Arjun was primarily conceived to counter the threat of Pakistan inducting Abrams in the 80s. That threat no longer exists.
Doctrine fits to the equipment. New assets like Attack helis and NCW can be added later. However, the tanks and infantry formations are the backbone of the doctrine. Changing this would mean changing strategy, tactics, logistics, planning, funding..in other words changing everything.
IA has been testing the NCW doctrine since 2002 with proven systems like the T-72 or the T-90. Bringing a new tank in the picture means putting pressure on the fighting abilities of the army. They will need to change a lot in order to fit the HMBTs into the doctrine. Even the US cannot be expected to change to medium tanks from the M1A2. Looking at their economy, they should be changing tanks every other decade. But, they are not. Changing infantry and tank formations would mean reorganizing the entire army. A similar comparison would be changing an entire form of govt. We can have democracy one or 2 decades, dictatorship the next, communism after that, then fascism. Battle Tanks are that essential to a doctrine.
We cannot have an equivalent number of Arjuns as the T-90s anyway. That's nearly 4000 tanks. Only US can afford it as of now. Perhaps when we get a $500Billion+ military budget.
The doctrine requires a specific number of tanks on the field, in the depot and in reserve at all times during a war. Undesirable changes in this number means we are effectively being pushed back, in other words, losing the war. Unfortunately in our doctrine, protection of soldiers is secondary to completing objectives. If a group can be destroyed in exchange for gaining a strategic point, then so be it. We follow the Soviet mentality. Number of dead mean nothing to us, unlike the Western Countries.
A doctrine is a guideline, not a set of rigid rules, a combination of lessons learned, theories formed, practiced and implemented.
A tank within a doctrine has to perform certain functions, now unless you are talking about a place where the weight of the tank prohibits the tank from performing those functions it is false to say that the tank does not fit in the military doctrine.
NCW does not depend on tank type, it will include MBTs, ICVs, APCs, Trucks, Jeeps, Motorcycles, any thing that the military has got with it and combine them to give the military a clear picture of what is going on with it.
In the last 30 years the US has carried out several upgrades to every single aspect of their MBT, the weight went up by 5-6 Tons, changed the gun, introduced improved ammo, electrical and electronics went up by several generations, meanwhile our soviet equipment lost a entire decade.
Again the Tank performs roles, i dont see the particular function that the T-72s perform better than the Arjun by just being a medium tank.
We are talking about a gradual replacement of T-72 and its upgrade the T-90 with the Arjun over a period of time, that certainly requires a 2000 tank figure and no it will not cost 500 billion dollar budget by any stretch.
The number of dead mean nothing till the reserves start to get exhausted, the days of training a soldier in a week and sending him in a tank are over, all the sophisticated equipment in a tank and the addition of NCW translates into increasing the value of every trained soldier, Soviets could do that through the 60s, 70s and 80s, that situation is long gone.
If the recent talks of an aggressive doctrine are true, having a technical and numerical superiority should be desirable.
This whole discussion should revolve around the tanks capability and cost, not its weight.
Cost of operating a T series is definitely cheaper than any HMBT. Especially when the HMBT is going to replace the T series. We need to set up infrastructure, train hundreds of tank crews with a new platform, train maintenance crews, train a million soldiers to fight with the tank. Training the soldiers alone would require a decade or more of continuous war exercises. Then synchronizing the new tank with Airforce and Navy. And this is only half done. After this comes the biggest headache of them all. Ensuring critical supplies during war and maintaining the supply lines. All of this is easier said than done. It can only be done once every 40-50 years and not every other decade.
It is impossible to do this with the Arjun right now. The problem is the Army has been accustomed to T-72s since the 80s. Changing them to Arjuns in 2010 and then changing everything all over again for a new generation tank after 2020 is impossible. Even the US is expecting to use Abrams through the next 2 decades.
The T series is very unique to the IA doctrine. And I don't see this changing for the next 10 to 15 years.
Even if we can afford to induct Arjuns, they will be given secondary duties like support or reserve. They can never be used in the frontline and will simply end up as Poster boys for the Army. You cannot expect the Army to come out with a new Cold Start doctrine for the Arjuns now can you?
The costs are marginally different till you start adding active protection, night vision, and all the fancy electronics.
In your argument you inflate the cost of Infrastructure and training, every number of tanks inducted carry the same amount of infrastructure with them be it support vehicles, crew, reserve or training, and the soldiers don't train to fight with a tank based on its weight, they train based on the capability of that tank, what i am saying is that the HMBT in question will do the same roles better.
The difference would be in the replacement of common equipment and training infrastructure which has to be raised over a long period of time (considering the huge amount of time it took to induct the T-72 and now will take to induct the T-90), which is considerable but not quite back braking as you suggest.
Supply lines are maintained by factories producing the parts required and transporting the parts to the field.
To arrive at a 40-50 years figure is strange considering that a nation can replace a entire generation by then.
The cold start doctrine focuses on achieving certain goals, the tank performs its part in achieving those goals, better armour protection with the same ability to maneuver is an advantage to the tanks ability not a disadvantage, and we have had multiple types in service before. The goals have to be achieved fast and then defended.
To start now for a entirely domestic MBT type would be very wise, as all the economic indicators seem to predict that the domestic industrial capability is on its way up, we have to start making the change now, only then will the capability develop.
The T-90 was a good deal in the mid 90s, a direct choice with induction running till 2010, however that generation had dreams of grandeur about the Arjun MBT, and the army had its own strange method of changing the requirements only to induct a tank which directly went against its changing requirements for the Arjun project.
I got a bit carried away m sorry for that but we might even lose what we are getting due to this guy.
To cut through unnecessary Red tapism.
You seriously need to do ssome reading.
No, he doesn't have the authority to make the army undertake any changes, he does however have the ability to start a discussion which is always helpful.
Redtapism? This is the work of Ministry of Defence they do the procurement, they present the data to the parliament, MOD is redtapism's biggest monument in India.
Production version of T-72BM, it provides us with not technological superiority over our adversaries.