ADA Tejas (LCA) News and Discussions

[nitesh]

Hey guys, can anyone tell me how many LCA are flying high till now? since TD-1 has already been retired. Sorry for asking, but life has become little frenatic and hence not able to keep up with the happenings.

ZOOM no other edition, LSP 3 is about to fly in 2-3 months. Rest will follow

 

[.v0id]

How About This Pic ???

 

[Sridhar]

ADA website now displays only 992 test flights sofar. What happened to those last 38 flights.

 

[ZOOM]

Can anybody convey specificiations of LCA payload in above pic?

 

[Sridhar]

Tejas Now completes 1052 test flights

(19-Feb-09)Tejas-LCA

 

[nitesh]

Tejas Now completes 1052 test flights

(19-Feb-09)Tejas-LCA

So there is another 50. Good progress

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://www.lca-tejas.org/weapons.html


WEAPONS

Gun one 23-mm GSh-23 twin-barrel cannon (220 rds)
The cannon comes in a basic variant GSh-23, and more popular GSh-23L , differing mostly in adding a muzzle brake, lowering recoil force. These cannon was standard fit on late-model MiG-21 fighters (M, MF, SMT, bis), all variants of the MiG-23, the SOKO J-22 Orao and IAR 93, and the tail turrets of the Tupolev Tu-22M 'Backfire' bomber and some late-model Tu-95s. In that application, it had the unusual ability to fire infrared flares and chaff rounds, allowing it to function as both a weapon and a dispenser of anti-missile countermeasures. It is also mounted on late small series

Specifications

" Type: dual-barrel automatic cannon
" Caliber: 23 mm (1.18 in)
" Operation: Gast principle
" Length: 1387 mm (GSh-23), 1537 mm (GSh-23L),
" Barrel length: 1000 mm
" Weight (complete): 50 kg (105 lb)
" Rate of fire: 3,000-3,400 rpm
" Muzzle velocity: 720 m/s (2,360 ft/s)
" Projectile weight: 180 g (6.3 oz)

R-73E, R-27R1, R-27T1, and R-59ME

Astra air-to-air (AA) missile

The Astra missile is an air-to-air (AA), beyond visual range (BVR) missile under development by India. This is the first indigenous air-to-air missile developed by India. The range of this missile is 80 km in head-on chase and 15 km in tail chase. This missile was successfully tested without control and guidance systems on May 9 to May 12, 2003.
India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is developing this advanced beyond visual range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM) for its Mirage 2000, MiG-29, Sea Harrier, Su-30, and the Light Combat Aircraft [LCA]. Astra looks like an elongated Matra 530. It uses an indigenously developed solid fuel propellant, though DRDO is believed to be looking at rocket/ramjet propulsion similar to that used in its AKASH SAM project. The missile's onboard radio-frequency seeker has been designed in India. It will have an active homing range of 15 km. The missile has a pre-fragmented warhead & is fitted with a proximity fuze. A radar fuze already exists for the Astra, but the DRDO is currently working on a new laser fuze.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

continued

LCA-TEJAS SHOWING ALL ITS WEAPONS AT AERO INDIA 2005

Specifications

First test: May 9, 2003
Total length: 3570 mm (11.7 ft)
Diameter: 7 in (178 mm )
Wingspan: 10 in (254 mm)
Weight: 154 kg (339 lb)
< 250 kg (550 lb) including launcher
Warhead: 15 kg (33 lb) HE fragmentation directional warhead
Fuze: Radar proximity fuze
Propulsion: solid fuel
Maximum speed: Mach 4 +
Maximum effective range: 80 km head on, 15 km tail chase, over 100 km (eventually)
Maximum altitude: 20 km (66,000 ft)
Minimum altitude: sea level
Missile g load: 40 g (400 m/s²)
Target g load: 9 g (90 m/s²)
Guidance mode: Inertial + mid-course update & terminal active radar (15 km)
Launch aircraft speed: Mach 0.6 to 2.2

CAD image showing Lca-Tejas with Drop tanks

ARMANMENTS OF LCA

1x 23 mm GSh-23 cannon
Seven external stations + one station for pod
Astra BVRAAM, R-77, or R-73 air-to-air missiles
Laser guided bombs, unguided bombs

OTHER EQUIPMENT :
Drop tanks
Recce pods
EW pods

 

[ZOOM]

Is there any proposal to equip LCA with Survillence and ECM Pods to do electronic intelligence?

Reason for asking this question is that, we should heavily inclined upon equipping LCA with this gadgets, as full scale war is highly unlikely, under such circumstances in case of Mumbai like terror attack our first tactics would be do gather radar signature of Pakistan's ground based radars as well as jamming of radio signals and all other electronic attacks. Since we should optimize LCA for Peace like condition rather then putting entire focus on enrolling it for Offensive strike or using it only for the purpose of Point defence fighter. As LCA with survillence pod rather then full weapons load have more merit of low radar signature and hence can be best utilized for Survillence tactics.

 

[nitesh]

Guys check this

http://www.domain-b.com/Video_Mediaplayer.aspx?id=434&sid=2

 

[nitesh]

domain-b.com : AeroIndia 2009: LCA programme is over the hump - from 2nd generation to 4+

AeroIndia 2009: LCA programme is over the hump - from 2nd generation to 4+ news
06 February 2009

From 1983, when an indigenous fighter development programme was launched with an attempt to develop second generation technologies, to 2008 when the programme has successfully developed 4+ generation technologies the LCA Tejas has come a long way, says ADA director, Dr PS Subramanyam.

What are the major state-of-the-art aircraft technologies used on the LCA?

To begin with, I'd like to take you back to 1983 when the programme began with the attempt to develop second generation technologies. The whole world then was developing fourth generation technologies. There was a gap of almost two generations of technologies. This is what we have overcome with this particular LCA programme.

When we talk about state-of-art technologies in the LCA, we are talking about state-of-the-art technologies related to unstable aerodynamics based aircraft, where the basic airframe is unstable. We have to make it stable by what we call instant fly-by-wire flight control systems, which is also a unique technology - we are only the fourth or fifth country in the world to have developed this digital technology.

Another technology that has been developed for the programme is called digital avionics technology, or a glass cockpit.

Yet another technology where we have really bridged the gap is in the area of composites.

I have mentioned these four state-of-the-art technologies because when we started the programme many foreign consultants on the programme said this country cannot catch up with these technologies at this point and suggested we go back to older technologies. It was then that Dr APJ Abdul Kalam, who was the director general of the organisation, who said no. He told us he had confidence in us and that we could go ahead with developing these technologies.

We did that and today we have arrived - these technologies are now in use with the two Technology Demonstrator aircraft - TD1 and TD2.

We have gone over the hump and today we are at the 4+ generation of technologies. In these particular aircraft all electronic and mechanical systems are controlled by computers.

Even today we don't have such functional systems as digital avionics, glass cockpit and other related technologies in the Indian Air Force.

Another state-of-the-art feature in these technologies is that all the microprocessors used in our systems are only 12-16 months old - since we have deployed the open system architecture. With such a concept we can catch up with any evolution in electronics and keep on changing the hardware, as with computers.

So all the microprocessors used in the system are only 12-16 months old . That's the kind of currency we have got.

All sensors used in our aircraft are state-of-the-art - whether it is the navigation systems, the helmet mounted system, or what we call the day-night attack sensor. If you look at the Indian Air force, even they have picked up the system only a year or so ago.

Most of the things we use, even the materials, are state-of-the-art and in terms of technology this aircraft is going to be current even after 10 years.

What are the derivatives of LCA?

Seeing the performance of the Technology Demonstrators the Indian Navy and air force have now gained confidence in the aircraft – a confidence that they can move on to higher derivatives of the aircraft.

First, in March 2003, the Navy came forward with an order for a naval variant of the aircraft and decided to fund it.

Subsequently, the air force, realising that there was inadequacy of thrust in the aircraft, asked for a higher derivative of the aircraft with a new engine in the 90 tonnes class. This will be a Mark 2 version of the aircraft and will boast of new electronic warfare tools, reduced weight and improved performance.

The navy has also asked for a Mark 2 variant which will use a very small distance for take off and landing from an aircraft carrier. It will land with an arrestor hook. So, almost four new derivatives are planned – the air force and naval variants, the air force fighter trainer,the navy fighter trainer and Mk 2 versions of these.

This shows the confidence with which the user is placing orders for these derivatives.

Another very important point is that the users are funding the development of these derivatives. This shows we now have a lot of business, which is taking place with user participation.

What are the future programmes planned?

As I said earlier, when we began the programme we were dealing with second generation technologies. Now we have jumped to fourth generation technologies. If you don't have future programmes planned, and stay where you are, you will only be widening the technology gap with the rest of the world. If you wish to progress further, one way is to keep developing technologies. Keeping this in mind we now have a separate programme for technology development.

But unless technologies are packaged and put on the aircraft they will not mature. So we are working on programmes like the medium combat aircraft. So far we were quite hesitant whether the user will require such technology. But they have communicated that they need a medium combat aircraft, in the medium weight class, in which platform they have asked us to incorporate next generation fighter technologies.

So we have conceptual studies for the next generation fighter aircraft with medium weight - of around 20 tonnes. The technologies which will go into that are futuristic technologies, like stealth. The aircraft should not be visible. It will have radar cross section reduction, infrared reduction. It will have super cruise technology, and also, this kind of an aircraft will have all weapons concealed in the airframe itself - all the conformal weapons.

In the case of avionics we have visualised that unless we take a quantum jump and understand what is happening in the rest of the world we will again be widening the gap.

So we have decided to work on integrated modular architecture of the weapons and avionics system. That architecture will be built into this.

These are some of the technologies on which we are currently working .

What is the relevance of this seminar for your future technology requirement?

The seminar is very relevant. As I have pointed out we are now working on future technologies and programmes -so depending on what we need, and what we understand from our interactions with our users, we have to conceptualize what our future programmes and technologies are going to be like.

Using interaction opportunities with experts from the rest of the world we intend to understand what they are contemplating... here we will find ourselves hobnobbing with all the experts who are coming eg: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Embraer - you name it and all the companies are coming. Based on our interactions and one-on-one discussions with them we will try and figure out what future technologies they are contemplating.

As one of my colleagues said today the rest of the world has realised that India is a force to reckon with. Earlier, they would never have partnered with us but today they want us to be partners. They are ready to share information. Through this sharing of information we will realise if the technologies we are contemplating for development are contemporaneous are not.

What kind of aircraft to make ...what kind of unmanned aircraft we should make, what kind of technologies we have to put into these aircrafts - all this visibility will come only from a seminar of this nature.

We have also made sure that the people who come, the topics we cover are of such a spectrum - that we get to know if the technologies that we intend to develop are the right technologies.

We would also like to understand their approach with such programmes, their programme management techniques which will help us make our plans perfect.

Continued in next post................

 

[nitesh]

from previous post.........................


In what way would co-operation with foreign agencies or companies benefit the LCA programme?

Since this our first time we are very conservative when it comes to designing and developing this aircraft. We wish to avoid failure at any cost. Technically, our aircraft weight is1.5 tonnes extra – because of our conservative design the weight is 500 kg extra.

If we had a foreign consultant on this project -someone who has gone through the same processes he doesn't have to do anything for us but tell us simply, where we could possibly curtail the weight of the aircraft. We would be prepared to improve our design. In other words, a large number of design iterations which will be required to reach perfection would be cut short because that consultant has already gone through similar experience.

Another thing is with regard to flight testing - the number of flight tests that we do is more than is required. This is something even the foreign vendors are saying. They know the optimal size of the testing that we need to do. Most of the companies have been in the industry for the last 50-60 years and have made three to four generations of aircraft. These are things they have already done and we have not.

The inputs we take from them is intellectual and not related to hardware or software. We will tell them what we intend to do - their job will be to tell us to achieve meaningful reductions in time and energy.

With such consultancy the number of design iterations we are going to do is likely to reduce - the number of flight tests we are going to do is also going to reduce.

If we reduce flight testing time by, say, six month we will achieve savings of nearly Rs1000 crore. So whatever small amount we will pay them for consultancy is meant basically for them to tell us whether we are on the right track, or not.

There is going to be no hardware or software support.

This is the way ahead for our future programmes where foreign collaboration will take place - we have now come to the four and a half generation level but when we contemplate taking on fifth generation fighter aircraft technologies benefits are expected to be substantial.

This is the purpose of the collaboration, which we are contemplating for the existing LCA programme, as well as for future fifth generation fighter programmes. This is the advice given to us by our higher management - do some kind of consultancy or participation programme so that partners also invest resources and result is optimal in terms of time and cost.

 

[nitesh]

Watch this guys:
Interview with Dr W Selvamurthy
http://www.domain-b.com/Video_Mediaplayer.aspx?sid=2&id=448

Up Close with LCA
http://www.domain-b.com/Video_Mediaplayer.aspx?sid=2&id=447

 

[nitesh]

http://livefist.blogspot.com/2009/02/lca-navy-brochure-images.html

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/attachment.php?attachmentid=170088&d=1235662665

 

[LETHALFORCE]

 

[Atul]

My Answer to those who think Investment is Tejas is a Waste?

Tejas – An Perspective.
The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the R&D arm of India's defence ministry, is not one of the most transparent organisations in the country. Involved as it is in development of military hardware of the future, it perhaps cannot really open up all its secrets for friend and foe to see.
That's the story of defence R&D organisations all over the world.
This compulsion to keep things under wraps can work against an organisation. It does, against the DRDO sometimes, because the DRDO is unable to rise to the bait and provide details to refute newspaper stories based on ignorance, bias or sheer motivation.
That these stories begin to fly around the time when a major aerospace or defence exhibition is held makes one wonder whether some of these reports are indeed motivated by a desire to please deep-pocketed global defence equipment companies that are desperate to sell their materiel to the Indian armed forces.
A year ago, before the Aero India 2007 show in Bangalore in February, a series of articles referring to ''DRDO's duds'', run almost like a campaign, adorned the pages of a national daily, hammering the DRDO with some truths and some half-truths. This year, just before the DefExpo2008 in New Delhi, beginning 16 February, we see another attack on the DRDO for its supposedly miserable performance in developing the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), the Tejas in another leading national daily.
A recent report in a leading national daily calls upon defence minister A K Antony to ''take a close look at the fighter which typifies all that is wrong with defence projects in India''. Then it proceeds to list ''all that is wrong with defence projects in India''.
The article points out that the LCA project was sanctioned in 1983 at a cost of Rs.560 crore; now, 25 years later, the cost has escalated to Rs.5,489.78 crore, even as the fighter remains another four years away from becoming fully operational.
That is damning. Sanctioned in 1983 and still not done! The conclusion that people are left to draw is that it was a complete waste investing in the indigenous development of the LCA. It would have been far simpler, cheaper, and safer (from the point of view of India's current defence needs) to have imported the aircraft from an American or European company – or maybe the Russians.
But that's not all. Intended or not, these campaigns end up drumming into our national psyche the stereotype of the inferior, shoddy, third-world DRDO versus technologically sophisticated Western aerospace companies.

 

[Atul]

So let's take a look at how some of these global defence companies have fared with their projects.

Take the Eurofighter Typhoon, one of the most ''advanced'' fighter aircraft projects in the world, and also a bidder for the Indian Air Force's medium range multi role combat aircraft (MMRCA) tender. The Typhoon owes its genesis to a European Combat Aircraft (ECA) study group formed in 1979. Development began officially in 1983 and the deadline set for commissioning it was fixed as December 1998. This deadline was then extended to December 2001. The induction of the Tranche1 versions into the UK's Royal Air Force was made in 2003 – fully two decades after an official start, more if you go back to1979.
The Tranche 2 version was inducted into service in 2005, another two years later. Now, in 2008, 25 years down the line (or three decades if you take 1979 as the starting point), the Eurofighter programme is yet to field a fully developed Tranche 3 multi-role version – the version that all the partner nations have actually been waiting for.
This is how it is with not one but several European nations that can pump in resources way above anything India and the DRDO can manage. The Eurofighter programme is a project of a consortium that includes British, Germans, Italians and Spanish governments and companies.
The irony is that by the time the Tranche 3 multi-role version finally enters squadron service, the American stealth fighters, the F-22 Raptor and the JSF-35 Lightning II, would have made their entry in sufficiently large numbers to put the Eurofighter in the shadow.
Since the Typhoon wouldn't really like to go up against either of these aircraft on a one-on-one basis you can say that obsolescence is built into the design of the Typhoon!
So what is the big deal about the Typhoon? The fact is that development of the Typhoon has given European aerospace industries a depth of experience and expertise that they wouldn't have missed out on for anything.
In terms of functionalities, the Eurofighter Typhoon combines the capabilities of the American F-15 Eagle and the F/A-18 Hornet in one compact platform. Some experts argued that the Europeans could have saved a lot of time, grief and money by opting for a mix of these American aircraft early on in the game.
However, the Europeans refused to make off-the-shelf purchases of these American fighters. Why? Because they did not want to lose out on the design expertise and the building of a sophisticated manufacturing base that the development of such an aircraft would result in.
Almost three decades later they are still lumbering on.

 

[Atul]

Cost overruns
Let's see how the Eurofighter has fared in terms of cost overruns. In 1988, the UK's secretary of state for defence told the House of Commons that the European Fighter Aircraft would cost the UK about £7 billion. The figure soon ballooned to £13 billion. By 1997 the estimated cost was £17 billion, and by 2003 it was £20 billion. Since 1993, the UK ministry of defence has refused to release updated cost estimates on the grounds of 'commercial sensitivity.'
Now, a late January 2008 press report says that the Eurofighter consortium has informed partners that the project cost has escalated by another £7.5 billion or so. That too, only for partners; ''clients'' will have to shell out even more.
However, these figures are subject to change, if the UK, for example, should back out of its commitments for Tranche 3 aircraft, of which it is committed to receive 88. Costs per unit of the Eurofighter would go up accordingly.
The Eurofighter consortium argues that its cost increases and delays compare favourably with those of the US F-22 Raptor programme. According to the Eurofighter consortium, the Typhoon is apparently only 14 per cent over-budget and just 54 months late, as compared to the Raptor, which is 127 per cent over-budget and 117 months late!
So, if the Europeans haven't been very efficient with their project it appears the Americans haven't been managing all too well either with their famed Raptor. This, in spite of their deep, deep pockets and the vast experience and arms producing infrastructure that they have.

 

[Atul]

Not indigenous …
The litany doesn't stop with complaints about the cost overruns. The article on DRDO's failures points out that when the IAF eventually inducts an LCA squadron, around 2012 or so, it will be powered by American GE-404 engines and Israeli radars, besides several other 'foreign' parts. Hardly 'indigenous', wouldn't you say?
This only betrays ignorance about the way in which R&D is done worldwide. The Eurofighter is a classic example of how Europe has gone about trying to negate American dominance in the field of fighter technology.
Everything about it - engines, armaments, airframes, et al - is a collaborative venture. The left wing, to provide one instance, will be manufactured by the Italian firm Alenia Aeronautica, and the right wing by Spain's EADS CASA. The aircraft's EJ200 engine has been developed by Eurojet GmbH, owned jointly by Rolls Royce, MTU Aero Engines, Fiat Aviazione and ITP.
Such collaboration applied to the US too. Several suppliers are involved in programmes identified with any one company. A Lockheed project, for instance, would easily have a competitor like Boeing or Northrop Grumman, or other companies, involved in the manufacture or integration of specific systems – and nobody's perishing of shame because of that.
So, if American GE-404 engines power our first lot of LCAs no need for any Indian to perish of shame because of that.
As for Israeli radars, there are any number of top-of-the-line, hush-hush projects where the Americans access Israeli technology and expertise, and vice versa. Why should we have a problem with their radars?
India recently launched Israel's state-of-the-art TecSAR spy satellite into 'pinpoint' orbit. According to ISRO chairman G Madhavan, the Israelis were very specific about the kind of orbit they wanted the TecSAR to achieve, which ISRO met flawlessly. Our boys are proud of their achievement, and so far, no Israeli appears to be blushing with shame.
As the decade rolls by there will be much of Israel that we shall be using, and not just radars. For that matter there is much that Israel will use, which it would have jointly developed with India.
Decades of development
The report concedes that developing a supersonic fly-by-wire fighter jet from scratch, with international sanctions in place, can be an extremely complex task, but says that taking almost three decades is ''criminal'', it implies.
Is the three decades of development for the Eurofighter also criminal? As for the Americans, the F-22 Raptor programme, for instance, was initiated in 1986, after years of initial study. It achieved 'full operational clearance' (FOC) only on 12 December 2007 - a full 21 years after the requests for proposals were issued. Is 21 years criminal or slightly less than criminal?