ADA Tejas (LCA) News and Discussions

[Compersion]

why dont we have a deal with israel where they buy some tejas from us ... this would help in engine tot and development ... and israel can get a alternative (secure) manufacturing source

iam sure there is a demand for such a light weight fighter in the developed world ... why dont we do a deal with them on that

 

[ersakthivel]

saw it on the net,

DM : We have purchased 36 Rafale is fly away conditions. And more Aircraft will be made in India for medium multi role purpose. It would be any fighters Rafale or other. I don't want to go into it. Since for the past 14 years from 2000 we haven't inducted any major Advanced aircraft. So we will looking at adding more Advanced jets . Rafale is 4+ generation aircraft (very capabcapable is what he ment)

We have well upgraded jets like Mig 29 mirages etc all are 3rd gen fighters .

Surprise statement on Tejas : He said our own Tejas light combat Multi role aircraft will go through final test flight next month. So within a month or two all issues will be sorted out . And major induction process will begin

Good news finally on endless test flights of tejas.

". And major induction process will begin", means what?



http://zeenews.india.com/news/india...dian-air-force-manohar-​parrikar_1576984.html

Noting that Light Combat aircraft Tejas will undergo final flight testing next month, he said, 'Make In India' is a long-term solution for India's Air Force strength.

"We have to push the development of Tejas and we have to also ensure that we could build some high grade aircraft," Parrikar said.

 

[Pulkit]

why dont we have a deal with israel where they buy some tejas from us ... this would help in engine tot and development ... and israel can get a alternative (secure) manufacturing source

iam sure there is a demand for such a light weight fighter in the developed world ... why dont we do a deal with them on that

Ooooooooooooooo

That will really be exciting.

Israel buying Tejas will be interesting.

Yes there is a demand of Light weight fighters all accross the globe , but the issue is are we ready to export.
We might just have enough to meet our domestic needs to export it huge steps needs to be taken..

 

[Pulkit]

saw it on the net,





Good news finally on endless test flights of tejas.

". And major induction process will begin", means what?



Rafale deal will bring relief to Indian Air Force: Manohar "‹Parrikar | Zee News

Will that mean more Tejas Mk1 orders or once Tejas MK2 is complete they are expecting huge orders...
What will it be?

Will these Test flight come up with more issues alegations problems (made up by IAF) or they are only for IAF to get familiar with the beauty they have now?

 

[Kunal Biswas]

As of now their are no plans to export it, The first priority to manufacture them in India in mass, Speed up production line and improve quality ..

Then only we can think abt exporting, And it is very possible the first of these will be operational over Vietnam ..

why dont we have a deal with israel where they buy some tejas from us ... this would help in engine tot and development ... and israel can get a alternative (secure) manufacturing source

iam sure there is a demand for such a light weight fighter in the developed world ... why dont we do a deal with them on that

 

[Compersion]

As of now their are no plans to export it, The first priority to manufacture them in India in mass, Speed up production line and improve quality ..

Then only we can think abt exporting, And it is very possible the first of these will be operational over Vietnam ..

Thanks for replying. The thought process in my mind was the full General Electric TOT engine and its source (especially tejas mk2) and who would be good customers what that in mind and its conversion. Israel needs to diversify its sources also and such a weapon system is not available i would think and the demographics suit the customer. Israel would get a infrastructure to use to develop and use the plane also which would also assist India to manufacture them in mass, speed up production line and improve quality. The ideal situation would "not" be like Dhruv where they only helped marketed but with actual use. I have a feeling if we play it right Israel will go not one step but two steps (and more) ahead. One can easily see geo-politics into this. I also suppose advanced light helicopter system is far different from a advanced light fighter jet system.

 

[salute]

An aircraft's lift capabilities can be measured from the following formula:

L = (1/2) d v2 s CL

* L = Lift, which must equal the airplane's weight in pounds
* d = density of the air. This will change due to altitude. These values can be found in a I.C.A.O. Standard Atmosphere Table.
* v = velocity of an aircraft expressed in feet per second
* s = the wing area of an aircraft in square feet
* CL = Coefficient of lift , which is determined by the type of airfoil and angle of attack.

So v^2=2L/d*s*CL





If you look at the equations, induced drag increases with the square of CL, and proportionately with the increase in wing area. So double wing area = a quarter the CL = half the induced drag.

Lift (N) = CL * area (sq m) * .5 * pressure (kg/cubic m) * velocity (m/s) squared

Coefficient induced drag (CDi) = (CL^2) / (pi * aspect ratio * Oswald efficiency)

Drag = coefficient * area * density *.5 * velocity squared

If you look at the equations, induced drag increases with the square of CL, and proportionately with the increase in wing area. So double wing area = a quarter the CL = half the induced drag.

As per the above set of formulas Cl reduces when surface area increases,

And the co efficient of induced drag reduces by square of CL ,

SO even though it appears that plain drag increases with directly with surface area , since the co efficient of drag reduce by the square of CL(which reduces further directly with wing surface area )


So v^2=2L/d*s*CL

SO even though v decreases with increase in surface area this is even out by decrease in Cl with surface area which leads to higher v.

And most important of all the L (the all important lift thing which determines the higher v) is always higher for low wing loading fighter at any given bank angle.

To plug some figures in, an example aircraft with weight 3000 kg and wing area of 10 m^2, then the same aircraft with 20 m^2 wings. (this assumes weight doesn't increase with the larger wings, of course)

Assuming lift = 4 times weight, sea level density, speed = 400 km/h

117,600 = CL * 10 * .5 * 1.225 * 111^2
CL = 1.56

CDi = (1.56^)/(pi*6*.8) = 0.16

Induced drag = 0.16 * 10 * 1.225 * .5 * 111^2

Induced drag = 12,074 N

Now the same thing but with double the wing area

117,600 = CL * 20 * .5 * 1.225 * 111^2
CL = 0.78

CDi = (0.78^)/(pi*6*.8) = 0.04 (note how doubling the wing area results in a quarter of the CDi, because CL is squared)

Induced drag = 0.04 * 20 * 1.225 * .5 * 111^2

Induced drag = 6,037 N

Of course, parasitic drag increases with a larger wing area, but basically lower wingloading = an increasing advantage the tighter the turn, and the lower the IAS you fly (and IAS of course is lower at high altitudes)

Lift (N) = CL * area (sq m) * .5 * pressure (kg/cubic m) * velocity (m/s) squared

Coefficient induced drag (CDi) = (CL^2) / (pi * aspect ratio * Oswald efficiency)

Drag = coefficient * area * density *.5 * velocity squared

If you look at the equations, induced drag increases with the square of CL, and proportionately with the increase in wing area. So double wing area = a quarter the CL = half the induced drag.

To plug some figures in, an example aircraft with weight 3000 kg and wing area of 10 m^2, then the same aircraft with 20 m^2 wings. (this assumes weight doesn't increase with the larger wings, of course)

Assuming lift = 4 times weight, sea level density, speed = 400 km/h

117,600 = CL * 10 * .5 * 1.225 * 111^2
CL = 1.56

CDi = (1.56^)/(pi*6*.8) = 0.16

Induced drag = 0.16 * 10 * 1.225 * .5 * 111^2

Induced drag = 12,074 N

Now the same thing but with double the wing area

117,600 = CL * 20 * .5 * 1.225 * 111^2
CL = 0.78

CDi = (0.78^)/(pi*6*.8) = 0.04 (note how doubling the wing area results in a quarter of the CDi, because CL is squared)

Induced drag = 0.04 * 20 * 1.225 * .5 * 111^2

Induced drag = 6,037 N

Of course, parasitic drag increases with a larger wing area, but basically lower wingloading = an increasing advantage the tighter the turn, and the lower the IAS you fly (and IAS of course is lower at high altitudes)

masterji not everyone is aeronautical engineer like you, dont understand a fc*king thing.

 

[sathya]

Todays pic in idrw shows tejas with black and white square sticker in tail and wings ..

spin and recovery tests going on ?

Or an old photo..

 

[Lions Of Punjab]

CALCULATED POLITICAL PUSH, NOT REGULAR PROCESS LED TO RAFALE DEAL; ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW


After a series of twists and turns, a multi-billion dollar deal for new fighter jets for the Air Force has hit the last mile with the NDA government determined to iron out differences and wrap up negotiations with an out-of-the-box solution to end a two-year deadlock.

A test of political will to find an innovative approach to ink a contract that was threatening to get out of hand, but one that had significant strategic and geopolitical implications, has been on display in the lead up to Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Paris, where the Rafale deal has been firmed up along with a memorandum of understanding on joint defence production in India.

The reworked deal—buying 36 fighters outright with the option for more could work out to up to $7.5 billion and scrapping an earlier requirement to manufacture 108 jets in India—has the potential to pump in at least $2.3 billion into the Indian defence manufacturing sector, a major chunk of which will go to the private industry.

While the mega deal—initiated in 2007 with six competitors—had been chugging along since 2012 when Dassault's Rafale was declared the winner, signs had appeared in the past few weeks that for the first time since coming to power, the NDA government was looking at walking the distance, provided New Delhi did not have to make significant concessions.

Dassault had been struggling to get the contract through in the last year of the UPA, which had gone slow on all defence procurements. The newfound political will in New Delhi, as well as a strong diplomatic push from Paris, offered the final chance to bag an order that was widely classified as the world's biggest open tender for fighter aircraft.

While many differences had been sorted out, a deadlock persisted for almost two years on two major sticking points. Innovative solutions were needed for both, something that the NDA government is not known to shy away from.

The easier one to sort out was liability for quality and delays in production. As per the original terms, French manufacturer Dassault had responsibility for timely delivery of the fighters as well as technical defects. But as the final negotiations started, the French firm raised the point that in case of delays by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd—nominated to produce the fighter in India—penalties would be unfair.

The other sticking point was pricing. The deal is complex—it involves the calculation of life cycle costs, carries a major technology transfer component to HAL and has a clause that requires Dassault to invest half the value of the contract in India. After negotiations on the transfer of technology and the setting up of a production line in India with HAL, it emerged that the cost that Dassault had projected for the India-made Rafale would be surpassed. The Indian PSU would be required to purchase more equipment, facilities and technology than anticipated to deliver the fighter on time, escalating the costs. Again, a novel solution was needed. One proposal was to divide the cost of the production line as Dassault had offered to use it to make different platforms such as its Falcon executive jets and unmanned aerial vehicles, which are churned out of the same line in France. This would potentially lower the per-unit cost of the Rafale fighter.
While in 2007, the government had assessed the deal at $10 billion, the cost of 126 Rafale fighters had swelled to an estimated $22 billion by 2014.

What worked was a commitment by the government for the outright purchase of 36 jets. This would keep the French company in profit, do away with HAL's liability issues and meet the operational requirements of the Indian Air Force, which is battling a crisis with obsolete fighter aircraft.

Going the final mile on the deal meant that some concessions have to be granted by both India and France. Dassault is likely to bend within reason, adhering to the commitments required by India on a fair price for the fighters, even at the cost of a dip in profit. For India, the outright purchase comes at the cost of the Make in India concept.

When it started in 2007, the fighter deal was touted as pivotal to moving modern aerospace and military technology to India. As per the original contract, the winner would have to set up a production line here. The outright purchase of 36 jets with the option for more means that will not happen immediately, although the option remains to manufacture subsequent orders in India.

However, caught between a rock and a hard place—the urgent need for new fighters and the inability to write off exceptions and concessions for the French firm, many of them made by the UPA—the Modi government has gone for the out-ofthe-box solution.

The scrapping of the original contract for 126 fighters is also a subtle message by the government about the UPA's inability and bungling in dealing with a complex matter. An argument being made is that it would have been impossible to sign the deal in the form that was presented to the NDA government.

There were too many concessions and deviations from the original terms and conditions, which the bureaucracy would have been reluctant to sign off on. This would have forced a political directive or the scrapping of the deal. To offset criticism that the deal does not bring manufacturing and jobs to India, the government is likely to insist that the French company invest 30-50% of the contract value in India and rope in the Indian private sector as a major, global chain supplier to Dassault and its associates. The government also says that manufacturing of greater number of these jets in India is still not ruled out and talks on that could continue over the next few months.

Most of the investments that Dassault will need to make are likely to go to the Indian private sector— from the supply of sub-systems for the Rafale to linking into the global supply chain of Dassault for other products such as commercial jets and combat unmanned aerial vehicles. By conservative estimates, the amount that Dassault is likely to invest to meet offset obligations over the next 5-6 years would be over $2.5 billion.

Other lucrative contracts for maintenance and overhaul of the fighters in India would also be up for grabs—something that HAL and the private sector will need to fight for. Beyond the strategic need for new fighters that will enable the Air Force to maintain a combative edge in the region, the Rafale deal had implications for bilateral relations with France, which has been a reliable partner for India.

The partnership goes beyond defence and extends to civil nuclear cooperation and space. All these aspects were kept in mind while seeking a middle path on the deal—buying the fighters and scrapping the complex process initiated by the previous government.

One thing is clear: The deal has been decided by a carefully calculated political push, not by the regular process or bureaucratic approval.

Calculated political push, not regular process led to Rafale deal; all you need to know - The Economic Times

 

[Lions Of Punjab]

CALCULATED POLITICAL PUSH, NOT REGULAR PROCESS LED TO RAFALE DEAL; ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW


After a series of twists and turns, a multi-billion dollar deal for new fighter jets for the Air Force has hit the last mile with the NDA government determined to iron out differences and wrap up negotiations with an out-of-the-box solution to end a two-year deadlock.

A test of political will to find an innovative approach to ink a contract that was threatening to get out of hand, but one that had significant strategic and geopolitical implications, has been on display in the lead up to Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Paris, where the Rafale deal has been firmed up along with a memorandum of understanding on joint defence production in India.

The reworked deal—buying 36 fighters outright with the option for more could work out to up to $7.5 billion and scrapping an earlier requirement to manufacture 108 jets in India—has the potential to pump in at least $2.3 billion into the Indian defence manufacturing sector, a major chunk of which will go to the private industry.

While the mega deal—initiated in 2007 with six competitors—had been chugging along since 2012 when Dassault's Rafale was declared the winner, signs had appeared in the past few weeks that for the first time since coming to power, the NDA government was looking at walking the distance, provided New Delhi did not have to make significant concessions.

Dassault had been struggling to get the contract through in the last year of the UPA, which had gone slow on all defence procurements. The newfound political will in New Delhi, as well as a strong diplomatic push from Paris, offered the final chance to bag an order that was widely classified as the world's biggest open tender for fighter aircraft.

While many differences had been sorted out, a deadlock persisted for almost two years on two major sticking points. Innovative solutions were needed for both, something that the NDA government is not known to shy away from.

The easier one to sort out was liability for quality and delays in production. As per the original terms, French manufacturer Dassault had responsibility for timely delivery of the fighters as well as technical defects. But as the final negotiations started, the French firm raised the point that in case of delays by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd—nominated to produce the fighter in India—penalties would be unfair.

The other sticking point was pricing. The deal is complex—it involves the calculation of life cycle costs, carries a major technology transfer component to HAL and has a clause that requires Dassault to invest half the value of the contract in India. After negotiations on the transfer of technology and the setting up of a production line in India with HAL, it emerged that the cost that Dassault had projected for the India-made Rafale would be surpassed. The Indian PSU would be required to purchase more equipment, facilities and technology than anticipated to deliver the fighter on time, escalating the costs. Again, a novel solution was needed. One proposal was to divide the cost of the production line as Dassault had offered to use it to make different platforms such as its Falcon executive jets and unmanned aerial vehicles, which are churned out of the same line in France. This would potentially lower the per-unit cost of the Rafale fighter.
While in 2007, the government had assessed the deal at $10 billion, the cost of 126 Rafale fighters had swelled to an estimated $22 billion by 2014.

What worked was a commitment by the government for the outright purchase of 36 jets. This would keep the French company in profit, do away with HAL's liability issues and meet the operational requirements of the Indian Air Force, which is battling a crisis with obsolete fighter aircraft.

Going the final mile on the deal meant that some concessions have to be granted by both India and France. Dassault is likely to bend within reason, adhering to the commitments required by India on a fair price for the fighters, even at the cost of a dip in profit. For India, the outright purchase comes at the cost of the Make in India concept.

When it started in 2007, the fighter deal was touted as pivotal to moving modern aerospace and military technology to India. As per the original contract, the winner would have to set up a production line here. The outright purchase of 36 jets with the option for more means that will not happen immediately, although the option remains to manufacture subsequent orders in India.

However, caught between a rock and a hard place—the urgent need for new fighters and the inability to write off exceptions and concessions for the French firm, many of them made by the UPA—the Modi government has gone for the out-ofthe-box solution.

The scrapping of the original contract for 126 fighters is also a subtle message by the government about the UPA's inability and bungling in dealing with a complex matter. An argument being made is that it would have been impossible to sign the deal in the form that was presented to the NDA government.

There were too many concessions and deviations from the original terms and conditions, which the bureaucracy would have been reluctant to sign off on. This would have forced a political directive or the scrapping of the deal. To offset criticism that the deal does not bring manufacturing and jobs to India, the government is likely to insist that the French company invest 30-50% of the contract value in India and rope in the Indian private sector as a major, global chain supplier to Dassault and its associates. The government also says that manufacturing of greater number of these jets in India is still not ruled out and talks on that could continue over the next few months.

Most of the investments that Dassault will need to make are likely to go to the Indian private sector— from the supply of sub-systems for the Rafale to linking into the global supply chain of Dassault for other products such as commercial jets and combat unmanned aerial vehicles. By conservative estimates, the amount that Dassault is likely to invest to meet offset obligations over the next 5-6 years would be over $2.5 billion.

Other lucrative contracts for maintenance and overhaul of the fighters in India would also be up for grabs—something that HAL and the private sector will need to fight for. Beyond the strategic need for new fighters that will enable the Air Force to maintain a combative edge in the region, the Rafale deal had implications for bilateral relations with France, which has been a reliable partner for India.

The partnership goes beyond defence and extends to civil nuclear cooperation and space. All these aspects were kept in mind while seeking a middle path on the deal—buying the fighters and scrapping the complex process initiated by the previous government.

One thing is clear: The deal has been decided by a carefully calculated political push, not by the regular process or bureaucratic approval.

Calculated political push, not regular process led to Rafale deal; all you need to know - The Economic Times

 

[Punya Pratap]

Found this interesting article on Tejas :

The Beta Coefficient: A preliminary performance review of the Indian Light Combat Aircraft

 

[cannonfodder]

Did we get required nose for Tejas from Cobham. Is Dec, 2015 FOC on track?? Anyone has any news regarding this?

Found this interesting article on Tejas :

The Beta Coefficient: A preliminary performance review of the Indian Light Combat Aircraft

 

[sgarg]

@gpawar, something is NOT right. I doubt FOC is on track if the nose cone and refueling probe are yet to show up on LCA. Hope they come out with a unit with complete FOC config soon. If a Tejas with complete FOC config does not show up by June, then Dec deadline is highly unlikely.

 

[aero_sp]

Day before Yesterday Mr. Parikar stated that FOC testings will be starting from month of May. This indicates that the necessary parts must have arrived and system integration is under progress.

 

[sgarg]

Found this interesting article on Tejas :

The Beta Coefficient: A preliminary performance review of the Indian Light Combat Aircraft

The calculations do not look right. The author should give complete list of references and assumptions.

It is very hard to come out with proper technical specs from guesses. Only ADA can give correct specs.

The IOC specs gives 500km combat radius for Tejas and a 1700km ferry range. However it is unclear if the ferry range is on internal fuel alone or uses drop tanks. The ferry range must be much higher than this figure if all three drop tanks are used.
There are many references on the web which give 3000km as ferry range, which sounds far more logical.

 

[tejas warrior]

yes, Photo of Tejas with In-Flight Refueling Probe :

Aero India 2015 :: scan0001 [Bharat-Rakshak.com]

 

[sathya]

is this an old image or latest

see all the black and white squares..

 

[Kharavela]

Costly $20 bn Rafale deal hits dead end, Parrikar says LCA to replace MiG 21s

New Delhi: India today said all future negotiations for purchase of French Rafale fighters would be through government to government route, discarding direct talks with manufacturers.
Dassault Rafale had won the MMRCA (Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) competition for 126 fighter jets in 2012. AFP

The disclosure by Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar came two days after Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced purchase of 36 Rafale fighter aircraft in fly-away condition from the French government directly, sidestepping gruelling three-year negotiations for Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA)
tender.

Modi announced purchase of 36 Rafale fighter aircraft in fly-away condition from the French government
directly, sidestepping a gruelling three-year negotiations for the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) tender.

While initially the tender was valued at about $10 billion for 126 aircraft, the current price is estimated to be over $20 billion, over which India had serious reservations.

Noting that negotiations had entered into a "loop" or a "vortex" with no solution in sight, Parrikar said direct negotiations with France will now decide how much more Rafale aircraft has to be bought and whether it will be under 'Make in India' programme.

The minister refrained from giving a direct reply to questions whether the requirement of Air Force for more MMRCA will be through Rafale or if any other player can come into action.

"Scope was only possible in government to government deal. Instead of going through the Request for Proposal (RFP) route where there was lot of confusion and chaos, it was decided that we will go through the G2G route," he said explaining that 36 Rafale jets would be procured in ready-to-fly condition.

He said what has to be done about the rest would be decided after discussions between the two governments.

Asked what will happen to 'Make in India' initiative, Parrikar said, it would be decided after proper discussions.

He said, he won't be able to give more details as the "fine print of what has been agreed in not with me".

Underlining that it was his personal opinion, Parrikar said in certain strategic areas like defence, government-to-government (G2G) route was better.

"Whenever you have complex platform to be acquired, government routes are normally better routes," he said giving the example of DTTI between India and US.

He refused to give a timeline for the delivery of 36 Rafale jets saying, at the prime minister's level, the nitty-gritty of a deal is not worked out.

"You agree with the principle. The principle has been agreed. Now the two sides will sit together and will work out all the details," he said.

Asked if India can go beyond 126 Rafale jets, Parrikar said, 126 was itself a "financially a steep slope to climb".

He said that everything will depend on discussions.

"That (Make in India) will depend on how we negotiate. What is the total quantum (of order). We may not go for full 126. That will be decided after we discuss at government to government level," the minister said.

Asked if this means the MMRCA tender has been scrapped or will die a natural death, the minister pointed out that he has neither said it will die nor that it was scrapped.

"But I can say that it has gone into a loop or vortex. That is why this route had to be taken to break the vortex... now if you start the process once again, by the time you complete it, it will take five years. Day by day, it was becoming more stiff," Parrikar said.

He said the G2G route was taken to break the ice.

Talking about the operational requirement of the Indian Air Force, which currently has 34 Squadrons, Parrikar said LCA would be replacing the ageing MiG 21s, whose life has been extended by another eight years or so.

He underlined that Indian now has better missile technology now than the time when the ideal squadron strength for IAF was registered at 42.

Parriker termed it as "strange", the decision of the previous government to designate only HAL as the partner under the tender.

He said the main problem was the man power ration proposed by HAL which was 2.7, which was "very high" in terms of cost.

Asked from where he will get the money, he said, management of resources was known to him as he had the
experience of running a "state government without money when the mining ban was on".

 

[aschauhan]

What's the time line on tejas mk2 ?

 

[Lions Of Punjab]

Rafale deal an unmitigated disaster – Bharat Karnad of CPR

India has ordered 36 "ready-to-fly" French-madeRafale fighter jets to modernise the country's ageing warplane fleet. But Bharat Karnad, a research professor at the Centre for Policy Research (CPR) in New Delhi, said the deal with French manufacturer Dassault Aviation is a disaster that will not meet the immediate needs of India's air force.

On April 13, Karnad joined the Trading India Forum, a live webchat hosted by Thomson Reuters where members from the financial industry interact. He shared his views on the Rafale jet deal, its implications for India and whether the Russian-made Su-30MKI would have been a better choice.

Here are edited excerpts from Karnad's responses in the chatroom. Any opinions expressed here are those of Karnad and not of Thomson Reuters.

Q: Your view on the Rafale deal
A: My view, encapsulated in my blog Security Wise | Bharat Karnad – India's Foremost Conservative Strategist on April 10, is that it's an unmitigated disaster at many levels.

Q: I remember reading somewhere that if the Indian order doesn't materialize, then the company will shut down.
A: Yes, because Dassault was down to producing 11 Rafales per year; now it can carry on for another 10 years. It is actually oxygen for the French aerospace industry.

Q: If not Rafale, what other option did the air force have?
A: If there was a critical requirement to make up fighter squadrons quickly, then there is no better way than putting an indent with the Russians for more Su-30MKIs. Parrikar actually favoured that as an alternative to Rafale.

Q: Is this because the aircraft are of very poor quality?

A: No, Rafale are not poor quality, but India will have to pay an arm and a leg for it at over $200 million per unit cost. While the more advanced Su-30, as Parrikar noted, with full ordnance load comes in at less than half the price.

Q: Why do you call the deal an "unmitigated disaster"?

A: Unmitigated disaster because
– it won't solve IAF's immediate needs, which induction of more Su-30s can do. The first Rafales will come in by 2017 at the earliest, more likely 2018
– it torpedoes the entire TOT (transfer of technology) and "Make In India" angle, and
– while rescuing the French combat aircraft industry, deprives the Indian Tejas Mk2 and the advanced medium combat aircraft projects of much needed funding to get going.

Q: So has the government been advised wrongly?

A: Given the enormous price differential between the Rafale and Su-30 options, the decision makes no sense, unless it is that the government of India has bought into the IAF's argument that it needs to diversify its sources of hardware. All this means that the Indian Air Force and the country are in hock to many more countries, and can be manipulated by them in the foreign policy arena and in crises. I am quite sure the PM was not offered the alternative to consider by the MEA-IAF-NSA combine.

Q: The Su-30MKI has been in service since the late 90s. If it can fill the requirement, then what was the need for the MMRCA (medium multi-role combat aircraft) tender in the first place?

A: You tell me what the need is. In fact, as I have argued, the entire concept of a medium, light, heavy combat aircraft categories are unique to IAF and entirely spurious.

Q: But if you keep buying Russian hardware, you risk being manipulated by them?
A: The reality is this – Russia post-Crimea is getting into deep financial waters and India holds the whip hand in its reins with Moscow, which is not the case with our reins with France.

Q: Is there a quid pro quo in the form of a nuclear deal? The PMO has been tom-tomming the L&T-Areva deal.

A: The N-deal for Areva, which is equally questionable is on a separate track; not connected with the MMRCA issue.

Q: What, in your opinion, should be the requirement of the IAF?

A: IAF needs can be fully met with a mix in the medium-term future – next 15-20 years – of Su-30s for strike and air superiority, MiG-29Ms (latest variety) for long-range air defence, and LCA Tejas Mk-Is and IIs for short-range air defence.

Q: What should the government's priorities be in defence expenditure? Did the first full budget by Finance Minister Arun Jaitley address those issues?
A: No, Jaitley's budget did not address the MOD (Ministry of Defence) priorities, but that's Parrikar's job. The top priorities should be to beef up capabilities against China, especially three – not one – offensive ops mountain corps, and getting another Akula-II SSN from Russia.

Q: In your view, does the IAF not need a medium multi-role combat aircraft?
A: Not, MMRCA is a dubious need expressly favoured by the IAF to go Western, rather than making fiscal sense or serve the national interest.

Q: But the Tejas was under development for more than 25 years and is still nowhere near the final product.

A: Time delays and cost escalation is par for the course for all new combat aircraft programmes. Consider the US F-35 costing a trillion dollars, over 20 years, nearly 8-10 years overdue and operationally still an absolute disaster. And this is with an established defence industry, mind you.

Q: Can you list India's top three threats in terms of countries?
A: China, China and China.

Q: That big a threat?
A: Yes, because unless India is able to achieve at least notional parity in conventional and nuclear military terms with China, the coercive pressure from that end will be virtually irresistible in the years to come.

Q: Can India still go ahead with buying Typhoon?
A: No, Typhoon has its own developmental and operational problems and its serviceability in the German Luftwaffe is some 39 percent.

Q: It's 36 ready-made Rafales and 90 to be produced in India with transfer of technology, right?
A: The question is TOT and licence manufacture at what price? After all, the price negotiation committee got stuck in talks with Dassault over precisely the French-sourced and HAL-built Rafales.

Q: How are Indian firms positioned to take Modi's defence push? Do L&T, Pipavav have the technological capabilities?

A: If HAL is disfavoured as per Modi's remarks, then Indian private corporations will have to pick up the slack. But they do not have the physical facilities for production like HAL does, and it will cost $5-8 billion to put up a production line. Can L&T or anybody else invest so much without the guarantee of future custom beyond Rafale?

Q: Russia supplies similar hardware to China as well as India. Doesn't broadening the military partnership make sense for India?
A: No, because Russia is apprehensive of China because of its security problems in Siberia, border, etc. with China, always sells less than the cutting-edge stuff to PLAAF (The People's Liberation Army Air Force). Moscow is more open about tech when dealing with India.

Q: Wasn't the deal finalized by the previous government?

A: No, there was no deal finalized with the UPA government, only a commitment to negotiate an appropriate contract to meet IAF's so-called MMRCA needs. Nothing else. It was completely the BJP government's call.

Q: Do you think securing French aviation from the brink of disaster is a masterstroke in securing the final vote at the UNSC?

A: If you know the history of France, you'd not have asked this question. No, France will not push India's candidature to the UNSC for love or money, other than as a generalized push by US-UK-France, and this won't happen, because it is more profitable to keep New Delhi stringing along.

Rafale deal an unmitigated disaster – Bharat Karnad of CPR | idrw.org