WAR 1971

[sthf]

Pakis will spent the rest of their miserable existence trying to convince themselves that;

a) They did not commit a genocide. Saazish e Yahood o Hanood.
b) They didn't lose the war because of shitty warfighting but reasons....

One of the often repeated bs is that they were "fighting 1000s of km away from home" not giving two hoots about the fact that they fighting in their own damn country.

The more they believe in this bs the better it is for us (India & Bangladesh).

 

[AmoghaVarsha]

I will give you an honest reponse.

1. Where did you hear this from, defence p.k? If so, not a reliable source. Moderated in a heavily biased way also in a manner to eliminate anyone too "anti-Pakistani".

2. I live in the UK so am not that familiar with what is going on in Bangladesh currently.

I don't see a major upsurge in pro-Pakistan sentiment in Bangladesh. The Awami League are in power and will most likely win the next elections in 2019. That's all that really matters. Whether people want to be pro-Pakistan or India is a matter of personal preference, but Bangladesh being used as a giant ISI base is unacceptable as was the case under Khaleda Zia.

3. Also it depends what "pro-Pakistani" means. Does that mean supporting the Pakistan cricket team? Does that mean posting positive stuff about Pakistan on social media (which I don't see amongst Bangladeshis). Even if Bangladesh was the most pro-Pakistan state on earth, as long as the country doesn't sponsor separatists in the north-east and there are relatively normal relations between the two, New Delhi decision makers won't care.

All that matters is strategic goals e.g. no support for separatists, peaceful border etc.

The Awami League are only in power because they are able to maintain economic growth in a country with possibly 170 million people unofficially. If they can't, they're out.

I am a bengali.from the other side.I have seen Bdeshis supporting Pakistan to a large extent on many forums,esp cricket forums.I agree that Awami league will win the next election,but the problem is that BDeshis are more and more identifying themselves with the muslim brotherhood Pakistan and not the Bengali identity.

I wonder how can any Bdeshi think of supporting pakis,when 2mn of their brethern were slaughtered by Pakis.

 

[Bengal_Tiger]

In any case Pakistan may not succeed
1. has developed more sensitive internal turmoil
2. geographical location
3. the past still haunts

.

They know they've lost to India over Bangladesh, not just in 1971 but in the past 10 years with their proxies kicked out of power and their network dismantled.

India cements its permanent victory in Bangladesh by making joint economic ties so productive and indispensable that whoever is in charge needs good economic ties with India to satisfy the 160 million hungry mouths of Bangladesh who will turn violent against their government if they are not fulfilled economically.

In this context even if India loses something economically for a greater strategic victory (blocking Pakistan off in Bangladesh) it would be worth it.

 

[Bengal_Tiger]

I am a bengali.from the other side.I have seen Bdeshis supporting Pakistan to a large extent on many forums,esp cricket forums.I agree that Awami league will win the next election,but the problem is that BDeshis are more and more identifying themselves with the muslim brotherhood Pakistan and not the Bengali identity.

I wonder how can any Bdeshi think of supporting pakis,when 2mn of their brethern were slaughtered by Pakis.

Even if this is true, not sure it's that bad but...

1. Will the BNP-Jamaat nexus come back in power? Probably not in the next 7 years.

2. Even if they come back to power in 2019 how much of their pro-Pakistan policies such as supporting separatists in India's north east can they carry out? Especially in the social media age.

Bangladeshis are not aggressive people and have no delusions of being a major power or wanting to be one. If they see their own government endangering our economic propserity by sponsoring aggressive policies against our neighbour which surrounds us on 3 sides, they won't like it and will think it's ridiculous. Pre-social media age the BNP-Jamaat nexus could do a lot secretly but now there's less.

3. The other reason why there might be so much support from Bangladeshis for Pakistanis is forbidden fruit is always more alluring. Now the pro-India Awami League is in power, so being somewhat rebellious and pro-Pakistani is appealing. If the pro-Pakistan BNP are in power it will be less.

Don't take social media stuff too seriously. It's like thinking Pakistanis want to be Indians and join India based on their love for watching Indian Bollywood films.

 

[Bengal_Tiger]

Pakis will spent the rest of their miserable existence trying to convince themselves that;

a) They did not commit a genocide. Saazish e Yahood o Hanood.
b) They didn't lose the war because of shitty warfighting but reasons....

One of the often repeated bs is that they were "fighting 1000s of km away from home" not giving two hoots about the fact that they fighting in their own damn country.

The more they believe in this bs the better it is for us (India & Bangladesh).

Pakistan army was and is full of bombastic rhetoric.

They had huge fervour and passion for raping and killing civilians in east Pakistan in 1971.

However unlike the Japanese or Turkish soldiers that fought to the end defending their home territory the Pakistan army cowardly surrendered en masse to India without any major resistance.

If there were no nuclear bombs and the Indian army entered Lahore you could expect something similar.

Don't believe it?

How did Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh rule Lahore and Punjab and enjoy the support of many of the Punjabi Muslims?

 

[Mikesingh]

It isn't therefore surprising that these Pakis either don't want to read their own official Hamoodur Commission Report or term it as fiction.

This report contains the official and classified papers of the events leading up to loss of East-Pakistan and the 1971 war with India. Initially, there were 12 copies of the report prepared by the Chief Justice of Pakistan, Hamoodur Rahman; all were destroyed except one. That single report was handed over to Government, which forbade its publication at the time. The report was leaked eventually by Indian and the Pakistani newspapers.

The original report’s findings accuse the Pakistan Army of carrying out senseless and wanton arson, killings in the countryside, killing of intellectuals and professionals and burying them in mass graves, killing of Bengali Officers and soldiers on the pretense of quelling their rebellion, killing East Pakistani civilian officers, businessmen and industrialists, raping a large number of East Pakistani women as a deliberate act of revenge, retaliation and torture, and deliberate killing of members of the Hindu minority.

So are apologists like Sarmila Bose and that Pakistani pseudo intellectual Junaid Ahmad more credible than the official report written by Hamoodur Rehman, then chief justice of Pakistan?

This report can be downloaded in pdf format from the web. Read the original report which brings out the facts as they were and NOT the supplementary report which was written after India repatriated the 90,000 Pak POWs as this was pretty much biased as it was based on the statements of the Pak prisoners who would naturally say nothing about the atrocities committed by them.

P.S. Were Sarmila Bose and that Pakistani pseudo intellectual Junaid Ahmad even born in 1971? Or they were probably in their diapers when the war happened. Did they witness what happened themselves? I bet the answer is no.

I as a youngster was there and saw it all. I vouch for every word in the original Hamoodur Commission Report written by the Chief Justice of Pakistan as true.

 

[Screambowl]

.

They know they've lost to India over Bangladesh, not just in 1971 but in the past 10 years with their proxies kicked out of power and their network dismantled.

India cements its permanent victory in Bangladesh by making joint economic ties so productive and indispensable that whoever is in charge needs good economic ties with India to satisfy the 160 million hungry mouths of Bangladesh who will turn violent against their government if they are not fulfilled economically.

In this context even if India loses something economically for a greater strategic victory (blocking Pakistan off in Bangladesh) it would be worth it.

The factor is no more Pakistan , they have sold their country to Chinese, the factor is China

 

[vinuzap]

porki terrorists lying again , see what there president was saying to bangladeshis



there is a movie on basterds child in bangladesh created by coward army of pakistani

http://www.genocidebangladesh.org/

http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/genocide-us-cant-remember-bangladesh-cant-forget-180961490/

ur government has failed to denounce the suppression of democracy. Our government has failed to denounce atrocities… Our government has evidenced what many will consider moral bankruptcy.” – Archer Blood, American diplomat, April 6, 1971.




Blood wrote this dispatch two weeks into the bloody massacre that would lead to the birth of Bangladesh. Unlike the Rwandan genocide, or the Holocaust, or the killing that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia, the genocide in Bangladesh that ended 45 years ago this week has largely slipped out of public awareness—even though the upper estimate for the death toll is 3 million. With the ongoing debate over how or even if America should assist Syria and those trapped in Aleppo, understanding how the U.S. has responded to genocides in the past is more crucial than ever.




In 1947, the partition of British India split the subcontinent into the independent nations of India and Pakistan, each a home for their respective religious majorities, the Hindus and the Muslims. But the unwieldy logistics of this divide meant Pakistan included two chunks of land separated by more than 1,000 miles of Indian territory.



The geographic distance between West and East Pakistan was mirrored by their economic and political separation. With most of the ruling elite having immigrated westward from India, West Pakistan was chosen as the nation’s political center. Between 1947 and 1970, East Pakistan (which would eventually become Bangladesh) received only 25 percent of the country’s industrial investments and 30 percent of its imports, despite producing 59 percent of the country’s exports. West Pakistani elites saw their eastern countrymen as culturally and ethnically inferior, and an attempt to make Urdu the national language (less than 10 percent of the population in East Pakistan had a working knowledge of Urdu) was seen as further proof that East Pakistan's interests would be ignored by the government. Making matters worse, the powerful Bhola Cyclone hit East Bangladesh in November of 1970, killing 300,000 people. Despite having more resources at their disposal, West Pakistan offered a sluggish response to the disaster.



As French journalist Paul Dreyfus said of the situation, “Over the years, West Pakistan behaved like a poorly raised, egotistical guest, devouring the best dishes and leaving nothing but scraps and leftovers for East Pakistan.”



In 1970, West Pakistan announced the country would hold an election for its first general elections since the country gained independence. Like other Pakistani leaders before him, West Pakistan’s chief martial law administrator and president, General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, placed limits on the freedoms of voters, indicating that the integrity of the country of Pakistan was more important than the election outcomes. This practice of “Basic Democracy” had been used in the past to provide the appearance of democracy while still leaving the military in true control.



In this election, 138 seats would go to West Pakistan representatives and 162 to the more populous East Pakistan (which had about 20 million more inhabitants). While West Pakistan’s votes were split between different parties, an overwhelming majority of votes in East Pakistan went to the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who campaigned on a platform of Bengali autonomy.



Shocked by the results and what they meant for the stability of the country, Yahya Khan delayed calling the first meeting of the assembly and instituted martial law. Riots and strikes erupted across East Pakistan, with Mujibur announcing the start of a civil disobedience movement in front of a crowd of 50,000 on March 7, 1971. A last ditch effort to avert war occurred in Dhaka, the capital of East Pakistan, from March 16 to 24. Mujibur and Khan met, discussed the issues, and seemingly reached an agreement—but on the night of March 25, Mujibur was arrested and 60-80,000 West Pakistani soldiers, who had been infiltrating East Pakistan for several months, began what would be known as Operation Searchlight, the massacre of Bengali civilians by Pakistani soldiers.



Estimates for the total number of deaths range from 500,000 to over 3 million, with the death toll having become politicized over the years, says Lisa Curtis, a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center.



“Regardless of what the number is, clearly massive atrocities took place against the Bengali people,” Curtis says. “I think we have to say that the atrocities committed by the Pakistan military far outstripped what we saw from the other side.”

The '3 million' figure came from the Soviet newspaper, Pravda, reported investigative journalist David Bergman in a New York Times op-ed, and it has been used to create a national narrative about Bangladesh and its formation that allows the government to extend its judicial power.



By halfway through the nine-month genocide, the U.S Central Intelligence Agency gave a conservative estimate of 200,000 Bangladeshis murdered. There was violence on all sides, with some fighting between Bengali factions (whose goals for independence or unity with West Pakistan differed), but it seems clear that Pakistani soldiers perpetrated most of the brutal attacks, many wielding weapons supplied by the U.S., since Pakistan was considered an American ally. In May 1971, 1.5 million refugees sought asylum in India; by November 1971 that number had risen to nearly 10 million. When Australian doctor Geoffrey Davis was brought to Dhaka by the United Nations to assist with late-term abortions of raped women, at the end of the war, he believed the estimated figure for the number of Bengali women who were raped—200,000 to 400,000—was probably too low.



All the while, tensions were gradually increasing between Pakistan and India, with both sides calling in reserve troops to prepare for a possible conflict along the Pakistan-Indian border. The massacre in Bangladesh came to an abrupt end when West Pakistan declared war on India in early December. By December 16, India forced Pakistan into unconditional surrender, and 90,000 Pakistani soldiers became prisoners of war. Bangladesh had achieved its independence—but at an incredibly high cost.



The world at large was well aware of the violence happening in Bangladesh throughout Operation Searchlight. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi termed the attack “genocide” as early as March 31 of that year. Blood, the American consul-general in Dhaka, and Kenneth Keating, the U.S. ambassador to India, both called on President Nixon to discontinue their support of the Pakistani regime. Both diplomats were ignored and Blood was recalled.



Overshadowing the genocide were the ongoing tensions of the Cold War. Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, considered Pakistan a close ally in the region. The U.S. provided weapons, and used Pakistan as a gateway to open diplomatic relations with China.

Further complicating matters was India’s closeness with the Soviet Union. In August 1971 the two countries signed the “Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation” that seemed to indicate India would be relinquishing its role as a neutral bystander in the Cold War. Nixon and Kissinger were both terrified about the possibility of India intensifying their relationship with the U.S.S.R. and not overly concerned about Pakistan’s military action in Bangladesh—or the reaction of Americans who read about it.



“Biafra [another genocidal war in Nigeria] stirred up a few Catholics,” Nixon was recorded saying. “But you know, I think Biafra stirred people up more than Pakistan, because Pakistan, they’re just a bunch of brown goddamn Muslims.”



As political scientist Gary J. Bass writes, “Above all, Bangladesh’s experience shows the primacy of international security over justice.”



Despite gaining their independence, Bangladesh has struggled to overcome its bloody history. Although the current prime minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina,has instituted an International War Crimes Tribunal, the process has specifically targeted Hasina’s political opposition, says the Heritage Foundation’s Lisa Curtis.



In addition to highlighting how one country has struggled to come to terms with its past, Curtis says the Bangladesh genocide should be further studied to help understand how the U.S. deals with massive atrocities happening abroad.



“How do we look at these from both a U.S. values perspective, but also a national interests perspective?” Curtis says. “And where do those values and national interests combine to merit a stronger response?”



The answer to that question, it often seems, is only clear in retrospect, when no more action can be taken.




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[pringles]

But i hear BD,esp youn BDeshis are becoming increasingly pro Pakistanis.

Not pro-Pakistani, pro-Wahabbi.

Even Pakistanis are becoming scared of Wahabbis now. A RAW officer was narrating an incident when he met a Pakistani ISI official and asked him if Pakistan really thinks they are still in control of the jihadi monster which is eating them from inside, the ISI general said, even they are scared. He showed a photo of two side by side mosques. When asked why 2 mosques are built when all people seem to fit well in one mosque, he said "the left mosque is attended by Muslims, and the right mosque belongs to Wahabbis".

That is how their society has been split now. It's not just a simple Shia vs Sunni anymore. Even within the Sunnis, there are brothers and sons killing their own fathers because they aren't 'Muslim enough'. This is a more potent drug than even poppy.

 

[AbRaj]

I will give you an honest reponse.

1. Where did you hear this from, defence p.k? If so, not a reliable source. Moderated in a heavily biased way also in a manner to eliminate anyone too "anti-Pakistani".

2. I live in the UK so am not that familiar with what is going on in Bangladesh currently.

I don't see a major upsurge in pro-Pakistan sentiment in Bangladesh. The Awami League are in power and will most likely win the next elections in 2019. That's all that really matters. Whether people want to be pro-Pakistan or India is a matter of personal preference, but Bangladesh being used as a giant ISI base is unacceptable as was the case under Khaleda Zia.

3. Also it depends what "pro-Pakistani" means. Does that mean supporting the Pakistan cricket team? Does that mean posting positive stuff about Pakistan on social media (which I don't see amongst Bangladeshis). Even if Bangladesh was the most pro-Pakistan state on earth, as long as the country doesn't sponsor separatists in the north-east and there are relatively normal relations between the two, New Delhi decision makers won't care.

All that matters is strategic goals e.g. no support for separatists, peaceful border etc.

The Awami League are only in power because they are able to maintain economic growth in a country with possibly 170 million people unofficially. If they can't, they're out.

Oh I've seen a lot of what he said. But IMO its simple trolling and counter trolling plus some religious prejudice on Bangladeshi's part.
Also illegal Bangladeshi refugees factor.
Indians mostly go to Packi forum to troll. Unfortunately some Bangladeshi's are highly provocative and Indians reply them with massive amount of trolling.
On serious discussions both get along quite well

PS: probably there are more anti India and anti Bangladesh hails from West Bengal than Bangladesh.
Bangladesh is very cooperative with India at Antiterrorism front unlike our own WB

 

[Bornubus]

Now days Pakis love to quote Indians like Sharmila Bose to debunk about the number of Deaths, Rapes and atrocities by Punjabi Army.

 

[Willy2]

A RAW officer was narrating an incident when he met a Pakistani ISI official and asked him if Pakistan really thinks they are still in control of the jihadi monster which is eating them from inside

unnhhh....they have these type of discussion ???? BTW , so what next ?? I saw a documentary about boco haram , it' started in same way family get divided by extremist ideology and early follower of Boko "graduated" by killing their own family members.

 

[Willy2]

@AmoghaVarsha , once I have a debate with bangladeshi , he said that he hate India due to these exact 3 reason
1) BSF kill Bangladesis ( avoid any talk about smuggling , drug dealing , woman abduction by same bangladeshis whom our BSF killed )
2)Due to teesta ,Torsha and farakka water debate .
3)INDIA CHEET IN ICC WORLD CUP 2015 MATCH ,to stop them qualify for the first time in semi-final(seriously ??)
What I understand that he can't speek why he really hate India , it's because we are hindu majority nation , and they can't be greatful to low life hindus for their freedom.
Islamization can't be reverse , a nation which run by any religion fundamentalism can never return to secular fold ,same hold for Bangladesh, as islamization mean in grass route level u create "thekedar" of religion named Imam , govt lose hold on ppls psyche , secular book can't have affect as they are't as strong as preeches of local person whom ur family respect , and islamization as well as christianization (as both are Abrahamic) also establishing that religion as one true religion , the hatred for other religion and that religion dominated state , entity will also created .
Benazir Bhutto was so much against Zia-UlHaq , and his islamization process , but when she herself came in power she did nothing to reverse the processes ,even if she want , she can't .
What we see in Bangladesh is the above one , Islamization of Khaleda Zia can no longer be reverse , for sheikh Hassena , neglecting them or reversing is same as political suicide , the statement bangladesi govt give when they officially join OIC's "military allience , they now move away from "Hindu-muslim-christian whatever we are ,we are Bengali", to "we are part of greater islamic world, and who are not Islamic , Bangladesh is't for u " mentality.
Sheikh Hassena can only ensure that Bangladesh will not use as ISI ,LeT base as long as Awami league stay in power . It's still better than other options which left .

 

[pringles]

unnhhh....they have these type of discussion ???? BTW , so what next ?? I saw a documentary about boco haram , it' started in same way family get divided by extremist ideology and early follower of Boko "graduated" by killing their own family members.

RAW and ISI officials do communicate quite often. During the Khalistan insurgency when Hamid Gul was ISI chief, he was managing all the ops and when RAW started hitting them back bullet for bullet, finally he asked to arrange a meeting where basically our side said to him, I am paraphrasing, "pet bhar gaya?" and he agreed to call off all anti-India operations.

ISI has a habit of getting carried away and overdoing things, then RAW has to knock some sense into them, "are you sure you want to do this?". Many people from Paki deep state have started expressing their apprehension that their doctrine has become too costly (jihadis are killing polio drop workers, blowing up schools, etc) population is increasing, economy is not increasing. Every country in the world should fear such a scenario. Indonesia is also a Muslim majority nation but even they are very particular about not allowing jihadis to take control of their streets. Pakistan has lost all control.

What's next? I believe there is still chance to save Balochistan and Sindh. We can liberate them, turn them into independent nations and write their constitution to make them more Balochi/Sindhi than anything else. If we rewrite their constitution and school syllabus, within 15 years the newer generation of kids who pass out of school will be normal human beings with ZERO jihadi leanings. 30 years later, when all Islamic references are removed from their culture and they are adequately Indianized, we can absorb both the territories into India. Simply annexing them now will fill our electoral system with more jihadis. Let's liberate them first, and quarantine them for a few decades before introducing them into our system.

 

[Bengal_Tiger]

1. From a wider international perspective, I think the Bangladesh genocide is a non-issue, Pakistan will never give Bangladesh an apology, in fact now it doesn't even recognize it carried out genocide.

It's finished in terms of what can really happen in practical terms.

The outside world can do little and cares little and with a more introspective US under Trump seeking to preserve its own declining status the world, with the US as its key power, will care even little.

2. From the viewpoint of BD-Pak relations, it reflects the Pakistani military's (the actual rulers of the country) insecurity and upset about the BD government bringing up the war or war crimes issue even just to its own domestic audience.

It reactivates their humiliation, and their pride is far more important than the actual real loss of human life and family members that Bangladeshis were afflicted with. Bangladeshis shouldn't talk about how their family were massacred in 1971 as it might hurt the feelings of Pakistani generals.

3. What will happen in the future?

Nothing major apart from the brainwashed Pakistani population feeling even more pain and hurt over their 1971 humiliation due to them being taught that Bengalis were culprits rather than victims.

Bangladesh will just go on with economic development.

 

[Kunal Biswas]

A disable M47 patton somewhere in Punjab ..

A disable T-59 by Hunter`s cannon at Rajasthan ..

A disable Chaffy somewhere at Bangaldesh ..

A disable M48 patton being loaded ..

 

[lcafanboy]

The Untold Story of India’s Decision to Release 93,000 Pakistani POWs After 1971 War
BY SASHANKA S. BANERJEE ON 26/03/2017 • 1 COMMENT

Indira Gandhi’s biggest worry after the surrender of Pakistan in 1971 was the safety of Mujibur Rahman. The release of Pakistani POWs was the price Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (and the ISI) extracted for the safe return of the Bangladeshi leader.

Pakistani soldiers surrender in Bangladesh n 1971. Credit: bdnews24.com

On August 2, 1972 – eight months after the 13-day India-Pakistan war ended on December 16, 1971 – the two countries signed the Shimla Agreement under which India agreed to release all the 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war (POW) its army had taken during the course of the war. This proved to be a controversial decision, with many in India questioning why Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had squandered a golden opportunity to bargain with Pakistan and settle the Kashmir problem on India’s terms.

What motivated Mrs Gandhi to release the POWs? What went on behind the scenes? Were there any compelling circumstances at play that have remained unreported? If there were any, ideally they should be brought into the public domain, so that future generations may benefit from the lessons of history. Since I was personally privy to these developments, as a retired diplomat I can now tell the story, even if it has been 40 years since these events transpired.

December 16, 1971 – the day when Pakistan’s armed forces laid down their arms at a surrender ceremony in Dhaka before the joint command of the Indian armed forces and Bangladesh’s Mukti Bahini – was the finest hour in both India and Bangladesh’s military histories, one old and another new.

However as the two armed forces were celebrating their military victory against an unrelenting tormentor, Mrs Gandhi was pondering the other critical issues facing India.

Apart from dealing with the enormous cost of the war, India also had to bear the financial burden of looking after the 10 million refugees who had crossed over to India from East Pakistan as they fled the Pakistani army’s horrendous atrocities, better known as the Bangladesh Genocide of 1971.

The other big challenge, which was quite complex diplomatically since it involved national security and foreign policy issues, in addition to requiring delicate handling, was the unforeseen and un-budgeted responsibility of having to look after the 93,000 Pakistani soldiers taken as POWs. India wanted to keep the Pakistani soldiers in conditions of comfort that went over and above the provisions listed in the Geneva Convention.

Indira Gandhi’s paramount concern at that moment of time was figuring out how to get Bangladeshi leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman back to his country alive and well.

She was prepared to pay any price to save his life. This much the prime minister confided to at least one member of her so called ‘kitchen Cabinet’. That person was Ram Nath Kao. the RAW chief.

She was acutely aware of the fact that Mujib was tried by a Pakistani military court and a verdict of death by hanging on charges of treason had been handed down to the Bangladesh leader. Also, as is typical with the Pakistani military, its security services did not fail to demonstrate their morbidity in the crudest possible terms. In his prison cell, a 6.5 ft long grave was dug with a rope with a loop at the end hanging over it – serving as a warning that he could face a cruel death any moment.

It would be a nightmare for Gandhi if the Pakistan army carried out the death sentence and left Bangladesh an orphaned state. For India, which supported the Bangladesh liberation struggle with its heart and soul, his execution would be an unmitigated disaster, a dream shattered. So it was in India’s interests to leave no stone unturned to save Mujib’s life, for his sake, for the sake of his family, for the sake of Bangladesh and for its own sake.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s defeat at the hands of its perceived arch enemy India was seen as an intolerable insult to its nationhood. To make matters worse, Pakistan lost half of its territory to Bangladesh, leaving Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s two-nation theory – the ideological foundation of Pakistan’s existence – in tatters. Stung by this catastrophe, the military dictator, General Yahya Khan, in a flash decision, took full responsibility for the national disaster and stepped down from office. He asked Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was still in New York attending UN Security Council meetings, to return home. Bhutto was also informed by General Yahya Khan that he had resigned from his office and that he (Bhutto) had been appointed as the chief martial law administrator of Pakistan. However, before he took his flight for Rawalpindi, Bhutto was instructed to call on US President Richard Nixon, Pakistan’s mentor at that time, in Washington DC.

From left to right: Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, Indira Gandhi, Sheikh Mujib and Sashanka S. Banerjee on the flight from London to Dhaka, Durga Prasad Dhar, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Credit: Wikimedia, YouTube, Sashanka S. Banerjee

The grand finale – an unlikely thriller

Bhutto’s Washington-Rawalpindi flight was scheduled for a refuelling stopover at Heathrow airport in London.

Having secured insider information about Bhutto’s journey home, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi called an emergency meeting of the war cabinet in New Delhi at her office in South Block. She wanted, with the utmost urgency, to secure a contact who would be present for Bhutto’s arrival at Heathrow, so she could get the only piece of intelligence India was looking for – what did Bhutto think about Mujibur Rahman being sentenced to death by a Pakistan military court?

The meeting was attended by Durga Prasad Dhar, head of policy planning in the Ministry of External Affairs; Ram Nath Kao, chief of RAW; P.N. Haksar, the prime minister’s principal secretary and T.N. Kaul, the foreign secretary.

It was under Mrs Gandhi’s instructions that Muzaffar Hussain – the former chief secretary of the East Pakistan government, the highest ranked civil servant posted in Dhaka as of December 16, 1971 who had subsequently become a POW in India – was lodged as a VIP guest at the official residence of D.P. Dhar. His wife, Laila, who was visiting London when war broke out on December 3, 1971 couldn’t return home and was stuck there. Both husband and wife (in Delhi and London) were communicating with each other through diplomatic channels. I was assigned the job of a VIP courier. Thanks to conducting several back and forths between the two, I soon established a useful rapport with Laila Hussain.

The prime minister was very much aware that Laila and Bhutto had been intimate friends for a long time and continued to be so. It was felt at the PMO that she was well placed to play a key role in a one-off diplomatic “summit” at the VIP lounge, the Alcock and Brown Suite, at Heathrow airport.

I had met Dhar several times in London during the nine months – from 25 March 1971 to 16 December 1971 – that the Bangladeshi liberation struggle was on. It was at that time that we became friends. He was an unassuming, refined literary personality, extremely well-versed in Urdu poetry. My love of Urdu poetry from my days at Osmania University in Hyderabad was what resulted in our unlikely friendship – despite the huge gap in official hierarchy. D.P. was a cabinet minister and I was a mere bureaucrat.

Just two days before Bhutto was to arrive in London I got a telephone call from D.P. in Delhi. He wanted me to inform Laila that Bhutto had been appointed the chief martial law administrator (CMLA) of Pakistan and that he was on his way to Islamabad from Washington. His flight would be stopping at Heathrow airport for refuelling. I was supposed to persuade Laila to meet Bhutto – for old time’s sake – and ask him, in his capacity as the CMLA, if he could help in getting her husband released from Delhi. Laila knew only too well that I was aware that she had had a relationship with Bhutto in the past. Seeing how the discussions progressed would be a matter of great interest to us. India wanted to know only one thing: what Bhutto was thinking about Rahman, whether to release him to return home, or carry out the military court’s verdict of death.

I succeeded in setting up the meeting. The two long-lost friends, Laila and Bhutto, met at the VIP lounge at Heathrow airport. The meeting was marked by great cordiality. It was as convivial as could be. Without a doubt, the back-channel encounter turned out to be a meeting of great historic significance. It was well and truly a thriller, a grand finale to this narrative.

Bhutto was quick on the uptake. As he responded to Laila’s emotional appeal for help in getting her husband released from Indian custody, he also cottoned onto the fact that the lady was in fact doing the Indian government’s bidding.

With a twinkle in his eye, Bhutto changed the subject. And pulling her aside, he whispered to Laila a very sensitive, top secret message for the Indian prime minister. Sourced from Laila, I quote:

“Laila, I know what you want. I can imagine you are [carrying a request] from Mrs. Indira Gandhi. Do please pass a message to her, that after I take charge of office back home, I will shortly thereafter release Mujibur Rahman, allowing him to return home. What I want in return, I will let Mrs. Indira Gandhi know through another channel. You may now go.”

After Laila briefed me following the meeting, I lost no time in shooting out a confidential message to the PMO in Delhi reporting Laila Hussain’s input.

Not unexpectedly, Gandhi was pleased that Bhutto had sent out a positive message, although it was done unofficially through a back channel. However, she remained suspicious of whether Bhutto could be trusted. The prime minister was cautiously optimistic, but only just. Was Bhutto trying to mislead India? Was he creating a false dawn with a mischievous motive? She wanted a confirmation of Laila’s input from our diplomatic mission in Pakistan as fast as possible. Meanwhile, within hours, a report came back from Islamabad confirming the authenticity of Laila’s report. At this point, Gandhi took matters in her own hands, elevating the discourse from the bureaucratic to the political level.

At her own level, Gandhi had come to know that Rahman would first land in London and then fly from there to Dhaka, or maybe via Delhi.

She confided to one of the members of her kitchen cabinet that she now had confirmed information about what Bhutto wanted from her in return for Rahman’s impending release.

Pakistan – 1972. One hundred and twenty four civilians and Pakistani prisoners of war
are repatriated to their home country in a Red Cross plane. © ICRC/François Musy

Bhutto had no option but to release Rahman first, the POWs would come later. Obviously, Bhutto was relying on Gandhi’s sense of decency to not let him down. It was starting to get clear that Indira Gandhi had made up her mind. If Bhutto personally asked her for the release of the POWs, she would not hesitate in agreeing to it. A gesture of generosity must be met with a matching gesture of grace. Nothing less.

In a show of manufactured geo-political generosity, Bhutto (read: ISI) over-ruled the death sentence handed out by a military court in Rawalpindi and released Mujibur Rahman on January 8, 1972. On his return, Mujib took charge as prime minister of Bangladesh on January 10, 1972.

Exuding a spirit of genuine gratefulness for sparing the life of Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh’s father of the nation, eight months after he was set free, India ordered the release of all 93,000 Pakistani POWs under the Shimla Agreement of August 2, 1972. The world had never known such decency in international relations as India’s conduct with Pakistan on the POW issue.

The brutal assassination of Mujibur Rahman and his family three years and eight months later on August 15, 1975 by a batch of Abbottabad-trained army officers – who were then holding senior positions in the Bangladesh army – seemed like the belated fulfilment of the ISI’s unfinished agenda for Bangladesh. The ISI wanted to mete out severe punishment to the Bangladeshi leader for his role in unravelling Pakistan’s territorial integrity. His release from Mianwali prison on January 8, 1972 was merely a distraction.

From India’s perspective, the Kashmir problem remained unresolved; Pakistan eventually launched an unrelenting proxy war which has lasted 45 years and continues to this day.

Thousands lost their lives. The blood never dried; the tears have never stopped flowing.

I conclude with what Justice Abu Said Choudhury, who later became the president of Bangladesh, had to say in a strongly worded letter dated December 16, 1971 that he addressed to Mrs Gandhi – warning her of dire consequences if she decided to go for a unilateral cease fire on the western front. It would remain, he maintained, the half-finished business of the Bangladesh war. His concluding line was, “When you chop off the tail of a cobra, its head becomes ten times more venomous.”

The letter arrived on the prime minister’s desk a day too late.

Sashanka S. Banerjee was posted as a diplomat in the Indian mission in London in 1971-72. Among other books, he is the author of India, Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh Liberation & Pakistan: A Political Treatise, published in the US in 2011. He was awarded a state honour, ‘Friend of Bangladesh Liberation War’ in October 2013 by Bangladesh Prime Minister Shaikh Hasina.

https://thewire.in/118134/the-untol...3000-pakistani-pows-after-the-bangladesh-war/

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[SilentKiller]

The Untold Story of India’s Decision to Release 93,000 Pakistani POWs After 1971 War
BY SASHANKA S. BANERJEE ON 26/03/2017 • 1 COMMENT

Indira Gandhi’s biggest worry after the surrender of Pakistan in 1971 was the safety of Mujibur Rahman. The release of Pakistani POWs was the price Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (and the ISI) extracted for the safe return of the Bangladeshi leader.

Pakistani soldiers surrender in Bangladesh n 1971. Credit: bdnews24.com

On August 2, 1972 – eight months after the 13-day India-Pakistan war ended on December 16, 1971 – the two countries signed the Shimla Agreement under which India agreed to release all the 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war (POW) its army had taken during the course of the war. This proved to be a controversial decision, with many in India questioning why Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had squandered a golden opportunity to bargain with Pakistan and settle the Kashmir problem on India’s terms.

What motivated Mrs Gandhi to release the POWs? What went on behind the scenes? Were there any compelling circumstances at play that have remained unreported? If there were any, ideally they should be brought into the public domain, so that future generations may benefit from the lessons of history. Since I was personally privy to these developments, as a retired diplomat I can now tell the story, even if it has been 40 years since these events transpired.

December 16, 1971 – the day when Pakistan’s armed forces laid down their arms at a surrender ceremony in Dhaka before the joint command of the Indian armed forces and Bangladesh’s Mukti Bahini – was the finest hour in both India and Bangladesh’s military histories, one old and another new.

However as the two armed forces were celebrating their military victory against an unrelenting tormentor, Mrs Gandhi was pondering the other critical issues facing India.

Apart from dealing with the enormous cost of the war, India also had to bear the financial burden of looking after the 10 million refugees who had crossed over to India from East Pakistan as they fled the Pakistani army’s horrendous atrocities, better known as the Bangladesh Genocide of 1971.

The other big challenge, which was quite complex diplomatically since it involved national security and foreign policy issues, in addition to requiring delicate handling, was the unforeseen and un-budgeted responsibility of having to look after the 93,000 Pakistani soldiers taken as POWs. India wanted to keep the Pakistani soldiers in conditions of comfort that went over and above the provisions listed in the Geneva Convention.

Indira Gandhi’s paramount concern at that moment of time was figuring out how to get Bangladeshi leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman back to his country alive and well.

She was prepared to pay any price to save his life. This much the prime minister confided to at least one member of her so called ‘kitchen Cabinet’. That person was Ram Nath Kao. the RAW chief.

She was acutely aware of the fact that Mujib was tried by a Pakistani military court and a verdict of death by hanging on charges of treason had been handed down to the Bangladesh leader. Also, as is typical with the Pakistani military, its security services did not fail to demonstrate their morbidity in the crudest possible terms. In his prison cell, a 6.5 ft long grave was dug with a rope with a loop at the end hanging over it – serving as a warning that he could face a cruel death any moment.

It would be a nightmare for Gandhi if the Pakistan army carried out the death sentence and left Bangladesh an orphaned state. For India, which supported the Bangladesh liberation struggle with its heart and soul, his execution would be an unmitigated disaster, a dream shattered. So it was in India’s interests to leave no stone unturned to save Mujib’s life, for his sake, for the sake of his family, for the sake of Bangladesh and for its own sake.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s defeat at the hands of its perceived arch enemy India was seen as an intolerable insult to its nationhood. To make matters worse, Pakistan lost half of its territory to Bangladesh, leaving Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s two-nation theory – the ideological foundation of Pakistan’s existence – in tatters. Stung by this catastrophe, the military dictator, General Yahya Khan, in a flash decision, took full responsibility for the national disaster and stepped down from office. He asked Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was still in New York attending UN Security Council meetings, to return home. Bhutto was also informed by General Yahya Khan that he had resigned from his office and that he (Bhutto) had been appointed as the chief martial law administrator of Pakistan. However, before he took his flight for Rawalpindi, Bhutto was instructed to call on US President Richard Nixon, Pakistan’s mentor at that time, in Washington DC.

From left to right: Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, Indira Gandhi, Sheikh Mujib and Sashanka S. Banerjee on the flight from London to Dhaka, Durga Prasad Dhar, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Credit: Wikimedia, YouTube, Sashanka S. Banerjee

The grand finale – an unlikely thriller

Bhutto’s Washington-Rawalpindi flight was scheduled for a refuelling stopover at Heathrow airport in London.

Having secured insider information about Bhutto’s journey home, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi called an emergency meeting of the war cabinet in New Delhi at her office in South Block. She wanted, with the utmost urgency, to secure a contact who would be present for Bhutto’s arrival at Heathrow, so she could get the only piece of intelligence India was looking for – what did Bhutto think about Mujibur Rahman being sentenced to death by a Pakistan military court?

The meeting was attended by Durga Prasad Dhar, head of policy planning in the Ministry of External Affairs; Ram Nath Kao, chief of RAW; P.N. Haksar, the prime minister’s principal secretary and T.N. Kaul, the foreign secretary.

It was under Mrs Gandhi’s instructions that Muzaffar Hussain – the former chief secretary of the East Pakistan government, the highest ranked civil servant posted in Dhaka as of December 16, 1971 who had subsequently become a POW in India – was lodged as a VIP guest at the official residence of D.P. Dhar. His wife, Laila, who was visiting London when war broke out on December 3, 1971 couldn’t return home and was stuck there. Both husband and wife (in Delhi and London) were communicating with each other through diplomatic channels. I was assigned the job of a VIP courier. Thanks to conducting several back and forths between the two, I soon established a useful rapport with Laila Hussain.

The prime minister was very much aware that Laila and Bhutto had been intimate friends for a long time and continued to be so. It was felt at the PMO that she was well placed to play a key role in a one-off diplomatic “summit” at the VIP lounge, the Alcock and Brown Suite, at Heathrow airport.

I had met Dhar several times in London during the nine months – from 25 March 1971 to 16 December 1971 – that the Bangladeshi liberation struggle was on. It was at that time that we became friends. He was an unassuming, refined literary personality, extremely well-versed in Urdu poetry. My love of Urdu poetry from my days at Osmania University in Hyderabad was what resulted in our unlikely friendship – despite the huge gap in official hierarchy. D.P. was a cabinet minister and I was a mere bureaucrat.

Just two days before Bhutto was to arrive in London I got a telephone call from D.P. in Delhi. He wanted me to inform Laila that Bhutto had been appointed the chief martial law administrator (CMLA) of Pakistan and that he was on his way to Islamabad from Washington. His flight would be stopping at Heathrow airport for refuelling. I was supposed to persuade Laila to meet Bhutto – for old time’s sake – and ask him, in his capacity as the CMLA, if he could help in getting her husband released from Delhi. Laila knew only too well that I was aware that she had had a relationship with Bhutto in the past. Seeing how the discussions progressed would be a matter of great interest to us. India wanted to know only one thing: what Bhutto was thinking about Rahman, whether to release him to return home, or carry out the military court’s verdict of death.

I succeeded in setting up the meeting. The two long-lost friends, Laila and Bhutto, met at the VIP lounge at Heathrow airport. The meeting was marked by great cordiality. It was as convivial as could be. Without a doubt, the back-channel encounter turned out to be a meeting of great historic significance. It was well and truly a thriller, a grand finale to this narrative.

Bhutto was quick on the uptake. As he responded to Laila’s emotional appeal for help in getting her husband released from Indian custody, he also cottoned onto the fact that the lady was in fact doing the Indian government’s bidding.

With a twinkle in his eye, Bhutto changed the subject. And pulling her aside, he whispered to Laila a very sensitive, top secret message for the Indian prime minister. Sourced from Laila, I quote:

“Laila, I know what you want. I can imagine you are [carrying a request] from Mrs. Indira Gandhi. Do please pass a message to her, that after I take charge of office back home, I will shortly thereafter release Mujibur Rahman, allowing him to return home. What I want in return, I will let Mrs. Indira Gandhi know through another channel. You may now go.”

After Laila briefed me following the meeting, I lost no time in shooting out a confidential message to the PMO in Delhi reporting Laila Hussain’s input.

Not unexpectedly, Gandhi was pleased that Bhutto had sent out a positive message, although it was done unofficially through a back channel. However, she remained suspicious of whether Bhutto could be trusted. The prime minister was cautiously optimistic, but only just. Was Bhutto trying to mislead India? Was he creating a false dawn with a mischievous motive? She wanted a confirmation of Laila’s input from our diplomatic mission in Pakistan as fast as possible. Meanwhile, within hours, a report came back from Islamabad confirming the authenticity of Laila’s report. At this point, Gandhi took matters in her own hands, elevating the discourse from the bureaucratic to the political level.

At her own level, Gandhi had come to know that Rahman would first land in London and then fly from there to Dhaka, or maybe via Delhi.

She confided to one of the members of her kitchen cabinet that she now had confirmed information about what Bhutto wanted from her in return for Rahman’s impending release.

Pakistan – 1972. One hundred and twenty four civilians and Pakistani prisoners of war
are repatriated to their home country in a Red Cross plane. © ICRC/François Musy

Bhutto had no option but to release Rahman first, the POWs would come later. Obviously, Bhutto was relying on Gandhi’s sense of decency to not let him down. It was starting to get clear that Indira Gandhi had made up her mind. If Bhutto personally asked her for the release of the POWs, she would not hesitate in agreeing to it. A gesture of generosity must be met with a matching gesture of grace. Nothing less.

In a show of manufactured geo-political generosity, Bhutto (read: ISI) over-ruled the death sentence handed out by a military court in Rawalpindi and released Mujibur Rahman on January 8, 1972. On his return, Mujib took charge as prime minister of Bangladesh on January 10, 1972.

Exuding a spirit of genuine gratefulness for sparing the life of Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh’s father of the nation, eight months after he was set free, India ordered the release of all 93,000 Pakistani POWs under the Shimla Agreement of August 2, 1972. The world had never known such decency in international relations as India’s conduct with Pakistan on the POW issue.

The brutal assassination of Mujibur Rahman and his family three years and eight months later on August 15, 1975 by a batch of Abbottabad-trained army officers – who were then holding senior positions in the Bangladesh army – seemed like the belated fulfilment of the ISI’s unfinished agenda for Bangladesh. The ISI wanted to mete out severe punishment to the Bangladeshi leader for his role in unravelling Pakistan’s territorial integrity. His release from Mianwali prison on January 8, 1972 was merely a distraction.

From India’s perspective, the Kashmir problem remained unresolved; Pakistan eventually launched an unrelenting proxy war which has lasted 45 years and continues to this day.

Thousands lost their lives. The blood never dried; the tears have never stopped flowing.

I conclude with what Justice Abu Said Choudhury, who later became the president of Bangladesh, had to say in a strongly worded letter dated December 16, 1971 that he addressed to Mrs Gandhi – warning her of dire consequences if she decided to go for a unilateral cease fire on the western front. It would remain, he maintained, the half-finished business of the Bangladesh war. His concluding line was, “When you chop off the tail of a cobra, its head becomes ten times more venomous.”

The letter arrived on the prime minister’s desk a day too late.

Sashanka S. Banerjee was posted as a diplomat in the Indian mission in London in 1971-72. Among other books, he is the author of India, Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh Liberation & Pakistan: A Political Treatise, published in the US in 2011. He was awarded a state honour, ‘Friend of Bangladesh Liberation War’ in October 2013 by Bangladesh Prime Minister Shaikh Hasina.

https://thewire.in/118134/the-untol...3000-pakistani-pows-after-the-bangladesh-war/

@IndianHawk@Willy2@roma@Krusty@Defcon 1@Ghanteshwar@raheel besharam@raja696@Amr@AnkitPurohit @Akshay_Fenix@aditya10r@airtel@aditya10r@ancientIndian@Bahamut@Berkut@Bornubus@Bengal_Tiger@ersakthivel@FRYCRY@Gessler @HariSud @hit&run@hardip@indiandefencefan@IndianHawk @JayPatel @Kshatriya87@LETHALFORCE@Mikesingh @NavneetKundu @OneGrimPilgrim@pmaitra@PaliwalWarrior@Pulkit@smestarz @SakalGhareluUstad @Srinivas_K @ShashankSharma@Superdefender@Screambowl @TacticalFrog

There was a lot of diplomatic pressure coming from USA and even Soviet Union.
Ideally Porki Army offiers should have been sent to bangladesh and sentenced to death for genocide, they were let go very cheaply.
But these are thing common man desire, we will never understand kind of diplomatic pressure governments have to face. in 1971, india lost UN vote, most countries were against india becoz of US and UK money power but Soveits veto all anti-india resolutions..

 

[lcafanboy]

There was a lot of diplomatic pressure coming from USA and even Soviet Union.
Ideally Porki Army offiers should have been sent to bangladesh and sentenced to death for genocide, they were let go very cheaply.
But these are thing common man desire, we will never understand kind of diplomatic pressure governments have to face. in 1971, india lost UN vote, most countries were against india becoz of US and UK money power but Soveits veto all anti-india resolutions..

Very True.

Even during war US was approaching Indian coasts with its Seventh fleet in bay of Bengal and it was only Soviet Russia that saved our ass. And we had to listen to them too, which in turn was under pressure from US. Any miscalculation could have proved fatal for world peace which by the way is still the case now. Why India or Pakistan can't have a full fledged war even now because it will lead to world war 3.

 

[Adnan Jumean]

India is smart look how france treated germany after ww1 you dont want to deal with a pakistani hitler in the future.