Ahha enlightenment!! Thanks Twinblade
So the weapons trials I presume will cover everything including the guns and be completed by December 2014!
I hope the pending issues of refuelling probe is nt going to cause too much delay or rather I don't see that as a huge hurdle.
Misgivings were regarding the weapons especially the gun.
Not such a bad place to be in.
LCA Tejas - Featured Articles: The Light Combat Aircraft Story by Air Marshal MSD Wollen (Retd)
The author, Air Marshal M.S.D. Wollen (Retd) was the chairman of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited from September 1984 to March 1988.
He entered the Indian Air Force in 1947 and was awarded the Param Vishisht Seva Medal (PVSM) for his exemplary role in the 1971 Indo-Pak War.
It was during his tenure at HAL that the design and development of the Advanced Light Helicopter and Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) was undertaken.
He is considered an authority on LCA, and MIGs in particular. Air Marshal Wollen has authored several papers on aviation and here he talks about Tejas and the reason why it is so important.
A few words on the final operational clearance (FOC). The entire avionics and weapon systems are con-figured around three 1553 B data bus. Mission oriented computation/flight management is through a 32 hit computer. Information: from sensors (e.g. multi-mode radar, IRST, radar/laser/missile launch-warning receivers); from the inertial navigation System with embedded GPS; from targeting pod (FLIR, laser designator) are presented to the pilot on a head-up-display and head-down-displays. A helmet mounted target designator steers radar and missile seekers for early target acquisition (during a 'close-in' air-to-air engagement with a Vympel R-73 missile, currently the best dog-fight' missile in the world). Laser guided bombs and TV guided missiles, require a pilot to initially 'zero-in' the laser designator or missile-mounted TV camera, on the ground target. Considerable engineering effort and expertise is necessary to achieve avionics-weapon integration and to prove the integration by live trials. Success here means FOC. Depending on what is stated in the (updated) ASR, it could take two years and around 1,500 hours of flight testing to move from IOC to FOC.
The above article is written by
Air Marshal M.S.D. Wollen (Retd) was the chairman of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited from September 1984 to March 1988 . It first appeared in Indian Aviation,
Opening Show report, Aero India 2001..
It clearly states that 1500 flight hours are needed before achieving FOC.
The interesting point is "
Depending on what is stated in the (updated) ASR" in Air marshal Woolen's article. Then why many IAf worthies in the recently concluded Vayu startpost conference kept on saying that IAF never moved the goal posts and insisted that the ASR for tejas was the same as the old one in 1984?
Even in 2001 Air marshal MSD Woolen clearly says that the ASR was updated already by 2001,
In 2004 FSED phase-2 was carried out to accommodate IAF's request for higher weight higher launch stress R-73 close combat missile , from the article "the case to support indigenous program",
The case to support the indigenous LCA programme
Ashok Parthasarathi and Raman Puri
The facts with regard to perceived cost and time overruns and performance shortfalls in perspective
There have been several articles in the press critical of projects of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) in general, and specifically the programme relating to the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), now named Tejas, and the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme. Indeed, whenever a significant event that involves indigenous R&D, particularly defence-related, occurs, or a crucial decision is set to be taken, articles originating from within the defence "system," or from vendors who see their business prospects threatened, appear. The real facts relating to the programme need to be put in context.
The two issues on which the LCA project is criticised are cost and time overruns, and performance shortfalls. As regards the so-called time overruns, when the zero/go date for the project is taken as 1983, the critics fail to mention that what was sanctioned in 1983 was an ad hoc 560 crore, pending full preparation of the Project Definition Document (PDD) — which is a fundamental step even to start the design and development process. The costs were to be finalised based on the PDD.
This required the setting up of infrastructure in a hundred academic institutions and R&D laboratories and building up expertise to undertake the fundamental and application-oriented R&D required, and harnessing the design and engineering effort available largely in the public sector units for such a complex, state-of-the-art aircraft. The Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) discussed with Air Headquarters the Air Staff Requirement (ASR). Air Headquarters had requirements added to what was originally to be a replacement for the MiG-21. As a result, the ASR that was finalised was practically that for a Mirage 2000. But in the public perception the LCA remained as a replacement for MiG 21.
It look seven years, till 1990, to formulate the PDD. Based on this the ADA, in a report to the Ministry of Defence in 1990, gave a time-frame of seven years to develop the LCA and projected a financial requirement of 4,000 crore. This included the building of four prototypes also. There had been a 25-year gap since the only fighter aircraft ever indigenously designed, developed and manufactured, namely the HF-24 Marut, had entered squadron service. So the period of seven years to set up a more advanced R&D infrastructure and build up even the core personnel needed to develop the technologies that the LCA's ASR and PDD called for, was modest.
After consideration, including by special committees, the Indian Air Force and the government gave the real operational go-ahead only in late-1993. Even that "go-ahead" covered the development of only two Technology Demonstrator Aircraft (TDA) without weaponisation. The funding approved was only of 2,000 crore — half the amount requested for full-scale development. The first TDA flew in 2001, eight years from the real operational 'go' date, despite much additional R&D work that had to be undertaken due to the U.S. sanctions imposed in 1998.
Comments appeared in the media in 2001 quoting IAF sources to the effect that what the ADA had achieved was just a flying machine that was yet to be weaponised. Considering the nature and scope of the approval accorded in 1993, what else was to be expected? Using the money sanctioned for two TDAs, the ADA built four. Full-scale development, for which another 2,000-plus crore was finally sanctioned, thus started only in late-2001. Some 1,200 hours of flight testing was to be undertaken to secure Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) from the IAF.
At that point, apart from the weaponisation requirements the project had to undergo extensive redesign to accommodate an air-to-air missile chosen by the IAF, which was considerably heavier and longer than what had been specified till 2000. The IAF had again changed its mind. This necessitated the complete redesign of the wing structure, using only composite materials in order to keep the weight within limits. The period of this redesign was also utilised to upgrade the avionics, to a completely open architecture.
Consequently, in "generational terms" the LCA is a fourth generation-plus aircraft with full networking capabilities. This made it more than comparable to anything the IAF had, and possibly would have, even after it acquires the 126 Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) now on tender, with first deliveries due eight years hence.
On the engine
Air Headquarters the Air Staff Requirement (ASR). Air Headquarters had requirements added to what was originally to be a replacement for the MiG-21. As a result, the ASR that was finalised was practically that for a Mirage 2000. But in the public perception the LCA remained as a replacement for MiG 21
But we often recall most critics of tejas program finding fault with ADA for increasing the technology level in tejas on their own volition , when the airforce wanted a simple fighter to replace the mig-21 . And they cite it as the only reason for the delay in the program!!!
but the article clearly states the other way around.
http://www.stratpost.com/video-vayu-stratpost-air-power-roundtable-ii
Traditionally, the Indian Air Force mix – the inventory was light and medium aircraft. Sukhoi-30 was the first heavy aircraft and initially 190 were to be acquired. Now slowly we contracted 82 more. And the number is 272 now. This plus MMRCA – plus all other future inductions, will take the mix leaning towards medium and heavy. Now its implication is that your revenue expenditure – operational expenditure will progressively go up. It has already started going up." – Air Marshal (retd.) Nirdosh Tyagi
"By the time the (MMRCA) RFP was issued the shortlist had turned around completely in favor of twin-engined, heavier aircraft"¦Did the air force also allow the market to define its requirement? This is something which they have to address." – Vishal Thapar, Journalist
"We also need to question an open-ended acquisition process where there are no timelines, there are no costs fixed and there is no accountability. We also need to question whether the ministry of defense is actually capable and competent to handle such acquisitions." Vishal Thapar, Journalist
"By 2032, we will have a force of 28 combat squadrons out of which 26 will be heavy. Is that the kind of force-mix that you're talking about just now? Is that what you want? is that what you can afford and sustain? And with that kind of a force actually do what you intend to do – if you know the roles and missions, the way you fight? We need a severe re-examination of our doctrines and the way we intend to fight the future air battles." – Air Marshal (retd.) Harish Masand
"Do we really need 35 Surface to Air Missile squadrons? Is that the way we're going to defend bases which can be penetrated anytime?" – Air Marshal (retd.) Harish Masand
"What surprises me – since you're the author of that RFP (MMRCA) – is that what is the significance of the term medium? Is it weight, is it performance, is it range, is it endurance? A. And B – how did you end up with a bunch of aircraft from single-engined to twin-engined, from 17 tons to 30 tons – I mean why did you stand for it? Make up your mind what you want. Whether it is performance, whether it is weight. So I think this mess, in which we are today has been self-inflicted." – Admiral (retd.) Arun Prakash
"It's about operational requirements – you know, meeting a certain spectrum of operational utility. You had to have a mix of both – I'm defending that. And I'm defending it very strongly. We had to actually bring in this Medium Multi Role Combat – because it was originally MRCA – primarily because you had to – although I'd said that weight consideration is no more a relevant issue – to categorize aircraft by weight limitations – we had to keep the Su-30 out because otherwise the Su-30 would have come into the competition, as well. And the question would have been raised, 'Why can't you buy more of the Su-30s'. Now you can't put all your eggs in one basket – strategically, it's unwise. That's one of the primary reasons. And therefore you created this Medium Multi role Combat Aircraft (competition) which is 30 tons and below. Okay, so the Su-30 is 34 tons and above – 34 tons category. So the heaviest aircraft in this entire category was the F/A-18, which is 29 tons. The costliest aircraft was the Eurofighter, as per our estimation at that point of time. The cheapest aircraft was – and the lightest aircraft was the Gripen. The F-16 would have been the cheapest. But the point is, you had the original contenders who were there in the fray – you couldn't have removed them because that process had started off. But you had the new technologies – 4 and half generation aircraft and you also had a spectrum of cost differentials from one end -I would say, averaging about 40 million dollars to almost 100 million dollars – or 85 million dollars." – Air Marshal (retd) M Matheswaran
And the 30 ton condition was added to keep SU-30 MKI out. Because if 30 ton condition was not put forth people would easily have noticed that we dont need this MMRCA at all, since Su-30 can do the job!!!
SO to cover up this folly,
Video: Vayu-StratPost Air Power Roundtable V | StratPost
Admiral (retd) Arun Prakash says,
=================================================
Let me go back to 1961 when the navy started the Leander project. It was a great leap of faith but today the navy owns the warship design, the warship building. They want any kind of warship to project any capability they can get it. Hopefully, soon we'll be the same in the submarine business. So I had thrown this gauntlet right at the beginning: Why has the air force not taken ownership of everything that they need – from a basic trainer to a fighter bomber to a transport aircraft.
We've sunk money into the FGFA – PAK FA – which is already – three prototypes are already flying – the Russians have built it for their air force and we've sunk three or four billion US dollars into it – for what reason I don't understand. So it's committed. At the highest level of the government. So why is the air force allowing this to happen. Instead of doing all that, back the LCA.
It's got problems, sure, but here the chief test pilot who's written a paper and his last words are 'It's a beautiful aircraft. Why don't we back it – why don't we back the LCA Mk II, and once again let me give you the navy's example. The navy sunk 900 crores into the LCA Navy – the air force has not given them a single rupee.
So if the air force had done it right at the beginning perhaps this stage would not have arisen. If you had shown enough interest, if you had backed it – meddled with it and interfered at every stage and made it go. This is only a personal opinion that we should not allow the LCA to fail. We should go on to LCA Mk II – the AMCA should also be a lead on from the LCA and then this whole thing will proliferate – we'll have a trainer, aero engines – the whole industry. –
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Air Marshal (retd) M Matheswaran says,
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Is the concept relevant anymore? We need to look at that. I think we've outlived the relevance of the concept. That is one issue. But having said that, in the context of Indian capability development – Indian aeronautics development, there is nothing more important than a program which is taken up and moved in full earnest. This choice of the program – you see you started off with the HF-24 and countries if you see them, you need to follow just like what the Chinese are following -the block approach – is what we should have done. We should have continued with HF-24 in different blocks. That's how you build the national capability.
We closed shop there and then we jumped to a four and half generation aspiration on the LCA – much has been achieved, which is very creditable, but it will take thirty years if we jump like that. And the time frames that have been projected have all been absolutely unrealistic. And this is where the government needs to be brought in – what are they doing, how do they analyze – or they just take their words for it?
Cost and time frames are absolutely unrealistic. And example: the Kaveri engine. 89 you get the CCS approval – project is approved for 450 crores saying that a 4th generation engine – no such engine existed anywhere in the world – and mind you we haven't made a single aero-engine that flies before that nor even today. No engine has been made – designed and made. And you want to jump to a 4th generation engine though original proposal was for a five-stage engine which people said 'Come on, have some sense. Look into it again.' So they made it six-stage – even that was not existing anywhere in the world.
And what do they say? We will do the complete development by 7 years – by the 7th year the series production will be ready and it will be inducted into the air force in 1996. Even for established majors like General Electric or Pratt and Whitney to start an engine from scratch design is a 20-year program. Okay, so here professionalism is in question. These are the reasons why we've got into this kind of a problem.
With respect to LCA, it's time to close it. Close it in the sense – what you have achieved is what you will get. And my reports are there already in that. The first choice of the design was wrong and that design can give you only this capability, which, I've said, is something akin to the Bison's capability.
So we need to close it here and move on to the next block approaches to address the problems that are there and develop different models. –
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Air Marshal (retd) M Matheswaran says according to reports he already has ,
"it's time to close LCA!!! But Admiral (retd) Arun Prakash says that according to a technical paper written by its chief pilot.
"tejas is a beautiful aircraft to fly and should be backed".
I hope there are no different Tejas programs are run side by side by ADA!!!
Many have wondered why scientific community did not want IAF to control tejas!!!. They feared that they will close the program. This is what Matheswaran exactly says, close it, I is below "Mig-21 Bison".
And in the most stupid way goes on to contradict himself!!!. He says,"This choice of the program – you see you started off with the HF-24 and countries if you see them, you need to follow just like what the Chinese are following -the block approach – is what we should have done.
We should have continued with HF-24 in different blocks. That's how you build the national capability."
If M Matheswaran advocates development of HF-24 in batches, why does he oppose the same development in batches approach advocated on tejas by Admiral (retd) Arun Prakash? (and Navy was first off the block to fund tejas mk2 with 1000 crores!!!, while our IAF guys want to close it down.)
We see why Navy has such a successful ship building program and why IAF is intent on destroying national capability and jinxing national interest by shutting down ""LCA" and leave it like a dead duck and indulging in brooding nostalgia of HF-24 developments in blocks!!!!
Is it true that there is no six stage jet engine functioning anywhere in this world?
Then what is the significance of 6 in GE 414 IN S6? I thought it was denoting a 6 stage engine!!
And group captain Suneeth Krishna an award winning test pilot whp has flown both Mirage-2000s and Tejas mk1 has gone on record saying that Tejas mk1 is "at least equal to Mirage-2000 upgraded". But Mateshwaran "according to reports received by him says it is below Mig-21 Bisons".
What is the thrust to weight ratio of Mig-21?
what is the wing loading of Mig-21?
What is the combat radius of action of Mig-21?
What is the weapon load of Mig-21?
What is the clean config RCS of Mig-21?
What is the crash record of Mig-21?
Is Mig-21 a better high ITR fighter with relaxed static stability fly by wire airframe than tejas?
What is the reliability of Mig-21 engines,
What is the radar tracking range of Mig-2 and tejas?
What will be the long range BVR carried on tejas after FOC and Mig-21?, which will be more effective?
Why is Matheswaran lying preposterously on all counts to justify the ruinous rafale decision and shut the door on tejas mk2?
No wonder still many self declared IAF faqnboys here cling to Matheswaran line of thought on tejas and dumping tons of lies like a pair of Mig-21s can wipe out a squadron of tejas!!!!!
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PUSHPINDR SINGH "the great" say,
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In a sense there's a kind of a déjà vu. Seeing a repeat of what we witnessed in the late sixties and early seventies. The HF-24 was a very brave attempt from absolutely scratch to develop a multi-role supersonic fighter bomber, as they called it. So, you go on into the 1980s and 90s – we had an opportunity again – and why I said déjà vu is because the same sort of, set of engineers came from the same country – that's Germany and it was a competitive bid – where the LCA feasibility studies were thrown open. I think took about two years for four-five companies to respond. The powers that were selected a company in Germany which doesn't exist anymore – MBB – and they signed the program – the feasibility study stage – it went on very well. The aircraft would have not only met the LCA requirement, it would have been a world beater.
For a very frivolous reason, a year later, the program was stopped and a new one was brought in and the French came in now – they replaced the Germans – but all they did was made it mini-Mirage without worrying about the state of the art of technologies available at that time and it was doomed from then.
You will never meet the requirement.
Okay, you could still do something. People say at least it's still better than the MiG-21. Of course it's better than the MiG-21. It better be. But that's not the point. I think we're missing the wood for the trees. The LCA was really the answer to everything from the air force's point of view, the industry and the R&D. Where did it go wrong?
Why the air force doesn't own it is because the air force saw the writing on the wall.
Come to a decision, be realistic, let's see what we can gain from it, stop this farce – its a charade. Keep your 40 LCA Mk 1s – maybe convert them into lead-in fighter trainers or something. Mk II – let's see where it goes, but give it a timeline. If they cannot meet the requirement in the next one year, stop it. And start looking afresh – look out of the box.
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Really a gernman firm can do better than Dassualt?
Thyen why did his beloved IAF chose the same stupid dassualt Rafale over the german involved TYPHOON?
What does Pushpinder Singh know about aerodynamics?
DOes he know more about aerodynamics than Suneeth krishna?
It is astounding how far our DDM folks could go without even knowing a sh!t about anything!!!
Ths is the great VAYU man, If I am not mistaken!!!!
Why is he making an ass of himself?
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Ajai Shukla says,
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I am completely of the school of thought that Admiral Arun Prakash here. At this point, given the fact that the Indian Air Force needs aircraft, given the fact that we need to gain something out of this LCA experience, given the fact that the whole future of India's aeronautical industry development hinges on what we can take out from all of this, this program cannot be allowed to fail"¦
we have just sunk in too much. Now nobody is suggesting that the Indian Air Force must buy it in its exact shape, go to war in it, get pilots killed. But surely it is salvageable from this point, something is salvageable from this point. Even if we, as Air Marshal Matheshwaran said, we call a stop at this point, move on to a next block, improve the design, rectify the shortcomings, get foreign consultancy, if necessary, for this – the Germans had come, EADS has worked on this, Gripen is panting to do it – surely, there is something we can take out.
===================================================
Mr shukla , if SAAB is ready to co operate on tejas mk2 why does Matheswaran and Pushpinder singh want to "call a stop on Tejas?"
Vice Admiral (retd.) Shekhar Sinha
======================================================
When you start coming on a new venture – new platform, we should not just write off the technology that you have imbibed. And it must be pursued. And while it is – Mk II, Mk III is all on the cards – we should get ahead with the next design and whatever you have made, use this as a trial platform or a trainer aircraft or lead-in fighter (trainer). Because if we don't get this technology right then we will continue to import and will remain from 70 import and 30 (indigenous) – we have not made any aircraft, actually, ourselves. So our capability may exist but we don't have the capacity to build those numbers and its going to keep increasing with time.
The second issue is that it's a badly managed program. Nothing wrong with the technicalities, there's nothing wrong with the – whatever decisions have been taken.
Sorry Mr Shekar Sinha , but Matheswaran and Pushpinder singh thinks that tejas is below Bison and it is junk. And the expertise of German firm is being missed dearly by Pushpinder Singh!!!
And he says Dassault has ruined it all!!! Then ask him why are they buying another big Dassault product which is not bought by any one in the world rejecting a german involved TYPHOON?
But if you have a project head and not leave it only to the LCA project team of the DRDO or somebody else to drive, this is exactly what will happen. I would very strongly recommend that we – we have spent a lot of money, there have been a lot of discussions with Matheshwaran in the IDS Headquarters even earlier – that LCA should have been better managed, it would have been flying you – you would have already stepped on to Mk II. So our thinking is that we should not allow this technology to be written off and take on from here and get on with Mk II, Mk III and use these aircraft for other purposes – for lead in fighter training or whatever. –
Thats why no one allowed not a single penny paying IAF to take control of the program.Judging fro the dominat IAF and "VAYU" view here they would have closed the program long back and Nacvy would not have had the opportunity for tejas mk2 development!!!
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Air Marshal (retd.) P Barbora(the one who says that rafale has thrice the combat range of tejas!!!)
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I happened to meet the designer of the Sukhoi-30 MKI. Seminov. I was in Russia then as an air attach̩. And he actually said to me Рhe said 'Very good you all are doing the LCA program. We wish all success.' He's the chief designer of this unique MKI. He said ' But first before you know how to make an aircraft please come and sit with us for fifteen years and maybe you'll learn how to make an aircraft.
from 1994 when funding for TD was approved and 2013 IOC-2 was give ,twenty years time, not very differnet from 15 years time frame given by Sukhoi designer!!!
Now Ajai (Shukla) rang me up from Bangalore, in respect of the LCA production line. He said there's no production line for the LCA as yet. How are we forming the squadron?
IN 1999 you expressed your desire for 126 mirage-2000s, you still haven't formed a squadron, Is ADA responsibe for that also? ANd by the way where is the rafale production line? So what is the use of sigingnthe MRCA deal? Can you give us all an exact date of MMRCA raale squadron formation, we have just learnt that MOD has asked Dassault to revise the prices,(price is the reason rafale lost all its bids till date!!!)
Why did you let 2009 financial bid expire on MMRCA, which is the reason for ll the cost difficulties and force structures of IAF now, Is this good managerial decision ?
Four and half years back we took a decision about forming the first squadron. We pumped in our manpower there in Bangalore to produce the first squadron, based on, again, the very optimistic supply chain that the HAL would give us. Till date, like he said, serial production hasn't started. Now, enough is enough also, na.
Our air force problems started with the LCA prompted that this is going to replace your MiG-21s. Today the shit we are in – I'm sorry for the word – the Indian Air Force structure – force structure – is because of LCA.
And I can agree there – please let's not stop,
block this program. Pick up the good points – there are very good things in the LCA. Managerial capability: Very poor. Every time we have gone to the government – when I was vice chief and the chiefs were there –
Matsy (Air Marshal M Matheshwaran) was supposed to pack up his bags and go to Bangalore and take over. What happened?
If Matsy packed his bags and took over the tejas project many in ADA would also hve packed their bag and a brand new tejas would have been standing in HAL museum now!!!
I mentioned it to the defense minister the day before I was retiring, suggesting as to what coud be done in respect of HAL and whatever it is. Actually, he got angry at me. He says 'you don't have faith in HAL'. I said, you don't have to say it, I don't have faith.
Frankly, we must pick up the good and go ahead and try and develop more. But we can't do it alone. I'm sorry – we made an Ambassador car and we made rocket launchers going into space. We missed out on mid-level technology – discontinuous route. And to get into – that happened to China also, but China is very good at reverse engineering – they're doing it. –
Don't worry Navy is dong it on Tejas mk2. It is better to hand over this tejas mk2 project and he upcomming AMCA project to Navy guys.
If it is not for tejas we would still be at Ambassador car level tech in fighter aircraft!!!!
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Air Marshal (retd) M Matheswaran. says,
============================================================
As someone who's been involved closely with the program, and who's done two studies intimately, I'd like to put certain things at rest. One: the LCA and MMRCA cannot be compared. So don't flog that fallacy that under the indigenous program the LCA can now take over the MMRCA's requirements and fill in those gaps – its not possible.
SO the cat is now out of the bag. It is the fear that tejas mk2-Su-30 MKI combo makes MMRCA redundant that is driving you to beat it down by saying it is below Bison and urging you to close down the program.
The most important thing is, in the LCA program, we suffer from a national culture which I call – it flows from our caste culture system. Why? Because nowhere in the world, when designers are given certain tasks to design an aircraft and develop it, the interface between the user – user's ability to convince and make him understand what he wants and what are the operational requirements so that the designer can choose the right design intent, is completely and interactive process.
Operational and technical requirement of airforce is important. What is even more important is to reach the 4.5th gen tech level with tejas. Sure F-22 has a host of problems and F-35 has many bags full even after being headed by air force guys. But all they are crying like you did , saying STOP THE PROGRAM!!! LETS PICK UP THE GOOD THINGS AND MOVE ON????
Many problems with them will be coped with and they will be matured into service.
Here, the scientific adviser will tell the air chief technology demonstration is my job – you've given me the ASR, now lay off – let me finish my technology demonstration program, then you come in – we will see thereafter. There's the problem. Because it's too late to come in and make changes. That's one.
Ofcourse, Which IAF guy can help scientific adviser with technology?The route was followed and whatever may be your"intimate association " with the project and the "origin of the reports, which says tejas is worse than Mig-21 Bison". It has reached production line. So don't worry tejas is in good hands, Since You guys are all retired for Good!!!
Second. What Admiral Arun Prakash said is absolutely correct. The F-22 program was – after the basic technology demonstration program the user takes over the entire program management. The US Air Force appointed a program manager with significant powers – financial as well as executive decision-making with respect to the program.
Arun Prakash said , "it is a beautiful aircraft according to technical paper submitted by its chief tesat pilot". You are saying it is below Mig-21 bison. So what is the point of giving you significant powers over tejas? To shut it down like once it was attempted during UF regime?
Sorry we dont want to see brand new tejas standing in HAL museums.
Because you must take even a decision – even if you have to foreclose the program if its not viable and you must have that wherewithal for it, so you have to be trained and you have to be fully in that process. This man took over the F-22 program as a Lieutenant Colonel – he remained the program manager when the F-22 was operationally inducted 20 years later and he was Lieutenant General when he retired. There's a problem in our service culture and service mindset. We don't want to put people on professional competencies as experts on a program for any length of time. Our P-staff or personnel staff in the other two services will cry hoarse and say 'no, this guy cannot be in Bangalore for 20 years or three years or five years. So we keep breaking the expertise and it's like the monkey climbing up and coming down two feet down so we are always at the perpetual start point. These are the fundamental factors that impinge on this.
He remained a program manger till F-22 was called a white elephant and its production line was being shut down, What difference did he make? Ultimately fighter planes are not built by pilots as in the old days of Wright brothers, it is being built by technicians.And after Hf=-24 Marut fiasco they preferred to go it alone. And it was good for the country they did that.
More importantly, I think DRDO and the public sector spend more time on publicity events – on non-events. I said, stop all that. You know you have a pre-IOC, you have an IOC, you have a huge celebration – you actually keep announcing things – 'we are the fourth country to achieve this', 'we are the fifth country to achieve this' or 'we are the third country to achieve this' – where is the final product? Where is it going to see the operational utility? How about questioning that? Where are the timelines? Where is the cost accountability?
This is what we need to question. We stop these public events, we stop these announcements for the rest of the world and if you think that we're fooling the rest of the world – we're fooling ourselves.
It is time to stop this public events like VAyu Stratpost, where ill informed guys like you dump on indian project like tejas and stop making a fool of ourselves before the whole world!!!
The rest of the world, who are experts in technologies in the aerospace domain – they know exactly what's wrong with your aircraft. They know exactly where your technologies remain.
hhhhhmmmmmmm!!
What's wrong with tejas? Shame it could not crash with the same frequency as your beloved Bison?
Recently the test pilot of tejas program was given a prestigious US award.
Pratt and Whitney inspected the same "6 stage , nowhere to be found in the world GTRE K-9 engine and said it is world class"(how many stages were there on the proposed K-10 90 Kn JV which you strangulated ? 10 perhaps?).
SAAB is ready to co operate on Tejas mk2 with 51 percent equity,
Composite making software developed by india has been licensed to global aircraft makers, same with fly by wire software.
composites and avionic developed for tejas has been deployed in Su-30 MKI, ANd russians are ordering 64 mission computers for theitr SU-30 SM after seeing the success of a decade long indian SU-30 MKI integration effort all thanks to Tejas,
So the person who said there's always been a conflict between HAL, DRDO and air force – there's never been a change of stance of air force. Constantly, there's an accusation that goalposts have been shifted by air force. The ASR was approved with everybody involved in 1985 and there were two concessions given in 1989 – no other change has ever been made. It is their inability to conform the ASR, for a variety of reasons. –
This is the biggest white lie. Haven't you read the MOD report submitted to parliament , which explicitly said that due to changes asked for by IAF a new FSED-phase-2 which led to redesign of wing commenced in 2004 with so and so thousand crore budget?
ho is lying you? or the govt?
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Air Chief Marshal (retd.) SP Tyagi
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I tried, when I was in service that the chief of air staff should at least monitor what is happening on the LCA program. So one of the things was the project – that's how (Air Marshal) Harish Masand, amongst others, went to the LCA program. But a meeting to be conducted under the chief's chairmanship – it took us two years to have one meeting per quarter, or one meeting in six months. Two years the scientists, actually – and please understand the problem is that our minister of defense is the minister of air force, he's minister of defense production, he needs to worry about the balance sheet of HAL, he's also minister of DRDO. So he finds it very easy to say, 'Inko aapas main ladhney do' and let my tenure pass.
Actually the truth is, yes, the air force must take ownership – there is no doubt about it. And for that we'll have to do some homework, incidentally, because we can't say 'Tu chala ja udhar. Kar de.' Because we'll have to find the right material. The navy has an advantage because they started at the Leander stage and it jst continued. The Indian Air Force tried like nobody's business to see that the HAL should come under chairmanship of an air force officer.
Navy guys started with Leander and you guys started with HF-24 Marut, which you seem to forget.
Navy guys promptly funded 1000 crorers into Tejas mk2 effort, when your matsy wants it to shut down , because it is below Mig-21 Bison levels!!!!
I guess the difference between Imported Airforce and Indian Navy still continues this day,
Who heads the Missile labs of DRDO? Concerned Naval, army and airforce officers heading the strategic forces division, which is in control of nuclear ballistic missiles?
Wh runs brahmos division oh PSU?
Who runs Dassualt? LM? SAAB? SUKHOI? All aiforce officers perhaps?
MSD Woolen was an airforce guy who ran the HAL, you seem to forget, and he has a very very differnt view on Tejas than that is put forward on this conference by the combined might of retired airforce!!!
It became a war. 'Nahin, nahin, local aadmi hona chahiye, idhar se hona chahiye, woh toh udhar se aayega', who will get it – who's recommending who's name. It actually got lost. But I'm saying the LCA Mk II type projects – we may surely have learned lessons. Maybe, one of the recommendations is, can we just sit down and say what are the lessons learned and how not to manage a project. And then say, 'okay, now we go for son of LCA'. Under the new management concept.
What is the use of taking ownership when your predominat view is to shut it down saying it s tll below Bison? SOn of LCA does not need any new management concept. Just leave it alone.
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Air Marshal (retd.) Nirdosh Tyagi
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We tried to put a team, there – leave alone takeover ownership of ADA – in 2007. It took more than a year. We wanted a chief's review which took more than two years. Then we wanted to put a team in HAL and the minister just wouldn't agree. And then later the team was combined to look after both. And the second issue is about supporting ADA. No matter what we feel about each other, air force paced an order for first 20 in 2006 – March. And for 20 more, before these 20 were delivered because they said we will do it and we require lead time and we require money. So we placed another order for 20 more. So all the orders are in pipeline, so even if we – there's no mutual admiration or liking for each other – at least on this front the air force has not been found wanting.
What IAF did before 2007 is better known to every one in the world thanks to Air marshal Philip rajkumar, who roundly accused IAF of dropping the ball and thanked SA to Pm SWaminathan for the present shape of the tejas project!!!
The issue why ADA has not been able to come up is because aircraft are very complex systems. There are many technologies in use. We are using – most of the systems onboard are imported. But for whatever we are doing in house – there are more than a dozen technologies. In some we have made good progress, in some we have not. And where we have not, the scientists don't like to admit and don't like to take help. And the consultancy which is there looks only at a project which is projected to them because of costs. In some cases, it's never projected to them.
And the last issue is cost-related. Cost of LCA and cost of MMRCA cannot be compared because in cost, it depends on what elements you've included. So in the first 20 order we placed, it was just for the aircraft. Fully formed aircraft. When we wanted to include – and there was a small component for ground-support equipment. That ground-support equipment became a major issue because HAL said 'we did not know what were the specifications' and another, additional amount had to be earmarked later. So if you include all the elements which are: MRLS – that is Manufacturer Recommended List of Spares – warranty, product support for certain period – eight years, normally. Five to eight years – training, all the infrastructure and at times the differed revenue cost, or the set-up cost. Then all this becomes comparable and if we add all that and the development cost, then LCA is not a very cheap aircraft. But since the figures which we're comparing, the figures which we compare tend to create a distorted picture.
Ofcourse, LCA is not cheap at 162 crore per piece, but rafale is!!!!
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So people when asked some tough questions on the 30 ton category , and when they are not able to answer , start dumping on tejas , with "monumental facts" like it is below mig-21 bison, the ASR was never changed, it is time to stop this program and move on!!!!!!
