MiG-23 combat record and capabilities

[MiG-29SMT]

A new attempt to use the MiG-23 followed in the autumn of 1983, when the fighters of the 735th regiment were given the task of working out the possibility of using the MiG-23 from Afghan airfields. More recently, this regiment was also in the air defense system. With the change of subordination in the Air Force, the TurkMO regiment received the MiG-23M in 1980, and on May 17, 1981 was transferred from fighter aircraft to the IBA and became a fighter-bomber, one of the few in the IBA that flew "twenty-third." At first, they limited themselves to flights of flights to Bagram and vice versa, laying the route and mastering the peculiarities of take-off and landing at high-altitude airfields. Departures were made without weapons, and stay in Bagram was limited to refueling before the return flight. However, these events were unsuccessful: after several “shuttle” flights on one of the aircraft, when starting up in Bagram, the engine failed, which crashed at a rather “uncomfortable” airfield, which was “jammed” with tanks and tractors, where sand and stones were parked and taxied commonplace. To replace the new engine and the repair group had to be transferred to the IL-76. A week later, the MiG-23M returned to the Union, and the whole thing ended. The decision to replace the 40th Army Air Force MiG-21 fighters with more modern aircraft was made by the summer of 1984. By this time, the entire air group was re-equipped with new types of aircraft, and only fighter aircraft continued to work on the "twenty first". With the increase in the scale of hostilities, their shortcomings became more and more obvious: a small combat load, insufficient range and duration of flight, poor aiming and, especially, navigation equipment, which was why even reaching a remote target was problematic. All this not only significantly affected combat effectiveness, but also narrowed the range of possible tasks. At the same time, the MiG-23, getting rid of "childhood diseases", became one of the main aircraft of the front-line aviation and replaced the "twenty first" in most fighter units. Sufficient operating experience was accumulated, methods of combat use were developed, and the arrival of new fighters to replace was natural. The most advanced modifications of the MiG-23ML were sent to Afghanistan, deprived of the shortcomings of earlier models and earned a reputation as a “real fighter” not only due to high thrust-weight ratio, ease of piloting, increased maneuverability and range, but also sufficient reliability and adaptability to service (by this time operational advantages began to be considered among the most important). Especially valuable at high altitude airfields and in the summer heat were the good takeoff and landing qualities of the MiG-23ML (its takeoff under normal conditions was one and a half times shorter than that of the MiG-21bis), which provided a reserve for fuel and combat load. The MiG-23ML flight range, even without additional tanks, was 1,450 km versus 1,150 km for the MiG-21bis. Stabilization of the aircraft in flight was ensured by the automatic control system SAU-23AM, which withstood the position of the aircraft in roll, pitch and heading, however, piloting while flying along the route remained the task of the pilot, who had a map and flight and navigation devices. Using RSBN significantly simplified navigation (however, by the time the first 23's appeared at Afghan airfields, this radio navigation system was only planned for deployment). When used as a fighter, the MiG-23ML had significantly better combat effectiveness, having a modern complex of sighting equipment. The aiming system made it possible to intercept air targets in various situations: under difficult weather conditions, in radio-contrast cloud cover, as well as against the background of the earth, at heading courses and in the rear hemisphere. Unlike the “twenty-first”, the arsenal of which consisted only of short range air to air missiles, the MiG-23 had a more powerful set of missile weapons and could conduct air combat using medium-range missiles R-23 and R-24 with a range of up to 35-50 km. The new missile weapons made it possible to hit enemy aircraft flying with an excess or lowering relative to their fighter to 8000-10000 m, having high efficiency including when attacking highly maneuverable air targets (launching R-24 and R-60 missiles ensured the defeat of the enemy aircraft when it maneuvers with overload to the "eight"). Since in the Afghan situation we had to deal with an air adversary only occasionally (such cases came down to episodic clashes with fighters from neighboring Iran and Pakistan, which we will talk about in more detail), the strike capabilities of the aircraft for use on ground targets were primarily demanded. As a strike machine, the MiG-23 could carry up to 2000 kg of bombs with caliber from 50 to 500 kg on the underwing and ventral holders, including up to four "five hundred" and incendiary tanks or 16 hundred-kilogram bombs on the beams of multi-castle holders. A set of weapons was supplemented by blocks of unguided missiles

Истребители МиГ-23 В Афганистане

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[MiG-29SMT]

MiG-23 from Shindand regularly bombed the area of Rabati-Jali in the south, from where caravans with weapons came. Dushman bases were located here near Sabari and Hamun lakes (according to the landmarks, the place was called “near two lakes”). We no longer talked about target designation and joint work with helicopter pilots in remote and completely controlled Dushman areas; pilots needed to rely on own forces when finding targets of attacks and conducting attacks. The last large-scale operation involving large aviation forces was the Magistral, carried out in November 1987 - January 1988. in order to unblock the provincial center Host, cut off from the center of the country. Every day, 50-60 aircraft — the Su-17MZ squadron, followed by 12-16 fighters followed by 16-24 Su-25s left Bagram to attack the positions of the Mujahideen surrounding the Khost. For two months of operation, pilots flew 90-120 hours (more than a year-old standard in the Union). The aviation, which was clearing the way for the infantry and paratroopers, was given special importance, and those who left for the mission kept on seeing the voice of the army commander Boris Gromov on the air: “Pilots, come on, it won’t dry up after me!” With the participation of fighters of the 168th IAP from Shindand in the fall of 1987, an operation was carried out to clean the "anthill" of the green zone of Herat. Detachments of Mujahideen of Turan Ismail were driven out of the valley into the mountains and gorges, where they tried to cover with bombing from the air. In addition to the usual ammunition, the MiG-23 used Concrete BetAB-500, suspended two by plane. Such bombs were distinguished by a narrow and long thick-walled case with a powerful cast steel head made of steel, which had a high breakdown effect. The objectives were underground kyariz tunnels, caves and burrows in the mountains. Using the BetAB-500, Bagram fighters attacked the revealed refuge of Ahmad Shah twice. Practically no other ammunition was used, except for high-explosive bombs, and only a few times because of the delay with their delivery incendiary ZAB-500 went into action. A total of 113 thousand bombs were produced in 1987 - 18% more than in the previous year. At the same time, the share of NAR decreased one and a half times, to 473 thousand units, and they were used mainly by helicopters. The reason was the departure of aircraft to high altitudes, from which the use of NAR was practically not possible. The share of the MiG-23 in direct air support was minimized due to insufficient efficiency and accuracy (the reason was the same displacement of aircraft beyond the reach of air defense - with high-speed bombing from a height, even sifting bombs of 50-60 m was considered very good). However, when working together with the troops, it was necessary to destroy precisely target targets - firing points, shelters and identified strong points, which were difficult to defeat with infantry fire weapons. For such an application, the MiG-23 was the least suitable, inferior to the Su-25 and, especially, helicopters. Only when they were absent or delayed were MiGs called for strikes on a call. One such incident near Gardez in February 1988 was recalled by the commanding officer of the 168th Iap Major Mikhail Oger: “. The spirits were squeezed on the outskirts of the village of paratroopers, and they asked for fire. But there was no aircraft pilot with them, and we spun three links from above. Nobody could tell us the goal, and looking out from the height of these machine gunners is a hopeless affair. We did not even see where the battle was going on; the village was large. In the end, the leading Tolik Jason ordered one to drop bombs directly in the center of the village, so that below they could determine the breaks and give their position. However, those heads could not raise and did not even notice tears. It helped that their commander guessed to say that a bus was burning nearby, they were smoking tires, black smoke was standing by a pillar - you could see a mile away. We went into a train of smoke and worked off steam after steam along the blowing line where perfumes nested. It seems that they hit - the gaps lay on the wall, the landing party managed to get out of the trap. Then they met - the paratroopers said when the bombs began to lie down next to the duval, the ground played under their feet so much that they suffered more fear than from the spiritual fire. " When working in remote areas, fighters of the 168th IAP again began to meet in the air with the F-16. Having regained consciousness after the loss of the plane in the spring accident, after a lapse of time, the Pakistanis returned to escorting the 40th Army aviation strike groups that appeared at the border. Flying for the bombing south of Jalalabad, the fighters somehow met the Pakistanis face to face. The F-16 pair, apparently unsuccessfully withdrawn by the ground operator, climbed directly into the battle formation loaded with bombs of the squadron, being next to Senior Lieutenant S. Talanov. Other pilots also saw the Pakistanis, but the fighter cover marching higher could not do anything - the F-16s were right under them, going at the same speed and course. The Pakistanis were in the same disadvantageous situation for the attack: the squadron’s front was pushing them from below, and a “cover” hung overhead. For some time, the pilots continued to go “sandwich”, looking at each other, after which the Pakistanis, sensible, lapel went to their side. After

 

[MiG-29SMT]

On September 12, 1988, the MiG-23MLD group from the 120th IAP flew to strike at targets in the Kunar River valley east of Asadabad. The Pakistanis were increasingly active, and the pilots more than once reported on "visual contact" with the F-16, who, for their part, accompanied the attack groups. Tension literally hung in the air, discharged that day with an open skirmish. Having gathered over a landmark (Lake Surubi), the group headed towards the border. Two cover pairs left ahead of time: the targets lay at the borderline itself, which is why two cover pairs were allocated. Above the mountain range, 50 km northwest of the attack site, the patrol zone was occupied by the fighter of the comedian lieutenant colonel Sergey Bunin and his political commander Major Nikolai Golosienko, and 40 km south were Major Semyon Petkov and Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Danchenkov. However, the F-16s, attracted by their appearance, were already in the air: a pair of lieutenant Khalid Mahmoud fighters from the 14th Pakistan Air Force squadron followed the MiGs in parallel flight from the Camra base. A few minutes later they were informed from the ground that a column of planes appeared in the air - an attack group was being pulled to the target. Over Kuna-rum, she turned north, laying down on a combat course along the border. When the strike group lined up in a convoy to enter the target, it was a few kilometers from the border, which the enemy took advantage of. The cover went pretty far, and nothing prevented Khalid from reaching the middle of the stretched target. The closest to it was the MiG-23MLD (board number 55) of captain Sergei Privalov, the last in the bearing of the second link. Emerging 13 km from it from the dense clouds, Khalid heard that he had a "flood" of a radiation warning station: MiGs that had been barring for several minutes were turning in his direction. This was not part of the plans of the Pakistani pilot. He began to maneuver, in a hurry from a half-turn with a roll of 135 ° he launched two AIM-9Ls and left the battle upside down 1,500 meters from the attacked MiGs. One rocket went far to the side, but the second Sidewinder exploded over Privalov’s plane, showering it with fragments. The shake was the strongest, the pilot experienced a sensitive blow, even his legs were knocked off the pedals. A large fragment entered the cockpit compartment half a meter from his head, the rest slashed at the flap and left console, breaking through the fuel tank-caisson. A whitish plume of fuel reached for the plane, but after the first shock, the pilot became convinced that the plane was off, kept in the air and listened to the rudders.

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[MiG-29SMT]

Both couples of cover rushed to the place of the skirmish on the afterburner, a scream and a mate aired. The Pakistani was in serious trouble - the R-24R missile launch range was enough to defeat him even before the border, they even heard an exclamation on the ground: “Let me bang him!” However, it was not possible to equalize the score - they ordered everyone to hastily leave the KP, fearing a battle over a remote area where the situation was not winning: the enemy could bring new forces into the battle, and the MiGs had a small supply of fuel. The Pakistanis had all the advantages here, from an advantage in strength to a tactical situation, and an open clash with a neighboring state on the eve of the long-awaited end to the war was undesirable. Having dropped the bombs, Privalov turned home, the rest of the group followed him. The formation was closed by Bunin and Golosienko, and then the F-16 pair again appeared behind. The Pakistanis followed, intending to shoot MiGs in pursuit, but could not keep up with them: setting the wings to maximum sweep, they accelerated to the speed of sound in the afterburner (although there was a limit of M = 0.8 with a hanging tank). On the approach to Bagram, the padded MiG was let forward so that it would land first. He had practically no fuel left: judging by the flow meter, the plane had already lost 1,200 liters of kerosene. Leaving a wet mark on concrete, the fighter taxied to the parking lot, where the leak stopped right after the engine was turned off - the fuel ran out. Petkov, who had sat next, got out of the plane and slammed his helmet on the concrete with annoyance: “Their mother ..! So I still flew to the "cover"! Well, he, you reptile, kept an eye on him! ” In the evening, Major General Romanyuk, Air Force Commander of the 40th Army, arrived at the debriefing, inclined to the fact that the pilots ran into fire from the ground - a conclusion far more profitable than recognizing the indecision of the leadership and planning flaws that led to the length of the group and the inefficiency of cover. If there were no interception, there would be no problem. But the pilots, in front of whom the picture was unfolding, insisted on their own. Going to the third link, captain Igor Dedyukhin, when asked why he decided that it was an F-16, poked a finger at the drawing of this aircraft in a book: "Why ... I just saw this one." The Pakistanis, after a successful return to their base, announced the destruction of two MiGs. Moreover, the diverging Khalid said that he could bring down all six cars with the remaining missiles and cannon fire, but he was prevented by another MiG-23 pair that arrived in time. Soon the Western press spread the news that Pakistani soldiers had picked up the wreckage of two downed planes. This legend migrated to the domestic press. There are other versions of this skirmish that are as diverse as the baseless ones. There are mythical tales in the press about the Afghan MiG-23 shot down on September 7 over Pakistan and another F-16 victory over the MiG-23 that happened on November 3 (the Afghan An-32 was shot down by Stinger on September 7, but this happened near Kunduz in 200 km from the border, and the battle on November 3 took place during the interception of the Afghan Su-22). Actually, the 40th Army in air battles did not lose a single MiG-23, and indeed in 1987-1988. there were no combat losses of this type of aircraft. Contrary to the claims of some domestic authors, the Afghans did not have “twenty-third” at all. A month after the September skirmish, it again nearly came to an air battle between Soviet and Pakistani fighters. This time, the Pakistanis acted openly defiant, apparently intending to repeat the recent "success". On October 15, the strike group of Soviet aircraft reached the border strip for striking when F-16s appeared near. The enemy was definitely looking for a battle: a pair of alien planes were found in close proximity - passing right under the strike group. The cover at that time was carried out by a MiG-23 unit under the command of Colonel G.P. Khaustov from the Air Force Directorate of the 40th Army. The leader already asked for permission to shoot, but the leader of the group did not rush into a retaliatory attack in a frankly unfavorable tactical situation, choosing a different option - ousting the enemy with deliberately assertive counter actions, the Commander went to the threatened flank of the group and went closer from the sun, demonstrating readiness to attack. Cutting off the enemy from his group, the “cover” fettered his maneuvers, warning of any active urges. Foreign fighters were continuously captured by radar sights, warning of being at risk. Deciding not to tempt fate, the Pakistanis turned their backs on their territory, and the situation for both sides was resolved by the principle "the best fight is the one that did not take place." Colonel Grigory Khaustov was the most productive of the 40th Army aviation fighter pilots, having on his account the number of sorties that exceeded 670. By that time, he was already in Afghanistan for the second time. As a pilot with a quarter-century experience, both times he was sent to “fulfill the international duty” from his unit individually: the first time in the position

 

[MiG-29SMT]

The combat work in Shindand was carried out less intensively, because of which, by the fall of 1988, there was still only the duty link of the fighters. Shindanda was on duty in shifts, giving the opportunity to relax in the "sanatorium" mode there. The local four fighters mainly had to carry out air defense of the airfield and accompany the attack groups of attack aircraft and fighter-bombers. “Iranian”, as the Afghans called neighbors, had no time for border conflicts: due to sensitive losses on the Iraqi front, the lack of replenishment of the aircraft fleet and difficulties with spare parts, only about a dozen Phantoms remained in the Iranian Air Force, several F-14As and up to fifty simpler F-5s. Shindand fighters have repeatedly seen planes appearing from the adjacent side on radar screens, especially during raids in the Rabati-Jali region, but they avoided rapprochement, keeping a safe distance. Nevertheless, it was in the Iranian direction that the Soviet fighters managed to win a “clean” victory. In September, air defense of an air base was detected four times by an air violation of the border in the provinces of Herat and Farah, but it was not possible to intercept the targets - they immediately went to their territory, and they were not allowed to launch missiles after them. The game of cat and mouse dragged on, and after several fruitless attempts, it was decided to cut off the violators from the border and destroy it. On September 26, after another alarm, experienced pilots Major Vladimir Astakhov and Captain Boris Gavrilov took off. After waiting for the violators to go away from the border, they performed a roundabout maneuver and attacked targets from the west, launching one P-24R from 7-8 km, as prescribed, deep into their territory. The attack was carried out over a deserted mountain plateau 75 km northwest of Shindand from a height of 7000 m with a radar sight. They didn’t see the hits visually, since the enemy was flying in a dusty haze near the ground, but the FKP films that recorded the extinguished marks on the sights screens served as proof of victory. Two weeks later, the infantry confirmed the victory, during a raid in the indicated square stumbled upon the wreckage of two helicopters. After the skirmish with the Pakistanis in the 120th IAP, there were several more cases of military injuries: one MiG-23 brought a jammed machine gun in the flap and the captain Nikolay Balabuha’s aircraft lantern (board No. 05) was shot on the ground while taxiing out. However, the frequent bombardment of the airfield almost led to dire consequences: during a night mortar raid one of the mines fell right under the nose of the victim in a skirmish with Pakistanis on the 55th side. In the event of shelling, the planes dispersed at the end of the flights, pulling them away from the parking lots, but at that time the mine lay down exactly at the plane. The plane miraculously escaped serious damage, only upon careful examination did they find a grease cut off by a fragment on the front wheel turning mechanism. A large fragment was stuck in a stack of ammunition boxes, others pierced the side of a neighboring fighter and set up the Sparky fuselage tank, from which half a ton of kerosene spilled. The next hit could turn the parking lot into a fire, but the ill-fated mine was the last. The misadventures of the 55th side didn’t end there: two weeks later, the high-explosive “Five Hundred” flew from the fighter that had taken to take off, flopped onto the concrete and rolled to the side. The pilot slowed down in bewilderment, and the technicians who released him, after a second of confusion, scattered all over the place, hiding behind the caponiers and ammunition stacks. Fortunately, the fuse did not work. After waiting a couple of minutes, the gunsmiths returned to the plane and planted the bomb in place. In addition to combat “holes”, equipment malfunctions occurred, although one of the most serious cases that led to the loss of a car was actually the result of lack of maintenance. On the MiG-23MLD No. 54, from the very beginning, a defect in the work of the wheel turning mechanism (MRC) used during taxiing “surfaced”. The malfunction manifested itself from time to time, being caused by the wear of the duralumin rollers of the guide by turning the rack. They did not notice him in time, and on November 8, the fighter of Major V. Krivoshapko pulled to the side on the run and carried it off the strip. Having flown out at a decent speed to the ground, the aircraft rushed to the post of the radio engineering service. To stop the car, the pilot began to remove the chassis, the front desk was folded, and the fighter buried its nose into the ground at the very fence. The bow turned out to be half-torn on the plane, and the glider was deformed so much that the machine could not be repaired. Two weeks earlier, when approaching, the MiG-23MLD pilot No38, captain K. Vorsin, in a hurry, did not release the flaps. At the back, a group was sitting down, sitting down at 10-15 second intervals, in the sky up to 10 km everything was jammed with decreasing planes, and a small remaining fuel did not allow to go to the second round. Touch occurred at a speed of 480 km / h. Immediately the brake parachute came off, the plane without delay jumped out of the strip and, breaking through the network of the airfield braking device, caught on its cable. On this “leash” he described an arc and crashed into the embankment of a guard post,

 

[MiG-29SMT]

MiG-23 fighters

After a year in Afghanistan, the 2nd squadron of the same regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel V.I. Novikov replaced the 2nd squadron of the 982th IAP in Kandahar at the end of May 1985. The beginners accounted for the first combat losses of the MiG-23. Less than a month after arrival, on June 21, MiG-23MLD did not return Lieutenant Bagamed Yusupovich Bagamedov, who flew in a pair to intensify the strike of the Shindand squadron near Kalat, 120 km north-east of Kandahar. The pilot, who was closing, died, but the circumstances remained unclear - his loss was noticed only when the second group came out of the attack and laid down on the opposite course. In all likelihood, the young and insufficiently experienced pilot, who was the last to attack, came under increased anti-aircraft fire. On that extremely unfortunate day, the victims were not limited to the loss of the MiG and its pilot: the search helicopter that flew to the aid, on approaching the fighter’s crash site, came under the fire of the DShK and was also shot down. The pilot and navigator Mi-8 managed to leave the helicopter with parachutes, but the flight engineer died in the helicopter.

Истребители МиГ-23 / Книга: Камуфляж и бортовые эмблемы авиатехники советских ВВС в афганской кампании / Библиотека / Главная / Арсенал-Инфо.рф

 

[MiG-29SMT]

During the air battles in the Middle East from 1982 to 1985. MiG-23 destroyed 12 enemy aircraft (including at least five F-16s and three F-15s according to Russian/Syrian authors), with their losses of 11-13 aircraft. Not such a bad balance, given that the majority of the "twenty-third" were far from the most recent modifications, and they were opposed by the most modern at that time American fourth-generation fighters, in the cockpits of which there were pilots who had, perhaps, the world's best professional training. In battles over Lebanon, both the strengths and weaknesses of the MiG-23 were demonstrated. The first included high speed and accelerating characteristics, which made it possible to carry out a rapid attack and leave the battle at high speed (according to some Western experts, the MiG-23 was able to successfully attack and leave the attack when meeting with any other fighter). The MiG also had certain chances of winning and the ability to perform relatively long high-speed flights at low altitude with the wing set to the maximum sweep position: the F-15 and F-16 with a low specific load on the wing experienced too much shaking near the ground, and such a ride cobblestone pavement "could not withstand even well-trained pilots.

At the same time, the MiG-23 was slightly inferior to the F-15 in both maximum and minimum speeds (however, the superiority of the Eagle in speed was rather theoretical: in practice, the 2.5 Mach flight capability of the F-15 was only in the flight manual since could not exceed Mach 2,3). The weakness of the "twenty-third" was the worst horizontal maneuverability compared to the latest American fighters. Up to a speed of 1200 km / h, the MiG-23 had a smaller available overload than the F-15, and therefore lower angular turn rate speeds, as well as a longer turn time (losing the MiG in the steady angular turn rate speed at a speed of 900 km / h was for various heights 2-6 deg/ s). However, at speeds above 1200 km / h, the advantage gradually passed to the MiG. The MiG-23 was slightly inferior to the American fighter in acceleration characteristics with a sweep angle of 45 ° and maneuvering with overloads close to the limit. This allowed the F-15 during the battle to gradually accumulate superiority in energy (in speed and height). The required input speed of the MiG-23 in the vertical maneuver was also slightly higher than that of the F-15. The maximum insertion height into the Nesterov loop for the MiG was 4000 m, and for the F-15 - 7000 m, while at the top of the vertical maneuvers the MiG-23 had a lower speed than the Eagle.





The American radar system had certain advantages over the MiG-23MF radar. However, the capabilities of the improved MiG-23ML and F-15A were approximately equal. The AN / APG-63 radar mounted on the Eagle was able to detect the MiG-23 at a maximum range of 100-110 km (with a heading angle of 90 degrees), and the MiG-23ML "saw" the enemy under the same conditions at a distance of 90 -95 km. The radars of both aircraft had the ability to detect targets against the background of the ground. Although the AN / APG-63 viewing area in azimuth was twice the viewing area of the RP-23 (+/- 60 and +/- 30 degrees, respectively), the resolution in angular coordinates of the Soviet station was 1.5 times better than that of American, which allowed, in particular, to hide from the enemy the true number of aircraft flying in tight formation.

Theoretically, if you compare published in the early 1980's. the characteristics of another fourth-generation American aircraft - the F-16A light fighter with real MiG-23 data, the superiority of the overseas machine over it in close combat (in terms of turn rate, acceleration, and vertical maneuvrability) should have been even more impressive than that of F-15A. However, the results of the battles over the Bekaa Valley did not show such obvious advantages of the F-16A. Moreover, it turned out that in a number of indicators (in particular, acceleration characteristics), the latest modifications of the MiG-23 are not only not inferior, but also somewhat surpass the capabilities of the American machine.

The reason for this embarrassment was the discrepancy between the real capabilities of the F-16A and its advertising parameters that fell into all the aviation directories in the world. So, it was reported that the normal take-off weight of the F-16A (with two AIM-9 “Sidewinder”, without fuel tanks ) is a little more than 10 tons. With the declared afterburner thrust of the Pratt-Whitney F100-PW-200 engine at 11340 kgf this provided a thrust ratio of more than 1, 1 with a specific wing load of 370 kg / m2 (the corresponding parameters of the MiG-23MF were 0.8 and 440 kg / m2). In fact, the normal take-off weight of the F-16A delivered to Israel exceeded 11,000 kg, and the maximum thrust of the turbofan engine was only 10,800 kgf. At the same time, the Israelis immediately began to improve their fighters, which led to the inevitable increase in weight. As a result, the take-off thrust-weight ratio of the F-16A was slightly more than 0.9, and the specific wing load was 430 kg / m2, that is, the American aircraft almost “dropped” to the level of the MiG-23MF and almost equaled the lighter MiG-23ML.

It is interesting to note that, in contrast to the advertising games that created the F-16 General Dynamics, McDonnell-Douglas, the supplier of the F-15, always tried to provide fairly reliable information about its aircraft. Therefore, estimates of the Eagle`s combat capabilities made by aviation experts before the 1982 conflict were almost completely confirmed during the fighting. "McDonnell-Douglas" has shown good faith in providing information on the results of the combat use of its vehicles, reporting that in 1979-82. The Israeli Air Force F-15A shot down 56.5 Syrian fighters (one MiG-21 Eagle shared with Kfir). This is accurate to the plane consistent with the Syrian data. At the same time, the General Dynamics announced 45 victories of the F-16 were won, in the vast majority, only on paper. A certain tactical superiority was given by the F-15 and F-16 significantly better visibility from the cockpit (in one of the Western magazines the MiG-23 was called a "fighter with an overview as from an armored personnel carrier"). At the same time, the presence on the MiGs of the automatic command guidance system "Azure" (the analogue of which was not on the F-15 and F-16) could provide Syrian aviation with an advantage in organizing combat control. However, the ground equipment delivered from the USSR was not put into operation, in addition, the Syrians did not have a continuous radar field over Lebanon for its effective use. In addition, the Israelis at the beginning of hostilities managed to destroy the Syrian fighter control center deployed in Lebanon.

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The increase in the production of the MiG-23M had a negative impact on the program for the creation of another supersonic aircraft - the Sukhoi T-4 ("100") bomber: The Tushinsky Machine Building Plant (TMZ), who built this machine, received a large order for the production of welded sections for the fuselage of MiG-23M. The Air Force command and the leadership of the MAP found the MiG-23 program to be more of a priority, and work on the "T-4" gradually ceased. Using the technology worked out on this machine, TMZ tried to master the production of sections of the MiG-23M fuselage made of titanium alloy, however such power elements cracked even stronger than steel ones, and this idea was abandoned.

The improvement of the MiG continued. Its design was gradually brought to higher reliability, and the afterburner thrust of the engine was increased by 1500kgf to a higher yield of 12,300kgf. It should be noted that the best American serial fighter of the early 70's. F-4E "Phantom-II", being much heavier and more expensive than the Soviet machine, was inferior to the MiG-23M in maneuvering and acceleration characteristics, climb rate, maximum speed and ceiling. Together with the newest fighter of gaining superiority in the air, the MiG-21bis - in fact a new aircraft with significantly improved flying technical characteristics, the MiG-23M - provided the domestic air force with superiority over American fighter aircraft right up to the introduction of the US Air Force in the second half of the 1970s. of the newer fourth generation F-15A and F-16A fighters.

As the main probable opponents of the MiG-23M in the 1970s, were the American fighter F-4E Phantom II (McDonnell produced 1127 aircraft of this model) and the French Mirage F-1. In combat with these formidable opponents, the MiG-23M pilot, depending on the conditions of air combat, could make full use of the positive qualities of the aircraft with variable geometry of the wing, which gave him the greatest possible superiority in maneuverability for each flight speed. So, the MiG-23M pilot could impose the combat conditions by making the wing shift to the maximum sweep and switch to a supersonic mode, in which the MiG-23M had a shorter acceleration time. The minimum sweep could be used in combat at flight speeds of less than 700-800 km / h, especially on vertical maneuvers . Almost in the entire range of altitudes at speeds of 700-1100 km / h, the MiG-23M was superior to the Mirage F-1 for maneuverability and climb rate. At speeds of over 1100 km / h at medium and high altitudes, the MiG-23M pilot was unable to match the Mirage on sustained turn handling. The existing superiority of the MiG in the rate of climbing was expediently used to transfer the battle to ascending vertical maneuvers with small overloads, which would lead to a decrease in speed and would transfer the fight to the conditions where the MiG-23 was superior to the Mirage F-1.

While conducting an air battle with the F-4E at speeds of 800-1100 km / h at low and medium altitudes at overloads close to the maximum in thrust, the MiG-23M in a horizontal maneuver surpassed the enemy, yielding to him in a vertical maneuver. The superiority of the MiG-23M over the F-4E (the most massive Israeli air force aircraft) indirectly confirms the fact that from the second half of the 1970s, from the moment of the MiG-23's appearance in the Middle East, the Israeli Air Force stopped using Phantoms for conducting air battles. Comparing the capabilities of combat aircraft, it is very important to evaluate their aiming systems and weapons. Without exaggeration, it can be noted that the aiming system of the MiG-23M fighter was not inferior to the aiming systems of the F-4E fighter aircraft (AN / APQ-120 radar, AN / ASG-26 optical sight) and Mirage F-1 (SIRANO IV radar, optical sight CSF-196), and by some parameters significantly exceeded them. (The capabilities of the Sapphire-23D-III radar, the AN / APQ-120 and the Cyrano IV are illustrated in figure 2.) The AN / APQ-120 radar, compared to the French and Soviet radars, did not have a target detection mode on the ground, and was also less jam-resistant. The presence on the MiG-23M of the thermal direction-finder significantly expanded its combat capabilities and allowed to successfully carry out combat missions even in conditions of powerful electronic countermeasures. Detection range of the TP-23 of an F-4 from the rear hemisphere in simple weather conditions was about 20 km. The R-23R surpassed in its capabilitiess , theAIM-7B "Sparrow" and "Matra" R.530 with a radar homing, but somewhat it was inferior to what the air to air missile the F-4E received in the second half of the 1970s AIM-7F Sparrow, which, however, it was compensated by a more powerful MiG-23M sighting system. (The permissible launch zones UR R-23R, AIM-7B and AIM-7F are shown in the diagram.3.)

It must be remembered that during the time of the mass production of the MiG-23M (1974-1976), neither F-15 nor F-16 were yet in service. The first F-15A appeared in the US Air Force only in the late 1976 (in the US Air Force in Europe - in the spring of 1977), and F-16 - only in late 1978. Of course, in terms of their flight characteristics and combat capabilities, the new American fighters outmatched the MiG-23M, but they were already planes of a newer generation. Moreover, the first serial F-16s, produced for several years, did not have medium-range missiles in their armament and could successfully fight the MiG-23M only in close combat, which was confirmed in 1982 during the battles over Lebanon . In 1982, Syrian pilots on the

MiG-23MF (the MiG-23M export version), not even trained in the way of conducting close combat maneuvering (it began to be developed in the USSR only in 1980, after removing restrictions on the MiG-23 overload capability) successfully resisted Israeli F-15 and F-16. By the beginning of hostilities, in 1982, in the fighter squadron of the 17th Brigade Air Force of Syria (Sigal airbase) were 21 MiG-23MF aircraft. The combat load of most of the squadron fighters included two R-23R, two UR R-60 and 200 rounds for the GSh-23A gun. During six days of the Lebanon war, the pilots of the squadron flew 52 sorties on the MiG-23MF, destroying 6 Israeli planes according to Syrian data, on the other source- 9 (six F-16, two F-15 one unmanned UAV). All Israeli planes were shot down from the first attack by R-23R missiles, which confirmed the high capabilities of the Sapphire-23D-III radar. The losses of Syrians were six MiG-23MF (two pilots were killed, four safely ejected). It should be noted that the removal of the Syrian land-based radar posts from the theater of military operations excluded the detection of low-flying Israeli fighters. At the same time, Israeli ground-based radars installed on the Golan Heights and reinforced by the Hawkeye E-2 aircraft fully controlled the airspace over the entire range of heights, ensuring the effective deployment of their fighters. Taking this into account, as well as using only the newest F-15 and F-16 fighters in air battles, the use of the MiG-23MF in 1982 over Lebanon can be considered successful.

MiG-23MF (izd.23MF, izd.2MF, variant A) is a single-seat frontal fighter with the R29-300 engine, modification of the MiG-23M with the S-23E armament system, practically not different in characteristics from the MiG-23M fighter armament system, for supplies for export to the Warsaw Treaty countries, and then Arab states. In 1977, on the basis of the MiG-23M, a MiG-23MF fighter was created, which was mainly intended for equipping the air forces of the Warsaw Pact countries. It differed from its prototype only slightly simplified avionics. For example, an export version of the command guidance system "Lazur-SMA", a radio sight "Sapphire-23E" ("E" - export), a TP-23-1 infrared search and track direction finder with slightly worse characteristics were installed on the plane. Part of the MiG-23MF was converted from the MiG-23M. Was built at the MAPO in 1974-1978. for exports to the Middle East and Africa. The first importing country of the MiG-23MF was Bulgaria, which received these fighters in 1978. It was built serially at MAPO in 1978-1983.

Libya and other Arab countries bought from the USSR a simplified export modification of the MiG-23MS (Export) (in the NATO classification - Flogger-E). This aircraft retained the design of the basic model, but was equipped with a R-27F2M-300 engine with a thrust of 10,200 kg. It was also equipped with a less powerful radar "Sapphire-21", housed in a shortened nose cone. This radar had a range of search and tracking of 29 km and 18 km, respectively, and did not have lock down shoot down capability. Its avionics did not include infrared sensors and Doppler navigation. This modification with minor changes in equipment was supplied to the Air forces of many Arab countries. All export modifications of the aircraft were substantially inferior in terms of capacity and capabilities to the aircraft that are in service with the CIS countries.

Уголок неба ¦ Микоян,Гуревич МиГ-23М

 

[MiG-29SMT]

The Americans say that in total during the war six MiG-23s were shot down (all of them were F-15Cs). However, Iraqi fighters also struck. So, on the first day (more precisely, night) of the conflict, a MiG-23ML pair shot down the Italian ADV Tornado fighter bomber over Baghdad. The Iraqi press also reported on the victories of the MiGs over the F-16. For comparison: the result of the air battles with the participation of Mirages F.1 - 9: 0 in favor of their opponents (7 on the account of the American and 2 Saudi “Eagles”). After the operation “Desert Storm” was completed, northern Iraq was declared a restricted area. for the aviation operations of this country. In January 1993, a pair of American F-16Cs, using the latest AIM-120 AMRAAM medium-range missiles, shot down MiG-23s in the area, which is so far the last combat loss among Iraqi fighters.

During the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the MiG-23 was used by both warring parties. In 1999, according to some reports, Eritrea lost two of these fighters, shot down by the Su-27.

Fragment of a downed Tornado in 1991

http://indbooks.in/mirror1.ru/?p=413822

сбитых самолетов фотографии

сбитых самолетов фотографии http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums...pur-War/page24 Египетские МиГ-21 сбит

forums.airforce.ru

 

[MiG-29SMT]

In Angola, MANPADS of this type were also fired in both directions. Trophy "Strela-2" of the Yuarians shot down the Angolan (Cuban) MiG-23ML fighter. On the other hand, the Cubans shot down from these MANPADS at least 2 of the Impala attack aircraft from South Africa, in reality their result was much higher.

С-75 forever - Армейский сайт «Почта полевая»

Попытки создания зенитных ракет делались еще во время Второй мировой войны, но в тот момент ни одна страна не достигла соответствующего технологического уровня. Даже война в Корее прошла без ЗРК. Впервые они всерьез были применены во Вьетнаме, оказав колоссальное влияние на исход этой войны. С...

pochta-polevaya.ru

 

[MiG-29SMT]

Did Israel suffered loses? yes they did, however the only loses admitted like always were the ones either there was evidence undeniable or POW.

For example this Gazelle helicopter downed in 1980
View attachment 47191


In soviet use no air to air F-16 victory over the MiG-23MLD was admitted by the Soviet Union, and Pakistan lost an F-16 conf

sorry the gazelle was Syrian, here are some Israeli aircraft downed in 1982

Ah-1 helicopter downed in 1982

One of the A-4N aircraft, which hit on June 6 a stronghold of militants in the n. Nabatiya was hit by a Strela-2 MANPADS missile. Pilot captain Aharon Akhyaz catapulted over the village of Arnun and was detained by local residents. He was later taken into custody by the PLO security forces (responsible - Colonel Abu Zaim) and taken to Beirut. Only 75 days later, as a result of the exchange of prisoners at the Fahami office, the pilot returned home. Being held captive - in the Sabra hospital, Akhyaz told reporters: “This was my first combat mission in the operation that began. I was supposed to attack artillery positions in the area of the old Buford fortress, but I could not find the target, and my plane was shot down. When the parachute landed in one of the villages, certain problems arose. Angry peasants, the third time subjected to bombing, began to beat me. But after the people from the Palestine Liberation Organization arrived, there was no more bullying. ”

Бои в Ливане - Авиация в локальных конфликтах - www.skywar.ru

 

[MiG-29SMT]

A combination of screenshots from video footage posted on YouTube show the MiG-23 aircraft before and after the explosion.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/syrian-fighter-jet-crashes-rebels-claim-they-shot-it-down/2012/08/13/104b98ac-e555-11e1-936a-b801f1abab19_blog.html

 

[MiG-29SMT]

Syrian MiG-23 / 27 Flogger E are used by the Syrian Air Force for ground attack, carrying bombs and unguided rockets.

https://defense-update.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/syrian_mig27_attacks_450.jpg

 

[MiG-29SMT]

MiG-23 shot down in Syria

A Syrian MiG-23 was shot down Nort-East of Damascus by the Free Syrian Army. The pilot has been killed. The Flogger has been identified as ...

alejandro-8en.blogspot.com

Monday, 5 June 2017
MiG-23 shot down in Syria

A Syrian MiG-23 was shot down Nort-East of Damascus by the Free Syrian Army. The pilot has been killed. The Flogger has been identified as MiG-23 "2797. There are no details on the type of weapons used to bring down the aircraft.

 

[MiG-29SMT]

Captured MiG-23MLD by Israel, after it was flown by a Syrian defector on October 11 1989

One of the MiG-23MS sent to China from Egypt, it helped to design the J-8II

 

[Foxbat]

Captured MiG-23MLD by Israel, after it was flown by a Syrian defector on October 11 1989


One of the MiG-23MS sent to China from Egypt, it helped to design the J-8II

I wonder how the USSR felt when their state of the art warplanes were betrayed to the enemy.
Despite these cases of unauthorised export of weapons the Soviets kept on selling warplanes to these countries for some reason(maybe compulsion due to financial need).

On the other hand I know the only Western jet fighter than landed in Soviet hands was the F-5 which was captured in Vietnam and perhaps F-4s.

 

[MiG-29SMT]

I wonder how the USSR felt when their state of the art warplanes were betrayed to the enemy.
Despite these cases of unauthorised export of weapons the Soviets kept on selling warplanes to these countries for some reason(maybe compulsion due to financial need).

On the other hand I know the only Western jet fighter than landed in Soviet hands was the F-5 which was captured in Vietnam and perhaps F-4s.

View attachment 47655

it speaks well about their aircraft, the MiG-23 was a great aircraft, but the Soviet Union usually barter goods, so most countries received goods practically free, Russia starting really asking cash and money.


The Americans received also old aircraft, MiG-21s when Russia was flying MiG-23MLs; and MiG-23MS to China and USA when Russia was flying MiG-31s.
The USA also received MiG-29As when Russia was flying MiG-29M and MiG-29SMT.

The USSR never was in danger because ICBMs were their true defense.

The Americans usually brag about their aircraft but Russian aircraft are good so the USA strategy was attack weak countries and study the few Russian weapons they had that explains their victories, but on a 1 to 1 bases the Russians have equivalent aircraft

 

[MiG-29SMT]

Allegedly MiG-23 loses in the Iran-Iraq war


23Sep80 F-14A 81TFS/TFB.8 ? AIM-7E-4 MiG-23 IrAF
23Sep80 F-14A 81TFS/TFB.8 ? AIM-7E-4 MiG-23MS 39FS/IrAF
28Sep80 F-4E TFB.6 AIM-7E-2 MiG-23BN IrAF
28Sep80 F-4E TFB.6 AIM-7E-2 MiG-23BN IrAF
28Sep80 F-4E TFB.6 AIM-7E-2 MiG-23BN IrAF
28Sep80 F-4E TFB.6 ? AIM-7E-2 MiG-23BN IrAF
29Sep80 F-4E 31TFW/TFB.3 A. Dowran AIM-7E-2 MiG-23MS 39FS/IrAF
29Sep80 F-4E 31TFW/TFB.3 A. Dowran AIM-7E-2 MiG-23MS 39FS/IrAF
29Oct80 F-14A 81TFS/TFB.8 Sedghi AIM-54A MiG-23MLA IrAF (pilot Ah.Sabah, KIA)
29Oct80 F-14A 81TFS/TFB.8 Sedghi AIM-54A MiG-23MLA IrAF
2Nov80 F-4E 31TFS/TFB.3 A. Dowran AIM-7E-4 MiG-21MF IrAF
10Nov80 F-14A 81TFS/TFB.8 ? AIM-7E-4 MiG-23BN 77FS/IrAF
7Dec80 F-4E TFB.3 ? AIM-7E-2 MiG-23BN IrAF
7Jan81 F-14A TFB.7 Farahavar AIM-54A MiG-23BN IrAF (Note 1)
7Jan81 F-14A TFB.7 Farahavar AIM-54A* MiG-23BN IrAF
7Jan81 F-14A TFB.7 Farahavar AIM-54A* MiG-23BN IrAF
7Jan81 F-14A TFB.7 Farahavar AIM-54A* MiG-23BN IrAF
http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_211.shtml

21Jul82 F-14A 81TFS/TFB.8 ? AIM-54A* MiG-23MF 23FS/IrAF (Note 2)
21Jul82 F-14A 81TFS/TFB.8 ? AIM-54A* MiG-23MF 23FS/IrAF
21Jul82 F-14A 81TFS/TFB.8 ? AIM-54A MiG-23MF IrAF
10Oct82 F-14A TFB.8 J.Zandi AIM-54A MiG-23BN IrAF
10Oct82 F-14A TFB.8 J.Zandi AIM-54A MiG-23BN IrAF
21Nov82 F-14A TFB.8 Khosrodad AIM-54A MiG-23MF 23FS/IrAF
21Nov82 F-14A TFB.8 Khosrodad AIM-54A MiG-23MF 23FS/IrAF
??Mar85 F-14A TFB.8 ? AIM-54A MiG-27 V-VS
??Mar85 F-14A TFB.8 ? AIM-54A MiG-27 V-VS
12Jul86 F-14A TFB.8 Reza ? AIM-7E-4 MiG-23ML 63FS/IrAF
14Oct86 F-14A 81TFS/TFB.8 ? AIM-54A MiG-23ML 63FS/IrAF


Allegedly MiG-23 victories in the Iran-Iraq war

26Sep80 39FS MiG-23MS R-13 F-4E IRIAF
26Sep80 ?FS MiG-23MF Ah.Sabah AAM or 23mm? F-5E IRIAF
15Oct80 39FS MiG-23MS R-13 F-4E IRIAF
15Oct80 39FS MiG-23MS R-13 F-4E IRIAF
16Oct80 39FS MiG-23MS AAM? F-4D IRIAF (pilot ?, POW)
14Nov80 39FS MiG-23MS witheld R-13M F-5E 21TFW/IRIAF (Zabihi KIA)
22Nov80 39FS MiG-23MS R-13 F-4D IRIAF
28Nov80 39FS MiG-23MS witheld R-13 F-4E TFB.6/IRIAF
16Oct80 39FS MiG-23MS R-13M F-4E TFB.6/IRIAF (Moftakhari/Koosta KIA)
4Feb81 MiG-23 AAM? F-4E TFB.6/IRIAF (Qoreishi/Ekhbari KIA)
21Apr81 MiG-23BN 23mm F-14A IRIAF (damaged)
??Dec82 23FS MiG-23MF O.Goben R-23 F-5E IRIAF (dam. & forced down)
11Aug84 63FS MiG-23ML 1stLt.? R-60MK F-14A 81TFW/IRIAF (All-e-Agha KIA/Rostampour OK)
6Feb86 63FS MiG-23ML witheld R-24 RF-4E TFB.3/IRIAF
13Feb86 63FS MiG-23ML witheld R-24 F-5E TFB.2/IRIAF (Varzdar KIA)
20Feb86 ??FS MiG-23ML O.Goben R-23 Fokker F.27-600 (EP-IOK?) Civilian (Note 3)
17Jan87 63FS MiG-23ML witheld R-? F-14A TFB.7/IRIAF (Ghanei OK/Assl-e-Davtalab KIA)
14Jun87 ?FS MiG-23ML witheld AAM F-4E TFB.4/IRIAF (pilot Solarie KIA)
14Jun87 ?FS MiG-23ML witheld AAM F-4E TFB.4/IRIAF (crew ?)
25Jun88 MiG-23ML R-60M AH-1J IRIAA

source

Ирано-Иракская война - Страница 5

Сообщение от Transit alexvolf, эти данные следует применять очень осторожно, т.к. они собраны иранской стороной и ни в коей мере не учитывают иракскую

forums.airforce.ru

 

[MiG-29SMT]

While not a MiG-23 but a Su-22 downed in the Iran Iraq

 

[MiG-29SMT]

Libyan MiG-23U flogger C trainer air refueling


The MiG-23 variants have different wing loading and thrust to weight ratio, MiG-23S had a wing loading of 490 kg per square meter and thrust to weight of 0.66. MiG-23M had a wing loading of 564 kg per square meter and thrust to weight of 0.81.

MiG-23ML had a wing loading of 370 kg per square meter and thrust to weight of 0.91.

The acceleration rate of the MiG-23 at sea level and from 600 km/h to 1100 km/h for the MiG-23 model 1971 in this configuration is about 23 km / h / per second, the acceleration rate of the MiG-23M corresponds to about 27 km / h / per second, and the acceleration rate increase of the MiG-23ML reaches 29 km / h per second. Converting this to acceleration time, we can say that at the sea level by every 100 km / h of speed increase, for the MiG-23 object 1971 will take it a time length of about 4.35 seconds, the MiG-23M in 3.7 seconds, and the MiG-23ML in 3.45 seconds.

Марковский В.Ю., Приходченко И.В. Истребитель МиГ-23. На защите неба Родины

Марковский В.Ю., Приходченко И.В. Истребитель МиГ-23. На защите неба Родины

pubhtml5.com

Реестр МиГ-23 - создадим вместе - Страница 19

Информация обновлена: 0390217152 МФ №30 27.05.79 Венгрия 01 12310 47.HRE 0390217153 МФ №30 30.05.79 Венгрия 02 12401 47.HRE 0390217154 МФ №30 11.06.79

forums.airforce.ru

 

[MiG-29SMT]

MiG-23 object year 1970 series