ADA Tejas Mark-II/Medium Weight Fighter

[Rushil51]

Re: ADA LCA Tejas - IV

Rtd Air Commodore found murdered in Bangalore house - IBNLive

Bengaluru: A retired Air Commodore was found dead in his house in Bengaluru Rural district on Monday morning. 70-year-old Parvez Khokhar, who was living with his wife in a residential villa in Huskura area, was found dead with his hands and legs tied with a cloth in his room.
Khokhar was the Project Director for the flight test of Tejas LCA (Light Combat Aircraft) and was India's attache to Pakistan.
He has served 35 years in the Indian Air Force. According to police, Khokhar and his wife slept in separate rooms. This morning, when his wife found that her room was locked from inside, she tried calling her husband. When there was no response, she called up neighbours. The neighbors found that the house was locked from inside. They broke open the back door and opened the Khokhar's wife's room.
When the wife along with the neighbours went to check on Khokhar, they found him dead with his hands and legs tied with a piece of cloth. They immediately reported the matter to police.
Police have registered a case of murder and are suspecting that Khokhar may have been strangulated.

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Re: ADA LCA Tejas - IV

Rest In Peace ..

=============

@ersakthivel

1. G K Kumaravel of the Combat Vehicles Research Development Establishment (CVRDE), Avadi, head of the Arjun Main Battle Tank (MBT) Mark 1 and 2 programmes
2. Squadron Leader (Retd) Baldev Singh, Director (Corporate Planning & Marketing) at HAL; former Executive Director Flight Operations and the Chief Test Pilot (Fixed Wing) at HAL's Bangalore Complex
3. KK Josh, 34, chief engine room artificer (CERA) at Shipbuilding Centre
4. Abhish Shivam, 33, a chief engineer working at INS Arihant, India's first nuclear-powered submarine.
5. Air Commodore Parvez Khokhar, 70, former project director of India's indigenous fighter aircraft Light Combat Aircraft

Definite Arms mafia out killing these persons which must be investigated.

 

[Kunal Biswas]

India's defence production problem

While Parrikar will certainly clear long pending acquisition proposals faster, the larger strategic aim of his tenure must be to harmonize India's defence spend with the 'Make in India' programme.

The appointment of Manohar Parikkar as Union Defence Minister could not have come sooner. A 'part time' minister for Defence as Finance Minister Arun Jaitley has sometimes been called in the course of the last six months would have found it difficult to do justice to a portfolio that must establish India as a net provider of security in its immediate region and beyond.

Now someone with Parrikar's unimpeachable integrity is obviously useful to oversee all the muscle that India's military seeks to acquire to match up to it's ever expanding brief. But that brief is not only about meeting the projected requirements of the military in a timely and above board manner but also about engendering a domestic military industrial complex that is worthy of a country with significant strategic goals.

So while Parrikar will certainly clear long pending acquisition proposals faster, the larger strategic aim of his tenure must be to harmonize India's defence spend with the 'Make in India' programme. After all if 'Make in India' has to be more than a jobs program it must focus heavily on the military and aerospace sectors which continue to be at the top of the technological value food chain of what we call 'industry'.

Moreover if 'Make in India' is accompanied with 'export from India', it would sit rather well with India's stated objective of becoming a net security provider in the IOR as well as balancing the 'iron friendship' of our neighbours by exporting weapons to their other neighbours such as Vietnam and Afghanistan for instance.

For that Parrikar will have to show the political will to break down the sharp polarization that takes place in India between 'users' (i.e the military), 'developers' (i.e DRDO), 'producers'(mostly DPSUs) and 'buyers' (MoD bureaucrats).

In the import raj of the UPA's 'ten' factionalism within different wings of the same team became commonplace and this should not be tolerated by Parrikar as he looks to fix the MoD. Yes while the easing of FDI in defence norms is all well and good, Indian military exports will be mostly of those systems to which intellectual property (IP) is owned domestically such as the Akash surface to air missile (SAM), sonars (already being exported), radars and a range of communication equipment.

Indeed, it is important to understand that license producing foreign designs in India will never be as useful as building domestically developed weapons.

To aid that process, Parrikar will also have to get the Indian military to actually commit large orders to indigenously developed weapons, some of which like the Arjun Main Battle Tank(MBT) despite all the bad press, have outclassed foreign designs such as the T-90 in comparative trials.

In fact the best way to leverage 'FDI in defence' would be to attract key sub-system manufacturers to set up shop in India via the promise of both large domestic orders as well as exports for indigenous platforms that use these sub-systems. An example would be getting GE to build low bypass military turbofans in India for an extended HAL Tejas production run which includes export to Africa and Latin America.

But for that the Indian military must be encouraged to see itself as an 'owner' of indigenous programmes rather than as a mere user with a 'set of requirements'. Requirements which it must be said are often completely unrealistic (betraying brochuritis) and acceded to by a DRDO with equally unrealistic deadlines only so that import can be staved off for as long as possible.

The DPSUs don't care whether they license produce foreign designs or DRDO developed ones and MoD bureaucrats one way or the other remain overlords of this delightful landscape. Parrikar has to put a stop to this 'passing the parcel' game and bring accountability to the system by ensuring that collective responsibility is not a mere euphemism.


Source : Can Parrikar fix India's defence production problem? | Swarajya

 

[ersakthivel]

Re: ADA LCA Tejas - IV

Rest In Peace ..

=============

@ersakthivel

1. G K Kumaravel of the Combat Vehicles Research Development Establishment (CVRDE), Avadi, head of the Arjun Main Battle Tank (MBT) Mark 1 and 2 programmes
2. Squadron Leader (Retd) Baldev Singh, Director (Corporate Planning & Marketing) at HAL; former Executive Director Flight Operations and the Chief Test Pilot (Fixed Wing) at HAL's Bangalore Complex
3. KK Josh, 34, chief engine room artificer (CERA) at Shipbuilding Centre
4. Abhish Shivam, 33, a chief engineer working at INS Arihant, India's first nuclear-powered submarine.
5. Air Commodore Parvez Khokhar, 70, former project director of India's indigenous fighter aircraft Light Combat Aircraft

Definite Arms mafia out killing these persons which must be investigated.

Kumaravel's death is certainly most critical loss. Parvez Khokar is senior and retired. But his words on tejas carries a lot of weight, a thorn in the flesh of tejas baiters.

He has open said that in mahy key respects tejas mk1 is superior to mirage-2000. I have quoted his words hundreds of time across forums.

Shocking to see him getting killed at a critical moment of tejas program. His words certainly carry credibility and his loss is a big loss .

History Of The F-16 Fighting Falcon | Code One Magazine

the Lightweight Fighter Mafia will point out that thrust-to-weight ratio is not the only indicator of aircraft performance. The figure doesn't account for the effects of wing loading and aerodynamic drag. A better measure of performance is energy rate (or Ps), which is a function of thrust, weight, velocity, and drag. Every external payload extracts a performance price in aerodynamic drag....

Another reason why single engined smaller fighters are more effective than the simple thrust to weight calculations suggest. Tejas has a far smaller airframe , so less drag and far higher wing area(lower wing loading)

So if we take all three important factors as base for agility, i.e thrust to weight ratio, wing loading and skin friction drag. Tejas mk1 scores a bit lower in TWR compared to MMRCA competitors(but mk2 will bring it on par) and in other two critical factors like wing loading and skin friction drag, tejas mk1 itself holds a clear lead over any MMRCA competitor.

Add to that tejas has a relaxed Static Stability which aids agility, In total tejas has many things going for it.

 

[ersakthivel]

India's defence production problem

While Parrikar will certainly clear long pending acquisition proposals faster, the larger strategic aim of his tenure must be to harmonize India's defence spend with the 'Make in India' programme.

The appointment of Manohar Parikkar as Union Defence Minister could not have come sooner. A 'part time' minister for Defence as Finance Minister Arun Jaitley has sometimes been called in the course of the last six months would have found it difficult to do justice to a portfolio that must establish India as a net provider of security in its immediate region and beyond.

Now someone with Parrikar's unimpeachable integrity is obviously useful to oversee all the muscle that India's military seeks to acquire to match up to it's ever expanding brief. But that brief is not only about meeting the projected requirements of the military in a timely and above board manner but also about engendering a domestic military industrial complex that is worthy of a country with significant strategic goals.

So while Parrikar will certainly clear long pending acquisition proposals faster, the larger strategic aim of his tenure must be to harmonize India's defence spend with the 'Make in India' programme. After all if 'Make in India' has to be more than a jobs program it must focus heavily on the military and aerospace sectors which continue to be at the top of the technological value food chain of what we call 'industry'.

Moreover if 'Make in India' is accompanied with 'export from India', it would sit rather well with India's stated objective of becoming a net security provider in the IOR as well as balancing the 'iron friendship' of our neighbours by exporting weapons to their other neighbours such as Vietnam and Afghanistan for instance.

For that Parrikar will have to show the political will to break down the sharp polarization that takes place in India between 'users' (i.e the military), 'developers' (i.e DRDO), 'producers'(mostly DPSUs) and 'buyers' (MoD bureaucrats).

In the import raj of the UPA's 'ten' factionalism within different wings of the same team became commonplace and this should not be tolerated by Parrikar as he looks to fix the MoD. Yes while the easing of FDI in defence norms is all well and good, Indian military exports will be mostly of those systems to which intellectual property (IP) is owned domestically such as the Akash surface to air missile (SAM), sonars (already being exported), radars and a range of communication equipment.

Indeed, it is important to understand that license producing foreign designs in India will never be as useful as building domestically developed weapons.

To aid that process, Parrikar will also have to get the Indian military to actually commit large orders to indigenously developed weapons, some of which like the Arjun Main Battle Tank(MBT) despite all the bad press, have outclassed foreign designs such as the T-90 in comparative trials.

In fact the best way to leverage 'FDI in defence' would be to attract key sub-system manufacturers to set up shop in India via the promise of both large domestic orders as well as exports for indigenous platforms that use these sub-systems. An example would be getting GE to build low bypass military turbofans in India for an extended HAL Tejas production run which includes export to Africa and Latin America.

But for that the Indian military must be encouraged to see itself as an 'owner' of indigenous programmes rather than as a mere user with a 'set of requirements'. Requirements which it must be said are often completely unrealistic (betraying brochuritis) and acceded to by a DRDO with equally unrealistic deadlines only so that import can be staved off for as long as possible.

The DPSUs don't care whether they license produce foreign designs or DRDO developed ones and MoD bureaucrats one way or the other remain overlords of this delightful landscape. Parrikar has to put a stop to this 'passing the parcel' game and bring accountability to the system by ensuring that collective responsibility is not a mere euphemism.


Source : Can Parrikar fix India's defence production problem? | Swarajya

He has an engineering background, lets see what transpires at the end.

The "make in india" free for all procurement policy with multiple players budding for the same product does away with corruption and gives max incentive for local production, because if more parts are made here costs will be less and the chances of winning the tender is brighter.

 

[sathya]

Re: ADA LCA Tejas - IV

Intelligence bureau or NIA must investigate it...

There is no way these can be done without leaving any evidence ..

These people will all be aware of security needs, would surely have made some for themselves..

Letting go death of these scientists will be a big mistake...

 

[power_monger]

The Radiance of Tejas: A bright prospect for 'Make in India'

Some of the Sailent points are :


LCA Tejas Mk-2


1) Tejas Mk-2 is built now to address the 1995 ASR completly.It uses more powerfull engine 98KN F414-GE-INS6.99 units of the Engine has been ordered so far.

2) Contrary to earlier speculation, Tejas Mk-II does not require an intake re-design since the MK-I intake was designed to be used with the Kaveri engine which has a greater mass flow than the current F404-GE-IN20 . Studies showed that existing intake could easily handle the additional mass flow from the F414-GE-INS6.

3) In 'weight reduction approach' Mk-2 has already redcued 350 Kgs of the intended 500 Kgs.it will also see 5% improvement in drag characteristics.These changes are expected to increase Aerodynamic performance to the required 1995 ASR level.

4) The Mk-II design will address the sustained turn rate (STR), climb rate and transonic acceleration shortfalls of the Mk-I. The ASR requires a STR of 18 degrees (same as the F-16's) and Mk-II will close in on that. The climb rate will also be more or less satisfactorily reached. Transonic acceleration is expected to be realized fully. Moreover the Mk-II airframe will certainly be able to reach and fly through Mach 1.8 in a dive.

5) Mk-II will has DRDO's Uttan AESA radar which is 40 kgs more than current MMR radar which will checked for maturity in Dec 2015.Hardware has been realized for this radar which has a range of 100 km and rooftop testing is underway.

6) ADA & IAF are both not in favour of getting Israeli offer on the EL/M-2052 as they are quite satisfied with progress on Uttam AESA radar.

7) The glass cockpit for the Mk-II is completly new which has bigger displays of 8 x 12 inch displays rather than the 5 x 5 and 6 x 6 inch displays currently featured in the MK-I cockpit. A prototype of the Mk-II cockpit has been developed already.The initial lot of MK-II displays will be imported, in the future Samtel will supply indigenously developed ones.

8) The 'Inboard' i.e the complete layout for the Mk-II has been is frozen. The Mk-II has 25-30 percent commonality in parts with the MK-I and these parts (i.e not requiring any modification) are already in production. For the MK-I parts that have to be modified, thousands of new drawings are being worked upon jointly by DRDO-HAL and the private sector. According to Dr Tamil Mani 'The final Mk-II drawings will be completed by December 2015.'


finally IAF wants the first flight of the prototype to happen by 2017, but Dr Tamilmani says that given the extensive instrumentation and system check out requirements, it could be that first flight spills over into 2018. A total of four test vehicles will be built and all of these will be of production standard. At least three of these at a minimum will be in airborne testing before the end of 2019 and FOC is likely to be achieved in another 2-2.5 years from then.

 

[power_monger]

Source: Ranjan rao from BRF

 

[Kunal Biswas]

I suggest lets keep this thread till tejas, Their is enough of off-topic discussion ..

 

[tramp]

The Tejas Mk.2 is scheduled to make its first flight in 2014, with full-rate production to follow two years later.

Any flight done yet?

 

[Kunal Biswas]

The flight of first prototype is now dated at 2017 ..

Any flight done yet?

 

[tramp]

The flight of first prototype is now dated at 2017 ..

So more time and cost overrun ahead for the Mk2 project also. Why can't DRDO set realist time frames for any project?

 

[sgarg]

There is a serious planning problem in aviation. Aviation requires a big collaboration between R&D organizations, educational institutes, and industrial companies. HAL cannot drive aviation, it has to be done by a government initiative. It is too big a job for HAL. HAL is only a cog in the wheel.

HAL is given too much importance in this country. This is the root of the problems in aviation. We need 3-4 large aviation companies supported by a number of medium and small sized companies.

HAL headed by ex-IAF officer does not bring a solution to the aviation puzzle. It may (or may not) increase efficiency of HAL but it does not create overall aviation capability as should be the case.

The government needs to allocate higher percentage of aviation production to indian private companies.

IAF must work closely with HAL and even companies like Tata, Taneja etc. so that its requirements are converted into reality. Aviation projects need complex technologies which require time to develop. Last minute purchases from foreign sources only increase dependence; and foreigner invariably take advantage of the situation. The refuelling probe and radome are latest examples of IAF's attitude creating delays in aviation programs.

 

[Ray]

I suggest lets keep this thread till tejas, Their is enough of off-topic discussion ..

Transfer all OT issues to the appropriate thread.

 

[ersakthivel]

Combat ready? IAF down to 25 fighter squadrons | idrw.org
We right now have just 25 combat ready IAF squadrons, and among them 14 are of pre historic Mig-21,27 jag variety!!!
Still our Imported Air Force worthies like matheswaran are plumping for a long winded devlopement of "twin engined tejas as few degrees of turn rates were not met!!!!!"
First IAF did not even bother to give a correct upto date weapon config for tejas , and after the PVs flew came up with new requirements which led to detailed wing redesign which added to the delay in 2004. Then when Navy wanted higher powered GE-414 based tejas mk2 for their higher load bearing carrier needs IAF cleverly jumped to their bandwagon and demanded that this Tejas mk2 was what they originally demanded!!!, which is down right false info. It was navy which provided 900 cr seed money in 2008 to kick off the naval tejas project.

With just 11 non mig-21,27 jag operational squadrons , our IAF guys are nit picking on tejas , while they must be ordering at least another couple of extra tejas squadrons to meet the pressing demand.
Countries like china and pak have built and inducted hundreds of fighters which were far below the maturity level of even tejas mk1. But IAF has no such practical thoughts and instead expects GOI to commit 20 billion dollar for just 6 rafale squadrons!!! , while saying we will not order more tejas mk1 till tejas mk2 is ready.

 

[Kunal Biswas]

@Saurav Jha: 4. Fighters: Major blue print for public-private approach for producing the Tejas Mk-II being readied. Potential game changer.

 

[Kunal Biswas]

]India Successfully Tests One Ton Glide Bomb

NEW DELHI: India today tested a one ton indigenously-developed glide bomb which successfully hit a target 100 kms away.The precision-guided bomb, tested in the Bay of Bengal off the coast of Odisha, was dropped by an Indian Air Force aircraft.The bomb, guided by its on board navigation system, glided for nearly 100 km before hitting the target with "great precision," said the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), which constructed it.Several radars tracked the flight of the bomb which was developed by multiple centres linked to DRDO.According to Dr G Satheesh Reddy, the Director of the DRDO's Research Centre Imarat Laboratory which was the nodal agency in developing the glide bomb, "India has now become self-reliant in the area of guided precision bombs."

Unlike missiles, glide bombs have no onboard motor and are therefore far cheaper to build and maintain than missiles. Glide bombs rely on small control surfaces which direct the weapon towards a target as it progressively loses altitude after being released from an aircraft. The key to a precision guided bomb is its seeker which can lock onto a target based on pre-programmed targeting data. The seeker itself can be optica l, infrared or a combination of the two and telemetry for the bomb can also be provided from overhead satellites.

With a range of 100 kms, the Indian-built glide bomb can be fired on ground targets which are beyond the range of most surface-to-air missile systems in use in Pakistan and China. In other words, the pilot of the fighter dropping the bomb can drop the weapon and escape before entering the range of the radars of enemy surface-to-air missiles which can shoot it down.

India Successfully Tests One Ton Glide Bomb. Why That's Important

 

[rahulrds1]

What is Glide bomb??
How it works??
How it is used with "fighter planes" and navigated??

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xrT2KtSzMd0

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Astra BVRAAM Successfully for a 3rd time

India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has tested the indigenous Astra Beyond visual Range Air-ro-Air Missile (BVRAAM) for a third time successfully from an Indian Air Force (IAF) Su-30 MKI aircraft. Astra would be fitted on both the Su 30 MKIs and Light Combat aircraft (LCA) variants that DRDO and HAL are developing for IAF and the Indian Navy.According to the statement: The latest test was conducted on 20th Jun 2014 from over 6 km altitude. It was a control and guidance flight which successfully demonstrated interception of an electronically simulated target at long range. Both tests, today's test and earlier launch on 09th June 2014 conducted to demonstrate the aerodynamic characteristics of the missile, have demonstrated the repeatability, robustness and endurance capability of Astra BVR-AAM as a weapon system.

The range of the missile was not disclosed.

Source : ..:: India Strategic ::. IAF: India tests Astra BVRAAM Successfully for a 3rd time

 

[Lions Of Punjab]

Ditching Rafale

Like an able pilot with his wits about him in an out-of-control warplane, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar may be preparing to ditch Rafale touted as the medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) answer, which the Indian Air Force has set its heart on procuring at any cost, and going for the more economical and sensible Su-30 option instead.

It has been repeatedly emphasised by this analyst that the IAF misconceived the MMRCA requirement, disregarded the uncommonly high costs involved in procuring the chosen Rafale and France's past record of unmet transfer of technology promises, and the Su-30s/MiG-29M2s as sustainable alternative. I also warned that the massive expenditure on the Rafale would starve the indigenous programmes (Tejas and the advanced medium combat aircraft — AMCA) of funds, and stifle the Indian aviation industry trying to get back on its feet.

The reasons for the nose-diving deal are many, and they are serious. The unwillingness of Dassault Avions, the Rafale manufacturer, to guarantee the performance of this aircraft produced under licence at Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd despite the original RFP (Request for Proposal) requiring bidders to transfer technology, including production wherewithal, procedures and protocols, to this public sector unit for the aircraft's local assembly, has been reported. There's, however, an untold back-story revealing France's intended duplicity.

Perceiving India as the perennial sucker, Dassault chose Reliance Aerospace Technologies Pvt Ltd (RATPL) as partner in the hope that the fabled Ambani reach and influence in Delhi would help it get around the HAL production obligation. Problems were not anticipated as evidenced by RATPL approaching the Andhra Pradesh government in 2013 for land around Hyderabad to set up a factory. But because RATPL has zero experience in producing anything remotely related to aviation, Dassault saw it as an opportunity to "double dip", meaning arrange it so India would pay it twice for the same aircraft! This was to be managed thus: Dassault would set up a production line under RATPL aegis importing every last screw and production jig and collect the money for the 108 Rafales it puts together here at the cost-plus-profit price HAL would charge IAF. In other words, Dassault would export the Rafale assembly kits and wherewithal virtually to itself and pocket the proceeds while paying a premium to RATPL.

But this double dipping ruse in the works merely whetted France's appetite for more. Capitalising on the IAF brass' penchant for newer French aircraft and the Indian government's tendency eventually to cave into the military's demands, Dassault proposed an enlarged Rafale deal with the cost revised upwards from the $30 billion level to a $45-$50 billion contract. For such enhanced sums, Dassault sought to replace the Rafale originally offered with the slightly better "F-3R" version, promised a mid-life upgrade involving retrofitment of the Thales RBE2 AESA (active electronically scanned array) radar, and suggested India's future fifth and sixth generation combat aircraft needs be met by the "F-4R" and "F-5R" configurations (or whatever designations they are given) now on the drawing board featuring crystal blade for jet turbines, "fly-by-light" technology, etc. Such contract extension suits the IAF fine because it plays on Vayu Bhavan's antipathy for Russian hardware (expressed in terms of "diversity of suppliers") as well as indigenous aircraft, and undermines both the multi-billion dollar project jointly to develop the fifth generation fighter aircraft, Su-50 PAK/FA with Russia and the Indian AMCA with its design finalised.

But for Parrikar's welcome show of common sense this French plan would have rolled out nicely. Inconveniently for Dassault, he publicly disclosed that the far deadlier and more versatile Su-30 MKI costs `358 crores (roughly $60 million) each compared to the `700 crore price tag for the Rafale, meaning two Su-30s could be secured for the price of a single Rafale. Implicit is the reasonable conclusion that it made more sense to buy a much larger fleet of 4.5-plus generation Su-30s than to get stuck with a 4.5-minus generation Rafale sporting 5.5 generation aircraft prices. The cost comparison remains skewed even when the "super Sukhoi-30", costing `70 crores, is considered, when the added advantage of the plunging the Russian ruble kicks in, allowing India to extract far more bang for the buck from Moscow.

Looked at another way, the original allocation of $12 billion for the MMRCA could fetch IAF at current prices a whole new, augmented, and more capable fighter/bomber armada and raise the force strength to 50 frontline combat squadrons. This because the $12 billion can buy 20 Tejas Mk-Is (in addition to the 40 already ordered), 150 Tejas Mk-IIs, some 35 super Sukhoi-30s, and around 50 MiG-29Ks/M2s (with the M-2s nearly equal of the MiG-35 the Strategic Forces Command wanted for delivering nuclear bombs, but were denied). In short, a composite additional fleet of 255 aircraft can be acquired for the initial price of 126 Rafales, with "incalculable" savings in streamlined logistics, training, and maintenance but absent the cost-hikes, delays, and aggravation of setting up a new production line (as HAL already produces Su-30 MKIs).

Besides, France's extortionist attitude is offputting. In response to the IAF's request not too long ago for an immediate transfer of two Rafale squadrons from the French Air Force as a quick-fix, Paris agreed but demanded these would have to be paid for at the same rate as new aircraft and that these planes could carry only French sourced weapons. Worse still, France's reputation for fulfilling technology transfer provisions too is suspect as past experience reveals.

The IAF trusts Paris not to cutoff the supply of spares if India follows a foreign policy not to France's or even America's liking. Except, heeding Washington's directive, France recently stopped the delivery of two Mistral-class amphibious assault ships Russia has paid for. What's the guarantee Paris won't sever supply links and leave HAL stranded mid-production and IAF frontline squadrons grounded in case India resumes nuclear testing, say?

The larger question is: How come France's record of defaulting on technology-related parts of contracts combined with the unaffordability of French aircraft generally using any metric, were not factored by IAF and Ministry of Defence when shortlisting Rafale?

Security Wise | Bharat Karnad – India's Foremost Conservative Strategist