ADA Tejas (LCA) News and Discussions

[Kunal Biswas]

Thread Open, Continue discussion ..

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Couple Of Points >

1. Avoid Off-topics, Or else they will be deleted ..
2. Lurk And Post Or your post may sound trolling ..

 

[rvjpheonix]

Does anybody know the given radar range is against what reference? 5m^2 or 2 m^2 ? @Twinblade

 

[ersakthivel]

Does anybody know the given radar range is against what reference? 5m^2 or 2 m^2 ? @Twinblade

According to karan M's recent post in bharath rakshak tejasmk1's radar range of 50 Km is for 2 sq meters(and 63 Kms for 5 sq meter targets , which is what is given out as radar range for all other fighters.) even with non quartz composite radome that is present now .

SO according to international specifications it currently tracks fighter sized targets at 63 kms,as 5 sq meter is the norm for fighter targets in international standards.Because all fighters up to 4.5 the gen will have close to 5 sq meter RCS once they carry external weapons.

With qaurtz they propose to increase it by 60 percent . So 100 plus Km for a 5 sq meter target, which is close to what is internationally accepted for a small or medium fighter as most of today's BVR missiles have 120 Km range.

 

[ersakthivel]

Light Combat Aircraft: Need for course correction I | StratPost

Light Combat Aircraft: Need for course correction I

Air Marshal M Matheswaran (retired) goes back in history to examine the reasons why the Light Combat Aircraft project has failed to meet expectations.

Every major power – and there are just a handful of them – have the capability to aspire to design, develop and manufacture fighter aircraft by themselves. Now, ideally, this would include all critical technologies – aero-engines, aircraft design, metallurgy, radar, sensors and weapons. However, very few countries have mastery and control in all these areas; the early birds or leaders – USA, Russia, UK and France are closely followed by Germany, Japan, Italy and Sweden.

Aspirants after the Second World War included Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Israel, Iran, South Korea and Taiwan, of which only a few have emerged as successful late entrants into the aerospace club.

These are Brazil, China, India, Israel and South Korea. While China and Israel lead the pack, all of them have built capabilities and strengths in a few domains but no one has comprehensive mastery of all the relevant technologies.

The most complex challenge involves design and development of aero-engines and aviation grade materials. Except for China to some extent, none of the others have achieved any meaningful control of technology in these two domains. The mastery of aerospace technology will continue to remain a huge challenge for emerging powers like India.

Good beginning but poor follow-up

India's aspiration to build its own fighter aircraft began well with the HF-24 programme. India took the prescient decision to bring in Dr Kurt Tank to head the design team in the fifties, when denial regimes were yet to take shape.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Dr Kurt Tank had offered his services to Argentina which gladly accepted. By 1948, he had designed the fighter Pulqui II, a state-of-the-art fighter in its time. A prototype was built but its development was cut short by Argentina's political turmoil.

That is when he moved to India and taught at IIT, Madras before he was entrusted in 1957 with the task of designing the HF-24 for Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). Until then, the only aircraft designed and built by HAL was the basic trainer HT-2. Attempting to develop the HF-24 after the HT-2 was an audacious leap in aspiration.

Dr Kurt Tank was allowed to bring his small team of German engineers who formed the nucleus of the final design strength of 150 HAL engineers by the end of the development. The project was sanctioned in 1957 and the first prototype flew in 1961, a mere four years later and the first squadron of series production aircraft went operational in 1967, only six years later!

Though handicapped by underpowered engines, the HF-24 acquitted itself well in the strike role in the 1971 Indo-Pak war.

The HF-24 was, in its time, a brilliant design and a state-of-the-art aircraft. The programme met an untimely demise in 1982 due to the short-sightedness of the User, Government and the Industry.

The User's leadership displayed singular lack of foresight and national perspective when it decided to phase out the aircraft in 1982, a mere 15 years later. The political leadership and the bureaucracy displayed ignorance and strategic blindness during the course of the HF-24's development and operational life. Decisions on engine development with foreign collaboration were shelved under the pretext of being too expensive, when the cost involved was a mere Rs 5 crores.

The industry failed to follow a strategy of developing improved derivatives in order to sustain the huge leap achieved with the help of Dr Kurt Tank's team.

The net result was withering away of precious talent. The entire 1970s was a lost decade.

HAL shifted its focus to license production of MiG-21s and when the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) decision was taken in 1985, HAL's design capability was at an all time low. It lost the control of the design process and management to the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), which created the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) to manage the LCA programme.

LCA – Genesis and Flawed Decisions

Of late there have been frequent articles written by a few self-proclaimed champions of indigenisation and Tejas patriots. Although they presume a license to comment on how the Indian Air Force (IAF) must learn to fly and fight any war with the Tejas as its backbone and not pursue the MMRCA or FGFA, their views are spectacularly misinformed and reflect their ignorance of aeronautics, air combat and strategy and military aviation. They would do well to study the LCA programme's genesis, development, hurdles, indigenous content and its true performance in order to appreciate its possible role and potential. The following narrative is for their benefit as well.

The Light Combat Aircraft concept was earlier referred to as the Light Weight Fighter (LWF). This concept has been a source of much study and research throughout aviation history to try and achieve performance requirements at affordable cost. This became more feasible in the jet age as downsizing of engines was relatively easier.

The Folland Gnat, which the IAF flew successfully in its 1965 and 1971 wars, was a classic Light Weight Fighter whose performance, in its age, was excellent at minimal cost, although it also brought with it large compromises in safety and reliability.

The MiG 21 has effectively proved to be the most successful Light Weight Fighter since its introduction. The IAF will have operated the MiG-21 for almost six decades if it phases out the last of them by 2020. The focus of the concept of the light weight fighter has always been low cost balanced by acceptable performance.

The genesis of modern Light Weight Fighter development goes back to the late sixties and early seventies, which ultimately resulted in the production of the most efficient Light Weight Fighter of the century, the F-16. The "Fighter Mafia" led by the late John Boyd and his Energy-Manoeuvrability theory laid the foundation for future light weight fighter development.

This radical change in concept became necessary because of the poor performance of technologically advanced, heavily armed, expensive and large aircraft like the F-4 Phantom against the low cost, technologically inferior but much smaller, highly nimble and agile aircraft like the MiG-15 and the MiG-21. A process of competitive prototype development was adopted. At the core of the LWF's design requirement was performance.

The YF-16, which won the prototype competition in 1972, was the first aircraft design to be based on unstable platform and fly-by-wire control system. It was also the first to use composite material for structures. The rest is history.

The prototype programme began in 1971 and the series production F-16 was in operational service by 1978. Fundamentally, the F-16 programme validated the relevance of balancing technology while keeping performance and low cost as the drivers of the programme.

By the late 1970s the IAF was looking for a replacement for its accident- prone and unreliable Gnat and its Indian version, the Ajeet. The requirement was a low-cost, conventional aircraft to replace the Gnat/Ajeet and the early MiG-21 fleet (Fishbed) by the late 1980s.

Based on its experience of the Gnat and the need for a low-cost fighter, the IAF projected the requirement for a small fighter of 5 tonnes empty weight. This would have left the aircraft only marginally larger than the Gnat and even smaller than the MiG-21.

This was a flawed approach and indicated that the Light Weight Fighter concept had not been studied in depth and could have been due to inadequate information at that time.

But that is only partially correct, as HAL did the feasibility study with consultancies from all leading aircraft design houses of Europe.

After the initial feasibility studies the IAF and HAL concurred on the plan for a conventional fixed wing fighter to be developed. The DRDO then stepped in to suggest that the fighter development programme be used to bridge technology gaps – Fly-By-Wire (FBW) control system, airborne radar, aero-engine and composite structures.

By the early 1980s this was agreed to and an ambitious plan to develop a fourth generation platform with high performance was put up to convince the government. The approval was followed up by the formulation of the Air Staff Requirements (ASR) in tune with the performance expected of a fourth generation fighter.

This is where the anomalies in decision-making crept in.

To develop a fourth generation fighter within a 5-ton lightweight airframe was a tall order. And although it was revised upwards to a 6-ton empty weight requirement, even this was difficult to achieve.

The projected time frame of less than a decade for the completion of development and operational induction of the aircraft was not only over-optimistic but also almost foolhardy, given the status of the technical base that existed with respect to FBW, aero-engine and the airborne radar.

Starting from scratch, each of these would have required nothing less than two decades of focused research and foreign assistance.

Ultimately, two of the major technology objectives were not achieved: the Kaveri aero-engine programme floundered even after three decades of work and has now been declared foreclosed, while the airborne radar did not make any headway and was dropped in 2006 in favour of the Israeli Elta-2032 radar.

HF-24 Marut

It is all nice and good for somebody to talk about reviving marut with Ge-404 engines!!!!

But the GOI did not even sanction 5 crs needed by bristol Siddley to design an upgraded orpheus engine to meet the thrust shortfall of older orpheus engine!!!!

Where were these people then?

HF-24 Marut

Discussions between Bristol Siddeley and the Indian Government were held in 1960 and 1961 with a view to completing development of the Orpheus 12, or of continuing development of the much later BS.75 turbofan as a possible HF-24 powerplant. These talks did not lead to a satisfactory conclusion.

In 1961 the Soviet Government was approached to investigate the possibility of fitting the HF-24 with a Russian powerplant. Six RD-9F turbojets were imported by the Indian Government in 1961 and bench-tested in that year and in 1962. Ultimately it was concluded that these engines would not be the best answer. One reason for the decision was the fact that the development potential of the RD-9F could not be extended beyond about Mach 1.5 without changes in materials and other specifications, whereas the HF-24 was regarded as potentially a Mach 2 aircraft. Another reason was that the Indians found it impossible to obtain from the Soviet Union the necessary level of detailed information on manufacturing the RD-9F without which they could not have produced it themselves.

By 1963 the decision had been taken to adhere to the Orpheus 703 engine as the basic powerplant of the Maruta Mk 1, but to do everything possible to increase its performance. The Orpheus 703 reheat made use of Bristol Siddeley techniques and advice, but was basically a product of HAL's Engine Division and reflects that organization's steadily growing self-sufficiency. The Orpheus 703 Reheat, as the engine is known, had a maximum rating in the 6,500 to 7,0001b class. A three-squadron batch of the just-supersonic Maruta Mkl ground attacker was built with Hindustan-made Orpheus 703R engines, with an afterburner of HAL design. The Government was unwilling to sanction Rs 5 crores to Bristol Siddeley for development of the afterburning follow-on engine to the Orpheus 703 as its power plant.

In 1964 an Indian mission visited Cairo to assist in the flight testing of the Egyptian E-300 turbojet, developed by a team under the Austrian Prof Ferdinand Brandner, for the indigenous HA-300 fighter. Indian assistance centered on the supply of a Hindustan HF-24 Maruta airframe for flight testing the E-300. The Indian Government was interested in the Brandner engine as a possible powerplant for the planned supersonic Maruta Mk2. By late 1964 there were reports that an agreement had been signed whereby the two countries will jointly produce a supersonic fighter. India would make the airframes and the UAR the engines. It would not appear illogical for the combination to be continued in production, as the Indian airframe is more capable than the UAR's HA-300.

The HF-24 could not achieve its designed performance without a more powerful engine, causing serious setback to the fighter's development and for that matter, the future of developing a substantially self reliant aircraft industry. In this situation, the Air Force continued to buy outright or take up licenced production (through HAL) of aircraft needed by them.

Delay in availability of the HAL-designed HF-24 Marut for the ground attack fighter mission led, in 1966, to the IAF evaluating and the Government purchasing the Sukhoi Su-7BM, deliveries of which from the Soviet Union were to commence in March 1968, with No.26 Squadron being the first of a half-dozen squadrons that were to operate the type. Numerically predominating in the fighter inventory by 1968 was the Gnat, equipping eight squadrons; six squadrons were equipped with the Hunter, a further four on the MiG-21FL and two on the Mystere IVA. Two squadrons fulfilled the photo-recce fighter role with adapted Vampire T Mk. 55s and one squadron was operating the HF-24 Marut.

The first of the production Marut trainers on order was delivered to the IAF by late November 1974. The tandem-seating HF-24 Mk.1T trainer could well have fulfilled the advanced jet training requirement of the IAF.

The first of the production Marut trainers on order was delivered to the IAF by late November 1974. The tandem-seating HF-24 Mk.1T trainer could well have fulfilled the advanced jet training requirement of the IAF.

The Mk.II prototypes had completed all flight testing required (over 300 test flights) by the end of 1974. The HF-24 Mk-II proposal was virtually rejected by 1974, as the Indian Air Force had not confirmed its initial interest in the afterburning Orpheus 703. HAL have submitted proposals for the Mark III, or HF-73, and this aircraft would reportedly exhaust the growth potential of the HF-24. The HF-73 would have maximum hardware commonality with the HF-24 and if GOI sanction is received within 1974, the aircraft was envisaged as entering squadron service in 1981-2.

Given the limited number of Marut units, most Marut squadrons were considerably over-strength for the duration of their lives. According to Brian de Magray, at peak strength No.10 Squadron had on charge 32 Maruts, although the squadron probably did not hold a unit-establishment of more than 16. All in all, the Marut squadrons acquitted themselves very well in the 1971 war. The Marut, as an aircraft, was shown to be tough and capable. No aircraft were ever lost in air-to-air combat. However, 4 were lost to ground fire and two were lost on the ground. The Maruts were in the thick of it, right through the fighting on the western front, and the Squadrons ended the war with a total of three Vir Chakras.

The next requirement to be met in the mid-1970s was for a Tactical Air Strike Aircraft (TASA). With the various development programs to enhance the operational performance of the HF-24 Marut by HAL abandoned for one reason or the other, the Government of India concluded an agreement with the Soviet Union for the MiG-23 variable-sweep fighter. Four squadrons, then flying the HF-24 and Sukhoi Su-7 were re-equipped with the MiG-23BN and induction into IAF service of this swing-wing fighter.

Development of the HF-24 underlined the importance of developing engines as an essential precursor for fighter aircraft development. One of the consequences of the HF-24 development program was the awareness that if India did not have a strong R&D base, it would not be possible to achieve any self-reliance.

This awareness resulted during the late 1950s in creation of the Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE) and the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) under the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DR&DO), as also the National Aeronautical Laboratories (NAL) under the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), being the R&D organisations to back aircraft development activities in HAL.

Along with development of the HF-24 was proceeding under Kurt Tank, HAL took on the concurrent responsibility for design, development and series production of the jet trainer HJT-16 Kiran. This was the first major attempt made by HAL to design and develop a jet aircraft on its own without any foreign assistance in its design.

http://www.bharatdefencekavach.com/print.aspx?newsid=34877&langid=1&mid=53

New Delhi: Soon after India became Independent in 1947, the government of India, under Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru set about the task of making the country strong and self-reliant.

As far back as 1948, Nehru envisioned the development of nuclear weapons and established the Atomic Energy Commission of India (AEC). The Indian National Committee for Space Research (INCOSPAR) was set up in 1962, under Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, to formulate the Indian Space Programme. Numerous other ambitious programmes were launched and many vital institutions were established during the first heady decades of independence. Two of these projects are of particular interest for anyone interested in the subsequent trajectory of India's defence industry: the plans to design and build a modern jet fighter and the project to construct modern frigates for the Indian Navy. A direct comparison is neither possible nor necessary. The projects were in different fields- aviation and shipbuilding. Their approach and scope were bound to be different. The projects were even launched in different decades. However, the outcomes of both projects have points of interest and lessons for the future.

In the mid-1950s, the Indian Air Force, seeking self-reliance, issued a requirement for an Indian multi-role fighter aircraft. The aircraft was named the HF-24 Marut (Spirit of the Tempest). From any point of view, it was an ambitious project being the first attempt outside the major powers to build such an advanced aircraft. It was to be a huge step forward as the Indian aviation industry's only prior design experience was the HT-2, a trainer powered by piston engine driving a single propeller. The existing aircraft manufacturing capability was equally modest being limited to license production of the de Havilland Vampire FB Mk.52 and T Mk.55s. The Vampire was hardly in the same league as the planned Marut, being only the second jet fighter to enter service in the Royal Air Force. The aircraft had a moulded plywood and aluminum fuselage and a top speed of 500 miles per hour.

The Air Staff Requirement (ASR) for the Marut called for a multi-role aircraft suitable for both high-altitude interception and low-level ground attack. The ASR specified a speed of Mach 2.0 at altitude, a ceiling of 60,000 feet (18,290 m) and a combat radius of 500 miles (805 km). Furthermore, the ASR demanded that the basic design be suitable for adaptation as an advanced trainer, an all-weather fighter and for 'navalization' as a shipboard aircraft. The aircraft was to be developed in India. To put some of these requirements into perspective, it is worth comparing them with the ASR for the LCA Tejas finalized in 1985, three decades later:


The HAL built Marut aircraft
LCA Performance

"¢ Maximum speed: Mach 1.8 (1,920 km/h) at high altitude

"¢ Range: 850 km (528 mi)

"¢ Combat radius: 300 km (186 mi)

"¢ Service ceiling: 15,250 m (50,000 ft)

Hindustan Aircraft Limited (now HAL Bangalore) got the challenging task of meeting the ASR. The government had clearly failed to appreciate the magnitude of the enterprise. With the task clearly beyond HAL's limited technical and manufacturing resources, the government opted for the prudent option and decided to bring in an experienced designer from abroad. In Dr. Kurt Tank they found the perfect person for the task.



Kurt Waldemar Tank (February 24, 1898 – June 5, 1983) was a German aeronautical engineer and test pilot who led the design department at Focke-Wulf from 1931 to 1945. He was responsible for several outstanding German aircraft of World War II, including the Fw 190 fighter aircraft, the Ta 152 fighter-interceptor and the Fw 200 Condor airliner.

The Fw 190 fighter was one of Tank's most successful designs with more than 20,000 manufactured between 1941 and 1945. After the war, the British government decided not to offer Tank a contract because they considered him too important and could not imagine him as part of any existing design group. He then worked in Argentina until the project ran out of funds. Dr. Tank first came to India as Director of IIT Madras where Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam was one of his students. Dr. Tank finally returned to Germany, in the late 1960s, to work as a consultant for Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB).

Dr. Tank arrived at Bangalore, in August 1956, to head the HF-24 design team. He was accompanied by his assistant, Engineer Mittelhuber. Theirs was not an easy task.

Hindustan Aircraft had only three senior Indian design engineers, supported by just 127 employees. Infrastructure, in most cases, was non-existent. So much so that the Hindustan Aircraft complex lacked even a runway for flight-testing. By the time the first prototype of the Marut began flying in 1961, the design team had 18 German design engineers, another 150 design personnel, a prototype shop and a production engineering department of more than 100 personnel.

The HF-24 was designed around the 8170 lbs. (3705 kg) afterburning Orpheus BOr 12 engine. Unfortunately, the British cancelled their requirement for this engine and the Indian government refused to fund the remaining development. This was clearly a case of false economy as a sum £13 million for the purpose was not a large amount by any standard. This single misguided decision crippled the Marut programme.

The design had to make do with the non-afterburning 4850 lbs. (2200 kg) Orpheus 703 for the initial and interim version of the fighter. A lengthy and ultimately unsuccessful search for a suitable engine followed. First the Soviet Union's Tumansky RD-9F from the MiG-19SF fighter was tried and found unsuitable. The E-300 turbojet, designed for the Egyptian government, by Ferdinand Brandner was tried until the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967 ended the project.


This was another missed opportunity because Brandner was an outstanding designer with extensive wartime experience in Germany. He had worked on the Jumo 004, the first operational turbojet engine. After the Second World War, he was interned in the Soviet Union. In 1953, Ferdinand Brandner headed a team that created the world's most powerful turboprop aircraft engine, the Soviet Kuznetsov NK-12. Derivatives of the engine are still operational in Russia. From 1972 to 1973, Brandner worked as a professor in China, giving lectures on engine construction, before returning to Germany and becoming a consultant. Brandner obviously had the capability to complete the task that Dr. Tank began.

In 1964, Bristol Siddeley offered to modify the Indian-manufactured Orpheus 703 for performance similar to the original Orpheus BOr 12. However, the Indian government again balked at the cost. Hopes of US assistance may have influenced the decision. Subsequent negotiations with the Soviet Union for licence manufacture of the MiG-21were the beginning of the end for the Marut. The MiG-21 was followed by further overseas purchases like the Jaguar, the MiG-23, Mig-25, MiG-27, MiG-29, Mirage 2000, Sukhoi 30MKI, MMRCA and the FGFA. In the end, a most promising start failed to live up to its true potential.


Marut was designed around 3750 KG afterburning orpheus B or 12 engine. Unfortunately british cancelled their requirement for this engine, and the indian government refused to fund the remaining developmental expenses.

It was clearly a case of false economy as a sum of 13 million ponds asked for by bristol siddley was not large by any amount of standard. This single misgiuded decision crippled Orpheus program and when it was built around the non after burning 2200 Kg orpheus 703 , it could not reach its potential

In 1964 the bristol siddley offered to develop tthe orpheus 703 to the B thrust leve. But again the indian govt refused this offer. Then the license production of Mig-21 sounded the deathknell of the Marut project.

http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/indian-air-force/43717-ada-lca-tejas-iv-223.html

Most of the points raised by Air marshal matheswaran's article were already countered in the link above.

Have you ever heard any USAF higher up asking for curtailing of the present F-35 program because its close combat specs only match that of 1980s F-16? if any one has written such an article people would have laughed their ass off!!!

because addition of another engine needs complete redesign of the air inlet ,fuselage(because area ruling will make all the older dimensions of the mk1 fuselage useless), fly by wire software, and in effect a brand new plane.

Since AMCA is already in the works for that purpose any "informed opinion" about twin engine tejas mk1 is a veiled suggestion for the closure of the program, nothing else.because by the time ADA twins the tejas mk1 world will have moved onto 5th gen internal weapon carrying fighters.

While it can b doable for mirage-2000 which the form of mirage-4000, since both have anlogu fly by wire tech, it will be very lengthy process foe tejas , since it has digital fly by wire tech.

 

[sgarg]

According to karan M's recent post in bharath rakshak tejasmk1's radar range of 50 Km is for 2 sq meters(and 63 Kms for 5 sq meter targets , which is what is given out as radar range for all other fighters.) even with non quartz composite radome that is present now .

SO according to international specifications it currently tracks fighter sized targets at 63 kms,as 5 sq meter is the norm for fighter targets in international standards.Because all fighters up to 4.5 the gen will have close to 5 sq meter RCS once they carry external weapons.

With qaurtz they propose to increase it by 60 percent . So 100 plus Km for a 5 sq meter target, which is close to what is internationally accepted for a small or medium fighter as most of today's BVR missiles have 120 Km range.

Air battle between India and Pakistan at 120km is illogical. The BVR combat in the local scenario is quite likely at below 40km range which is within the capability of current LCA Tejas radar. The issue of BVR is more than radar, it is linked to BVR missile too, as Astra is in trials.

LCA Tejas will get "proper" BVR capability by FOC. However that is not a roadblock in manufacturing the plane.

 

[Kharavela]

HF-24 Marut

It is all nice and good for somebody to talk about reviving marut with Ge-404 engines!!!!

But the GOI did not even sanction 5 crs needed by bristol Siddley to design an upgraded orpheus engine to meet the thrust shortfall of older orpheus engine!!!!

Where were these people then?

HF-24 Marut



http://www.bharatdefencekavach.com/print.aspx?newsid=34877&langid=1&mid=53



http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/indian-air-force/43717-ada-lca-tejas-iv-223.html

Most of the points raised by Air marshal matheswaran's article were already countered in the link above.

Have you ever heard any USAF higher up asking for curtailing of the present F-35 program because its close combat specs only match that of 1980s F-16? if any one has written such an article people would have laughed their ass off!!!

because addition of another engine needs complete redesign of the air inlet ,fuselage(because area ruling will make all the older dimensions of the mk1 fuselage useless), fly by wire software, and in effect a brand new plane.

Since AMCA is already in the works for that purpose any "informed opinion" about twin engine tejas mk1 is a veiled suggestion for the closure of the program, nothing else.because by the time ADA twins the tejas mk1 world will have moved onto 5th gen internal weapon carrying fighters.

While it can b doable for mirage-2000 which the form of mirage-4000, since both have anlogu fly by wire tech, it will be very lengthy process foe tejas , since it has digital fly by wire tech.

From the above points presented by @ersakthivel it is obvious to even a layman devoid of technical prowess that LCA MK1 with IOC-2 configurations has enough capabilities for becoming a part of Indian Defence Forces.

Still the resistance to LCA project in general & MK-1 in particular, displayed by successive top brass of IAF is beyond common understanding.

Personally, I do not see any logic for induction of 126 Rafale by spending whopping 20-30 billion USD. I hope Indian political leadership & MoD should have similar point of view for spending precious foreign currency.

Rather, more production lines for LCA should be opened by more participation of private industries. HAL may continue to be the lead integrator under professional management having fixed accountability of churning out 2 squadrons per annum. ADA should ensure the production of maximum possible subsystems is outsourced to Indian private industries.

 

[ersakthivel]

Air battle between India and Pakistan at 120km is illogical. The BVR combat in the local scenario is quite likely at below 40km range which is within the capability of current LCA Tejas radar. The issue of BVR is more than radar, it is linked to BVR missile too, as Astra is in trials.

LCA Tejas will get "proper" BVR capability by FOC. However that is not a roadblock in manufacturing the plane.

A fighter is not threat specific. It should be as good as any modern fighter to remain relevant in air combat for the next two or three decades for this ability to track target at 100 plus Km and the 100 Km plus BVR missile carrying ability is must.

No PAF alone is not our only threat. There is PLAF. Even PAF can acquire longer range missile from china. SO the capability to track targets at 100 Km is a must have.

 

[navkapu]

Or we can close all domestic projects LCA, Arjun and follow Panchsheel and get back to where we are after another 30 years....

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Their are many kind of people around this thread, This post is for the type who make absurd comparisons between MIG-21 ++ with Tejas MK1 without credible research .. >>

I suggest members to copy this post whenever such retarded commentary passed down in this very thread to stop further derailment, Thank You !

==========================>>

Comparison between MIG-21+++ ( Bision 3G++ Upgrade ) with Tejas MK1

---------->

Full Glass Cockpit: No (1HUD+1MFD+limited HOTAS+HMCS)
LCA: Yes (3MFD, HUD, full HOTAS, Helmet Mounted Display - better than cueing sight)

LCA -far more modern ejection seat, the Martin Baker Mk16 as compared to that on the Bison which is the KM-1M, one that is unchanged from the Bis.

Radar: Bison - Kopyo (range limited to 57Km for 5SqMtr, limited scan angles thanks to Bison nose)
LCA: Hybrid MMR - 100 plus Km for a 5 sq meter target, wide variety of modes, scan angles of the order of 60 degrees

EW suite: Bison - Tarang MK1, external jammer which if carried, reduces number of pylons (already limited to 5, by 1)
LCA: Integrated internal suite, with both RWR & jamming capability

Litening pod for the LCA; not on the Bison

Propulsion: LCA - modern more reliable powerplant with FADEC
Bison: Older gen powerplant, no FADEC, issues with reliability and maintenance

LCA: FBW for carefree handling and pilot friendlyness; has FBW dictate maneuvering limits with loads, stores, and other criteria preventing errors
Bison: No

LCA: Special measures for reduced signature in design itself - canopy, airframe, use of specific materials, Y shaped intakes displaced for signature reduction
Bison: Original MiG-21 design, only RAM possible, comes with weight penalty, important as weapons add radar signature

LCA: Able to carry dedicated LDP/Special store on dedicated pylon
Bison: No

LCA: Has 7+1 pylons per design
Bison: 4+1, limiting flexibility

Payload: Edge to LCA even using 6400 Kg empty aircraft weight (~900 kg over original 5.5T) and 10.5T, empty weight with 2R73E missiles included. Has payload of 2.5T for 5 remaining pylons

Growth potential: Edge to LCA - items such as Oxygen generating equipment being included, plus In Flight Refuelling

Stores flexibility: LCA has 1760 standard avionics fit allowing for western, Indian, Russian weapons
Bison: No

Avionics: LCA has provision for datalink, has modern avionics, computers etc
Bison: Limited upgrade, few of these are included in current aircraft

Systems: LCA designed around test kits, with simulators for crew
Bison: Limited by original MiG-21 design, only part task training

Combat Radius : Tejas +500Kms, Bision limited to under 300kms ..

---

With 7 pylons and more fuel capability + even disregarding IFR on the way, its a joke to say LCA == MiG-21 as some folks have been pushing on various forums ..
@ersakthivel, You can add if some thing being missed here ..

Credit : [MENTION=693] rohitvats from BR ..

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Re-posting, So it wont be lost in this thread ..

 

[akshay m]

 

[ersakthivel]

Their are many kind of people around this thread, This post is for the type who make absurd comparisons between MIG-21 ++ with Tejas MK1 without credible research .. >>

I suggest members to copy this post whenever such retarded commentary passed down in this very thread to stop further derailment, Thank You !

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Comparison between MIG-21+++ ( Bision 3G++ Upgrade ) with Tejas MK1

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Full Glass Cockpit: No (1HUD+1MFD+limited HOTAS+HMCS)
LCA: Yes (3MFD, HUD, full HOTAS, Helmet Mounted Display - better than cueing sight)

LCA -far more modern ejection seat, the Martin Baker Mk16 as compared to that on the Bison which is the KM-1M, one that is unchanged from the Bis.

Radar: Bison - Kopyo (range limited to 57Km for 5SqMtr, limited scan angles thanks to Bison nose)
LCA: Hybrid MMR - 100 plus Km for a 5 sq meter target, wide variety of modes, scan angles of the order of 60 degrees

EW suite: Bison - Tarang MK1, external jammer which if carried, reduces number of pylons (already limited to 5, by 1)
LCA: Integrated internal suite, with both RWR & jamming capability

Litening pod for the LCA; not on the Bison

Propulsion: LCA - modern more reliable powerplant with FADEC
Bison: Older gen powerplant, no FADEC, issues with reliability and maintenance

LCA: FBW for carefree handling and pilot friendlyness; has FBW dictate maneuvering limits with loads, stores, and other criteria preventing errors
Bison: No

LCA: Special measures for reduced signature in design itself - canopy, airframe, use of specific materials, Y shaped intakes displaced for signature reduction
Bison: Original MiG-21 design, only RAM possible, comes with weight penalty, important as weapons add radar signature

LCA: Able to carry dedicated LDP/Special store on dedicated pylon
Bison: No

LCA: Has 7+1 pylons per design
Bison: 4+1, limiting flexibility

Payload: Edge to LCA even using 6400 Kg empty aircraft weight (~900 kg over original 5.5T) and 10.5T, empty weight with 2R73E missiles included. Has payload of 2.5T for 5 remaining pylons

Growth potential: Edge to LCA - items such as Oxygen generating equipment being included, plus In Flight Refuelling

Stores flexibility: LCA has 1760 standard avionics fit allowing for western, Indian, Russian weapons
Bison: No

Avionics: LCA has provision for datalink, has modern avionics, computers etc
Bison: Limited upgrade, few of these are included in current aircraft

Systems: LCA designed around test kits, with simulators for crew
Bison: Limited by original MiG-21 design, only part task training

Combat Radius : Tejas +500Kms, Bision limited to under 300kms ..

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With 7 pylons and more fuel capability + even disregarding IFR on the way, its a joke to say LCA == MiG-21 as some folks have been pushing on various forums ..
@ersakthivel, You can add if some thing being missed here ..

Credit : [MENTION=693] rohitvats from BR ..

The most important thing is because of larger wing area, low wing loading -compound delta design(for vortex based lift in high AOA), tejals will out score Mig-21 many times over in most important Instantaneous Turn Rate (ITR) spec, It even scores over mirage-2000 in this spec a key design goal of tejas mk1 is to outscore mirage-2000 on this score. This is pointedly "ignored by many chair marshals and TOI pandits", when they shed crocodile tears over tejas mk1.

In fact in this spec Tejas out scores any other fighter currently serving in IAF, PAF and PLAF. No other fighter has such a low wing loading.

It is this high ITR which is used to take a very sharp turn to avoid a BVR or WVR missile and this same ITR which helps the fighter to turn fast and get a lock on enemy plane first. In this department it either equals or exceeds Mirage-2000(which was praised as better than F-16 in a dog fight by once serving Greek Airforce chief ).

http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/indian-air-force/43717-ada-lca-tejas-iv-2.html

http://www.f-16.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=1872

As far as the M2000 vs F-16 comparison is concerned, I should add something totally practical which comes from daily usage of both types in HAF. What I want to say is generally that when a HAF M2000 wants to engage a Viper, it leads the Viper at low altitude where the M2000 connot be beaten in any way.

I haven't seen yet any aircraft-apart from Su-27 family,which is, for me, the best aircraft ever built-that can achieve "Kill Hour" on a M2000 below 6-7,000 ft no matter the aspect between them. Ok? I have nothing else to add,as Fantasma337 -ask him about F-4E, I think no one else knows more about this aircraft- and the other Greek friends covered me and gave you a very clear picture about the M2000.

PS: I should mention that this is not a thread talking about HAF and TuAF or Greeks' and Turks' politics.

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I served in an M2K fighter squadron in HAF. We analyzed tactics and combat scores against HAF F-16 squadrons all the time.

The M2Ks higher INSTANTANEOUS turn rate gives it an advantage during the first pass. The F-16 cannot outturn the Mirage. It has to climb in hopes of avoiding the lock. A good M2K pilot will end it right there (the Magic 2 is a better IR weapon than the AIM-9L/M).

A rookie in the M2K, however, will probably lose the F-16's climb. The more powerful viper will escape and will then gain the advantage because of 1) Altitude 2) Higher SUSTAINABLE turn rate.

As for turn rates, altitude differences are purely theoretical and in practice make no difference EXCEPT for sea level manuevers where the more powerful Viper starts gaining the advantage.
Would you agree with the statement that F-16 is a better choice for multi role missions than Mirage 2000 ?

Absolutely. The M2K is a multi-role fighter also, but its performance varies greatly among roles - whereas the Viper performs almost all missions at a very satisfactory level.

HAF M2Ks are specialized. 331's (where I served) primary role is now TASMO (naval strike with AM-39 Exocet) and 332's primary role will become Deep Strike (with SCALP EG). CAP & Air Supremacy are their secondary roles.

The F-16 sqdns OTOH undertake a number of roles such as SEAD, CAP, CAS, and numerous specialized strike missions (enemy AFBs, enemy C&C centers etc). The Viper is a much more volatile weapons system

http://www.f-16.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=30&t=1872&sid=9792b3c0fa2ea774a3b775e8d457200d&start=30

Read an article in the magazine "Illustrated Aircraft" from March 2005 where a HAF MIRA 330 squadron commander states the following:

"I'm very satisfied with the F-16 - in fact, I love it. In particular I love the Block 30."

He also states about the Mirage 2000 used mainly for Air to Air:

"It's an effective fighter, which the f-16 can't beat in a dogfight."

He ends by saying:

"The F-16 is much better multi-roll combat jet... it really is the complete package..."

To me this captures it in a nutshell.

Even though Mirage-2000 had far lower thrust to weight ratio than F-16, the large wing are low wing loading wing design of Mirage-2000 always enabled Mirage-2000 to have a fast turn and get a first lock and shoot solution for its WVR missiles in combat. Mirage-2000 does not have a visually cued HMDS enabled HOBS missile like R73. But tejas has this extra advantage also.

There is no need for canards on tejas mk1 or nk2 as Air marshal Matheswaran says in his course correction for LCA progran article.

Tejas has a far more power ful and bigger wing attached control surfaces than gripen to give the required turning effect.

With canards gripen has more empty weight and the same fly by wire usable AOA of Tejas mk1. Lack of canards have not resulted in lower fly by wire usable AOA for tejas mk1 over gripen C.

Canards is a vortex enabling control surface. WIthout that tejas mk1 reaches the same AOA means there is no need for this extra weight and drag inducing surface.Compound delta in tejas takes care of vortex based lift augmentation , the same job done by canards of gripen.

Tejas mk2 with more power ful engine and further composite percentage will address the weight problem. The gripen E empty weight has beyond 8 tons. In contrast DRDO aero DG has said that ADA was successful in eliminating 350 KG of weight from tejas mk1 for Tejas mk2. Tejas mk1 has a 200 KG ballast behind the nose for CG correction . This too will be done away in tejas mk2 redesign.

Unlike the addition of more drag inducing fairing s for gripen E , tejas mk2 will have a 5 percent lesser drag even with increased wing and fuselage area due to the 0.5 meter fuselage addition reducing wave drag with better fineness ratio.

SO I don't know why people are asking for the inclusion of canards at this latter stage.

It is interesting to note that with 20 deg AOA and 6G li8mitatio Tejas did a 360 deg vertical turn within 20 seconds giving it a vertical turn rate of close to 18 deg. In horizontal turn it took more than 24 seconds with those limits. Mow according to tamil Mani DRDO aero DG those limits will reach close to 28 deg AOA and 8 plus Gs.

We have to see what kind of STR and ITR will it give before commenting on imaginary shortfalls in climb rate and STR.

 

[power_monger]

Their are many kind of people around this thread, This post is for the type who make absurd comparisons between MIG-21 ++ with Tejas MK1 without credible research .. >>

I suggest members to copy this post whenever such retarded commentary passed down in this very thread to stop further derailment, Thank You !

Credit : [MENTION=693] rohitvats from BR ..

Hats of to your patience sir. I see you replying to same dumb queries again and again,thread after thread,day after day tirelessly without loosing your patience. Please carry on your good work sir.

 

[Singh]

you are presenting most fictitious figures , even HAL people claim radar to be puny 45 km range for mk1 IOC 2 , they are aspiring to increase it by 60% by FOC that too only hopefully.
Combat radius go check hal / ada site its 300 km with full payload much less than fully loaded jf 17.
You can ban as many people you want for arguing with you but that wont help anyone , stop presenting wrong pictures via fiction

Sir,

Why were you banned ?

And if you don't mind me asking what are your qualifications/credentials. You can send me a private message if you are uncomfortable sharing it in public.

 

[mans.randhawa]

Sir,

Why were you banned ?

And if you don't mind me asking what are your qualifications/credentials. You can send me a private message if you are uncomfortable sharing it in public.

i was banned when i returned favour of few abuses i was handed out earlier in this forum , post was same tejas related and instead of presenting actual facts based on solid evidence or website links people dished out all kinds of derogatory remarks even calling me a paki .

My qualifications are masters in computer science.

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Re-re posting IOC-2 figures via Government Source ..

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MMR : 50km is for 2 sq meters = 63kms for 5sq meters, Without Quartz radome according to IOC-2 report ..

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This is not facebook, We do not encourage repetition of whole debates over and over again for sake of individual members ..

If you are repeating same question despite given proper links and other proof, You are trolling and its way to Ban ..

Complaining Moderator about infraction or ban is another way to p*** him off ..

you are presenting most fictitious figures , even HAL people claim radar to be puny 45 km range for mk1 IOC 2 , they are aspiring to increase it by 60% by FOC that too only hopefully.
Combat radius go check hal / ada site its 300 km with full payload much less than fully loaded jf 17.

You can ban as many people you want for arguing with you but that wont help anyone , stop presenting wrong pictures via fiction

According to karan M's recent post in bharath rakshak tejasmk1's radar range of 50 Km is for 2 sq meters(and 63 Kms for 5 sq meter targets , which is what is given out as radar range for all other fighters.) even with non quartz composite radome that is present now .

SO according to international specifications it currently tracks fighter sized targets at 63 kms,as 5 sq meter is the norm for fighter targets in international standards.Because all fighters up to 4.5 the gen will have close to 5 sq meter RCS once they carry external weapons.

With qaurtz they propose to increase it by 60 percent . So 100 plus Km for a 5 sq meter target, which is close to what is internationally accepted for a small or medium fighter as most of today's BVR missiles have 120 Km range.

 

[mans.randhawa]

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MMR : 50km is for 2 sq meters = 63kms for 5sq meters, Without Quartz radome according to IOC-2 report ..

still much less than jf 17 in many fronts cr - 1300 km , radar range 130 km rcr 5m2 , service ceiling 55500 ft,speed mach 1.8 source wiki and PAC website

 

[Kunal Biswas]

We are already discussion in great detail of capabilities of both Aircraft in a dedicated thread over this particular topic here : http://defenceforumindia.com/forum/military-aviation/10726-lca-tejas-vs-jf-17-thunder.html

Please do post your concerns there, Will reply and others there only, This thread is for Tejas MK1 development only ..

still much less than jf 17 in many fronts cr - 1300 km , radar range 130 km rcr 5m2 , service ceiling 55500 ft,speed mach 1.8 source wiki and PAC website

 

[rohit b3]

Wait a minute...Wikipedia says " The EL/M-2032 radar used in LSP-3 has a detection and tracking range of up to 150 km in air-to-air mode, the air-to-ground mode generates high resolution radar imagery of locations at up to 150 km, and air-to-sea mode can detect and classify naval targets at ranges of up to 300 km."

So isnt Tejas's max detection range Air-Air about 150 kms?