Chinese infrastructure relevant to India

[bennedose]

Here are two videos - the first two of a series exploring Chinese roads in Tibet and Airfields relevant to India

 

[sthf]

@bennedose Watched your videos, loved them. You must have put a lot of time & effort in them. I have few things I'd like to discuss if you are game.

1) Now that MSC is finally taking shape and the infrastructure along LAC is being steadily improved. Do you think by the start of next decade, India would be able to preempt PLA mobilization and capture passes?

2) Do you think that forward deployed IA units are outnumbering their PLA counterparts and much of the PLA strategy revolves around their belief that India won't be able to disrupt their mobilization from Chengdu & Lhasa to frontlines?

 

[sthf]

3) You mentioned use of air power to disrupt PLA's mobilization on the narrow valley floor. Shouldn't rocket or tube artillery be used to induce landslides instead of risking air assets?

4) If a race of acclimatization ensues, where do you think IA stands?

 

[bennedose]

@bennedose Watched your videos, loved them. You must have put a lot of time & effort in them. I have few things I'd like to discuss if you are game.

1) Now that MSC is finally taking shape and the infrastructure along LAC is being steadily improved. Do you think by the start of next decade, India would be able to preempt PLA mobilization and capture passes?

2) Do you think that forward deployed IA units are outnumbering their PLA counterparts and much of the PLA strategy revolves around their belief that India won't be able to disrupt their mobilization from Chengdu & Lhasa to frontlines?

Even today I don't think the PLA can have a walkover anywhere in these regions. From the looks of it - the Chinese have (in some places) - a "robust" presence but not overwhelming. From the reading I have been doing related to making these videos there are certain issues that the Chinese face. It is still not easy to move stuff from China to Tibet. Hence stuff is stacked up at Golmud in the north - to be taken up the plateau by train. 30% of people coming from the lowlands into Tibet get some form of high altitude sickness (mild or severe) Giving them oxygen helps them but Oxygen only makes life more livable - it will delay acclimatization which requires exposure to low oxygen concentrations.

Tibet is marginal in terms of food supply - if you fill Tibet with PLA men they will have to ship in food as well.

So, in order to prepare for war - the Chinese will have to put in several weeks of building up forces which will all be openly visible to satellite and humint. If the Chinese start doing that - it means they are preparing for war and India will have to do that as well. No such preparations are evident at the time of taking those Google earth images.

I doubt if the Chinese can take anything for granted regarding what India might or might not do. Just my thoughts..

 

[HariPrasad-1]

Even today I don't think the PLA can have a walkover anywhere in these regions. From the looks of it - the Chinese have (in some places) - a "robust" presence but not overwhelming. From the reading I have been doing related to making these videos there are certain issues that the Chinese face. It is still not easy to move stuff from China to Tibet. Hence stuff is sticked up at Golmud in the north - to be taken up the plateau by train. 30% of people coming from the lowlands into Tibet get some form of high altitude sickness (mild or severe) Giving them oxygen helps them but Oxygen only makes life more livable - it will delay acclimatization which requires exposure to low oxygen concentrations.

Tibet is marginal in terms of food supply - if you fill Tibet with PLA men they will have to ship in food as well.

So, in order to prepare for war - the Chinese will have to put in several weeks of building up forces which will all be openly visible to satellite and humint. If the Chinese start doing that - it means they are preparing for war and India will have to do that as well. No such preparations are evident at the time of taking those Google earth images.

I doubt if the Chinese can take anything for granted regarding what India might or might not do. Just my thoughts..

If conflict happens, we will teach chinese a lesson. Our population is very much near the border and we shall not have much logistic problems like chinese. WIth few strikes of Brahmos, we can demolished chinese supply line by breaking their rail and road network which will make chinese army helpless.

 

[bennedose]

3) You mentioned use of air power to disrupt PLA's mobilization on the narrow valley floor. Shouldn't rocket or tube artillery be used to induce landslides instead of risking air assets?

4) If a race of acclimatization ensues, where do you think IA stands?

I spend much time on BRF (which I nurtured in part) and even there I see statements that "air assets should not be risked". This is not true. Those air assets are there for war and they will be used. I personally believe that too much of input about war for Indians comes from American sources and the Americans are always talking about not risking air assets because Americans were stung by their huge losses in Vietnam. That is true for wars against piddling forces like Taliban. Iraq , Libya or Syria. Not China or Russia. If we are talking about "not risking our air assets" in a future war with China- we will have a repeat of 1962

The reason why India had fairly heavy attrition in 1965 and 71 was because the IAF was always in attack mode. It was the PAF in 1971 that went into "Let us preserve our assets" mode. We will use our air force and we will have attrition. Late Jasjit Singh has written extensively on how air wars are fought and how much attrition can be accepted and how much is to be expected.

If the PLA spend 2 months preparing for war - landslides caused by artillery will not stop them. We will need to attack deep into Tibet and we will have to hit Oil installations and military bases in Golmud as well as bridges on the Golmud-Lhasa railway line.

I think the IA is pretty strong on acclimatization. The Chinese may not have a huge number of troops acclimatized and ready (what with living in oxygen enriched barracks) but given time they will have enough of them. But evacuation of sick soldiers to low altitude zones is more arduous for the Chinese.

 

[bennedose]

One more video: Chinese infrastructure in the Tawang area

 

[bennedose]

If conflict happens, we will teach chinese a lesson. Our population is very much near the border and we shall not have much logistic problems like chinese. WIth few strikes of Brahmos, we can demolished chinese supply line by breaking their rail and road network which will make chinese army helpless.

There is another issue. If you look at the border areas - there is nowhere on the Indian side where the Chinese can pour in with tanks and vehicles and whatever is bought in is all downhill - making their logistics lines longer and longer, and our lines shorter.

1962 was a different story of poor intelligence and piss poor leadership and tragically valiant and disciplined soldiers

 

[HariPrasad-1]

I spend much time on BRF (which I nurtured in part) and even there I see statements that "air assets should not be risked". This is not true. Those air assets are there for war and they will be used. I personally believe that too much of input about war for Indians comes from American sources and the Americans are always talking about not risking air assets because Americans were stung by their huge losses in Vietnam. That is true for wars against piddling forces like Taliban. Iraq , Libya or Syria. Not China or Russia. If we are talking about "not risking our air assets" in a future war with China- we will have a repeat of 1962

The reason why India had fairly heavy attrition in 1965 and 71 was because the IAF was always in attack mode. It was the PAF in 1971 that went into "Let us preserve our assets" mode. We will use our air force and we will have attrition. Late Jasjit Singh has written extensively on how air wars are fought and how much attrition can be accepted and how much is to be expected.

If the PLA spend 2 months preparing for war - landslides caused by artillery will not stop them. We will need to attack deep into Tibet and we will have to hit Oil installations and military bases in Golmud as well as bridges on the Golmud-Lhasa railway line.

I think the IA is pretty strong on acclimatization. The Chinese may not have a huge number of troops acclimatized and ready (what with living in oxygen enriched barracks) but given time they will have enough of them. But evacuation of sick soldiers to low altitude zones is more arduous for the Chinese.

I too a member of BR but it is a ch**ya forum and you have no freedom to discuss various issues. If you put forward different angle, you will be issued a warning.

 

[bennedose]

^^:biggrin2:

A lot of people do get turned off BRF for various reasons. That is why it is important to have more than one place on the web to discuss defence issues.

 

[sthf]

@bennedose I think the narrative of Chinese walkover is deliberate and has served well for the successive governments. It's simply the best answer to "Why is India spending so much money on arms?" or "Why is India dramatically expanding it's capabilities when Pakistan is broke & weak?". Agreed about the rest of the points you mentioned

The one thing I find hilarious is that, Indian media bean counts the planes, tanks & ships and present that Chini and their 7000 tanks are just on the border like 500 meters away and will start rolling into India uncontested at a moment's notice.

Chini today and for the foreseeable future will be engaged in the East & South East Asia. Tibet is least of their worries when the sole superpower keeps fingering them.

To be cont.

 

[sthf]

@bennedose Partially agreed on the air power usage. While I agree that Americans are a major influence, things have changed a lot since 1971. As for the "piddly" air forces Iraqi or Libyan. Iraqi AF was one of the most powerful Asian air force. Indian AF at that time wasn't even close to Iraq's in terms of firepower or numbers or even experience. Training however is a different story all together.

My point is, though IAF is repeatedly stressing on the fact that they need strike aircraft for the Eastern border, I'd rather they use air power for local air superiority and leave the tactical strike/interdiction duties to the army. We now have access to long range artillery and sooner rather than later, cheap subsonic cruise missiles.

Oil depots and railway lines are a fair game for IAF but leave the highways for IA.

 

[Kunal Biswas]

@bennedose , Thanks for sharing, Really appreciated ..

Will be looking forwards for more ..

 

[bennedose]

My point is, though IAF is repeatedly stressing on the fact that they need strike aircraft for the Eastern border, I'd rather they use air power for local air superiority and leave the tactical strike/interdiction duties to the army. We now have access to long range artillery and sooner rather than later, cheap subsonic cruise missiles.

Oil depots and railway lines are a fair game for IAF but leave the highways for IA.

The problem about interdiction - medium distance (10-100 km from border) is acquisition of realtime intelligence (as of reinforcements coming down some route) and a rapid response to that. Unless the army acquires an air force of its own it will never be able to do that. Only the air force is capable of doing that.

That apart one of the biggest "disagreements" between army and alr force is that the jawan on the frontline wants that mortar that is targeting him taken out now. But the air force finds itself too stretched to do that - because they are busy taking out trains, convoys, armour, C&C centers and dumps leading to the frontline. Both acts are important but the interdiction may shorten the war, although it may not save the jawan. Saving the jawan will not shorten the war in the absence of that medium distance interdiction

As long as fixed wing aircraft are the business of the air force - it is better that they handle all 3 roles - air defence, medium distance interdiction and deep strike. Army helos may offer CAS to take out that mortar site.

 

[bennedose]

@bennedose , Thanks for sharing, Really appreciated ..

Will be looking forwards for more ..

Thanks. The following is just a short video - the last of 4 related to Arunachal Pradesh and the Indian North east. I will move on to Himachal/Uttrakhand and a few other areas next. May do one on Chinese railways in Tibet

 

[bennedose]

New video:A study of the route/s used by the Chinese in their forays into the Barahoti plain of Uttarakhand

 

[tharun]

@bennedose How many roads are there that PLA can use to attack India?
And what is the terrain and can they send armored columns?
And what is the chances of air attack on forward posts and our main bases?

 

[sthf]

@bennedose Found something that should interest you. Look up

"2016 China Military Power Report - Department of Defense"

 

[Tshering22]

New video:A study of the route/s used by the Chinese in their forays into the Barahoti plain of Uttarakhand

As China gets more and more powerful with stable economic growth (even if the % is lower than before), it will become more and more aggressive. They know that Indian democracy and steps taken by Indira after 1971 have weakened the military and the political intervention from civilians will likely cause lots of trouble for Indian armed forces in the conflict.

They also enjoy a great economic advantage over us which we have much to cover.

They know we are not strategically independent in producing weapons en masse such that they can use UNSC to bully us in case they are facing political challenges from Indian diplomats during a potential conflict.

Unlike the CCP which has a decided and fixed stand against India, India's politics is volatile with only a temporary hardened stance of the saffron nationalist parties versus the appeasement of left liberals and subservience of islamist/communist factions to China and Pakistan.

These things means that we are very very slow in our military developments.

Himalayas are a target for China where they eventually wish to gobble up Bhutan Nepal and all of Indian Himalayan states to assert power.

This is where Indian military doctrine needs to be ruthless and re-align its Pakistan-focused strategy to take on an enemy with more resources.

 

[sthf]

@Tshering22 You are looking it from a different perspective than I am & since you are from a "frontline" state, I'd like to know your opinions on a couple of things.