ADA Tejas (LCA) News and Discussions

[Anony86]

worth watching:


Video: Vayu-StratPost Air Power Roundtable VI | StratPost

 

[ersakthivel]

I know Engines now a days have matured enough but it is still a machine.... nothing is 100% confirmed...
Two engines do provide some sense of safety and security to the pilot.....

NATO and US forces ordering close to thousand F-35 with single engines also know english , I suppose.

Knowing english has nothing to do with technical discussion, Boss,

Google and find for yourself.

 

[ersakthivel]

worth watching:


Video: Vayu-StratPost Air Power Roundtable VI | StratPost

looks like,

"What happens in Vegas ,stays in Vegas " stuff,

Beating down Tejas is a prerequisite for our retired IAF gents, otherwise there is no way to justify rafale buy perhaps,

IAF opposed tejas tooth and nail from 1984,

By the same logic that is proposed there, we should give BARC to to Army since only army folks launch Nuclear missile warheads,

and give DRDO missile section , to all three services folks(divided equally,ofcourse, so that they can keep on revising ASRs and GSQRS every three yers to make sure not a single missile ever reaches service)

Retd aichief mateshwaran was lying profusedly that IAF never asked for any IAF ASR revision after 1984, then what is FSED phase-2?

The whole government and parliament is lying perhaps on the IAF demand to upgrade air to air missiles on tejas.

 

[Pulkit]

NATO and US forces ordering close to thousand F-35 with single engines also know english , I suppose.

Knowing english has nothing to do with technical discussion, Boss,

Google and find for yourself.

how does even knowing english or not has anything to do what i wrote...

I said Engines tech today has matured enough.... yes they are ordering huge numbers ... yes they are .... but that doesnot take away the fact that with two engines you are safe...


Very recent example was failures in engines(Russian Sukhoi MKI) and a large number of aircrafts were landing with one engine only... the other engine did save them..... thats a fact...

You yourself said that Russian have not yet perfected this art so playing safe is actually not a bad thing....

what is there for me to google? I have not stated any thing incorrect....

 

[p2prada]

Trust me Israel will fight all its battles on enemy airspace and geared up to hit Iran over the nuclear weapons issue yet I have nt heard them ever demanding a MMRCA!!

And then they become the first country to sign a contract for the F-35.

https://www.f35.com/global/participation/israel

Israel signs contract to buy F-35 stealth fighter | JPost | Israel News

The Israelis have been demanding a new aircraft well before IAF did. They signed the first F-35 contract back in 2003 while we were still dithering over MRCA RFP. IAF requirement came well after IDF requirement for MMRCA.

Their contract signature predates ours by 5 years. And their requirement is similar to ours. And yes, F-35 is a MMRCA and meant to replace their F-16s.

This is why I don't like posts from the Arjun brigade. Everything pulled out from behind, no research at all.

 

[Anony86]

looks like,

"What happens in Vegas ,stays in Vegas " stuff,

Beating down Tejas is a prerequisite for our retired IAF gents, otherwise there is no way to justify rafale buy perhaps,

IAF opposed tejas tooth and nail from 1984,

By the same logic that is proposed there, we should give BARC to to Army since only army folks launch Nuclear missile warheads,

and give DRDO missile section , to all three services folks(divided equally,ofcourse, so that they can keep on revising ASRs and GSQRS every three yers to make sure not a single missile ever reaches service)

Retd aichief mateshwaran was lying profusedly that IAF never asked for any IAF ASR revision after 1984, then what is FSED phase-2?

The whole government and parliament is lying perhaps on the IAF demand to upgrade air to air missiles on tejas.

Even I feel the same. Other than Arun Prakash and the two journalist (Vikram Thapar & Ajay Shukla), no one ever said a word favourable about Tejas or even shown interest to truly discuss to "how to rectify the shortcomings, if any".

I only wonder why no one from DRDO was invited to be a part of this discussion, who can counter IAF.

 

[Punya Pratap]

And then they become the first country to sign a contract for the F-35.

https://www.f35.com/global/participation/israel

Israel signs contract to buy F-35 stealth fighter | JPost | Israel News

The Israelis have been demanding a new aircraft well before IAF did. They signed the first F-35 contract back in 2003 while we were still dithering over MRCA RFP. IAF requirement came well after IDF requirement for MMRCA.

Their contract signature predates ours by 5 years. And their requirement is similar to ours. And yes, F-35 is a MMRCA and meant to replace their F-16s.

This is why I don't like posts from the Arjun brigade. Everything pulled out from behind, no research at all.

My dear P2Prada,

I know Israel was the first to sign the deal for F35 and I m not disputing the reasons or the facts of the deal... I m simply objecting to the Light/Medium/Heavy mix IAF has been advocating which does nt exist in the entire world...not even for a war veteran fighter arm like Israel Air Force which takes the fights to the enemies territory and yet has a Light/Heavy mix only!!

As for Arjun Brigade... I assure you within 5/6 years our IAF will start hankering for a 5th Gen fighter and find it does not have the money to buy any....then it will be us, the tax payers who shall have to suffer when another 30/40 Billion $ will be needed.... you and I shall lose out on 30/40 Billion worth of investments in better infrastructure cos IAF will start the whole "Threat Perception" circus vis-a-vis J20's of PLAAF!! Then it shall be the Arjun Brigade saying "I told you so"

 

[ersakthivel]

Even I feel the same. Other than Arun Prakash and the two journalist (Vikram Thapar & Ajay Shukla), no one ever said a word favourable about Tejas or even shown interest to truly discuss to "how to rectify the shortcomings, if any".

I only wonder why no one from DRDO was invited to be a part of this discussion, who can counter IAF.

The Failed Negotiations with Snecma for Engine Technology

But the government of India does not believe in using its leverage in bargaining for what it needs most. It issued a stand-alone RfP for collaboration for developing an improved Kaveri in 2006. A separate RfP for the MMRCA deal followed a year later. The US General Electric (GE) and Britain's Rolls Royce refused any form of participation. America's Pratt&Whitney is on record having expressed its willingness to aid the Kaveri project. But later reports said it was willing to participate only as a consultant. In 2008, MoD selected Snecma over Russia's NPO Saturn as the collaborator for the Kaveri. It was reported that it would take 4 years to develop and certify a new engine, after which the technology would be transferred to GTRE. MoD entered into separate negotiations with Snecma on this deal even as it was processing the MMRCA proposals. Thesenegotiations dragged onfor more than three years. Meanwhile, the Dassault Rafale, powered by a Snecma engine, emerged as the lowest bidder among those shortlisted for the MMRCA and MoD began contract negotiations with it. Was Snecma playing a game, waiting for the finalization of the Rafale deal? It would seem so. It appeared that in a bizarre twist, at this stage India had allowed France to make the Rafale deal an offset for the engine technology deal.

As what was thought to be price negotiations with Snecma progressed, it also appeared thatSnecma was really offering the "ECO" core it had already developed and that it would pass on the technology to the DRDO only after 15 years. Considering the pace at which engine technology progresses, the know-how, by the time Snecma transferred it to GTRE, would have become obsolete. MoD rejected this proposal. Evaluation of the MMRCA contenders was then going on. Snecma quickly climbed down, agreeing to ToT as soon as GTRE could absorb it.

MoD then began negotiations with Snecma for a joint venture for the development of the Kaveri. Minister of State for DefencePallamRajutold Business Standard: "(Snecma) is willing to co-develop an engine with us; they are willing to go beyond just transfer of technology. It is a value-added offer that gives us better technology than what we would get from ToT from Eurojet(the maker of the Typhoon's engine) or GE." This was misleading. GE and Eurojet were not contenders for the collaboration with GTRE. The technology they were offering was part of a deal for the import of 99 engines for the LCA Mark II. The kind of technologies sought for the collaboration on the Kaveri engine were not sought for this deal. Officially, no specifics of what technologies Snecma would offer have been disclosed. A senior DRDO official said two years ago that the work share between GTRE and Snecma would be 50:50; that price negotiations would be completed "within a month"; and that GTRE would gain the intellectual property rights for the new engine. Aviation Week reported in March 2012 that an agreement on the joint venture to develop and build a 20,230-lb-thrust engine would be reached by June that year. Snecma would provide "exhaustive know-how" on the technologies and manufacturing processes GTRE lacked, the sources for the report claimed.

In early January this year came the news that MoD has dropped the proposed deal with Snecma. No reason has been reported for this unexpected development. Quite likely Snecma raised the cost of its technologies or refused to pass on the intellectual property rights for the new engine to GTRE as it seems to have promised earlier. At this point, it looks like a classic case of bait and switch. It is hard not to conclude that Snecma was stringing India along with promises it had no intention of keeping, until almost the end of the Rafale price negotiations, and revealed its hands when it could no longer put MoD off. Snecma, by bidding for the collaboration, prolonging the negotiationsfor several years, and finally hardening its position, has made India's engine development programme lose precious time.

The decision to build a 20,230-lb-thrust engine is also questionable. Such an engine would be inadequate for India's future needs. The 22,000lb thrust GE engine is being procured for the initial batch of the LCA Mark II ordered by the IAF. The improved Kaveri, with a 10 per cent less thrust, would not be adequate for later batches of the LCA, should the IAF decide to order more of them. It is also doubtful if it would be suitable for the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) which India is planning. The AMCA, a stealth aircraft, would need to have an internal weapons bay, fairly high internal fuel capacity, and supercruise capability. If the LCA program imparted any lesson to Indian military planners, it is that the AMCA is going to turn out to be heavier than now planned. Developing a 20,000lb class engine now for it makes no sense. Presumably, it is the maximum level to which Snecma's ECO core can be developed. As Air Marshall Philip Rajkumar (rtd.) recounts in his book The Tejas Story, the DRDO and the IAF had a falling out in the 1980s over the choice of partners for developing the LCA's flight control system. The IAF wanted to go with Dassault, while the DRDO preferred Lockheed Martin. This disagreement had caused the IAF to wage a decades-long cold war against the DRDO and the LCA project in particular. Quite possibly,DRDO bought peace with the IAF by accepting the latter's preference for Snecma.

In the wake of the VVIP chopper scam, Defence Minister A. K. Antony has promised corrective action. He cannot act until he finds out what really happens behind the scenes in the procurement process. The complete lack of transparency in all matters relating to defence makes it easy for unscrupulous elements to manipulate the system. Antony must order a thorough inquiry into the whole Kaveri-Snecma saga. Several questions relating to this affair need answers. Who was pushing for delinking the Kaveri collaboration from the MMRCA tender? What specifically did Snecma offer in its response to the RfP, and at what price? Why did the negotiations drag on for so many years, and on what basis were predictions of imminent agreement fed to the media on a regular basis (see here and here)? What were the reasons for the termination of the negotiations? This charade could not have gone on for so long unless senior levels of the GTRE, MoD, and the IAF were involved. A top-to-bottom shakeup in the MoD, DRDO, and the services would inspire some confidence that it is not going to be, once again, business as usual.



About the author:

Appu Kuttan Soman is a diplomatic historian, and was a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University from 2007-2009. His research interests include arms control, nuclear history, and South Asian security. He is the author of Double-Edged Sword: Nuclear Diplomacy in Unequal Conflicts: The United States and China, 1950-1958 (Praeger, 2000), and Through the Looking Glass: Diplomacy, Indian Style. He holds a PhD in US diplomatic history from Vanderbilt University and master's in Psychology and bachelor's in History and Psychology from Andhra University in India. He was an Associate of the Charles Warren Center for Studies in American History at Harvard University from 1995-1997.

Appu kuttan is too diplomatic, I think. The real reasons are,

1. neither the govt of the day nor the IAF was serious in holding the success of GTRE-Snecma negotiations as precondition for rafale deal and mirage-2000 upgrade deal , which is what honest gov has to do.

2. And the engine order lot of 300 is not the problem , because that engine can be used on mg-29,Tejas mk1 and on Rafale itself.

Now what is going to happen is Dassault is going to use the profits from the indian MMRCA deal to develop the engine separately and after a decade , it will pass it to us as a mid life upgrade at exorbitant cost with some sham TOT agreement.

From this instant you can easily know how will the MMRCA TOT work in the real world.

Dassault production line will close if indian order is not going to come and then there will be no hope for french to get back the money invested in rafale.

Still IAF, MOD let it go, by painting GTRE as an ignorant idiot in the process. This matter must be lookedinto by new govt,

 

[ersakthivel]

Even I feel the same. Other than Arun Prakash and the two journalist (Vikram Thapar & Ajay Shukla), no one ever said a word favourable about Tejas or even shown interest to truly discuss to "how to rectify the shortcomings, if any".

I only wonder why no one from DRDO was invited to be a part of this discussion, who can counter IAF.

The Failed Negotiations with Snecma for Engine Technology

But the government of India does not believe in using its leverage in bargaining for what it needs most. It issued a stand-alone RfP for collaboration for developing an improved Kaveri in 2006. A separate RfP for the MMRCA deal followed a year later. The US General Electric (GE) and Britain's Rolls Royce refused any form of participation. America's Pratt&Whitney is on record having expressed its willingness to aid the Kaveri project. But later reports said it was willing to participate only as a consultant. In 2008, MoD selected Snecma over Russia's NPO Saturn as the collaborator for the Kaveri. It was reported that it would take 4 years to develop and certify a new engine, after which the technology would be transferred to GTRE. MoD entered into separate negotiations with Snecma on this deal even as it was processing the MMRCA proposals. Thesenegotiations dragged onfor more than three years. Meanwhile, the Dassault Rafale, powered by a Snecma engine, emerged as the lowest bidder among those shortlisted for the MMRCA and MoD began contract negotiations with it. Was Snecma playing a game, waiting for the finalization of the Rafale deal? It would seem so. It appeared that in a bizarre twist, at this stage India had allowed France to make the Rafale deal an offset for the engine technology deal.

As what was thought to be price negotiations with Snecma progressed, it also appeared thatSnecma was really offering the "ECO" core it had already developed and that it would pass on the technology to the DRDO only after 15 years. Considering the pace at which engine technology progresses, the know-how, by the time Snecma transferred it to GTRE, would have become obsolete. MoD rejected this proposal. Evaluation of the MMRCA contenders was then going on. Snecma quickly climbed down, agreeing to ToT as soon as GTRE could absorb it.

MoD then began negotiations with Snecma for a joint venture for the development of the Kaveri. Minister of State for DefencePallamRajutold Business Standard: "(Snecma) is willing to co-develop an engine with us; they are willing to go beyond just transfer of technology. It is a value-added offer that gives us better technology than what we would get from ToT from Eurojet(the maker of the Typhoon's engine) or GE." This was misleading. GE and Eurojet were not contenders for the collaboration with GTRE. The technology they were offering was part of a deal for the import of 99 engines for the LCA Mark II. The kind of technologies sought for the collaboration on the Kaveri engine were not sought for this deal. Officially, no specifics of what technologies Snecma would offer have been disclosed. A senior DRDO official said two years ago that the work share between GTRE and Snecma would be 50:50; that price negotiations would be completed "within a month"; and that GTRE would gain the intellectual property rights for the new engine. Aviation Week reported in March 2012 that an agreement on the joint venture to develop and build a 20,230-lb-thrust engine would be reached by June that year. Snecma would provide "exhaustive know-how" on the technologies and manufacturing processes GTRE lacked, the sources for the report claimed.

In early January this year came the news that MoD has dropped the proposed deal with Snecma. No reason has been reported for this unexpected development. Quite likely Snecma raised the cost of its technologies or refused to pass on the intellectual property rights for the new engine to GTRE as it seems to have promised earlier. At this point, it looks like a classic case of bait and switch. It is hard not to conclude that Snecma was stringing India along with promises it had no intention of keeping, until almost the end of the Rafale price negotiations, and revealed its hands when it could no longer put MoD off. Snecma, by bidding for the collaboration, prolonging the negotiationsfor several years, and finally hardening its position, has made India's engine development programme lose precious time.

The decision to build a 20,230-lb-thrust engine is also questionable. Such an engine would be inadequate for India's future needs. The 22,000lb thrust GE engine is being procured for the initial batch of the LCA Mark II ordered by the IAF. The improved Kaveri, with a 10 per cent less thrust, would not be adequate for later batches of the LCA, should the IAF decide to order more of them. It is also doubtful if it would be suitable for the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) which India is planning. The AMCA, a stealth aircraft, would need to have an internal weapons bay, fairly high internal fuel capacity, and supercruise capability. If the LCA program imparted any lesson to Indian military planners, it is that the AMCA is going to turn out to be heavier than now planned. Developing a 20,000lb class engine now for it makes no sense. Presumably, it is the maximum level to which Snecma's ECO core can be developed. As Air Marshall Philip Rajkumar (rtd.) recounts in his book The Tejas Story, the DRDO and the IAF had a falling out in the 1980s over the choice of partners for developing the LCA's flight control system. The IAF wanted to go with Dassault, while the DRDO preferred Lockheed Martin. This disagreement had caused the IAF to wage a decades-long cold war against the DRDO and the LCA project in particular. Quite possibly,DRDO bought peace with the IAF by accepting the latter's preference for Snecma.

In the wake of the VVIP chopper scam, Defence Minister A. K. Antony has promised corrective action. He cannot act until he finds out what really happens behind the scenes in the procurement process. The complete lack of transparency in all matters relating to defence makes it easy for unscrupulous elements to manipulate the system. Antony must order a thorough inquiry into the whole Kaveri-Snecma saga. Several questions relating to this affair need answers. Who was pushing for delinking the Kaveri collaboration from the MMRCA tender? What specifically did Snecma offer in its response to the RfP, and at what price? Why did the negotiations drag on for so many years, and on what basis were predictions of imminent agreement fed to the media on a regular basis (see here and here)? What were the reasons for the termination of the negotiations? This charade could not have gone on for so long unless senior levels of the GTRE, MoD, and the IAF were involved. A top-to-bottom shakeup in the MoD, DRDO, and the services would inspire some confidence that it is not going to be, once again, business as usual.



About the author:

Appu Kuttan Soman is a diplomatic historian, and was a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University from 2007-2009. His research interests include arms control, nuclear history, and South Asian security. He is the author of Double-Edged Sword: Nuclear Diplomacy in Unequal Conflicts: The United States and China, 1950-1958 (Praeger, 2000), and Through the Looking Glass: Diplomacy, Indian Style. He holds a PhD in US diplomatic history from Vanderbilt University and master's in Psychology and bachelor's in History and Psychology from Andhra University in India. He was an Associate of the Charles Warren Center for Studies in American History at Harvard University from 1995-1997.

Appu kuttan is too diplomatic, I think. The real reasons are,

1. neither the govt of the day nor the IAF was serious in holding the success of GTRE-Snecma negotiations as precondition for rafale deal and mirage-2000 upgrade deal , which is what honest gov has to do.

2. And the engine order lot of 300 is not the problem , because that engine can be used on mg-29,Tejas mk1 and on Rafale itself.

Now what is going to happen is Dassault is going to use the profits from the indian MMRCA deal to develop the engine separately and after a decade , it will pass it to us as a mid life upgrade at exorbitant cost with some sham TOT agreement.

From this instant you can easily know how will the MMRCA TOT work in the real world.

Dassault production line will close if indian order is not going to come and then there will be no hope for french to get back the money invested in rafale.

Still IAF, MOD let it go, by painting GTRE as an ignorant idiot in the process. This matter must be lookedinto by new govt,

 

[p2prada]

My dear P2Prada,

I know Israel was the first to sign the deal for F35 and I m not disputing the reasons or the facts of the deal... I m simply objecting to the Light/Medium/Heavy mix IAF has been advocating which does nt exist in the entire world...not even for a war veteran fighter arm like Israel Air Force which takes the fights to the enemies territory and yet has a Light/Heavy mix only!!

Firstly, yes, there is no light/medium/heavy mix based on weight. There is only high/low mix. And these are handled by high end and low end aircraft.

Strictly speaking, in the IAF the mix is more complex than what people assume. IAF wants over 500 high end aircraft, but these high end aircraft have been further divided into two. One is the MKI for air dominance missions and the other is Rafale which is forms the high end for other roles like strike, generating more sorties, better availability etc. The MKI cannot generate as many sorties as a Rafale, but each mission of the MKI is more specialized and lasts for a long time. Rafales missions too last for long periods of time.

Then comes LCA, which forms the actual low end with other aircraft like Mig-29, Mirage-2000 and Jaguar which perform all possible roles while filling up the numbers. Some of these aircraft are meant to have higher sorties per day and are for short duration missions. These form the remaining 300 or 400 aircraft.

In the future, the numbers for high end aircraft is set to increase even further. Eventually, the definitions will change once again, once IAF has only heavy and medium weight aircraft.

Basically what IAF is trying to say is they need high end aircraft capable of performing all missions and they want low end aircraft capable of performing most missions. This is similar to USAF where they have high end air dominance aircraft in the F-15C and high end strike aircraft in the F-15E. Their low end will be the F-16A through D which perform most of the F-15's missions but at lower standards.

The F-15C would be the MKI for us. The F-15E would be the Rafale. LCA would handle missions relating to the F-16A/B/C/D. Hence why all three aircraft are required. And this would be our high/low mix, MKI and Rafale at the high end and LCA at the low end. The addition of "medium" in the IAF MRCA program was meant to keep MKI out of the program. Basically, it was a "IAF MRCA minus MKI" program, if we removed medium from MMRCA.

As for Arjun Brigade... I assure you within 5/6 years our IAF will start hankering for a 5th Gen fighter and find it does not have the money to buy any....then it will be us, the tax payers who shall have to suffer when another 30/40 Billion $ will be needed.... you and I shall lose out on 30/40 Billion worth of investments in better infrastructure cos IAF will start the whole "Threat Perception" circus vis-a-vis J20's of PLAAF!! Then it shall be the Arjun Brigade saying "I told you so"

What are you talking about? IAF has presented the requirement for a 5th gen very early on. The first MoU with Russia was signed in 2005. FGFA is pretty much a done deal, and the money for it is independent of the Rafale. Right now there are questions being raised whether we can afford both or not. We don't know the exact truth, but the fact is the FGFA and Rafale deals are quite small compared to how big the deals will be for the navy's three submarine projects and the army's modernization program.

The navy plans to get SSBN/SSGNs, SSNs and SSKs. Each of these are as big as Rafale. And the army's plan to modernize is already as big as the Rafale and FGFA combined. Just raising one corps is as big as Rafale, and then we plan to raise two more corps, followed by modernizing at least a dozen corps after that in the F-INSAS program. These deals wouldn't be happening today if the MoD didn't think it couldn't spend so much.

Basically, IAF seems to be getting a bigger piece of the pie today, but it is temporary. Once the navy and army start their processes, the Rafale will seem paltry in comparison. But by the time these programs are signed for, the defense budget would have doubled in value making it appear smaller in comparison.

And yes, sacrificing some of the investment budget into the military is more important considering the threat.

Btw, the 30 or 40 billions are meant to be spread out in a period of 30 to 40 years. When it comes down to it, the actual expenditure on Rafale and FGFA won't exceed $2 or 3 Billion per year. And people always forget that the economy will continue increasing, as will the defense budget whereas every time an aircraft is delivered, its fly away price won't appreciate anymore.

They had earlier questioned whether IAF will be able to pay for the MKI program along with LCA. While LCA didn't happen, there was no issue with procuring the MKIs, even if more than what was earmarked for LCA was spent on modernizing Mig-21, Mig-27, Jaguar, Mig-29 and Mirage-2000. IAF managed to find the funds, didn't they? Otherwise the total money spent on all these programs over the last 15 years is $20-25 billion, with MKI alone amounting to over $15 Billion today. The Indian defense budget in 1999-2000 was a paltry $10.5 Billion in comparison. Today, it is around $40 Billion. Roughly a 4x difference.

Basically, we spent around $25 Billion on jets in 15 years while we plan to spend just $40-50 Billion on FGFA and Rafale over the next 15 years. Heck we should actually be spending around $80-100 Billion on fighters by 2030 just to keep up with our spending in the previous 15 years.

The cost of a F-16C in 2000 was around $17-18 Million. The cost of a MKI was almost $30 Million in comparison. The difference is even greater since the costs reflected prices prevalent in the US compared to Russia. Today, it is similar when it comes to aircraft like Gripen and Rafale, considering the markets are the same. The cost of a Gripen is around $60-65 Million while Rafale costs $95 million. Both prices are at 30% difference.

This is a pretty interesting article written after 2000 by a Pakistani Air Marshal about the IAF. I would recommend reading it to understand how things were before and how things have changed in the last 10-15 years. And a pretty interesting comment about the Su-30 as well.
India's Arming Blitz

 

[Ashutosh Lokhande]

@p2prada ; intresting article; any idea on what date was the article published?
thnx.

 

[Ashutosh Lokhande]

looks like the article is very old.

 

[p2prada]

@p2prada ; intresting article; any idea on what date was the article published?
thnx.

Most likely the year 2001. It's just a guess.

 

[Punya Pratap]

Firstly, yes, there is no light/medium/heavy mix based on weight. There is only high/low mix. And these are handled by high end and low end aircraft.

Strictly speaking, in the IAF the mix is more complex than what people assume. IAF wants over 500 high end aircraft, but these high end aircraft have been further divided into two. One is the MKI for air dominance missions and the other is Rafale which is forms the high end for other roles like strike, generating more sorties, better availability etc. The MKI cannot generate as many sorties as a Rafale, but each mission of the MKI is more specialized and lasts for a long time. Rafales missions too last for long periods of time.

Then comes LCA, which forms the actual low end with other aircraft like Mig-29, Mirage-2000 and Jaguar which perform all possible roles while filling up the numbers. Some of these aircraft are meant to have higher sorties per day and are for short duration missions. These form the remaining 300 or 400 aircraft.

In the future, the numbers for high end aircraft is set to increase even further. Eventually, the definitions will change once again, once IAF has only heavy and medium weight aircraft.

Basically what IAF is trying to say is they need high end aircraft capable of performing all missions and they want low end aircraft capable of performing most missions. This is similar to USAF where they have high end air dominance aircraft in the F-15C and high end strike aircraft in the F-15E. Their low end will be the F-16A through D which perform most of the F-15's missions but at lower standards.

The F-15C would be the MKI for us. The F-15E would be the Rafale. LCA would handle missions relating to the F-16A/B/C/D. Hence why all three aircraft are required. And this would be our high/low mix, MKI and Rafale at the high end and LCA at the low end. The addition of "medium" in the IAF MRCA program was meant to keep MKI out of the program. Basically, it was a "IAF MRCA minus MKI" program, if we removed medium from MMRCA.



What are you talking about? IAF has presented the requirement for a 5th gen very early on. The first MoU with Russia was signed in 2005. FGFA is pretty much a done deal, and the money for it is independent of the Rafale. Right now there are questions being raised whether we can afford both or not. We don't know the exact truth, but the fact is the FGFA and Rafale deals are quite small compared to how big the deals will be for the navy's three submarine projects and the army's modernization program.

The navy plans to get SSBN/SSGNs, SSNs and SSKs. Each of these are as big as Rafale. And the army's plan to modernize is already as big as the Rafale and FGFA combined. Just raising one corps is as big as Rafale, and then we plan to raise two more corps, followed by modernizing at least a dozen corps after that in the F-INSAS program. These deals wouldn't be happening today if the MoD didn't think it couldn't spend so much.

Basically, IAF seems to be getting a bigger piece of the pie today, but it is temporary. Once the navy and army start their processes, the Rafale will seem paltry in comparison. But by the time these programs are signed for, the defense budget would have doubled in value making it appear smaller in comparison.

And yes, sacrificing some of the investment budget into the military is more important considering the threat.

Btw, the 30 or 40 billions are meant to be spread out in a period of 30 to 40 years. When it comes down to it, the actual expenditure on Rafale and FGFA won't exceed $2 or 3 Billion per year. And people always forget that the economy will continue increasing, as will the defense budget whereas every time an aircraft is delivered, its fly away price won't appreciate anymore.

They had earlier questioned whether IAF will be able to pay for the MKI program along with LCA. While LCA didn't happen, there was no issue with procuring the MKIs, even if more than what was earmarked for LCA was spent on modernizing Mig-21, Mig-27, Jaguar, Mig-29 and Mirage-2000. IAF managed to find the funds, didn't they? Otherwise the total money spent on all these programs over the last 15 years is $20-25 billion, with MKI alone amounting to over $15 Billion today. The Indian defense budget in 1999-2000 was a paltry $10.5 Billion in comparison. Today, it is around $40 Billion. Roughly a 4x difference.

Basically, we spent around $25 Billion on jets in 15 years while we plan to spend just $40-50 Billion on FGFA and Rafale over the next 15 years. Heck we should actually be spending around $80-100 Billion on fighters by 2030 just to keep up with our spending in the previous 15 years.

The cost of a F-16C in 2000 was around $17-18 Million. The cost of a MKI was almost $30 Million in comparison. The difference is even greater since the costs reflected prices prevalent in the US compared to Russia. Today, it is similar when it comes to aircraft like Gripen and Rafale, considering the markets are the same. The cost of a Gripen is around $60-65 Million while Rafale costs $95 million. Both prices are at 30% difference.

This is a pretty interesting article written after 2000 by a Pakistani Air Marshal about the IAF. I would recommend reading it to understand how things were before and how things have changed in the last 10-15 years. And a pretty interesting comment about the Su-30 as well.
India's Arming Blitz

Bravo p2prada...I wish there was an appreciation markI could give you for putting your point out in such a well explained manner.... much appreciated.

As for my statements...correct me if I am wrong but arent we supposed to shell out half the contract fees when we sign the deal with Dassault?? That too is a hefty amount dont you think.

As for my other statement regarding IAF shoring up for Rafael over FGFA, please read this link :

Russia can't deliver on Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft: IAF | Business Standard News

Even MOD was lost for words by the stinging upraisal of FGFA by IAF!!

 

[p2prada]

Bravo p2prada...I wish there was an appreciation markI could give you for putting your point out in such a well explained manner.... much appreciated.

As for my statements...correct me if I am wrong but arent we supposed to shell out half the contract fees when we sign the deal with Dassault?? That too is a hefty amount dont you think.

It is not half. It is 15%.

This is from DPP2013.

Option 1: Advance payment + payment upon receipt of goods.

Advance Payment - Fifteen (15%) of the Contract price shall be paid within thirty
(30) days of signing of Contract through Direct Bank Transfer (DBT) and upon submission
of claim and a Bank Guarantee (BG) for equivalent amount.

1.3.2. On Dispatch - (Note - The percentages for this stage can be fixed in the RFP on
merits of case).____% of the Contract Price of the Goods shipped shall be paid through
Irrevocable Letter of Credit (LC).

................The Seller will give a notification to Buyer about the readiness of goods for dispatch at least 45 days prior to delivery of goods..................

Option 2: Payment based on stages.

1.3.3. Stage-wise Payments (Note – This para may be included if the Buyer wants
to release payments other than Advance into different stages. The number of stages, their
activities and documents required for payment may be framed keeping in view the unique
requirements of the case. In such cases, Paras 1.3.2 above will get replaced by Para
1.3.3)
1.3.3.1. The payments will be done in stages as under –
"¢ First stage - ___% on completion of ____
"¢ Second stage - - ___% on completion of ____
"¢ Third stage - ___% on completion of ____

There is also an option for installments, quarterly/half-year/yearly etc which would be option 3.

There are many different payment methods, we don't know what has been chosen by Dassault. So, there is no guarantee whether there is any advance payment necessary or not.

Also it won't be 15% of the total contract amount since a lot of it consists of spares and maintenance which will come up much later. Total industrial production costs shouldn't be more than $2 Billion. It was $1.5 Billion for the French. There will so many different types of costs involved which will come into play as the years pass and won't be a direct one-off payment from the very first day. We may see the main contract itself being split into many contracts meant for each phase of the project. I am just speculating since we don't really know anything about the contract.

We will need a separate contract between Dassault and MoD for buying the first 18 jets. We will need another for the one between Dassault and HAL for building 108 Rafales. Then there will be one between Thales and BEL for the radar. There will be one between Reliance and Dassault for wings. One between Snecma and HAL for engines. And so on. So in each of these cases, the contracts will be different. Then there are numerous contracts to be negotiated between HAL and private industries where work is outsourced. They will have their separate contracts.

Dassault will need a separate contract with IAF for setting up base infrastructure, so the payment terms will be different. Then IAF will want their men trained, which will be different. Weapons will need a different contract.

After everything is said and done, IAF, HAL and Dassault will have to setup maintenance and spares supplies which will require a set of different contracts. We will need new facilities for overhauling the aircraft and engine.

Then there is the massive offsets agreement. This will see half the foreign exchange value of the contract being reinvested into the country. We have no idea how big this amount is but each of these will require a new contract which will again be subdivided into a multitude of smaller contracts like mentioned above.

So, you see, there will be many contracts and all of them will be part of the very big Rafale MRCA contract. It is not necessary that the deal they are signing today will require immediate payment for every one of these. These payments would be spread over many months in some cases, and many years in some cases.

What's most important today would be the cost of the 18 flyaway Rafales and the cost of construction of 108 Rafales along with the addition of new equipment on them, like Litening pod, KH-31 missile integration etc. This alone should take 10 years to be fully paid for and should cost around $15 Billion (worst case) in total. That would mean an initial payment of $2.25 Billion (worst case) in the first year followed by $1.25 Billion every year for the next 10 years. I have taken $120 Million for each Rafale even though it is not so much. Best case, Rafale should cost $100 Million each along with the integration costs, and first year payment would be $1.9 Billion followed by $1.1 Billion every year, for a total of $12.6 Billion.

When things are broken down, it suddenly becomes affordable, doesn't it?

And the best part is, the advance payment doesn't necessarily have to come from IAF's sanctioned budget.

But there is no guarantee we will know the actual cost of the Rafale contract. At best we will know the initial contract values and the flyaway price of the aircraft, I suppose. We may possibly know the cost of other contracts as and when they are implemented, if we are lucky.

As for my other statement regarding IAF shoring up for Rafael over FGFA, please read this link :

Russia can't deliver on Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft: IAF | Business Standard News

Even MOD was lost for words by the stinging upraisal of FGFA by IAF!!

It's fake news, or just a badly informed Air Marshal making claims that even netizens know is not true. Ajai Shukla is lobbying for selling F-35s to the IAF. He began by targeting the Rafale deal initially.

Broadsword: Scrap the MMRCA: buy US F-35s

Google his name with the F-35 and you will find plenty of articles worshiping it.

Now, he is saying "Scrap FGFA and buy F-35."

After FGFA contract is signed, in a few years he will say "Scrap AMCA and buy F-35."

 

[Apollyon]

@p2prada ; intresting article; any idea on what date was the article published?
thnx.

June, 2000 (see the url)

 

[Punya Pratap]

It is not half. It is 15%.

This is from DPP2013.

Option 1: Advance payment + payment upon receipt of goods.




Option 2: Payment based on stages.


There is also an option for installments, quarterly/half-year/yearly etc which would be option 3.

There are many different payment methods, we don't know what has been chosen by Dassault. So, there is no guarantee whether there is any advance payment necessary or not.

Also it won't be 15% of the total contract amount since a lot of it consists of spares and maintenance which will come up much later. Total industrial production costs shouldn't be more than $2 Billion. It was $1.5 Billion for the French. There will so many different types of costs involved which will come into play as the years pass and won't be a direct one-off payment from the very first day. We may see the main contract itself being split into many contracts meant for each phase of the project. I am just speculating since we don't really know anything about the contract.

We will need a separate contract between Dassault and MoD for buying the first 18 jets. We will need another for the one between Dassault and HAL for building 108 Rafales. Then there will be one between Thales and BEL for the radar. There will be one between Reliance and Dassault for wings. One between Snecma and HAL for engines. And so on. So in each of these cases, the contracts will be different. Then there are numerous contracts to be negotiated between HAL and private industries where work is outsourced. They will have their separate contracts.

Dassault will need a separate contract with IAF for setting up base infrastructure, so the payment terms will be different. Then IAF will want their men trained, which will be different. Weapons will need a different contract.

After everything is said and done, IAF, HAL and Dassault will have to setup maintenance and spares supplies which will require a set of different contracts. We will need new facilities for overhauling the aircraft and engine.

Then there is the massive offsets agreement. This will see half the foreign exchange value of the contract being reinvested into the country. We have no idea how big this amount is but each of these will require a new contract which will again be subdivided into a multitude of smaller contracts like mentioned above.

So, you see, there will be many contracts and all of them will be part of the very big Rafale MRCA contract. It is not necessary that the deal they are signing today will require immediate payment for every one of these. These payments would be spread over many months in some cases, and many years in some cases.

What's most important today would be the cost of the 18 flyaway Rafales and the cost of construction of 108 Rafales along with the addition of new equipment on them, like Litening pod, KH-31 missile integration etc. This alone should take 10 years to be fully paid for and should cost around $15 Billion (worst case) in total. That would mean an initial payment of $2.25 Billion (worst case) in the first year followed by $1.25 Billion every year for the next 10 years. I have taken $120 Million for each Rafale even though it is not so much. Best case, Rafale should cost $100 Million each along with the integration costs, and first year payment would be $1.9 Billion followed by $1.1 Billion every year, for a total of $12.6 Billion.

When things are broken down, it suddenly becomes affordable, doesn't it?

And the best part is, the advance payment doesn't necessarily have to come from IAF's sanctioned budget.

But there is no guarantee we will know the actual cost of the Rafale contract. At best we will know the initial contract values and the flyaway price of the aircraft, I suppose. We may possibly know the cost of other contracts as and when they are implemented, if we are lucky.



It's fake news, or just a badly informed Air Marshal making claims that even netizens know is not true. Ajai Shukla is lobbying for selling F-35s to the IAF. He began by targeting the Rafale deal initially.

Broadsword: Scrap the MMRCA: buy US F-35s

Google his name with the F-35 and you will find plenty of articles worshiping it.

Now, he is saying "Scrap FGFA and buy F-35."

After FGFA contract is signed, in a few years he will say "Scrap AMCA and buy F-35."

Thanks p2prada please also inform me about future MLU and what else is NOT covered?

 

[Ashutosh Lokhande]

June, 2000 (see the url)

yup i saw it much latter but since 15 mins had passed i couldnt delete it.
stupid me

 

[ersakthivel]

Bravo p2prada...I wish there was an appreciation markI could give you for putting your point out in such a well explained manner.... much appreciated.

As for my statements...correct me if I am wrong but arent we supposed to shell out half the contract fees when we sign the deal with Dassault?? That too is a hefty amount dont you think.

As for my other statement regarding IAF shoring up for Rafael over FGFA, please read this link :

Russia can't deliver on Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft: IAF | Business Standard News

Even MOD was lost for words by the stinging upraisal of FGFA by IAF!!

Such complexities dont apply to french , US,many NATO countires and british who are all standardizing on two type of fighters at the most!!!!

may be the civilian authorities there

 

[Punya Pratap]

Please go through the entire acquisitions panned out for IAF in the 13th & 14th Year Plan... we are inducting Light/Medium & Heavy all together making our IAF mix of 7 different types