I would beg to differ. The differences between Iraq and Himalays is in the terrain. Air-strikes over the desert plains of Iraq could cripple any army - without air-support the armor and infantry will be sitting ducks. Compared to that air strikes are not so simple, neither as effective over the mountainous terrains of the Himalayas. Ask the Russians who fought in Chechnya.
Air superiority will be important, and will determine who gets the upper hand, but without boots on the ground, it will be well neigh impossible to defend/ attack through the Himalayas. And boots in the ground means supply lines (including aerial supply), all leading back to air-support.
All in all, a war over the Himalayas in the modern age will be brutal, short and all-pervasive - and any early advantage will be devastating for the opposite side (remember Kargil?).
As for airlift capabilities and air supply capabilities, I am not informed enough to form an opinion. However, if IAF can indeed airlift a whole battalion strength of Mechanized infantry into Tibet and then keep them supplied for 3-4 months, while at the same time provide them with air-defense, then I can agree that opening a second front in Tibet will be a good idea. All in all IA will need a whole division dedicated to Tibet for a new front there.
As for Arunachal, IA should be making fortifications in each and every China-accessible valley, armed with SAMs, Arty batteries, Light tanks and MBRLs. These should be supported by tactical (conventional) SSMs and attack choppers, not to mention air-defense aircraft and air-superiority fighters.