in WW1 wasn't unprovoked.
The US took hostile and provocative actions towards Japan before Pearl Harbor even explicitly mentioning in private that it is being done to provoke an overt reaction from Japan which will make USA enter the war.
In November 1940,
Roosevelt loaned China one hundred million dollars for war with Japan, and after consulting with the British,
US Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau made plans to send the Chinese bombers with US crews to use in bombing Tokyo and other Japanese cities.
On December 21, 1940, China’s Minister of Finance T.V. Soong and Colonel Claire Chennault, a retired US Army flier who was working for the Chinese and had been urging them to use American pilots to bomb Tokyo since at least 1937, met in Morgenthau’s dining room to
plan the firebombing of Japan. Morgenthau said he could get men released from duty in the US Army Air Corps if the Chinese could pay them $1,000 per month. Soong agreed.
In 1939-1940, the US Navy built new Pacific bases in Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Wake, Guam, Samoa, and Hawaii.
On October 7, 1940, the director of the US Office of Naval Intelligence Far East Asia Section Arthur McCollum wrote a memo. He worried about possible future Axis threats to the British fleet, to the British Empire, and to the Allies’ ability to blockade Europe. He speculated about a theoretical future Axis attack on the United States. He believed decisive action could lead to the “
early collapse of Japan.”
He recommended war with Japan:
“While . . . there is little that the United States can do to immediately retrieve the situation in Europe, the United States is able to effectively nullify Japanese aggressive action, and do it without lessening US material assistance to Great Britain.
“. . . In the Pacific the United States possesses a very strong defensive position and a navy and naval air force at present in that ocean capable of long distance offensive operation. There are certain other factors which at the present time are strongly in our favor, viz:
Philippine Islands still held by the United States.
Friendly and possibly allied government in control of the Dutch East Indies.
British still hold Hong Kong and Singapore and are favorable to us.
Important Chinese armies are still in the field in China against Japan.
A small US Naval Force capable of seriously threatening Japan’s southern supply routes already in the theater of operations.
A considerable Dutch naval force is in the Orient that would be of value if allied to US
“A consideration of the foregoing leads to the conclusion that prompt aggressive naval action against Japan by the United States would render Japan incapable of affording any help to Germany and Italy in their attack on England and that Japan itself would be faced with a situation in which her navy could be forced to fight on most unfavorable terms or accept fairly early collapse of the country through the force of blockade.
A prompt and early declaration of war after entering into suitable arrangements with England and Holland, would be most effective in bringing about the early collapse of Japan and thus eliminating our enemy in the pacific before Germany and Italy could strike at us effectively. Furthermore, elimination of Japan must surely strengthen Britain’s position against Germany and Italy and, in addition, such action would increase the confidence and support of all nations who tend to be friendly towards us.
“It is not believed that in the present state of political opinion the United States government is capable of declaring war against Japan without more ado; and it is barely possible that vigorous action on our part might lead the Japanese to modify their attitude. Therefore, the following course of action is suggested:
Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly Singapore.
Make an arrangement with Holland for the use of base facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East Indies.
Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang-Kai-Shek.
Send a division of long range heavy cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore.
Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.
Keep the main strength of the US fleet now in the Pacific in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands.
Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for economic concessions, particularly oil.
Completely embargo all US trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire.
“
If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully prepared to accept war.”
Note the one point about
keeping the fleet in Hawaii –part of a
nefarious plot to get more ships destroyed in a dramatic attack (not a particularly successful plot, as only two ships were permanently destroyed).
Not just that one point – which is significant with or without such a plot – but all eight recommendations made in the memo or at least steps similar to them were pursued. These steps were aimed at intentionally or accidentally (the distinction is a fine one) starting a war, and they seem to have worked. Work on the recommendations, coincidentally or not, began on October 8, 1940, the very next day after the memo was written.
On that date, the US State Department told Americans to evacuate Eastern Asia. Also on that date,
President Roosevelt ordered the fleet kept in Hawaii. Admiral James O. Richardson wrote later that he had strongly objected to the proposal and to its purpose.
“Sooner or later,” he
quoted Roosevelt as having said, “
the Japanese would commit an overt act against the United States and the nation would finally become willing to enter the war.”