Pokhran II not fully successful: Scientist

[Yusuf]

What the ex Army chief has demanded is clarity on the yield. They have not doubted the functionality of the nukes. A working nuke is a deterrence. Read all the posts in this thread to get a better idea.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Pakistani view of Pokran

DAWN.COM | World | India?s nuclear fizzle

India’s nuclear fizzle By Pervez Hoodbhoy
Wednesday, 02 Sep, 2009 | 08:39 AM PST | We need not panic an invasion even if India increases its nuclear arsenal.

Suspicion has now turned into confirmed fact: India’s hydrogen bomb test of May 1998 was not the fantastic success it was claimed to be. Last week’s dramatic revelation by K. Santanam, a senior RAW official with important responsibilities at the 1998 Pokhran test site, has essentially confirmed conclusions known from seismic analysis after the explosion.

Instead of 45 kilotons of destructive energy, the explosion had produced only 15 to 20. The bomb had not worked as designed.

Why blow the whistle 11 years later? An irresistible urge to tell the truth or moral unease is scarcely the reason. Santanam’s ‘coming clean’ has the stamp of approval of the most hawkish of Indian nuclear hawks. Among them are P.K. Iyengar, A.N. Prasad, Bharat Karnad and Brahma Chellaney.

By rubbishing the earlier test as a failure, they hope to make the case for more nuclear tests. This would enable India to develop a full-scale thermonuclear arsenal.As is well known, a thermonuclear (or hydrogen) bomb is far more complex than the relatively simple fission weapon first tested by India in 1974 and by Pakistan in 1998. Advanced weapons needs fine-tuning to achieve their full destructiveness — France had to test 22 times to achieve perfection.

By generating a pro-test environment, India’s nuclear hawks hope to make life difficult for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s moderate government whenever India’s signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) comes up for discussion. Santanam’s revelation has been spurred by the fear that if President Obama succeeds in his initiative to revive the CTBT — which had essentially been shot dead by the US Senate in 1999 — the doors on nuclear testing could be shut worldwide. A race against the clock is on.

There are not the only ominous developments. India has begun sea trials of its 7,000-ton nuclear-powered submarine with underwater ballistic missile launch capability, the first in a planned fleet of five. India became the world’s 10th-highest military spender in 2008 but now plans to head even further upwards. In July 2009, Indian defence minister, A.K. Antony announced that for 2009-2010 India plans to raise its military budget by 50 per cent to a staggering $40bn, about six times that of Pakistan.

On the Pakistani side, the desire to maintain nuclear parity with India has caused it to push down the pedal as hard as it can. Although the numbers of Pakistani warheads and delivery vehicles is a closely held secret, a former top official of the CIA recently noted in a report released this month that: ‘It took them roughly 10 years to double the number of nuclear weapons from roughly 50 to 100.’

This is bad news for those Pakistanis, like myself, who have long opposed Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Our Indian friends and colleagues — who have opposed their country’s bomb with far greater vigour — have failed even more spectacularly in stopping their nuclear juggernaut. It is little satisfaction to note that post-1998 developments have repeatedly confirmed predictions, made by Pakistani and India anti-nuclear activists separately, that the loud claims of ‘minimal deterrence’ by nuclear hawks on both sides are a proven sham. Only the sky is the limit.

Stuck with an arms race that is fuelled by India’s newfound economic strength, what should Pakistan do? Before contemplating alternatives, one must calmly scrutinise India’s motives and disaggregate the threats that Pakistan faces both externally and internally.

First, an unpalatable truth — India’s nuclear planners want to play in the big league, not with Pakistan. While nuclear Pakistan is indeed seen as troublesome, it is a side consideration. India’s newfound aggressive and dangerous nationalism now actively seeks new rivals and enemies across the globe. This potentially includes its present allies, Russia and the US. But it is strongly focused upon neighbouring China.

An example: this month’s article by Bharat Verma, the hawkish editor of the influential Indian Defence Review, makes the preposterous prediction that China will attack India before 2012, leaving only three years to the Indian government for preparation. He claims that a desperate Beijing is out ‘to teach India the final lesson, thereby ensuring Chinese supremacy in Asia in this century’ and China is working towards an end game rooted in the ‘abiding conviction of the communists that the Chinese race is far superior to Nazi Germany’. Verma’s solution: India must arm itself to the teeth.

Pakistan should find reassurance in this kind of thinking, warped though it is. It indicates that India’s China obsession is doing most of the driving, not hostility with Pakistan or the Muslim factor. Certainly, India’s military expansion deserves a full-throated condemnation both because of the unnecessary tension it creates, as well as the diversion of resources away from the actual needs of India’s people. But the lesson for us is that we need not panic or fear an Indian invasion. Pakistan already has enough military muscle to stay safe in this regard, even if India increases its nuclear arsenal manifold.

On the other hand, Pakistan is not safe from dangerous internal threats. These are: population growth, terrorism and provincial tensions.

Pakistan’s population is out of control. From 28 million in 1947, it has shot up to 176 million today, roughly a six-fold increase over 60 years. This exploding population bomb makes it impossible to provide even basic education and health facilities to a majority. Shrinking per capita availability of water is inevitable and is certain to become a source of serious internal violence as well as growing tensions with India.

Terrorism, fortunately, is not yet out of control. But recent army victories and the elimination of Baitullah Mehsud, while welcome, are far from decisive. The epicentres of terrorism are highly mobile. Religious radicalism has penetrated deep into the core of Pakistan’s society, particularly its youth. The real problem lies in our cities, not the mountains.Nationalist struggles, with those in Balochistan being the most serious, are a third important threat. They are indicative of the deep unhappiness felt by a good fraction of Pakistanis living outside Punjab. While too inchoate to seriously threaten the federal structure at this point, circumstances could rapidly change.

These are serious existential threats. But they cannot be met by following India’s path. Would tripling Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and missile inventory, or having thermonuclear weapons, reduce their severity even marginally?

Instead, the way to create a viable Pakistan lies in embarking on an emergency population planning programme, building a sustainable and active democracy on the back of a welfare state, restructuring the economy for peace rather than war, remaking the federation so that provincial grievances can be effectively resolved, eliminating the feudal order and creating a tolerant society that respects the rule of law and does not discriminate between citizens.

The writer is a professor of nuclear physics at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

 

[Yusuf]

Shantanam a RAW agent working for the nuke program???
RAW has to figure in any editorial in Pak mentioning India.

But that apart the edit is showing a final realization that indias nukes are not directed against pakistan and thst jndia harbors wider international role at the geo political high table. It's realization that not India but it's internal threats is what is an existential threat. That seeking an arms race with India will spell doom for it.

 

[RPK]

Atomic politics: Who needs the H-bomb? - US - World - NEWS - The Times of India

Atomic politics: Who needs the H-bomb?
Chidanand Rajghatta, TNN 2 September 2009, 06:20am IST
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In the pantheon of devices worshipped by nuclear weapons' boffins, there are bombs and there are bombs. There's the old-fashioned clunker of the
kind dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki now consigned to the museum; the garden variety atomic bomb that fills the inventory of the nuclear five; smart bombs fitted on multiple-warhead missiles; dirty bombs made with not-very-enriched fuel; mini-nukes or tactical battlefield weapons; new-fangled neutron bombs...

And oh, then there is the father of all bombs, the thermonuclear weapon, better known as the Hydrogen Bomb - a device that is typically hundreds of times, or even thousands of times, more potent than the ones dropped on Japan; a monstrosity powerful enough to vaporize whole countries and cause a gaping hole on Earth.

That's the kind of weapon India was trying to perfect in one of the five 1998 tests - and didn't entirely succeed, according to dissident scientist K Santhanam.

But consider this: Even at its planned 45 kiloton yield, India's thermonuclear device would have been a mini H-bomb, a sort of "technology demonstrator". It would have been a puff of dust compared to the most powerful H-bomb of all times, the so-called Tsar bomb tested by the former Soviet Union in 1961.

The Tsar bomb was originally meant to be 100 megatons (one megaton = 1000 kilotons), which is about 7000 times more powerful than the ones dropped on Japan (around 15 kilotons). But the Soviets took pity on the planet, not to speak of the island of Novaya Zemlya in the Arctic Circle where it was to be tested, and scaled it down to 50 megatons - only about 3500 more powerful than Fat Man dropped on Hiroshima. Even that halved version, when tested, could be seen and heard in Finland and broke window panes in Sweden. The seismic waves could be measured on its third passage around the Earth.

Fortunately for the planet, that vulgarity, the single most powerful weapon ever made in the history of humanity, was considered so impractical (it was too heavy and the shock waves and fall out would have impacted its users) that it never entered service. Even the United States, equally mindless in these matters, tested only a 25 megaton H-bomb, which actually fizzled to give only a 15 megaton yield.

In contrast to the USSR's Tsar bomb, India's "Saar" bomb (because it was an operation run mostly by South Indians) would have been a mere pop even if it had realized its full yield of 45 kilotons. H-bombs are typically measured in megatons and India's 45 kiloton thermonuclear device, at only two or three times the yield of Fat Man and Little Boy (as the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were named), was a modest stab at mastering the technology. Santhanam says even that coy effort failed, and therefore India should not rush to sign the upcoming comprehensive test ban treaty - because it needs to test again to get it right.

What exactly is an H-bomb and how is it different from the A-bomb? Well, shorn of tech overload, an atomic bomb is a one-stage fission device that uses fissile material (typically uranium or plutonium) assembled in a chain-reacting critical mass. The H-bomb uses fusion in two or three stages to boost the primary fission device, giving it more bang for the buck. It is considered more compact, scalable, and cost-effective; in other words, it causes much greater destruction at about same cost.

Indian bomb-makers kept their H-bomb small for several reasons, including not vaporizing villages around the Pokhran region, and containing fall-out. Besides, say weapons experts, low-yield tests are not entirely wasted - they too can lead to mastering H-bomb technology because they can provide information on the behaviour of the primary device without the full ignition of secondaries (which is what Santhanam is suggesting happened). That is pretty much what the Indian scientific establishment seems to be relying on - saying "we have the hang of it" even if did not produce the expected bang.

But contemporary nuclear pundits even question the basic H-bomb quest. Thermonuclear weapons, they say, belong to an era when ballistic missiles were not as sophisticated and accurate, nor were there multiple-warhead delivery systems. They were made to a monstrous scale because nuclear weapons states were not sure of the accuracy of delivery. H-bombs, even if they were dropped far from the intended target, could still do the job of decimating a wide area.

Crudely put, they could pulversize twin-cities, even if they were not precisely targeted. Today, with fast and accurate delivery systems, and missiles capable of carrying multiple war-heads, mega-tonned TN bombs may be redundant. In fact, so mindlessly powerful and destructive are TN weapons that the man known as the father of the H-bomb, Andrei Sakharov, eventually became a peacenik after helping the former Soviet Union master the frightful technology.

But for some Indian weapons boffins, nailing the TN bomb technology is a matter of pride; not to speak of the security angle of China having one (and therefore Pakistan inevitably getting the design). Of all nuclear weapons' states, China also made the fastest transition from fission-based atom bombs to H-bombs (less than two years) with its thermo-nuclear test measuring 3 megatons. Pakistan too has made known its intention to master TN technology. Can India bank on the knowledge gleaned from its sole TN test without an assured, working weapon? Will it be worse off against China is a confrontation if it does not have a H-bomb?

Not really, say US nuclear pundits, who are apprehensive that Santanam's bombshell presages some corrective tests by India. "There are people who say American nuclear bombs won't work because we have not tested for so long," says Gary Milholin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. "I don't think anyone would want to test that assumption."

Similarly, he says, it would be risky for any country to count on India's thermonuclear weapon to have a low yield. "There are now ways other than testing to increase confidence," Milholin added. "And I think India has enough computing power to do that." Milholin also cautions that "An Indian test would be very toxic to cooperation it has just gained under the nuclear deal."

Whether India attempts to certifiably nail a working H-bomb with more tests will mostly be political decision based on security perceptions. But there will also be important scientific inputs into this - and right now a majority of scientists seem to be saying they have mastered the big one even if the bang, as Santhanam says, wasn't big enough.

 

[RPK]

Need reassurance on nuclear deterrence: ex-Army chief : Single Page View

How do the armed forces respond to reports that cast a doubt over either the credibility of India's nuclear deterrent as well as reports that suggest that Pakistan's nuclear capacity has enhanced and its delivery improved? Karan Thapar asked one of India's former Army chiefs and the victor of Kargil, General V P Malik.


Karan Thapar: General Ved Malik, three leading Indian scientists, Dr Santhanam, Dr Sethna and Dr Iyengar, have raised doubts about India's nuclear as well as thermo-nuclear tests of 1998. The thermo-nuclear test is said to have been a fizzle and the nuclear test is said to have been done in haste. Have these comments said to have cast a shadow of doubt over the credibility of India's nuclear deterrent?


General V P Malik: I don't think that out ability to produce nuclear weapons and to deliver them is in doubt. However, what is in doubt today is the yield of these weapons. That is linked to whether we need more tests or not.


Karan Thapar: So in a sense if the yield is in doubt then there are also question marks about the efficacy of them?


General V P Malik: Yes, that is true. It affects the armed forces particularly because they have to plan. When they do the planning they have to execute the task given to them, then they have to know what is the kind of yield that each bomb or nuclear weapon has.


Karan Thapar: Now, the armed forces will have question marks assessing the yield because there is a dispute about it?


General V P Malik: Particularly about the mega-tonne weapons, I'm talking about the fusion weapons, the thermo nuclear ones.


Karan Thapar: And therefore there will be question marks within the armed forces about the efficacy of the weapon and their own planning?


General V P Malik: They need to be reassured, there is no doubt about it. That the weapon system that they are going to use and for which they have to do their planning, about what kind of yield it has and what kind of damage it can cause at the target.


Karan Thapar: Now if there are doubts in the minds of the Indian armed forced and they need to be reassured, what would the same comments have done to the planners in Pakistan and in China in a sense to have strategic opponents. How will they view these doubts?


General V P Malik: As I said earlier, right in the beginning, that we have the weapons and we can deliver them. The question is that we would probably have to over-ensure in places we feel the yield may be less.


Karan Thapar: Also the Pakistanis and the Chinese, having heard what our three scientists have said, will themselves question marks about the credibility about India's nuclear deterrent?


General V P Malik: Well, credibility and deterrence is about how you convince people and how they take it. And therefore to that extent they could have.


Karan Thapar: The truth is that these doubts have existed for a while. In fact, even in 1998 after the tests, when you were Army chief, one of the former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Dr Iyengar, came to meet you and expressed these doubts to you at that time. How did you respond?


General V P Malik: Well he met me and many others also. I had a long chat with him, then he gave something in writing to me and I told him that I would put it across to the National Security Advisor and which is what I did.


Karan Thapar: Which was Mr (Brajesh) Mishra, what happened after that?


General V P Malik: When I met Mr Mishra he told me that the matter had been discussed with the scientists and they are quite convinced that the indicated yield is correct.


Karan Thapar: And Mr Mishra and the government of the day left the matter at that point?


General V P Malik: That is right.




Karan Thapar: But the truth again is that these meetings did not assure someone like you. As in 2008 to mark the tenth anniversary of Pokhran you wrote an article for the United Services Institute Journal in which you write 'technical claims of Pokharan too have been challenged by some scientists who need to be allayed convincingly'. You further wrote many of our own scientists have created fear in the minds of public and more importantly the armed forces. So, even after 10 years later you still had doubts which needed to be convincingly allayed?


General V P Malik: Because there had been so much of writing, talk about it, not only for Mr Iyengar, but some foreign scientist had also written about it. The doubts were only about the thermo nuclear weapons.


Karan Thapar: And if you, as the former army chief, expressed these concerns last year, on the tenth anniversary of Pokhran they I assume that these concerns have worried several of your successors as army chiefs and in fact have worried the armed forces as a whole?


General V P Malik: Look, I can't say about my successors but I will say one thing that this is a very important issue. And therefore, to build your credibility in the minds of the adversaries, as well as for your proper planning and execution, you do need to be reassured on things like this.


Karan Thapar: And to be reassured these doubts as you put it have to be allayed convincingly?


General V P Malik: Yes, that is right.


Karan Thapar: Now after these doubts appeared in the last 10 days, Dr Abdul Kalam who was he head of the DRDO at the time of the Pokhran test, issued a statement effectively rubbishing what Dr Santhanam said. Did that convince you?


General V P Malik: Let's not forget that Dr Santhanam was part of his team and it came as quite a shock when Dr Santhanam himself mentioned that it was a fizzle, of course he was referring to the thermo-nuclear weapon. So, Dr Kalam's statement was not quite convincing.


Karan Thapar: In fact in your article of 2008, you said: the doubt is compounded by the fact that our DRDO scientists are well known for claims and over-optimistic public statements. In a sense their boastfulness has added to the problem?


General V P Malik: Well that has been our experience over the development of the weapons and that equipment that the DRDO has delivered or not delivered.


Karan Thapar: In fact, Dr Kalam when he was the head of the DRDO, it established a small track record for committing the Government to creating weaponry in India, which clearly India couldn’t create. As a result the Army went short of critical things like weapon locating radar and radio sets which was needed particularly during Kargil, but you didn't have?


General V P Malik: Yes, we had one or two incident particularly on the weapon-location radar. If the DRDO had not come into the way, we would not have got them before the Kargil war and we would have definitely reduced our casualties.


Karan Thapar: In a sense Dr Kalam over-estimated India's capacity and ability?


General V P Malik: Well, I don't want to go more into that.


Karan Thapar: A second response from the government to the recent that questions the credibility of our deterrent is an interview given by our present national security advisor to The Hindu, where he dismissed Dr Santhanam as a bit of a maverick. He questioned why is he (Dr Santhanam) speaking up now? But is that in your mind a convincing way to allaying the doubt


General V P Malik: Look, you can convince people only through the scientists and particularly those contributed to the exercise, I'm referring to Chidambaram and his whole team from the economic energy commission, so I don't know if we can be convinced so easily by people who are not scientists. It is a matter of technology and these are the people who can discuss and reassure people.




Karan Thapar: So in other words what you are saying it that if the Government wants to convincingly allay these doubts then scientists Chidambaram and Kakotkar need to speak up. And secondly they need to speak put with detailed fact and not just make a simple assertion.


General V P Malik: It's not a political or military matter alone, but it is primarily a scientific issue.



Karan Thapar: And it needs to be done convincingly and with detail?


General V P Malik: Obviously.


Karan Thapar: So when the Prime Minister last Sunday on a visit to Barmer just spoke two sentences, 'We believe in our scientists. It is very clear that the test was successful' that is not sufficient?


General V P Malik: Well, that is a political statement. But for things like this, particularly for the armed forces they have to be convinced by the people who have developed these weapons.


Karan Thapar: If the sort of convincing rebuttal of these doubts doesn't come from the Government or the scientists, then what will be the impact on the armed forces?


General V P Malik: Look, it is not necessary to bring it out in the open. I also don't believe it is a public debate.


Karan Thapar: But it can be done privately, reassuringly?


General V P Malik: That is right.


Karan Thapar: If it is not done privately then what will be the impact on armed forces and the confidence in the nuclear deterrent?


General V P Malik: I'm sure there will be questions and answers within the establishments and if the armed forces raise this point they will have to be reassured.


Karan Thapar: Do you think the armed forces are likely to raise this point, though not in public but privately?


General V P Malik: I think they should discuss this matter.


Karan Thapar: Because it is important to remover doubt?


General V P Malik: Yes, it is important to remove doubts.


Karan Thapar: Is it also important to remove doubts that may be in the minds of strategic planners in Pakistan and China, that if they are taking any joy from what the Indian scientists have said, do we need to remove that joy?


General V P Malik: The issue is only of thermo-nuclear weapons so when it comes to its use, if we want to make use of those, which means it has to be counter-value target then only this doubt creates this kind of problem.


Karan Thapar: But with regard to the thermo-nuclear weapon you are also saying that we do need to remove it?


General V P Malik: Yes, that is right.


Karan Thapar: And that doubt has to be removed for both our armed forces but also from the minds of our potential enemies and adversaries?


General V P Malik: To make our deterrence credible yes that is required. But more importantly it is the end user, as he must know what and how he has to plan.


Karan Thapar: So it is critical that for the Indian armed forces these doubts be removed?


General V P Malik: It is important.


Karan Thapar: Side by side with doubts being cast over the credibility of India's thermo-nuclear deterrent, there are also reports from America which say that Pakistan could have anywhere between 70-90 nuclear weapons.


It has the nuclear-capable ballistic missile ready for deployment, it has nuclear-capable cruise missiles which are being developed and in addition it is developing chemical separation facilities as well as plutonium production reactors.


As a former army chief how do you respond to these reports?


General V P Malik: We have to go into the details of these reports both from the points of view of the intelligence and to prove their credibility. It does affect us because it creates the imbalance of the deterrence level that we have got and particularly when we are banking on our second-strike capability. In the sense that we believe in no first use. So, when your adversary accumulates such large number of weapons, you have to worry about your survivability.




Karan Thapar: And when there is an imbalance in the deterrent that suggests that both quantitatively and qualitatively that they are better or gaining an edge that is worrying?


General V P Malik: Yes, that is true because the report which has been published talks both about the quantity as well as quality being improved.


Karan Thapar: And that again would worry our armed forces because it would suggest that since we are entirely dependant on the second strike, their first strike imbalance could be a matter of great concern?


General V P Malik: Yes it is, as I said both quantity and quality-wise it would be worrisome.


Karan Thapar: Is there a second problem that arises from these reports as this could boost Pakistan's confidence to carry out low-intensity warfare in the belief that they have such a large deterrent India wont react?


General V P Malik: That is true, because if you recall even in 1999, one of the reasons why Pervez Musharraf and his colleagues carried out this incursion in the Kargil was because they thought that with the nuclear symmetry we will not be able to wage any type of conventional war.


They were quite confident about it and that was their belief and that is how they carried out the incursion. So it's not only the low intensity conflict but even the ongoing proxy war may get extended because they are so confidant the we will not be able to do anything. Of course Kargil-type incursions can take place.


Karan Thapar: If Kargil happened because of nuclear symmetry then in fact the situation could be much worse and imbalance in Pakistan's favour?


General V P Malik: Well that is true, it makes them more confident and reassured. But I'm not saying that it was the only reason that Kargil happened, it was one of the important reasons.


Karan Thapar: And clearly this imbalance would once again give them the opportunity for that sort of behaviour Kargil, proxy wars or even low-intensity warfare?


General V P Malik: That is true, it can impact that.


Karan Thapar: So this is a very worrying situation?


General V P Malik: Yes that is true. There is one more reason and that is that we now have good relations with United States and we are in the process of buying a number of weapons and equipments from them. But now what we see is that Pakistan is violating the weapons export laws of the United States.


Karan Thapar: Now you are referring to the reports in the ‘New York Times’ that Pakistan has the American delivered Harpoon to make it both nuclear capable and also enable it to hit land targets.


General V P Malik: This is another report which appeared in the ‘New York Times’ and I'm referring to that.


Karan Thapar: This is a clear violation of the agreement and because this violation is targeted directly at India, you are worried this will effect India's relations with America.


General V P Malik: Obviously they continue Indo-centric and they are not as concerned about counter-terrorism for which they are being so much of aid $ 7.5 billion in the next five years.




Karan Thapar: This is a proof in fact that they are using it to target India?


General V P Malik: Well as I said they continue to remain indo-centric.


Karan Thapar: Do these two reports - ‘New York Times’ and the American Bulletin of Scientists - suggest that the perception of the strategic threat that India faces from Pakistan has increased significantly in the recent days.


General V P Malik: Yes, they have to be taken note of because of these developments that are taking place. We have to take note of these and think of how to counter them.


Karan Thapar: And on the converse the doubts which have been created of our own nuclear deterrent suggest that the perception of India's ability to stand up to these strategic threats may now have a few question marks around it?


General V P Malik: We have to strengthen our deterrence capability. Unfortunately over the years because of so many weapon system that we need and haven't been able to get, both referring to missiles in terms of conventional weaponry, we have been lagging behind.


So, obviously our deterrence capability both for deterrence and other nature of conflict has got eroded and we have to build it, particularly now with the kinds of reports that are coming it. When you mention about these Harpoons being modified what it really means is, they will be able to target any of our establishments along the coastline, not only from the ships but also from the aircrafts.


Karan Thapar: Which means cities like Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai but also cities right around eastern and western coast of the peninsula are now vulnerable which they weren't earlier?


General V P Malik: It gives them extra capability now and it's not only the cities, lets not forget our important establishments like the atomic energy commission, the headquarters and the ONGC platforms that we have in the seas are all vulnerable.


Karan Thapar: the govt has called the American ambassador on Saturday and filed a formal protest, but is that a sufficient response, surely this isn't a diplomatic issue but a strategic planning and response which I take you are more interested in?


General V P Malik: One aspect is strategic response and the other is diplomatic as it effects indo-us relations, particularly of the kind of weapons system we are going to but from them. If they are going to find their way to Pakistan obviously we have to be worried.


Karan Thapar: Side-by-side you also want to see the govt respond strategically building up its own equipment and strength.


General V P Malik: I'm absolutely convinced that we need to build our deterrence capability much more than what we have today.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

Revisiting the folly of India's nuclear tests | The Japan Times Online

Tuesday, Sept. 8, 2009

Revisiting the folly of India's nuclear tests

By RAMESH THAKUR
WATERLOO, Ontario — Three recent events reopen the debate on the wisdom of India's nuclear tests in 1998, as judged from within the narrow framework of its own interests. Or rather, they confirm the folly of the tests:

• K. Santhanam, director of the 1998 test site preparations, has claimed that the hydrogen bomb tests yielded less than half the amount of projected destructive energy: 15 to 20kt, not 45kt. His claims have been rejected by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, former President Abdul Kalam, the then scientific adviser to the Ministry of Defense, and Brajesh Mishra, the BJP Government's national security adviser.



The claims have been backed by some influential heavyweights, including P.K. Iyengar, former chief of the Atomic Energy Commission, and they are broadly in accordance with the conclusions of most disinterested international observers who analyzed the test data at the time. The reason for his revelation may be to put pressure on the government to conduct further tests for validating the design of India's hydrogen bomb, before the window is closed if the Obama administration ratifies the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and pressures remaining holdouts to follow.

• Second, India recently began sea trials of a new nuclear-powered submarine with underwater ballistic launch capability. It plans to acquire a fleet of five, although even the first will not be operational for combat duty for some years yet.

• Third, Pakistan has been publicly perturbed at the prospect of more nuclear tests by India, nuclear-powered submarines and the civil nuclear cooperation deal with the United States.

In an article in the current issue of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen argue that Pakistan is enhancing its nuclear weapon capabilities across the board. It has been developing and deploying new nuclear- capable missiles and expanding its capacity to produce fissile materials for use in weapons. Their article adds weight to calculated leaks from the U.S. intelligence community expressing unease at Pakistan's nuclear programs.

In other words, the critics of the 1998 tests have been vindicated. Nuclearization has bought India neither strategic gains nor defense on the cheap. It still lacks an effective deterrent capability against China, let alone parity with the U.S. Doubts have now been sown in the public mind in India and in official policy circles in China and Pakistan about the reliability, robustness and resilience of India's nuclear power status. These cannot be removed without further tests that are unambiguously successful in delivering the projected yields.

Yet any such tests would bring down the wrath of the international community and wreck the hard-fought nuclear deal with the U.S. At a time when President Barack Obama has recommitted to the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and entered into fresh agreements with Russia for dramatic further steps in denuclearizing the world, India would be marching to a tune that everyone else finds harshly discordant. And it would launch a fresh round in the endless cycle of arms races in the subcontinent, with blame falling largely, perhaps even solely, on India.

In the meantime, during and after the decade since nuclearization, India continues to suffer serial terror attacks originating, by its own account, from across the border in Pakistan; continues to confront the prospect of a war with Pakistan that would be ruinous for both; and therefore continues to invest heavily in conventional defense at the cost of social welfare programs like health and education, which would boost economic productivity instead of draining the public coffers. Indians in huge numbers are among the poorest, unhealthiest and least literate peoples of the world.

Nuclear weapons in Indian hands did not stop Pakistan from occupying the forbidding Kargil heights on the Indian side of the Line of Control in 1999. The effort to retake it cost over a thousand lives in the end. The two countries came perilously close to a full-blown war in 2002, after the terrorist attack on India's parliament in December 2001.

Nuclear weapons have caused a triple damage to India vis-a-vis Pakistan. They have encouraged Pakistani provocations, be it in the form of incursions or cover for terrorist attacks as in Mumbai in November last year. They bring sobriety to Indian debates on how best to respond for fear of stepping on the ladder of escalation from which it would be difficult to step off because the process cannot be controlled. And the fear of a nuclear war has brought far greater international interest and involvement, something that suits Pakistan but agitates India.

Absent nuclearization, India could retaliate more easily and have much better assurance of inflicting military defeat. With nuclearization, India has found its policy options for dealing with a nettlesome neighbor far more sharply curtailed. The BJP, the nationalist party in power in 1998, should have been a tad more careful in what it wished for.

There is no chance of India or Pakistan renouncing nuclear weapons unilaterally. But the costs, risks and complications offer compelling reasons for India, ahead of the five-year review of the Nonproliferation Treaty next year, to line up solidly behind recently reinvigorated efforts to achieve global nuclear disarmament.

Ramesh Thakur is director of the Balsillie School of International Affairs and a distinguished fellow at the Center for International Governance Innovation in Waterloo, Ontario.

 

[Yusuf]

The author is bracketing indias nukes with Pakistan which is not the case. India acquire nukes because of it's global ambitions. The author says that india doesn't have deterrence against china which is also wrong. We have delivery systems thst can reach key targets in china irrespective of the yield the nukes have. What Gen Malik has asked for is the nuke establishment to be truthful on the yield to the Army as it has puts plans in place based on the info given to them. He has not doubted the nukes themselves but the yield. If for instance the Army has allocated 3 nukes for A target based on the information they have been given, then they may need 5 for it if the new revelations are validated. It doesn't take away the deterrence value of Indias nukes. 15 KT of Little Boy killed 150,000 and flattened Hiroshima.
What is also lost on people is that the nukes did not turn out to be fire crackers. They did explode. Even if the yield was less, it would have given the scientists the reason and they would have solved the problem. Simulation will give them further details as yo how to ramp up the yield.
Yes the best case would be to test again and maybe again to validate what's simulated, but that option is out of the window after the nuke deal. India will not test unless their are very serious flaws in the design. Atleast not at the moment. If it somehow resists till Obama is there in office and hope he will not be voted back, then it's possible that by that time the west would have invested enough in the civil nuclear program in India and cannot leave. That will be the moment india will be able to test again.

 

[RPK]

domain-b.com : India has 'comprehensive' simulation capability: AEC chief

Stressing that the country has ''comprehensive'' simulation capability, Atomic Energy commission chief Dr Anil Kakodkar said Wednesday that the country did not require additional nuclear tests. Dr Kakodkar was joining issue with a small band of ex-nuclear and defence scientists who have recently questioned the success of the thermonuclear device tested on 11 May 1998 at Pokharan.


Baneberry's accidental radioactive plume rises from a shock fissure
The dissenting scientists, all very senior ex-officials and well informed, have issued a warning to the political establishment at New Delhi not to be pressured into signing contentious treaties, such as the CTBT, as the country may need to go in for additional nuclear weapon tests to validate design and technologies. It is their contention that the 'shot' on 11 May 1998 did not yield the desired results, a claim, they say, which is validated by international observations.

This has been hotly contested by other scientists, including Dr Kakodkar, who was himself part of the 11 May 'Buddha Smiles' tests.

"We have enough data. We have comprehensive simulation capability and therefore there is no need for any more tests," Dr Kakodkar said. "We are very confident about the simulation capability."

The recent controversy was ignited by ex-DRDO scientist K Santhanam, who was intimately involved with the tests. He claimed that as far as the thermonuclear device was concerned it was a 'fizzle,' which in nuclear parlance denotes a failure.

"We used the data of 'Baneberry' nuclear tests of US of 18 December1970 to validate our 3-D simulation for earth motion and displacement and this validated tool was used for bench marking," Dr Kakodkar said.

''Scaling up of neutronic calculations can always be done,'' he said, adding that all the observations and calculations were done by scientists from BARC.

Dr Kakodkar said that the measurements, carried out by BARC scientists were done meticulously and that a large number of diverse instrumentations were used for four independent measurements -- seismic, large teleseismic, accurate measurements at Gauribidanur seismic measurement site; radiochemical samples estimation done by different groups; specific evidence of fusion reaction and 3-D simulation of motion of earth and displacement.

Baneberry nuclear event

In March 2009, TIME magazine identified the 1970 Yucca Flat Baneberry Test, where 86 workers were exposed to radiation, as one of the world's worst nuclear disasters.

On 18 December 1970, the 'Baneberry' underground nuclear test (a code name accorded individually to all nuclear tests, much as hurricanes carry names in the US) conducted at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) released radioactivity into the atmosphere. Baneberry had a yield of ten kilotons and the bomb was buried about 900 feet beneath the surface of Yucca Flat.

The energy cracked the soil in unexpected ways, causing a fissure near ground zero and the failure of the shaft and cap. A plume of fire and dust was released three and a half minutes after ignition, raining fallout on workers in different locations within NTS.

The radiation release or venting resulted in a cloud of radioactive dust that reached an altitude of 10,000 feet. Baneberry's accidental radioactive plume was carried in three different directions by the wind.

The radioactive plume released 6.7 million Curies of radioactive material, including 80 kCi of 131I.

After dropping a portion of its load locally, the hot cloud's lighter particles were carried to three altitudes and conveyed by winter storms and the jet stream to be deposited heavily as radionuclide-laden snow in Lassen and Sierra counties in northeast California, and to lesser degrees in southern Idaho, northern Nevada and some eastern sections of Oregon and Washington states.

The three diverging jet stream layers conducted radionuclides across the US to Canada, the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean.

Extensive geophysical investigations, coupled with a series of 1D and 2D computational studies were used to reconstruct the sequence of events that led to the catastrophic failure.

However, the geological profile of the Baneberry site was complex and inherently three-dimensional, which meant that some geological features had to be simplified or ignored in the 2D simulations. To address this issue, a new study was undertaken that encompassed 3D high-fidelity Baneberry simulations based on the most accurate geologic and geophysical data available.

The computational model used included about 40 million zones and the simulation required approximately 40,000 CPU hours to complete, thus making it the largest simulation of its kind.

The simulation helped establish a new capability to perform underground test containment simulations in 3D.

Following the Baneberry venting, new containment procedures were adopted to prevent similar occurrences.

In 1984, Yucca Flats was called "the most irradiated, nuclear-blasted spot on the face of the earth".

 

[Sridhar]

Does India really need the H-Bomb?

BY : W Pal Sidhu / LIVEMINT
The recent assertion by K. Santhanam, formerly with the Defence Research and Development Organisation and a key figure who coordinated the Shakti series of nuclear tests, that the thermonuclear bomb tested on 11 May 1998 was a fizzle and failed to reach the desired yield has raised questions about the reliability of India’s nuclear arsenal.
It has also renewed the debate on whether it is essential to conduct further nuclear tests or not to ensure India’s thermonuclear weapon will work as expected.
It is the wrong question to ask. The real question is: does India really need a thermonuclear weapon to ensure its credible minimum nuclear deterrent?
Before addressing this question, it is important to understand what a thermo- nuclear weapon is and how it is different from a nuclear weapon. It is equally crucial to understand the factors motivating countries to acquire such weapons.
So, what is a thermo- nuclear bomb? A nuclear bomb, which is triggered by conventional explosives to create a chain reaction from the critical mass of fissile material, derives its explosive power by splitting (fissioning) atoms of the heavy elements uranium (U235) and plutonium (Pu239). That is why a nuclear bomb is known as a fission weapon.

In contrast, a thermonuclear bomb is also called a fusion bomb or a hydrogen bomb because the bomb derives its explosive power from fusing atoms of the light element hydrogen, such as tritium (3H) or deuterium (2H or D). Since fusion can only be achieved at extremely high temperatures of around 10,000 degrees Celsius (such as those found in the sun), hydrogen bombs are triggered by a fission bomb, which is the only source capable of producing these high temperatures on earth. Because of the high temperatures needed for fusion, the hydrogen bomb, or H-bomb, is also known as a thermonuclear bomb.
The H-bomb is a two-stage weapon where a fission nuclear bomb serves as the primary detonator, which then compresses and triggers a fusion fuel secondary, leading to a massive explosion. In theory, an H-bomb can produce unlimited destructive power. The biggest bomb tested by the Soviet Union produced 50 megaton of explosive power—nearly 3,000 times more destructive power than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.
The H-bomb is also the most complex of all nuclear weapons to develop and this is why no country has been able to perfect it in a single shot. It would have been a miracle or a technological fluke if the first ever test of an Indian H-bomb had worked flawlessly.
The challenges of building an H-bomb notwithstanding, there are at least three reasons why countries seek to acquire this deadliest of all nuclear weapons. First, thermonuclear weapons provide more bang for the buck in that the fissile material used to make a fission bomb can be made a hundred or thousand times more lethal by adding a secondary or a second-stage fusion at little extra cost.
This might be particularly appealing to countries that have limited fissile material and feel the need to develop weapons with yield in the megatons. Although this might be attractive to a country such as India that perhaps has limited fissile material for all its strategic nuclear needs, it is a huge gamble to depend on a design that has not worked as expected. It would be far more prudent to use the material in a boosted weapon, which has already been successfully tested in 1998.
Secondly, countries that adhere to a counter-force strategy, which seeks to attack and destroy the nuclear forces and related command and control capabilities of the other side in a decapitating first strike before these forces can be launched, will find the H-bomb attractive. The enormous destructive power of the H-bomb is particularly suitable for destroying the hardened underground nuclear missile silos and command and control centres.
However, for India, which has a declared no-first-use strategy and an implied second-strike, counter-city strategy (which calls for India to absorb the first nuclear strike and then retaliate against the vulnerable cities of the other side), the H-bomb is not particularly useful. Such massive destructive power is not necessary against unprotected cities, which are particularly vulnerable even to fission weapons.
Perhaps this is why the Indian Armed Forces, which have consistently asked for nuclear weapons, have never demanded the H-bomb. The outgoing navy chief and the chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, endorsed this when he categorically stated that India had already acquired a credible minimum nuclear deterrent, implying that an H-bomb was not essential for India’s strategic nuclear objectives.
The third reason why countries might seek the H-bomb is prestige. In fact, given the complexity of building the H-bomb, the history of this bomb is rife with stories about scientists and countries seeking this weapon to prove that they are as good, if not better, than scientists in other countries or even in their own nuclear establishments.
This debate is likely to remain alive and the reliability of India’s nuclear arsenal will be constantly questioned until the government firmly endorses the credibility of the arsenal by ruling out any further tests once and for all.
The best way for the Manmohan Singh government to end this debate and shut off the possibilities of future tests is to sign and ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty. Such a move would be even more courageous than signing the Indo-US nuclear deal or, indeed, carrying out more tests for a weapon that India does not really need. Will Singh show this courage of conviction?
W. Pal Sidhu is vice-president of programmes at the EastWest Institute, New York. His PhD thesis from Cambridge University was on The Development of India’s Nuclear Doctrine Since 1980. He writes on strategic affairs every fortnight.



Does India really need the H-Bomb? IDRW.ORG

 

[Sridhar]

Pokhran-II thermonuclear test, a failure

• K. Santhanam

• Ashok Parthasarathi

http://www.addthis.com/bookmark.php?v=20

The Hindu A scanned photograph of one of the sites where nuclear test was conducted on May 11, 1998.
A critical analysis of the technical facts can lead to no other conclusion. BARC must learn to tell the nation the truth.

Several inaccuracies in the claims made by BARC and in the articles published in the press, including The Hindu, on Pokhran-II need to be corrected. We have hard evidence on a purely factual basis, to inform the nation that not only was the yield of the second fusion (H-bomb) stage of the thermonuclear (TN) device tested in May 1998 was not only far below the design prediction made by the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), but that it actually failed.
All the five nuclear tests conducted in May 1998 were undertaken through a joint BARC and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) team. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam and R. Chidambaram assigned the DRDO team the critical responsibility for all the field instrumentation to record seismic data from all the tests: this was vital in estimating the yields. The seismic sensors were placed at many points in the device shafts and out to a radius of 2.5 km. The sensors and instrumentation were calibrated several hundred times and perfected. They fully met international standards and were acknowledged to be so by BARC.
The DRDO was thus deeply involved in all the seismic measurements and was fully aware of the BARC-projected readings vis-À-vis its own measurements. One of the authors, Dr. Santhanam, was personally aware in detail from key BARC scientists of the core designs and hence the projected yields. Consequently, the reference in a report published by The Hindu on August 28 (headlined “’Fizzle’ claim for thermonuclear test refuted”) attributed to a “former senior official of the Vajpayee government” that I was “not privy to the actual weapon designs which are highly classified,” was incorrect.
The DRDO also designed and conducted numerous tests of the High Explosive (HE) Trigger of the TN test. BARC scientists witnessed these tests, took copies of test records, and expressed satisfaction with the DRDO’s work.
Over May-October 1998, DRDO produced a comprehensive report of actual seismic readings vis-À-vis values predicted by BARC, mentioning why the former showed considerably lower yields than the latter.
The DRDO report was discussed at a meeting called by National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra in late 1998. The meeting was attended by Dr. Chidambaram and Dr. S.K. Sikka, the scientific head of the BARC team; Mr. Kalam, the Director-General of the DRDO; Dr. V.K. Aatre, the Chief Controller of the DRDO, Dr. Santhanam, and the Chiefs of the Defence Services. Despite a long discussion, largely between the DRDO and BARC, both stuck to their positions on the TN device yield. Thereafter, the NSA took a ‘voice vote’! This was highly unusual because the matter was technically very complex and the services were ill equipped to give an opinion on yields. Most surprisingly, NSA concluded saying government would stand by Dr. Chidambaram’s opinion.
Dr. Chidambaram’s claims and those in Atomic Energy Commission statement reported on September 16 under headline “No reason to doubt the yield of 1998 nuclear test: AEC” are wrong.
BARC basically argued that the geological structure of Pokhran was different from test sites elsewhere. However, the DRDO and BARC utilised the same published information in their calculations of TN device yield. BARC accepted the DRDO’s yield estimates of the fission (A) bomb, but not of the TN device, although the latter’s shaft was situated only a few hundred metres from the former’s shaft. Globally, geological structures do not change dramatically at such small separations. So BARC’s argument to “explain” a lower TN yield is untenable.
Dr. Chidambaram’s statement that “the post-shot radioactivity measurements on samples extracted from the test site showed significant activity [levels] of radioisotopes Sodium 22 and Manganese 54, both of which are byproducts of a fusion reaction rather than a pure fission [device]” is incorrect. He should indicate the exact level of activity instead of merely saying “significant activity” as the activity level determines whether a fusion reaction of the magnitude claimed by BARC actually occurred.
Dr. P.K. Iyengar, a former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and a former Director of BARC, informed me that trace levels of these same isotopes were detected in Apsara, a pure fission reactor not involving any fusion at all. This is the exact opposite of Dr. Chidambaram’s claim.
Dr. Chidambaram’s statement that “from a study of this radioactivity and an estimate of the crater radius confirmed by drilling operations at positions away from the shaft, location, total yield and break-up of fission and fusion components, could be calculated” is extremely surprising. First, after the TN test, its shaft remained totally undamaged: if the fusion stage had worked, the shaft would have been totally destroyed. Secondly, the A-frame sitting astride the mouth of the shaft, with winches to lower and raise personnel, materials and so on, also remained completely intact. If the fusion stage had worked, the ‘A’ frame would also have been totally destroyed.
As for radioactivity levels, senior BARC radiochemists who undertook radio-assay of fission products in samples similarly drilled at Pokhran-I (of May 1974) told Santhanam that the yield announced to the media was substantially higher than what they had submitted to Dr. Raja Ramanna. Dr. Chidambaram must publicly substantiate any claim that it did not occur in the TN test along with justification data.
Dr. Chidambaram states: “BARC scientists worked out total yield of TN device as 50 +10 kt — consistent with design yield and seismic estimates.” However, he subsequently asserts: “BARC experts established DRDO had under-estimated yield due to faulty seismic instrumentation.” BARC cannot eat the cake and have it too.
The fission bomb yield from the DRDO’s seismic instrumentation was 25 +2 kiloton and left a crater 25 metres in diameter. If the TN device had really worked with a yield of 50 +2 kt, it should have left a crater almost 70 metres in diameter. Instead, all that happened was that sand and mud from the shaft were thrown several metres into the air and then fell back, forming a small depression in the shaft mouth. There was no crater.
This factual analysis reveals India’s decade-long, grim predicament regarding the failed TN bomb and so our Credible Minimum Deterrent (CMD). No country having undertaken only two weapon related tests of which the core TN device failed, can claim to have a CMD. This is corroborated by fact that even after 11 years the TN device has not been weaponised by BARC while the 25 kiloton fission device has been fully weaponised and operationally deployed on multiplate weapon platforms. It would be farcical to use a 3500-km range Agni-3 missile with a 25 kiloton fission warhead as the core of our CMD. Only a 150 – 350 kiloton if not megaton TN bomb can do so which we do not have.
(K. Santhanam was Project Leader, Pokhran-II. He worked as a physicist at BARC for 15 years. Later he was Chief Adviser (Technologies) in DRDO for 14 years and was then also Director General, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Ashok Parthasarathi, the co-author of this article, was S&T Adviser to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and deeply involved in Pokhran-I, of May.)



The Hindu : Opinion / Op-Ed : Pokhran-II thermonuclear test, a failure

 

[Yusuf]

The best way for the Manmohan Singh government to end this debate and shut off the possibilities of future tests is to sign and ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty. Such a move would be even more courageous than signing the Indo-US nuclear deal or, indeed, carrying out more tests for a weapon that India does not really need. Will Singh show this courage of conviction?

Precisely what the scientists dont want. They dont want India to sign the CTBT. They want further testing.

I dont know why the media and everyone at large started doubting the credibility of the Indian nuclear deterrent. As if our fission bombs are not working. India is deterred by Pakistans 5-10KT fission device. We have had that since 74.

Dont know what the fuss is all about. We have the data generated for the H bomb. So fail or success there is data that gives us information for future course.

If we go through Gen Maliks interview, all he has asked for is the exact yield so that the Armed forces can plan accordingly. He has not asked for proof whether our nukes work at all or not.

 

[RPK]

Santhanam favours probe into Pokhran-II

New Delhi: A former DRDO scientist, who had questioned the efficacy of the thermonuclear device during the Pokhran-II tests, has favoured an inquiry to determine the success of the 1998 experiments, saying creation of nuclear power could not be based on myths.

"I think this is standard procedure in science and if there are claims then an impartial group of scientists is normally formed to look into the relevant facts," K Santhanam, who triggered a controversy when he claimed that the tests have not yielded desired results, said.


Asked whether such a probe will affect the country's image as a nuclear power, he said one should not be carried away by "images or imagery" and that the image must be rooted in solid facts and cleared by competent group of scientists.

"So the creation of a myth must be avoided," he said. On whether he would prefer to made public the findings of such a committee, he said the panel should be allowed to form its own rules and if there is classified information made available to them, then the report "must remain" confidential.

"They can submit a classified report to the government and an unclassified version for the press," Santhanam said.

His comments came a day after three top nuclear scientists -- M R Srinivasan, P K Iyengar and A N Prasad -- demanded a probe into the claims made by Santhanam, DRDO's Project Director for Pokhran-II tests.

Santhanam had last month described the May 11, 1998 test as a 'fizzle' (failure to achieve expected yield) and said India needed to conduct more tests besides not signing CTBT.

His contention, however, did not receive much attention from the government with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh saying "a wrong impression has been given by some scientists which is needless".

Kalam, who as Director General of the DRDO was involved in the nuclear tests in 1998, said the tests were successful and had generated the desired yield.

India conducted five nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998 at the Pokhran range in Rajasthan which included a 45 kiloton (kt) thermonuclear device, called as hydrogen bomb in common parlance.

The other tests on May 11 included a 15 kt fission device and a 0.2 kt sub-kiloton device. The two simultaneous nuclear tests on May 13 were also in the sub-kiloton range -- 0.5 and 0.3 kt.

Kalam, also Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister, then Atomic Energy Commission Chairman R Chidambaram and then Director of Bhabha Atomic Research Centre Anil Kakodkar were key players in the Pokhran-II tests.

 

[sayareakd]

every thing is mess up at present, to settle this we need to test once again.......... BTW we need new design warhead for MIRVs for agni3,5 and for Agni 3 SL versions.

Therefore we better test again.

 

[Yusuf]

Testing nukes is not the same as testing fire crackers. A lot is at stake if we test again. We are not yet free from sanctions. We need the nuke deal badly. Remember, if we have the nuke deal, we get to import fuel from other countries and that frees up our own little resources of Uranium to build bombs. Its little for making electricity but substantial for making bombs.

Once again i would like to say and ask, what is the use of the data generated from the test if we cant find the flaw and rectify it? The data was generated to simulate in the future. What about that? Why hasnt any scientist doubting the test of the H-bomb come up and say what went wrong?

 

[ajay_ijn]

media reports as if all tests of 1998 were dud, meaning complete failure, every bomb went for a tuss like a failed diwali bomb. obviously sends a wrong signal to public.

Media isn't interested in reporting the fact only one bomb didn't do as expected and even that has exploded with significant yield, greater than what destroyed hiroshima or nagasaki.

Media has got to explain or atleast learn about what even 1 KT yield actually means and what kind of damage it can do a major population centre.

Besides where was media when US was shouting in 1998 itself that Indias hydrogen bomb didn't give the yield as expected. Most ppl who know something abt indias nuke tests would already know that all was not well with that H-bomb test.

If we go through Gen Maliks interview, all he has asked for is the exact yield so that the Armed forces can plan accordingly. He has not asked for proof whether our nukes work at all or not.

if armed forces doesn't know that true yield of our nukes, then god knows what will happen with our country when we get into a war.

 

[Yusuf]

if armed forces doesn't know that true yield of our nukes, then god knows what will happen with our country when we get into a war.

That is why he gave the interview. To make sure the powers to be come clean at least with the Army.

 

[fulcrum]

if armed forces doesn't know that true yield of our nukes, then god knows what will happen with our country when we get into a war.

hahaha.. so true.

That is why he gave the interview. To make sure the powers to be come clean at least with the Army.

What?

----

I knew it.. I even knew it back then in 1998 that our Fusion weapon didn't work. I mean it's obvious.. there is no way a sane government official would admit that it was a failure. The circumstances back then was that India was under tremendous pressure, and the fact that Pakistan also tested would mean our test only resulted in making Pakistan a nuclear power while giving us nothing! All that data gathered would only mean that the particular design didn't work or was a mediocre success. It would no way mean we could design a 100% working Thermonuclear weapon.
For ppl who say a fission bomb is enough.. you can only get a maximum yield of about 35kt-45kt for a fission bomb. 45kt is crap!!! It's so crappy that you need 15, 45 kt weapons to cover the whole of mumbai(blast & thermal radius combined.. mind you). While it only takes 2 X 1MT weapon to wipe out a city the size of mumbai. The weight of 2 X 1 MT bombs is probably equal to 3 X 45kt ones. So just imagine the disadvantage we are in. Our IRBM and ICBMs will be equipped with crappy 2 X 45 Kt warheads, while that of china will have 1MT riding on it for the same amount of payload. This is disastrous strategically!! I say lets test it and dump the Indo-us nuke deal. That deal was shit anyway. Let the government open it's eyes and allot more funds for R&D on thorium based reactors. When all the options are shut and we are desperate for energy, only then those lazy bums in BARC and DRDO would feel the heat and really start squeezing their brains to work.

Just to let you know.. the Soviet Union & the United states tested hundreds and hundreds of nuclear weapons. There designs are so advanced that they have MULTIPLE stages in their thermonuclear design. Our stage is only a very basic 2 stage one which failed. And we don't even have the guts to test again.. God we are pathetic. India a future super power? yeah right.. dream on.. most probably we'll end up like Japan.. Just an economic power.

 

[Yusuf]

Fulcrum,

you have no idea of nuclear targetting. It's better you read up on it and come back.

 

[ajay_ijn]

For ppl who say a fission bomb is enough.. you can only get a maximum yield of about 35kt-45kt for a fission bomb. 45kt is crap!!! It's so crappy that you need 15, 45 kt weapons to cover the whole of mumbai(blast & thermal radius combined.. mind you). While it only takes 2 X 1MT weapon to wipe out a city the size of mumbai. The weight of 2 X 1 MT bombs is probably equal to 3 X 45kt ones. So just imagine the disadvantage we are in. Our IRBM and ICBMs will be equipped with crappy 2 X 45 Kt warheads, while that of china will have 1MT riding on it for the same amount of payload. This is disastrous strategically!! I say lets test it and dump the Indo-us nuke deal. That deal was shit anyway. Let the government open it's eyes and allot more funds for R&D on thorium based reactors. When all the options are shut and we are desperate for energy, only then those lazy bums in BARC and DRDO would feel the heat and really start squeezing their brains to work.

tell me one thing.
are you going to live in mumbai if only part of city was nuked and not the entire city?
"hey its fine, just one part mumbai was nuked, few millions died, thats all"

what about aftermath effects? blast may not destroy entire city but who would stop radiation?

if Pakistan say had 15KT weapon, there is no way i would assume that destroying some part of Mumbai is ok but destroying whole of mumbai with a megaton nuke is not ok for my country. Both are going to equally disastrous for long period. The very threat of nuclear war with our economies damages long term economic prospects. we cannot even dream to become just an economic power. Lord knows how much India already loses because we have disputes with our neighbours.

forget about nuclear war, conventional war fought for long time is more than enough to the all the damage to the countries prosperity and future.

Are we risking all this for what?
Disputed land in border areas where most of it is grazing land serving the cattle? and few isolated tribes here and there who simply don't care as to what happens with rest of India or with India & China. Those tribes live in a different world altogether, no communication with the rest of the country, no development. what would make them feel that they are really a part of the India?

Chinese are ofcoz very much clever, they wouldn't even think so much before coming to conclusion that nuclear war of any yield/numbers/damage will end all their hopes of economic development. but the problem is with Pakistan.

Just to let you know.. the Soviet Union & the United states tested hundreds and hundreds of nuclear weapons. There designs are so advanced that they have MULTIPLE stages in their thermonuclear design. Our stage is only a very basic 2 stage one which failed. And we don't even have the guts to test again.. God we are pathetic. India a future super power? yeah right.. dream on.. most probably we'll end up like Japan.. Just an economic power.

and what did Soviets & US managed to achieve with building thousands of nukes? what an amazing achievement, Soviets & US can destroy the planet again and again. Is this what taxpayers expect from govt.

They wasted so much money in testing, building all those weapons. It would probably pay for welfare of millions of families for generations. Not a single weapon was ever used in the cold war, It only added to the tensions which further created security fears to common public.

 

[fulcrum]

you have no idea of nuclear targetting. It's better you read up on it and come back.

?? Nuclear targeting? There is no phrase called nuclear targetting!
There are tactical nukes and strategic nukes. You use tactical nukes for tactical battle field targets, and strategic nukes for strategic long term ones. If there is a full blown war between India and china, the china can use both tactical and strategic nukes, we on the other hand have no strategic nukes. We have to improvise and use 15, 45kt ones as strategic nukes, which is plain silly and also impossible because, plutonium 239 and uranium 235 don't grow on trees. Li6D on the other hand is relatively easy to get and gives 49.5% of the total nuke output in a T-Nuclear weapon. 50% is got from U238 which is nothing but naturally occurring Uranium ores(the easiest to get of the 3 substances). We can never match china with just U & PU weapons.