Naxals/Maoists Watch

[Pintu]

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...-eyed-Sunderbans-base/articleshow/6108595.cms

Nabbed Maoists eyed Sunderbans base
TNN, Jun 30, 2010, 03.38am IST

KOLKATA: Nandigram Maoist unit chief Madhusudan Mondal alias Narayan alias Selim and his henchmen Siddhartha Mondal and Rajesh Mondal, who were arrested in the city on Tuesday, were setting up the Maoist network in coastal South 24-Parganas, including the Sunderbans. Three cellphones, a letter and some documents were recovered from them.

Narayan, who hails from Durgachak area of Haldia, has been involved with ultra-Left politics for two decades. He joined Sangrami Sramik Mancha as a youngster, and switched to the Naxalite organization Party Unit (PU) — the same outfit from where former Maoist state secretary Himadri Sen Roy alias Somen started his political career, say sources.

Following the unification of PU and People's War — Narayan shifted to the merged outfit People's War Group and later to CPI(Maoist). Working under the alias of Selim, he played a key role in spreading the rebel organization in Nandigram and Khejuri during the land acquisition rebellion, say police. He recruited hundreds of youths and sent some of them to Jharkhand and Jangalmahal for advanced training.

After Nandigram, his zonal committee was assigned to expand the organization in coastal South 24-Parganas adjacent to Nandigram. This is crucial to the Maoists, who are trying to build a safe corridor from coastal West Bengal to Chhattisgarh through Gopiballavpur and Nayagram in West Midnapore, bordering East Midnapore and Orissa.

Police reports suggest that Narayan had succeeded in setting up strong bases in Diamond Harbour, Kakdwip and parts of Sunderbans which are still remote and isolated.

Narayan is a significant catch because it will hit the red brigade's efforts to build a safe corridor, say police.

Sources said that a section of political activists from both the Trinamool Congress and CPM helped cops track Narayan since his men emerged as a major threat to the Trinamool leadership in East Midnapore in the post-Nandigram period. Police suspect Narayan was the key man behind Trinamool panchayat pradhan Nishikanta Mondal's murder in Nandigram.

While Narayan was one of the architects of Maoist expansion in the state, Sachin Ghoshal, 44, who hails from Bagnan in Howrah, was no less important in the Maoist network. He used to monitor the supply lines, apart from overseeing the party's intelligence wing.

Siddhartha Mondal, a native of Khejuri and once a close aide of Narayan, disguised himself as Sankar when he worked in a small factory at Garia. Rajesh is a fresh recruit and was nabbed on his way to deliver a letter to Narayan. "The letter was sent by another Maoist leader, Debu," said P Nirajnayan, IG-I CID. Rajesh's father Sanjay has been booked for harbouring the Maoist leaders. He is from Noorpur in South 24-Paragans.

All five have been booked under UAPA and will be produced in court on Wednesday.

 

[Oracle]

Maoist bandh begins; local Congress leader shot dead in Garhwa

Ranchi, June 30 (PTI) Maoists abducted and killed a local Congress leader in Jharkhand's Garhwa district ahead of their two-day bandh in five states today. Bardhan Kachhu, a 45-year-old local tribal leader of Garhwa, was kidnapped from Barkol village around 8 pm last night by the Maoists and shot dead, Garhwa Superintendent of Police Richard Lakra said.

The Left-wing guerrillas are observing a 2-day bandh beginning midnight last night in Jharkhand, West Bengal, Orissa, Chhatisgarh and Bihar against the alleged anti-people policies of the government. This is the fifth 48-hour bandh this year, affecting mining activity in the mineral-rich state.

To avoid Naxal-pockets, up and down trains of Ranchi-Delhi Swarna Jayanti Express, Ranchi-Varanasi inter-city and Sambalpur-Varanasi inter-city have been diverted through Gomo-Gaya-Mughalsarai route, railway sources said here.

As per a new order, the trains will run at a speed of 65 km in Naxal areas during nights, the sources said. Though security forces have been deployed in strength at strategic places, including national highways, buses and trucks have kept off the routes for fear of Naxal attack.

http://in.news.yahoo.com/20/20100630/1416/tnl-maoist-bandh-begins-local-congress-l.html

 

[Minghegy]

to solve this problem is easy, just give land of landowners to peasants.
landowners are very rich, while the peasants can't survive, the soil of maoist is peasants have no land.
china did the land reform in 1950-1953, the land of landowners were confiscated, and every peasant has their land.

 

[anand_6869]

give the peasants land and see them misuse and destroy it
anyway the Maoists are mostly brainwashed by the real culprits into fighting with the police and causing problems

many ministers are also known to be involved in this, only if the Army is brought into Orissa and given authority to clean up the situation will the truth come out.

the maoists make more than 200 million dollars annually by growing opium, drugs, extorting innocent people, mostly with approval from corrupt ministers
the maoists even illegally mine tonnes of coal, and minerals destroying their own States resources and forests not for equality or equal distribution of wealth but for cold hard cash

And greed is the fuel for these Maoists not equality and rights no doubt these maoists are ready to take on Indian armed forces since it is only the CRPF and police that stand in the way of their illegal activities.

 

[RAM]

How Bastar battlefield turned into death bed


NARAYANPUR (Chhattisgarh): The firing began at 1pm and went on for at least 2-3 hours. The huge number of grenades and cartridges strewn at the site indicated that the battle was also intense. And the CRPF men, exposed to a shower of lead fought to the end almost without cover, wounded and huddled in a tiny paddy field.

A bid by a CRPF jawan to save his life spoke of the desperation of the doomed men. Next to the splotches of blood lay open a first-aid booklet titled "Quick Clot". It had instructions on how to stem the flow of blood from a bullet injury. On its cover a message typed across the colours of the national flag eerily read: "Thank you. Be Safe".

Along the mud walls of a small paddy field, big splotches of blood had turned the brown earth and tiny green shoots red. A majority of CRPF men fell to bullets in this piece of land about 10 metres long and 20 metres wide.

Twenty-seven men of the 39 Battalion were ambushed and cut down by Maoists in Narayanpur on Tuesday afternoon. Most had crouched behind the mud walls of the field, taking cover and firing back at the Maoists. But it was an unequal battle since the Maoists were in a remarkably secure position: A 20 feet deep nullah or rivulet, which the police say, they used as a trench to launch the attack on the CRPF party.

"We recovered 18 bodies from the small field," said a CRPF constable.

The nullah cuts across and flows under the elevated road that the CRPF was clearing as part of a road opening operation. The road connects Narayanpur to Orcha and goes through Abhujmadh forests, a known Maoist hideout. The ambush took place 35km from Narayanpur, halfway between the hills of Jhari Ghati and a CRPF camp at Dhaudai.

"The party with 59 CRPF men and one special police officer had left the camp early morning to clear the road unto Jhari Ghati ahead of movement of buses and troops. They were on their way back when they were ambushed near the nullah 3km short of the camp," said Rahul Bhagat, SP of Narayanpur. Sources said the rear end of the party was attacked.

A constable who survived the attack said the shots initially came from the side of the nullah, but soon enough, the firing began to appear from multiple directions, including the surrounding low lying hills. The CRPF men spilled over into fields and bushes on both sides of the road -- most of them taking position in one field.

"The last communication with the party was at 2.45pm," said a senior officer. After that the wireless set blanked out. According to police sources, it was taken away by Maoists, along with at least 20 rifles and guns.

It was not clear if any Maoist had been killed. "Our men said they saw bodies of at least 10 Maoists being carried away on wooden stretchers," said an officer, who did not wish to be named.

MISSING BODY FOUND, DEATH TOLL 27

Twenty four hours after the attack, the body of CRPF constable Neeraj Kumar was brought back to the camp at Dhaudai. In the morning, the police said Neeraj was missing and could have been possibly taken away by Maoists. But by afternoon, his body had been found in the bushes on a small hill near the road.

With the recovery of Neeraj's body, the final count of CRPF men killed has gone up to 27. Those killed include one Assistant Commandant, two sub inspectors and eight head constables. "There was just one police representative in the party. He was a Special Police Officer. He has returned safe," said Rahul Bhagat, SP of Narayanpur. Five CRPF personnel were injured, he said

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...turned-into-death-bed/articleshow/6112347.cms

 

[Daredevil]

In this article, the author points out the flaws in fighting Naxals and the steps to be taken to effectively wipe out these terror menace. I think GoI and state goverments should take these suggestions seriously and implement them if they want to see success with Operation Green Hunt. Recommended read.

Fight a guerrilla like a guerrilla

There is a basic flaw in the anti-Naxal operations being undertaken by the security forces. There is a clear lack of aim and no clarity on standard operating procedures (SOPs) resulting in Dantewada-like disasters. Headlines Today accessed the E.N. Rammohan report on the Dantewada massacre, and even to a layman it is unbelievable how the 81-member CRPF company moved around like headless chicken for three days before finally being slaughtered.

There is a crisis in command. The Director General of CRPF needs to do some serious soul-searching. If this is how his men are going to fight the Naxals they'd better pack their bags and leave. Not just the officers on the ground, what was the CRPF brass doing? What was their plan B, their contingency plans for an ambush-like situation? If they had not factored in an ambush, they were not doing their basic job right.

Headlines Today's Ashish Khetan travelled to the forests in Dantewada where the encounter took place. He spoke to his sources on the ground and also in the Ministry of Home Affairs. It was shocking that the CRPF patrol did not even follow the SOPs.

While they left the camp at 7 pm on April 4, they did not enter the forest as tasked. Instead they camped a few hundred metres outside their base. This indicates their fear of entering the jungle they were tasked to dominate.

Camped inside village

The CRPF personnel violated the patrol plan and entered village Mukram, 4 kilometres from their Chintalnar camp. They asked villagers for cots, utensils to cook and a goat for meat. As per their SOPs they were supposed to maintain secrecy and not mingle with local villagers or stay at any location for long.

This was a big mistake. By camping just outside their camp, they displayed a total lack of seriousness of approach. By asking the villagers to bring cots to sleep in, utensils to cook food and a goat for meat, the CRPF team behaved like an 'occupation army'. Not a lean mean war machine out to neutralise Maoist guerrillas. They were just marking time - in the bargain - the better trained, armed and motivated Maoists found time to plan their operation annihilation.

Lost wireless set during patrolling

The CRPF personnel botched the patrolling operation at every stage. Such was the level of fear and demoralisation that they did not even follow the set plan for area domination.

The CRPF personnel did not follow the laid out plan for patrolling. They entered another housing cluster at Tadmetla. A CRPF officer lost his wireless set here. The personnel looked for the set but gave it up midway.

Returned to same village at night

Ignoring the grid references for the patrol, the CRPF patrol party returned to Mukram village and camped at the Chintalnar Ashram for school children 4 kilometres away. Again a violation of norms.

Did not dominate high ground

The CRPF patrol party patrolled the same area for more than 24 hours, giving ample time to the Maoists to follow their movement and plan an ambush. This is exactly what the Maoists did on April 6. They ambushed the 82-member CRPF patrol at Tadmetla and killed 76 personnel.

Maoist training, strategy and operations

Maoist literature seized by the security forces indicates their high level of military training and tactics. Consider this:

1. How to launch an offensive on a security forces patrol party. How company of Maoist guerrillas (100-120 men) will split into three platoons (25-30 men each) and attack from flanks"¦how a reserve platoon of Maoists will launch a deception attack"¦and then the main party will hit from the rear"¦how another platoon will be in place to beat back any rescue operation mounted by the security forces.

2. How the Maoists will disengage from operations if outnumbered, re-group and then launch another offensive.

3. How to plant IEDs and trigger them at an appropriate time to inflict maximum damage and disappear into the jungles and then regroup at a pre-appointed place.

4. There are several such training maps and sketches that talk of how sections (10 men) will loot weapons and reach the reserve platoon and secure the flanks to beat back counter attacks.

And this is exactly what the Maoists did during the four-hour long offensive in Dantewada. They took the high ground, launched an ambush with military precision, attacking the security forces from three sides. The jawans ran in one direction for cover. That is where the Maoists had apparently placed guns on tree tops and opened fire, cutting down the jawans.

Two Maoist platoons were in place to beat back the CRPF rescue operation. They triggered a landmine to ensure mine protected vehicles could also not reach the troops.

Maoist air defence and attack plans

Even as the Centre and the states debate the use of airpower, the Maoists already have a air defence and counterattack plan in place.

From aiming at rotor blades to bring down a chopper, the Maoist air defence training manual says engage helicopters with small arms when they are hovering or moving slowly. Also aim at the hub of the rotor so that the bullet or the debris falls into the engine that will bring the chopper down.

Using natural camouflage and total radio silence is also a part of the passive air defence systems being taught to the guerrillas.

Naxals are also being trained to fix light machine guns on treetops to be used as anti-aircraft guns for low-flying helicopters.

Naxals are also being trained to lob grenades at helipads and fire at helicopters when they come in to land and take-off. Four such attacks have already been carried out in the past two years.

Neutralise top leaders

The counter Maoist forces need to improve their intelligence gathering abilities. Some of the top IB officers are now heading forces in the region and they need to pinpoint the location of Ganpathy, Kishenji, Kosa, Nambala Kesav and Kisan Da among others. A entire sector of CRPF and state police will not be able to locate them. It is shocking that the media reaches Kishenji each time but the state police and other forces are still unable to locate him. This despite the best technology available with the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Pinpoint the location of these commanders and neutralise them. The movement will be directionless. But don't rest on your laurels. Before the second-rung leadership can completely take over, neutralise them. Then the guerrillas will move around like headless chicken and will be easier to pick.

But this would require a national resolve. It is hard to believe that the Maoists who seriously started arming themselves only in 2001 are today too powerful for the state to handle. It appears that the state - or elements within the state - is happy to let the situation continue the way it is.

Poverty helps politicians and both bureaucrats and the police benefit from additional funds - being pumped into states in the name of development and counter-insurgency operations.

Learn from the army

I don't buy the logic that you don't use the army against your own people. This is the most flawed argument. Are Kashmiris not our own people? Just to name a few: Are Nagas, Manipuris, Assamese, Punjabis not our own people? Yet we have used the army extensively in all these states. The army runs the counter-insurgency and jungle warfare school in Vairangte. Use their training and tactics. Fight a guerrilla like a guerrilla. And you shall win. Behave like an occupation army and you will be like the Romans taking on the Gauls. Bound to lose. Wake up before it is too late. It is now or never.

 

[RAM]

In this article, the author points out the flaws in fighting Naxals and the steps to be taken to effectively wipe out these terror menace. I think GoI and state goverments should take these suggestions seriously and implement them if they want to see success with Operation Green Hunt. Recommended read.

Will definitely change the configuration of the whole Gameplan for antinaxal operations especially if GOI forces can track the Top leadership and Neutralise it.I think the Biggest advantage for them (maoists) is their complex /unique human Intelligent network and GOI forces know little about the whereabouts of its TOP leadership.If GOI can overturn this advantageous postion and cut thier financial feeding lines -for sure positive results will follow .Secondly the Tough forest terrain where GOI forces have to fight this battle also make the enemy more formidable. But WHO will Tie the Bell?
wait/see...

 

[Daredevil]

Will definitely change the configuration of the whole Gameplan for antinaxal operations especially if GOI forces can track the Top leadership and Neutralise it.I think the Biggest advantage for them (maoists) is their complex /unique human Intelligent network and GOI forces know little about the whereabouts of its TOP leadership.If GOI can overturn this advantageous postion and cut thier financial feeding lines -for sure positive results will follow .Secondly the Tough forest terrain where GOI forces have to fight this battle also make the enemy more formidable. But WHO will Tie the Bell?
wait/see...

I see following problems in GoIs approach towards Naxals problem.

1) Lack of will and strategy to take them head on and finish off the top leadership of Maoists.
2) Lack of counter-insurgency and jungle-warfare capability of state and central police forces (CRPF etc).
3) No concerted pan-Indian attack against Naxals letting them escape from one state to the other.
4) No concerted effort to uplift the regions affected by naxalism through development.

There is a strong precedent that the naxal menace can be effectively tackled. Look at Andhra Pradesh, they have completely wiped off naxal top leadership from AP and naxals fear to come into AP and carry out their activities.

Naxal-hit states must follow AP

Hyderabad, April 7: The much-touted Operation Green Hunt against the Maoists has turned out to be more hype than substance. The stark proof was the massacre of 76 CRPF men in Dantewada on Tuesday.

After the combined Centre-state operation began in 2010, 136 security personnel have been killed as against 74 Maoists. Moreover, the Maoists killed over 90 civilians during the same period. There is no doubt that the state has suffered more than the extremists.

In the wake of the continuing setbacks, many experts feel the need to revise the strategy to combat the Maoists especially in the worst affected areas of Chhattisgarh, West Bengal and Jharkhand.

They also feel that the much-talked about AP formula of tackling the Maoists should be imbibed, though it is not a short cut method as it evolved over 20 years. The state went through similar phases of heavy losses for security forces till it was able to devise an effective strategy.

"After the setting up of the special intelligence branch, an exclusive anti-Maoist unit, and Greyhounds, the elite anti-Naxal combat force, the scenario has changed drastically in the state," said a senior intelligence official.

He added that AP never depended on the CRPF or Central forces and used them only for subsidiary works.

"The Naxal-affected states should not only set up specialised forces but should also give special training to the regular police," said the official.

However, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand, West Bengal and Bihar are lagging behind in all fronts on this issue. As of now, they are depending too much either on central paramilitary forces or militia groups such as Salwa Judum.

The Dantewada massacre also made it evident that there was utter lack of coordination between Central and state police forces. The Balimela incident where around 36 AP Greyhounds sleuths drowned in Orissa also brought this aspect to sharp relief.

Experts say that the AP procedure of briefing before anti-Naxal operation and debriefing after the operation is very important.

"During debriefing, security personnel share all their experiences and every detail including that on topography is noted down and this wealth of data is used again to brief the forces when thy go to the same place again," said the intelligence official.

The former DGP, Mr P. Ramulu, added that security forces should keep it in mind that Maoists were not identifiable enemies. "They mingle with local people, eat their food, wear their dress, speak their language," he said.

He added that cops should carefully study Che Guevera's books on guerrilla warfare "He says when the enemy is attacking you retreat, when he is resting you harass and when enemy is retreating you attack," said the former DGP. "This is exactly what happened in Dantewada massacre."

The Standard Operating Procedures are also not followed in the most operations in other states. Though SOP says no vehicle shall be used in combing operations, this rule is rarely followed.

"A surprise element should always be maintained," said a senior police officer. "The combing police parties should change the timings and routes very frequently."

The Centre has sanctioned 37 India Reserve battalions and ten battalions of specialised force CoBRA (commando battalions for resolute action) for anti-Maoist operations. In all, around 40 battalions of Central paramilitary forces are currently deployed on long-term basis for assisting the police forces in the affected states.

Mr Ramulu also pointed out that Maoists could not be defeated merely by deploying huge number of forces.

"Alienation of tribals from mainstream life is the biggest problem," he said. "The first step is to see that they get the benefits of government schemes. Maoists have won their hearts. The interface between government machinery and tribals inhabiting Dandakaranya has to be improved hundredfold."

An official involved in anti Naxal operations in the state said that all operations should be based on intelligence. "We should talk less and act more," he said.

 

[Daredevil]

As a corollary to above post read this article as well. Good information about how AP has tackled naxalism and why it is failing on other states.

Replicating the Andhra Model: Headed for Failure
Venkat Sathya
Independent Analyst
e-mail: [email protected]

Andhra Pradesh has been projecting itself as a successful model in the fight against Naxalites. The state is no longer a citadel of the Naxalites and their top leadership. An effective police action combined with simultaneous developmental activities and an effective field level intelligence in the Naxal affected districts are the primary reasons for the successful containment of Naxalites in the state.

A possibility of replicating Andhra Pradesh model in other Naxal affected states is being discussed. The success of this strategy will depend on how quickly the government machinery in respective states implements the developmental programs in areas from where Naxalites will be flushed out by security personnel. In light of the growing intensity of Naxalite violence in the states like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Bihar and West Bengal, the respective state governments with the help of the federal government have decided to launch large scale security offensive. The operation has been referred to as 'Operation Green Hunt' and the federal government assists respective state governments by providing paramilitary forces, sharing intelligence and technical help. The operation has been in progress since the first week of November 2009. The main idea behind this operation is to simultaneously carry out security operations and developmental activities, aswas done by the Andhra Pradesh government. Through Operation Green Hunt, it seems that attempts to replicate the Andhra model are being carried out.

Replicating the model in other states may not yield the desired results. This could be because the work done by the government of Andhra Pradesh before launching security operations against the Naxalites, not been done in other states. For instance, during the ceasefire period between the Andhra Pradesh government and the Naxalites in 2004, security forces sent informers into the fold of the Naxalites, which helped them strengthen their intelligence machinery. Security forces also collected information on Naxalites during political negotiations with the state government during the ceasefire period. During these negotiations, security forces came to know the hitherto unknown faces of the Naxalites which helped nab these leaders in later days. Moreover, security forces have also undertaken certain confidence building measures like interacting with parents of alleged Naxalites about the future of their children and organizing sports meets, to woo the disgruntled youths into mainstream society. Above all, development work was also done simultaneously, in addition to attractive surrender and resettlement policies.

The states that are attempting to replicate the Andhra model are launching offensive operations against the Naxalites ignoring the background action taken by the Andhra Pradesh government. Consequently, planned operations like Operation Green Hunt are doomed to result in massive failure and most certainly increase the people's animosity towards the establishment. Moreover, in the states like Chhattisgarh, initiatives like Salwa Judum have already created a hostile feeling towards the administration and security personnel among sections of the tribal populace, apart from dividing the tribals into two major groups, one supporting the Naxalites and another opposing them. Before launching an offensive, taking the tribals into confidence is an essential mandatory requirement, without which successful collection of intelligence on the movement of Naxalites and their actions is not possible. Moreover, without the help of the tribals, security personnel may find it difficult to differentiate between Naxalites and tribals, which might result in faulty casualties. Through the massive security offensive, the government is attempting to bring to an end, a decades old problem within a shot span of time. This is unlikely to yield expected results unless massive developmental works like construction of roads, provision of clean drinking water, primary health centres, precedes the security offensive.

The plan to simultaneously carry out both - security action and developmental initiatives - is based on the premise that security action must be taken first and development agenda next, and will lead to confusion. It has no answer for the queries like what will happen to development if security forces failed to meet with success. As a result, the initial premise on which the government has planned the current operations is faulty and lacks foresight.

On the other hand, though the Naxalites have been contained in Andhra Pradesh, a few of their top leaders who are also part of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India - Maoists (CPI-M) are still active, if not in the Andhra Pradesh then in neighboring states. One of the objectives of the leadership is to regain their lost ground in Andhra Pradesh. The possibility of Naxalites regaining their position in Andhra Pradesh though seemingly remote, may well become possible if the Naxals are able to gain strength from the lapses of the government like corruption, maladministration and poor governance.

 

[dineshchaturvedi]

Why don't we provide them cover of attack helicopters, which ones will suite the job. We are 3rd class that way ministers have helicopters but not the ones that need them most.

 

[Daredevil]

Why don't we provide them cover of attack helicopters, which ones will suite the job. We are 3rd class that way ministers have helicopters but not the ones that need them most.

Using attack helicopters in jungles/forests makes them vulnerable because of the cover the jungle provides to the maoists. If you go through some of the previous articles on this thread it is clear that maoists have already acquired the capability to shoot down helicopters. What is needed is thorough combing operations with good human intel. Otherwise CRPF and Police are dead meat in the forests whose terrain is known to every maoists at the back of their hand.

 

[Singh]

It is essential to realize that in such a COIN op hundreds of Security personnel will be martyred and possibly hundreds of civilians will die as well. The sooner this timid government realizes the inevitable the better.

 

[Singh]

Why don't we provide them cover of attack helicopters, which ones will suite the job. We are 3rd class that way ministers have helicopters but not the ones that need them most.

Using attack helicopters in jungles/forests makes them vulnerable because of the cover the jungle provides to the maoists. If you go through some of the previous articles on this thread it is clear that maoists have already acquired the capability to shoot down helicopters. What is needed is thorough combing operations with good human intel. Otherwise CRPF and Police are dead meat in the forests whose terrain is known to every maoists at the back of their hand.

Pakistanis were armed with thousands of SAMs and AA guns that didn't stop IAF's bombing campaign during Kargil War. We sent dozens of choppers to our UN mission weren't the rebels armed with AA guns ?

Attack choppers armed with FLIR can take out Maoists when they least expect at: in pitch dark and under massive forest cover. Currently our advantage over Maoists includes brute force and technology we need to make use of both.

The only thing lacking is resolve.

 

[anand_6869]

How Bastar battlefield turned into death bed


NARAYANPUR (Chhattisgarh): The firing began at 1pm and went on for at least 2-3 hours. The huge number of grenades and cartridges strewn at the site indicated that the battle was also intense. And the CRPF men, exposed to a shower of lead fought to the end almost without cover, wounded and huddled in a tiny paddy field.

Salute to the brave men who fought bravely against these iron ore smuggling opium farming drug lords even when all odds were against them.

But why did it take 3 long hours for reinforcements to arrive whwn the CRPF jawans were attacked just 2 kilometers from their own camp, why were the CRPF cornered out when reinforcements were just a 10 minute walk away, why were the CRPF personnel forced to fight it out for 3 hours when these maoists could be overpowered with reinforcements, i am sure that there were many non mine infested alternative routes for reinforcements to reach their own men in less than 3 hours.

Or was all this politically motivated and reinforcements were not allowed to reach in time? and the main oblective of those in power were to massacre all the 70 CRPF in the convoy but unfortunately the CRPF fought back fiercely?

since the ministers and Police governing Chattisgarh, orissa and most of these maoist infested areas are known to taking a cut of the profits of the drug sales and illegal iron ore mined in these areas which amount to thousands of crores,
are our politicians themselves are responsible for preventing reinforcements to be sent and revealing the plans of the CRPF to these drug peddling maoists so that the armed forces do not get thwart the Maoists aka drug mafias illegal plans.

is this the reason why the CRPF personnel are constantly being attacked and not given accurate intelligence is this the reason why covering fire from helicopters is not being provided to the CRPF during their missions is this why the Army is not being called in against these thieving drug lords.

Is the reason for which our own ministers do not offer support and are against the CRPF as a whole are that the CRPF are the only people brave enough to stand against their source of illegal cash inflow??

 

[tarunraju]

Maoist spokesperson Azad killed in Andhra

Hyderabad: In a major blow to the Maoists, their top leader and spokesperson Cherukuri Rajkumar alias Azad was killed in a gunfight with police in Andhra Pradesh Friday, police claimed. The shootout took place near Jogapur in Adilabad district, about 300 km from Hyderabad. Another Maoist guerrilla, who is yet to be identified, was also killed. Police also recovered an AK-47, a 9mm pistol and two kit bags from the scene of the gunfight.

Azad, who carried a reward of Rs.12 lakh on his head, was a member of the central committee of the outlawed Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist). Hailing from Krishna district, he was associated with the Maoist movement for four decades. Following the killing of Azad, security agencies have sounded a high alert in Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Chhatttisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand and West Bengal.


Azad was gunned down by police two days after Maoists killed 27 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel in Chhattisgarh.

http://ibnlive.in.com/news/maoist-spokesperson-azad-killed-in-andhra/125804-3.html?from=tn

 

[RAM]

Helicopter-mounted radar to tackle Naxal IEDs


India is deploying cutting-edge technology to defeat a simple insurgent weapon that J&K militants and Naxals are using to lethal effect: the Improvised Explosive Device, or IED. Swedish company, Saab, has offered to partner India's Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO) in fitting Saab's CARABAS radar on India's Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH), which would allow the scanning of wide swathes of territory to detect IEDs well before they can be exploded.


Naxal IEDs --- explosives that are detonated with a timer, or with signals from a mobile phone, to blow up jawans or vehicles --- are blamed for over 60% of all casualties caused by the Maoist group. In only the most recent example, on 17th May, a Naxal IED, buried inside a metalled road, blew up a civilian bus in Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh killing 36 people, including 12 Special Police Officers. Any movement of security forces in Naxal areas must be preceded by a painstaking manual search for IEDs. Many casualties have been caused during these search operations.


In the new system being evaluated, a Saab CARABAS radar, fitted in a Dhruv helicopter, does an aerial scan of the area in which security forces will be operating. The CARABAS radar is specially designed to detect metallic components of an IED, even when it is buried 5-6 metres below the ground. A computer quickly compares the image of each flight with the images of the previous flight over that area; any new metallic objects are highlighted, and their exact location mapped. Armed with that information, a bomb disposal team is sent to defuse the IED harmlessly.


Best of all, the exceptionally low frequency waves from the CARABAS radar ignores vegetation, reflecting only off man-made objects. This is especially useful in jungle terrain, where the dense foliage provides both visual and electro-magnetic cover. Naxal IED tactics involve burying IEDs several feet deep, sometimes under tarmac roads; such a system would detect even the deep-buried IEDs, which conventional, hand-held scanners, and even sniffer dogs, often cannot pick up.


"We have provided a radar at the request of the DRDO", says Inderjit Sial, the India head of Saab International India AB. "The DRDO will integrate it on the Dhruv ALH and then evaluation trials will be conducted. There is also a lighter version of the radar which can be flown on a UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle)."


The helicopter-mounted CARABAS radar weighs about 150 kg. The smaller version of the radar, which has been developed for UAVs, weighs just 50 kg.


Saab believes that this surveillance platform has a very high potential in India. The company has indicated that, if India chooses to deploy the CARABAS/Dhruv platform, Saab would set up its global manufacturing hub for the radar in India.


The DRDO, is carefully evaluating Saab's offer. Confirming to Business Standard that it is evaluating a foreign foliage penetration radar, the DRDO spokesperson stated, "We are seeking foreign collaboration in this field. Talks are actively on"¦ but we have not yet made a final decision."


A key challenge the DRDO faces in integrating the CARABAS low-frequency radar on a UAV, or on the Dhruv helicopter, is the unusual shape and large size of the radar antennae, which look like two long poles. A place on the flying platform will have to be found for these antennae.

http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/

 

[bhramos]

PARAMILITARIES PURCHASING WEAPONS

This time, the units (the Central Reserve Police Force, the Railway Protection Force, Border Security Force, National Security Guard and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, and Central Industrial Police Force) are buying, at the cost of about ~$70 million:

119 Tata light armored troop carriers

98 Mahindra Rakshak bullet-proof light vehicles
night vision devices for rifles
146 automatic grenade launchers
47,000 grenades from Rosoboron Export of Russia
laser range finders from Slovenian company Fotono
59,000 light-weight, bullet-proof jackets
1,000 pistols
800 Swiss-made SIG Sauer assault rifles
380 automatic grenade launchers and related ammunition.

 

[ajtr]

Police admit journalist too was killed in Azad encounter​

NEW DELHI: Hemchandra Pandey, a freelance journalist, was also killed in the encounter in which top Maoist leader and spokesperson Cherukuri Rajkumar alias Azad was killed in Andhra Pradesh on Friday.

While admitting that Pandey too was killed in Friday's encounter, the Adilabad police described him as a Maoist.

Hemchandra Pandey was working as a journalist for the Hindi newspaper Nayi Duniya in Chhattisgarh.

Friday's shootout took place near Jogapur in Adilabad district, about 300 km from Hyderabad.

Azad, who carried a reward of Rs 12 lakh on his head, was a member of the central committee of the outlawed Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist). Hailing from Krishna district, he was associated with the Maoist movement for four decades.

Following the killing of Azad, security agencies have sounded a high alert in Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Chhatttisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand and West Bengal.

Azad was gunned down by police two days after Maoists killed 27 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel in Chhattisgarh.

 

[nitesh]

cross post: this should act as force multiplier

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article498514.ece
DRDO develops UAV 'Netra' to aid anti-terrorist operations

India's defence research agency DRDO has developed an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) specifically for anti-terrorist and counter insurgency operations, which will be inducted into the armed forces by the year-end.

The 1.5 kg UAV, called 'Netra', is a collaborative development project between ideaForge, a company formed by a group of Indian Institute of Technology, Powai, alumni and one of Defence Research and Development Organisation's Pune-based labs, Research and Development Establishment (Engineers) (R&DE) Pune.

DRDO scientist Dr Alok Mukherjee, who demonstrated the UAV, here yesterday said Netra would be ready for induction into the services within the next six months after it is subjected to some more trial tests.

"The UAV is capable of operating in all the conflict theatres, including urban quarters, in a situation similar to that of the 26/11 terror attacks.", he told reporters here yesterday.

Dr. Mukerjee said the estimated cost of Netra is Rs 20 lakhs, but the price could vary if additional components like thermal camera are added as per the requirements of the security agencies concerned and their use.

IdeaForge, vice-president (Marketing and Operations Unmanned Systems) Amardeep Singh said the UAV has been designed to carry out surveillance in an area of 1.5 KM Line of Sight (LOS) and has an endurance capacity of 30 minutes of battery charge.

Apart from that, Netra is equipped with a resolution CCD camera with a pan/tilt and zoom to facilitate wider surveillance. It can also be fitted with thermal cameras to carry out night operations.

Singh said the operational altitude of the UAV is 200 meters maximum, having a vertical take-off and landing capacity (VTOL) and is equipped with a wireless transmitter.

In addition to that, the in-built fail-safe features allows Netra to return to base on loss of communication or low battery.

Asked if the UAV could function in all-weather condition, Singh said the machine cannot be operated in rainy conditions but research is being carried out to make Netra function even during monsoon.

 

[Pintu]

http://www.ptinews.com/news/763247_Maoists-vow-to-avenge-Azad-s-killing

Maoists vow to avenge Azad's killing

STAFF WRITER 13:35 HRS IST

Hyderabad, July 4 (PTI) The CPI (Maoist) today vowed to avenge the death of its top leader Cherukuri Rajkumar alias Azad in an encounter with police in Adilabad district of Andhra Pradesh.

"Azad was murdered brutally by Intelligence Bureau of the Central Government and Special Intelligence Bureau (SIB) of Andhra Pradesh with complete knowledge of Union Home Minister P Chidambaram," a statement issued by the CPI (Maoist) said.

Hailing Azad, it said he has become the "mind and soul of Indian revolution through his consistent and efficient work" and vowed to avenge his death.

Azad, a senior member of CPI (Maoist) Central Committee as well as its spokesman, was killed along with another suspected Naxalite on July 2.