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India's Angi V sends strong nuclear signal
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One of the most noted historians of the Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis, stated that existence of nuclear weapons made the long, post-1945 peace possible. Given the devastating potential, states possessing nuclear weapons lock themselves into a mutual deterrence posture. This was most evident between the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union during the Cold War.
This appears to be the inevitable situation between China and India at present. With the successful test of the 5,000 kilometer-range Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), Agni V, from Wheeler Island, off the Odisha coast on April 19, India has joined an elite club of nations that possess ICBM capability; namely the US, the UK, China, France, Russia, and Israel. The Agni V test has also significantly strengthened India's minimum nuclear weapon's credibility vis-Ã -vis China. The Agni V can reach Chinese cities like Beijing and Shanghai. Significant is the fact that India has a "no first use" policy and hence Agni V is purely a strategic deterrent against potential adversaries (read China) if they threaten India with nuclear strikes.
Nuclear signaling, which implies overt psychological pressure on the adversary in order to deter any military aggression into ones own territory is the political rationale of nuclear weapons. And this is how the Agni V test should be interpreted. Indian values, national interests and military force structures are not geared towards any offensive or expeditionary ends. The 'first order' interest of the Indian state is to defend its territory against external threats. And hence, improving its defense force structures and nuclear deterrence adds credibility to its response mechanism towards this end. It is also a signal to China that India will not be coerced by China with regard to the border dispute in India's eastern sector. Nuclear deterrence also offers a robust defense for safeguarding the interest of Arunachal Pradesh within India. As is well known, China claims the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh by stating that it is Southern Tibet.
That said, nuclear escalation 'signaling' between two of the rising powers of Asia is not without its downsides. First, China already possesses ICBM capabilities ranging from 5, 500 km to 8, 000 kilometers. It's Dongfeng 31 or the D-31 is a solid fuel ICBM with a range of 8,000 kilometers. China is at present also developing the Dongfeng-41 (D-41) with a range of over 11, 500 kilometers. It also possesses the JL-2 nuclear tipped ICBM with a range of 7,000 kilometers and can be launched from sub-marines. Secondly, this situation of a potential nuclear arms race could result in a "security dilemma". Security dilemma by definition implies that when the first state arms itself, the second state fearing the first state's armament, in turn arms itself. The first state then responds to the second state's armament by further arming itself resulting in a vicious cycle of armament.
That could happen to India and China. For instance, China equipped itself with the ICBMs and acted aggressively with India on the border issue by escalating its claims on the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector. India responded by deploying the Brahmos supersonic cruise missile, which has a flight range of 290 kilometers, in the eastern sector to strengthen its defense posture vis-Ã -vis China. It has now tested the Agni V with the capability to hit Chinese cities by 2014. China in turn, develops the D-41 with a flight range of 11,500 kilometers and targets India. The consequence of all this is a classic "security dilemma" requiring deft handling as any wrong signaling of intent or offensive military posture from either side could lead to conflict escalation.
In this situation, it is important for India and China to work out a mechanism of 'bilateral nuclear dialogue' in order to reassure the other side that these weapons are purely strategic weapons meant for the purpose of deterrence. Both India and China could jointly commit to a "no first use" policy with regard to their nuclear weapons. Most importantly, this situation of mistrust and potential conflict escalation should be mitigated by deft diplomacy in order to ensure that both countries are sincere about resolving the border dispute in the eastern sector within the 2005 framework agreement.
Dr Namrata Goswami is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. The views expressed here are those of the author alone.