Main Battle Tanks and Armour Technology

[Damian]

On AUSA 2012 conference, GDLS officialy presented their proposal for the M1 Abrams powerpack replacement, the old AGT-1500C Gas Turbine will be replaced with MB883 compact Diesel. GDLS claims that range will increase from 329km to 482km and fuel efficency will be 14% for each kilometer.

 

[average american]

In July 2009, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that they will reduce the total number of tanks in active service in the military from 23,000 to 2,000. (And down from an astonishing 65,000 at the end of the Cold War.) These will be based in two separate tank brigades and more than 20 tank battalions that will be incorporated into other brigades. The two separate brigades will be located in Siberia and Moscow. Even Russia is pretty well aware that tanks are obsolete.

 

[Damian]

Even Russia is pretty well aware that tanks are obsolete.

Tank is not obsolete You idiot!

US Army wants a deep modernization of their tanks, did You even read the lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan? I would rather say that Your beloved aircrafts and attack helicopters are piece of useless junk in attacking ground forces and providing support to them than tanks, that proved to be far more efficent, effective and are far more cheaper, have greater survivability etc.

In July 2009, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that they will reduce the total number of tanks in active service in the military from 23,000 to 2,000. (And down from an astonishing 65,000 at the end of the Cold War.) These will be based in two separate tank brigades and more than 20 tank battalions that will be incorporated into other brigades. The two separate brigades will be located in Siberia and Moscow.

Are You even capable to use a brain?

Russia is downsizing it's tank fleet becaue 90% of that fleet are obsolete tanks like T-54/55, T-62's, and old tanks, mostly in very bad condition so their refurbishement would be too expensive. This means tanks like T-64's, most T-72's and T-80's.

What is the exact long term plan of Russian MoD is to reduce quantity of active tank fleet to 2,000 relatively modern tanks + then purchase approx 2,000 modern tanks based on "Armata" heavy platform + reserves which will be probably around 5,000 tanks. This gives a fleet of ~9,000 tanks.

Same is in US Armed Forces plans, where US Army will have ~2,000 tanks in active service, ARNG ~1,000 tanks in service, USMC ~100-200 in service + reserves of approx ~5,000-6,000 stored. This gives a fleet of total ~8,000-9,000 tanks.

So nobody in any armed forces who is sane thinks that tank is obsolete. Only such idiots and parasites like You thinks so, in fact You are internal threat to the US security, as well as any such person like You in any other country. Shame on You!

 

[average american]

You seem rather abusive,
but then I seem that indicates a lack of rational thinking, so thats your problem.


Is the Tank Really Obsolete?
by James Dunnigan
November 11, 2002
For several decades, the main battle tank has been declared obsolete. Like the battleship, another weapon that depended on big guns and thick armor, the tank was seen as inevitably done in by faster, cheaper and more numerous weapons. The first modern battleship was launched in 1906, but aircraft and submarines made the battleship obsolete, and none were built after 1945. The tank has lasted longer than that. First appearing in combat during World War I, the tank became a decisive weapon during World War II and continued to dominate battlefields to the present. That's over 80 years, twice as long as the battleship. But the tank, like the battleship, became too expensive and too vulnerable to cheaper weapons.

But there's another major factor that kept the tank going for so long; the Cold War arms race. Russia saw the tank as their principal land warfare weapon and produced over 100,000 of them after World War II. Russia introduced a new model every decade from 1945 to the 1990s. The World War II T-34 gave way to the T-54, then the T-62, the T-72, the T-80 and the T-90. The United States responded with the M-48, M-60 and M-1.

As the Arab-Israeli wars, and the 1991 Gulf War demonstrated, the American tanks in the hands of well trained crews could handily defeat larger numbers of Russian tanks. But the M-1, with it's use of high tech sensors, composite armor and depleted uranium shells, set a new standard for tank design and effectiveness. It also cost nearly five million dollars each. With Russia dropping out of the arms race when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and no one else willing, or able, to afford a tank to match the M-1, the end of the line has been reached. Well, a few nations could match the M-1 (Israel, Britain and Germany), but none of these were willing to build many of them.

The United States ended up with 7,000 M-1s when the Cold War ended. Russia was selling off its best tanks for less than a million dollars each, but no one thought of these as anything more than targets in a battle with M-1s. The world will still have plenty of tanks for the next few decades, until the last of the 50,000 Cold War surplus Russian tanks rusts into uselessness.

But why should the tank disappear now? Simply because the main reason for the tank was to provide a weapon that could battle its way past determined infantry and their machine-guns, artillery and anti-tank weapons. With modern electronics, cheaper precision rockets and bombs can deliver the firepower and flexibility that only tanks could provide in the past. These new weapons are easier to use and maintain than tanks, which have always been complex and difficult to keep going. Just like admirals did the math and decided that submarines and aircraft were cheaper and more effective than battleships, generals the world over will consider their options and go with what they feel will work best. There won't be much choice. With few new tanks being built, and cheaper, more effective, weapons available.

There will have to be some battles to make the point. China and India are still building tanks, using technology far behind, and a lot cheaper than, the M-1. But with smarter and cheaper anti-tank weapons available (missiles, "smart mines" and air delivered robot tank killers like SADARM), it will only take one incident of the "cheap and smart" stuff beating up on a lot of tanks to make the point. Another telling sign is the lack of enthusiasm in America and Russia for designing a replacement for current tanks. At least not a replacement that features the "bigger gun and thicker armor" that has characterized tank development for the past 80 years.

Then again, it may be premature to write off the tank. For a weapon that has been dismissed as obsolete for decades, it still survives. True, there are a lot fewer tanks in use now (about 60,000) than there were at the end of the Cold War (over 100,000). And the new ones being built are not sufficient to replace those that wear out each year. Less affluent nations will still find tanks useful against their own citizens, or equally poor neighbors who also have some tanks. The math, however, is unavoidable. Unless a new arms race begins, the number of tanks in service will slowly decline year by year. Meanwhile, the number of "smart weapons" grows rapidly. The tank won't completely disappear soon, but never again will it be the key weapon for ground warfare
Is the Tank Really Obsolete?

The USA had battle ships around for forty years after world war II, that did not mean they werent useful in some cases but it also did not mean they werenot obsolete.

 

[Damian]

You seem rather abusive,
but then I seem that indicates a lack of rational thinking, so thats your problem.

Well of course I'am abusive when I need to read BS generated by such idiots like You. And definetly rational thinking is not Your strong side... well You are unable to think at all... primitive form of life.

Is the Tank Really Obsolete?
by James Dunnigan
November 11, 2002
For several decades, the main battle tank has been declared obsolete. Like the battleship, another weapon that depended on big guns and thick armor, the tank was seen as inevitably done in by faster, cheaper and more numerous weapons. The first modern battleship was launched in 1906, but aircraft and submarines made the battleship obsolete, and none were built after 1945. The tank has lasted longer than that. First appearing in combat during World War I, the tank became a decisive weapon during World War II and continued to dominate battlefields to the present. That's over 80 years, twice as long as the battleship. But the tank, like the battleship, became too expensive and too vulnerable to cheaper weapons.

But there's another major factor that kept the tank going for so long; the Cold War arms race. Russia saw the tank as their principal land warfare weapon and produced over 100,000 of them after World War II. Russia introduced a new model every decade from 1945 to the 1990s. The World War II T-34 gave way to the T-54, then the T-62, the T-72, the T-80 and the T-90. The United States responded with the M-48, M-60 and M-1.

As the Arab-Israeli wars, and the 1991 Gulf War demonstrated, the American tanks in the hands of well trained crews could handily defeat larger numbers of Russian tanks. But the M-1, with it's use of high tech sensors, composite armor and depleted uranium shells, set a new standard for tank design and effectiveness. It also cost nearly five million dollars each. With Russia dropping out of the arms race when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and no one else willing, or able, to afford a tank to match the M-1, the end of the line has been reached. Well, a few nations could match the M-1 (Israel, Britain and Germany), but none of these were willing to build many of them.

The United States ended up with 7,000 M-1s when the Cold War ended. Russia was selling off its best tanks for less than a million dollars each, but no one thought of these as anything more than targets in a battle with M-1s. The world will still have plenty of tanks for the next few decades, until the last of the 50,000 Cold War surplus Russian tanks rusts into uselessness.

But why should the tank disappear now? Simply because the main reason for the tank was to provide a weapon that could battle its way past determined infantry and their machine-guns, artillery and anti-tank weapons. With modern electronics, cheaper precision rockets and bombs can deliver the firepower and flexibility that only tanks could provide in the past. These new weapons are easier to use and maintain than tanks, which have always been complex and difficult to keep going. Just like admirals did the math and decided that submarines and aircraft were cheaper and more effective than battleships, generals the world over will consider their options and go with what they feel will work best. There won't be much choice. With few new tanks being built, and cheaper, more effective, weapons available.

There will have to be some battles to make the point. China and India are still building tanks, using technology far behind, and a lot cheaper than, the M-1. But with smarter and cheaper anti-tank weapons available (missiles, "smart mines" and air delivered robot tank killers like SADARM), it will only take one incident of the "cheap and smart" stuff beating up on a lot of tanks to make the point. Another telling sign is the lack of enthusiasm in America and Russia for designing a replacement for current tanks. At least not a replacement that features the "bigger gun and thicker armor" that has characterized tank development for the past 80 years.

Then again, it may be premature to write off the tank. For a weapon that has been dismissed as obsolete for decades, it still survives. True, there are a lot fewer tanks in use now (about 60,000) than there were at the end of the Cold War (over 100,000). And the new ones being built are not sufficient to replace those that wear out each year. Less affluent nations will still find tanks useful against their own citizens, or equally poor neighbors who also have some tanks. The math, however, is unavoidable. Unless a new arms race begins, the number of tanks in service will slowly decline year by year. Meanwhile, the number of "smart weapons" grows rapidly. The tank won't completely disappear soon, but never again will it be the key weapon for ground warfare
Is the Tank Really Obsolete?

Are You even capable to read this? It is from 2002 during the rules of hated by US Armed Forces secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld who also contrary to the Army belived that tank is obsolete.

The USA had battle ships around for forty years after world war II, that did not mean they werent useful in some cases but it also did not mean they werenot obsolete.

Do not compare a main battle tank to battleship. Main battle tanks evolved much more than any type of combat ship, and are much more advanced technology, as well it is far more dofficult to properly design a tank, that any comparision proves that person making such comparisions have completely 0 knowledge.

Now read something more recent:

http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/content/pdf/IDR 10 Sept 2012.pdf

Where they say:

Heavy metal: arguing the continued need for Abrams in action
Publication: International Defence Review 2012
Author: Scott R Gourley
Section: Equipment profile
Last posted: 2012-09-10
The US' Abrams MBT has proven itself in conventional anti-armour fights and urban warfare, but is still not safe
from creeping cuts and force rationalisation.
In February last year, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates staged a vociferous defence of the main battle tank (MBT).
He told the West Point Military Academy that "the need for the heavy armour and firepower to survive, close with, and
destroy the enemy will always be there, as veterans of Sadr City and Fallujah can no doubt attest. One of the benefits of
the drawdown in Iraq is the opportunity to conduct the kind of full-spectrum training - including mechanised combined
arms exercises - that was neglected to meet the demands of the current wars."
Despite originally being designed as a counterbalance to the nightmare vision of a Cold War 'Fulda Gap' battlefield
scenario, the M1-series Abrams tank has proven to be flexible and adaptable across the broad spectrum of modern
conflict.
Today, while its continuing critical battlefield role is widely acknowledged, the Abrams faces a potentially turbulent future;
as broad service needs are balanced against programmatic priorities, declining defence budgets, and the realities
surrounding a unique defence industrial base.
Measuring 387 inches long (gun forward), 144 inches wide and 93.5 inches high, the 70 ton Abrams is an imposing
vehicle that provides the mobility, firepower, and shock effect to act effectively on the complex, integrated battlefield. It is
the only US Army weapon system that can withstand the impact of high-energy warheads and remain lethal in fullspectrum
operations.
Its Rheinmetall-developed 120 mm M256 smoothbore gun combined with the 1,500 hp Honeywell AGT1500 gas turbine
engine and advanced armour package, have proven successful attacking or defending against large concentrations of
heavy armour forces on a highly lethal battlefield and for roles that require shock effect, wide area surveillance, combined
arms manoeuvre, and mobile direct firepower to support mission requirements.
Key variants of the current US Abrams fleet include M1A1 US Marine Corps (USMC) Abrams tanks, upgraded digitised
M1A2 System Enhancement Program (SEP) Version 2 (V2) tanks being fielded to Active Army components, and
upgraded M1A1 Situational Awareness (SA) tanks being fielded to the National Guard.
The latest fielded version of the Abrams is the US Army's M1A2 SEP V2, which began production deliveries in February
2005. As a follow on to the initial 1998 SEP that upgraded the M1A2's computer systems and its night-vision capabilities,
M1A2 SEP V2 provides a digital tank featuring a new electronic backbone, powerful computers and an open architecture
designed to accept future technologies without the need for significant redesign. Service representatives point to the fact
Copyright © IHS 2012. All rights reserved. IHS Jane's International Defence Review Reproduced with permission.
Page 2
that the V2 fully exploits the intent of the SEP programme to maximise the tank's fightability on today's battlefields while
preparing for the challenges of tomorrow.
The USMC has deployed a company of its M1A1 Abrams tanks in Afghanistan's Regional Command - Southwest since
2011, following a decision to send the 14 tanks into theatre made in late 2010 after decision.
"The Abrams was designed primarily as an offensive main battle tank for more of what I would call 'The Cold War tank-totank
fight'," acknowledged Colonel Paul Laughlin, commandant of the US Army Armor School at the Maneuver Center of
Excellence in Fort (Ft) Benning, Georgia. "However, as we've seen over the last decade, that tank is adaptable to any
situation that we have faced and believe that we will face in the future."
Col Laughlin pointed to the army experience on Operation 'Iraqi Freedom' as well as the marines' deployment to
Afghanistan (the USMC armour also trains at Ft Benning) as proving his point.
"First, the mere presence of this beast is a psychological deterrent, let alone what it brings to the combat forces - that
being mobile protected precision firepower to the battlefield," Col Laughlin said. "Another advantage of this tank is that it
can go off-road. Its off-road tactical mobility is a huge advantage over some of the other platforms that we have in our
inventory, because the enemy we are facing right now has a tendency to leverage putting their explosive devices and
ambushes on known routes and roads."
Among lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan, Col Laughlin highlighted the tank's initial design and subsequent
adaptations "to absorb and withstand the enemy's counter-actions, through either direct fire or IEDs [improvised explosive
devices], while maintaining protection for our forces".
Among those adaptations is the development of the Abrams Tank Urban Survivability Kit (TUSK), which adds a range of
features to enhance crew survivability in urban environments. TUSK elements include: loader's thermal weapons sight;
loader's armour gun shield; IED blast-resistant seat; tank infantry phone; Abrams reactive armour tiles; Abrams belly
armour; power distribution box; driver's vision enhancer; counter sniper/anti-material mount; and remote thermal sight (on
the M1A1 only).
"The whole premise behind that was to protect our soldiers and marines within that beast," Col Laughlin explained. "The
kit includes a series of shields that we can adapt and put on the tank for the loader's station and the commander's station,
as well as some other protection that we can put throughout the tank, and we improve the optics so that we can remotely
detect and identify targets and engage those targets without the soldier having any part of his body outside the armour.
"I'll give you an example. This was reported to us recently in an after-action review. A marine tank company last year went
through their rotation in southern Afghanistan, during which they had 19 IED strikes. Only two of those strikes required
that the tank had to go to higher echelon maintenance. Both of those tanks were then returned to the fight. During the tour
the unit only had one wounded marine, and it was from a shrapnel wound from the explosion, because the tank
commander had his arm outside the commander's hatch."
He added that continual feedback from operations is worked into upgrades for the vehicle fleet.
With US Army budget documents reflecting that the Abrams is expected to be in service through 2045, service planners
have looked at the challenges of continuing the improvement and modification process to maintain platform viability.
In the near term, the next round of Abrams enhancements will address the fact that current Heavy Brigade Combat Team
platforms like Abrams are at, or have exceeded, their limitations for space, weight and power (SWaP) at a time when the
army must continue to add to or increase capabilities through subsystems like the Counter Radio-Controlled IED
Electronic Warfare (CREW Duke 3) remote-controlled IED jammer.
Copyright © IHS 2012. All rights reserved. IHS Jane's International Defence Review Reproduced with permission.
Page 3
As a result, the army developed a series of Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs) to re-establish space, weight, power
and cooling (SWAP-C) headroom to facilitate integration of technologies being developed under existing 'programmes of
record'. Planners stress that the proposed ECPs will restore lost capability to the platforms, not to exceed operational
envelopes outlined in current requirement documents.
On 8 June 2011, an Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) approved the ECP package for Abrams, along
with another for the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle.
Representatives for the US Army Program Executive Office for Ground Combat Systems point to four critical focus areas
for the Abrams ECP: SWaP; commonality; schedule; and cost.
Within those focus areas, the approved ECP will address identified 'gaps' in the areas of network enabling, lethality,
protection, and sustainment.
In the case of the network enabled gap, the ECP technologies will enhance Abrams network compatibility, power
generation and distribution, battery monitoring, and line-replaceable modules.
As an example, network compatibility will be expanded through the integration of the government-furnished JTRS
Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS) radio and Joint Battle Command - Platform (JBC-P). JTRS-HMS replaces
the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) and Enhanced Position Location Reporting System
(EPLRS) capabilities, while JBC-P is the next iteration of the FBCB2 programme that provides integrated, on-the-move,
timely, relevant command and control (C2), and SA information to tactical combat, combat support, and combat service
support commanders, leaders, and key C2 nodes.
Additionally, JBC-P incorporates Unified Battle Command (UBC) identified upgrades including chat, email, low bandwidth
imagery, and full NetOps, and provides the ability to share imagery and integrated Tactical Ground Reporting (TiGR) data.
Power Generation/Distribution elements of the ECP include: the improved amperage alternator; modified slip ring, with
capability to pass increased radio frequency and power to the turret; upgrades to the Hull Power Distribution Unit
(HPDU)/Remote Switching Modules (RSMs), required by changes to the alternator and slip ring; and the Battery
Monitoring System (BMS), required for the user to know the current status of the batteries that are needed for starting and
maintaining silent watch capabilities.
Benefits resulting from these changes include: reduced SWaP; regaining some additional interior volume for crew and
equipment; increased energy efficiency; reduced operations and support costs; and enabling all systems/subsystems in
the vehicle to operate simultaneously, without the need to prioritise and shut down some systems so that others may
operate.
The introduction of Line Replaceable Modules (LRM) will provide benefits ranging from leveraging industry standards for
single-board computer interfaces to supporting the emerging VICTORY generic vehicle architecture.
Identified lethality gap shortfalls will be closed by an Ammunition Data Link in the ECP, while the protection gap will be
addressed by an integration kit for the CREW Duke 3 outfit and additional armour upgrade.
Finally, the key ECP efforts to fill the sustainment gap will focus on a long-awaited introduction of a minimum of a 10 kW
auxiliary power unit (APU), using conventional mature technologies (diesel/turbine) to power on-board systems with a
reduced noise signature. The unit will be integrated in the left sponson of the hull, and will be under armour, with fulloperator
interface for operation control, monitoring critical parameters, and health and fault signals.
Benefits of the unit will include: the capability to operate on-board systems with a reduced probability of detection during
main engine off or silent-watch operation; cost and fuel efficiencies over the main engine to support operation of key
Copyright © IHS 2012. All rights reserved. IHS Jane's International Defence Review Reproduced with permission.
Page 4
systems for a duration of 12 hours (threshold requirement) from a stationary tank and providing power to start the vehicle;
and extending current M1A2 SEP V2 capability to support power demands of future inbound technologies.
In addition to the currently identified ECPs, the Armor School commandant acknowledged that the army is continuing to
look towards future enhancements.
As examples of interest in greater lethality, he noted, "We are looking right now at a couple of rounds of ammunition that
are being tested quite fervently. We expect to see those, I hope, at some time in the near future. Specifically, one is a
kinetic energy round that we feel can defeat anything we face on the battlefield."
The M829E4 120 mm Advanced Kinetic Energy round noted by Col Laughlin is externally similar in appearance to the
current M829E3 Armor-Piercing Fin-Stabilized Discarding Sabot - Tracer (APFSDS-T) round. However, in announcing its
three-year contract to develop and qualify the new round in July 2011, ATK representatives credited the new E4 design
with "heavy armour defeat capabilities that allow the tank crew to engage and destroy threat main battle tanks protected
with advanced, explosive reactive armour at extended ranges as well as in Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT),
mountain, and nontraditional battlefields.
"Along with ammunition improvements we also are improving our target acquisition means through our improved FLIR,"
Col Laughlin added. "So the better refinement of identifying targets at greater distances with more clarity will prevent
damage that we don't want to have happen."
When asked about communications enhancements, Col Laughlin said, "There are three things that we continually look to
improve. One is the situational awareness for the guys who are inside the tanks. The second is to be able to perform what
we call 'Mission Command' across a wide area. And third, we want to be able to use and integrate all sensors, so that
when we get into that tank we are able to analyse and be able to capitalise on weaknesses that we see with the enemy,
while understanding where our folks are to left and right of us.'"
Translating those SA, mission command and sensor goals into tactical reality is one of the myriad issues that are being
explored during the army's semi-annual Network Integration Evaluation (NIE) events at Ft Bliss, Texas and White Sands
Missile Range, New Mexico.
As an example, representatives for the army's Program Manager, Abrams points to the implications resulting from the
recent addition of Warfighter Information Network - Tactical (WIN-T) capabilities to the Army's Infantry Brigade Combat
Teams (IBCTs) in Afghanistan, affording the IBCTs assured communication outside direct line-of-sight.
As demonstrated in the recent NIE 12.2 (May-June 2012) and soon to be fielded to eight brigade combat teams as part of
the army's 'Capability Set 13', the army is installing WIN-T Increment 2 capabilities into M-ATV mine-resistant, ambushprotected
(MRAP) vehicles, to give the unit commanders on-the-move immediate high-capacity, secure communications
for voice and data well beyond what they had previously.
While the M-ATV MRAPs are relatively new vehicle designs, the sequential enhancements that have been made to the
Abrams tanks have progressively used up most of the SWaP margin available in the original design. However, based on
lessons learned at the NIEs, integrating WIN-T or similar systems into Abrams would be complex, with multiple electronic
boxes - connected by in excess of 200 cables - and require significant power.
Upcoming NIEs will provide a likely venue to explore the utility of this type of communications capability on Abrams and to
look at proof-of-principle designs for integrating future network 'Capability Sets' onto the Abrams combat platform.
It is not just a question of simply implementing the planned ECP package or future approved enhancements; significant
challenges surround the scheduling of work at the single Abrams production facility in Lima, Ohio. Formerly known as the
Lima Tank Plant, the government-owned/contractor-operated facility is now the Joint Systems Manufacturing Center
(JSMC).
Copyright © IHS 2012. All rights reserved. IHS Jane's International Defence Review Reproduced with permission.
Page 5
Army officials have previously said that they were willing to accept a multiyear pause in the Abrams tank production cycle
at JSMC. However, recent Congressional direction and funding have provided continued production demand at the
facility.
According to Keith Deters, GDLS plant manager at the JSMC, demand has the plant currently building Abrams tanks at a
".65 rate," equaling 12-15 tanks per month. The current rate reflects a drop from the "1.0 rate" per day that was achieved
in June 2012.
"We also build the Stryker structure here, but it's different from Abrams because all we build is the structure, which we
shift to our sister facility down in Anniston, Alabama where they do assembly and integration. And right now, we're
building those Stryker structures at one per day," Deters said.
"Our workforce has dropped from the end of [20]09 to now by about 300 people," he explained. "We are now sitting here
with about 775 General Dynamics employees, 49 per cent of those people are working Abrams; 42 per cent working
Stryker; and the remainder working a Namer vehicle for the Israelis."
Under a direct sale with Israel's Ministry of Defence, GDLS is currently building five "qualifier structures" for the Namer
heavy armoured personnel carrier at JSMC, with plans to do 15 low-rate initial production structures in 2013, followed by a
rate of 60/year in 2014-19.
Deter said the biggest near-term Abrams production concern involves "about five months starting in January. Right now
we will go down in January to a .2 rate, which is only four tanks a month".
"But we plan on going back up to the .65 rate again starting around the June-July timeframe. And that's to deal with
Foreign Military Sales with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Now, it's not under contract yet, but they are speculating that it
will be, and that we will be taking tanks that we built for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia back in the early [19]90s - they were
some of the first M1A2 tanks ever built - and now they need to have upgrades. The plan is to bring a quantity of those
tanks back into this country and have us remanufacture them."
However, "the difficulty with the Abrams is that if this Saudi thing doesn't happen then we are in some real significant
trouble with the Abrams", he continued. "There has been this whole plan of the army saying that they want to take a
pause in the production cycle of the Abrams and stop building them between the 2014 and 2017 timeframe. And we were
able to go back and get funding to fill us with US Army sales that take us through the middle of 2014.
"There is currently money that was added to the defence bill through the House of Representatives - another [USD]181
million, which creates another 33 tanks to get us through 2014. And right now that is in the Senate Appropriations
Committee being reviewed. So obviously that would have to get through the Senate and then receive the President's
signature.
"The obvious concern that I have is that if something happens and we don't do that Saudi work here, we really can't easily
pause this Abrams programme and then plan to start it back up," Deter added. "I've been here since 1982 and the
technology we use and the skills we use to build these tanks "¦ to stop it and try to start it back up - I don't know how you
could possibly do that. And that goes for our vendor base as well. How do you turn vendors off for three years and then
turn them back on? They're either going to go out of business or they are going to find something else to do."
"You just can't say, 'Here's an automotive factory; let's convert it over to a tank plant.' That's not going to happen. This is a
very unique facility here," he said.
Col Laughlin offered some takeaway messages about Abrams for both industry and warfighters.
In the case of industry, for example, he said. "If they can sustain what we have got, and as we adapt and look to improve
where we can - while maintaining flexibility - that will help us all."
Copyright © IHS 2012. All rights reserved. IHS Jane's International Defence Review Reproduced with permission.
Page 6
Referencing warfighters, Col Laughlin continued, "The Abrams, in my humble opinion, fits into future warfare. In almost
every operation that we do there is a role for armour. If you ask any commander who has been on the ground, when
armour shows up, specifically the M1 Abrams, it changes the calculus of the fight. And it changes it from both a
psychological and a physical perspective. That enemy is doing a lot more moving than he was before that tank section
showed up. So, we, at the Armor School are committed to ensuring that the Abrams remains an incredible mobile
protected precision firepower platform so that it is a critical member of the combined arms team. Its versatility, lethality,
and survivability, plus that precision firepower, combined with infantry and Stryker forces, makes us unique in this world
right now. And I see that in the future as well. Armour must remain a critical piece of the combined arms team."
To illustrate his point, he offered, "When I was in Israel I spoke to the 27th Brigade Commander from the Second Lebanon
War [2006] - at the Battle of Wadi Saluki - where they got 'beat up' a little bit. His quote to me was, 'The only platforms that
could operate in the anti-tank saturated contemporary operating environment were tanks, based on their survivability, their
versatility in terms of mobility, and their ability to quickly suppress and/or defeat whatever system fired at them.'
"So his message to me was that, regardless of the fight, tanks have a prominent place on the battlefield".

As we can see US Army disagree's with You, whole world disagree's with You, the reality disagree's with You.

Just accept the fact You are a moron and shut up, maybe then You will learn something.

Hey as a side note, why we would not present how important is vehicle survivability on avarage american by puting him in to lightly armored APC and fire at it ATGM, if he will survive (which is not very probable) we can ask him how much liked to be allmost killed... maybe then he will change his idiotic opinion and instead of talking that troops need a less survivable less safe vehicle, he will actually support troops and support the military and industry in their efforts to provide the best vehicles as possible with the best survivability as possible.

 

[average american]

In the Gulf and Iraq war we saw entire Iraqi Division of Armor destroyed in place by aerial weaponry, that was over ten years ago and planes carry even more and more effective weapons against tanks today and will even be more so tomorrow. Infantry and observers can just call for ground support artillary, to fire a shell or missile over thier area that will identify a tank and home in on its location. So the last place any one wants to be is shut up inside little boxes on a modern battlefield against a modern conventional opponent.

On the insurgent side, what the asymmetric adversary can do with an IED against an M1. Not pretty. Tanks are past being obsolete, like dog fighting and bayonets.

. The MBT is senile and obsolete in the face of infantry weapons like Javelin and PGMs from larger platforms.

What is really sad is that the Armor Corps didn't want to see a vision beyond General Patton's charge across open fields, oil stained faces and grime and the loud shouts of "Gunner! Tank! Sabot!" "On the way!"

 

[Damian]

In the Gulf and Iraq war we saw entire Iraqi Division of Armor destroyed in place by aerial weaponry, that was over ten years ago and planes carry even more and more effective weapons against tanks today and will even be more so tomorrow. Infantry and observers can just call for ground support artillary, to fire a shell or missile over thier area that will identify a tank and home in on its location. So the last place any one wants to be is shut up inside little boxes on a modern battlefield against a modern conventional opponent.

There is nothing real in this besides Your lies little lier.

And hey I know many people that were on the real battlefield contrary to You, and were very happy to be inside a tank, instead of being vurnable and "crunchy" infantrymen.

On the insurgent side, what the asymmetric adversary can do with an IED against an M1. Not pretty. Tanks are past being obsolete, like dog fighting and bayonets.

Well As document from US Army says, after adaptation of additional belly armor, the IED's are actually ineffective against M1's.

. The MBT is senile and obsolete in the face of infantry weapons like Javelin and PGMs from larger platforms.

With active protection systems and advance in the armor materials, notably nanotechnology and nanomaterials like Fullerene's and ADNR's sooner shaped charge based weapons like Javelin and other ATGM's become obsolete. In the end the only anti tank weapon will probably be other tanks with big gun firing kinetic energy projectiles that are much more difficult to being stop by active protection systems and armor than shaped charge based ones.

What is really sad is that the Armor Corps didn't want to see a vision beyond General Patton's charge across open fields, oil stained faces and grime and the loud shouts of "Gunner! Tank! Sabot!" "On the way!"

They are real soldiers, that fought the real war, seen the real battlefield, and have the read data for analisis, countrary to You imbecile.

Besides this, what You wrote above only shows that You do not know anything about modern tanks, and their crews, as well as the job they do.

God damn, I'am very thankfull US Army tank crews for saving Polish infantry troops during battle for the Karbala City Hall. Nothing else helped them, not artillery, not air forces, neither any missiles, the only thing that helped them to safely return to their families alive were US tanks and IFV's.

This argument alone shows how wrong You are.

http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/content/pdf/IDR 10 Sept 2012.pdf

Heavy metal: arguing the continued need for Abrams in action
Publication: International Defence Review 2012
Author: Scott R Gourley
Section: Equipment profile
Last posted: 2012-09-10
The US' Abrams MBT has proven itself in conventional anti-armour fights and urban warfare, but is still not safe
from creeping cuts and force rationalisation.
In February last year, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates staged a vociferous defence of the main battle tank (MBT).
He told the West Point Military Academy that "the need for the heavy armour and firepower to survive, close with, and
destroy the enemy will always be there, as veterans of Sadr City and Fallujah can no doubt attest. One of the benefits of
the drawdown in Iraq is the opportunity to conduct the kind of full-spectrum training - including mechanised combined
arms exercises - that was neglected to meet the demands of the current wars."
Despite originally being designed as a counterbalance to the nightmare vision of a Cold War 'Fulda Gap' battlefield
scenario, the M1-series Abrams tank has proven to be flexible and adaptable across the broad spectrum of modern
conflict.
Today, while its continuing critical battlefield role is widely acknowledged, the Abrams faces a potentially turbulent future;
as broad service needs are balanced against programmatic priorities, declining defence budgets, and the realities
surrounding a unique defence industrial base.
Measuring 387 inches long (gun forward), 144 inches wide and 93.5 inches high, the 70 ton Abrams is an imposing
vehicle that provides the mobility, firepower, and shock effect to act effectively on the complex, integrated battlefield. It is
the only US Army weapon system that can withstand the impact of high-energy warheads and remain lethal in fullspectrum
operations.
Its Rheinmetall-developed 120 mm M256 smoothbore gun combined with the 1,500 hp Honeywell AGT1500 gas turbine
engine and advanced armour package, have proven successful attacking or defending against large concentrations of
heavy armour forces on a highly lethal battlefield and for roles that require shock effect, wide area surveillance, combined
arms manoeuvre, and mobile direct firepower to support mission requirements.
Key variants of the current US Abrams fleet include M1A1 US Marine Corps (USMC) Abrams tanks, upgraded digitised
M1A2 System Enhancement Program (SEP) Version 2 (V2) tanks being fielded to Active Army components, and
upgraded M1A1 Situational Awareness (SA) tanks being fielded to the National Guard.
The latest fielded version of the Abrams is the US Army's M1A2 SEP V2, which began production deliveries in February
2005. As a follow on to the initial 1998 SEP that upgraded the M1A2's computer systems and its night-vision capabilities,
M1A2 SEP V2 provides a digital tank featuring a new electronic backbone, powerful computers and an open architecture
designed to accept future technologies without the need for significant redesign. Service representatives point to the fact
Copyright © IHS 2012. All rights reserved. IHS Jane's International Defence Review Reproduced with permission.
Page 2
that the V2 fully exploits the intent of the SEP programme to maximise the tank's fightability on today's battlefields while
preparing for the challenges of tomorrow.
The USMC has deployed a company of its M1A1 Abrams tanks in Afghanistan's Regional Command - Southwest since
2011, following a decision to send the 14 tanks into theatre made in late 2010 after decision.
"The Abrams was designed primarily as an offensive main battle tank for more of what I would call 'The Cold War tank-totank
fight'," acknowledged Colonel Paul Laughlin, commandant of the US Army Armor School at the Maneuver Center of
Excellence in Fort (Ft) Benning, Georgia. "However, as we've seen over the last decade, that tank is adaptable to any
situation that we have faced and believe that we will face in the future."
Col Laughlin pointed to the army experience on Operation 'Iraqi Freedom' as well as the marines' deployment to
Afghanistan (the USMC armour also trains at Ft Benning) as proving his point.
"First, the mere presence of this beast is a psychological deterrent, let alone what it brings to the combat forces - that
being mobile protected precision firepower to the battlefield," Col Laughlin said. "Another advantage of this tank is that it
can go off-road. Its off-road tactical mobility is a huge advantage over some of the other platforms that we have in our
inventory, because the enemy we are facing right now has a tendency to leverage putting their explosive devices and
ambushes on known routes and roads."
Among lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan, Col Laughlin highlighted the tank's initial design and subsequent
adaptations "to absorb and withstand the enemy's counter-actions, through either direct fire or IEDs [improvised explosive
devices], while maintaining protection for our forces".
Among those adaptations is the development of the Abrams Tank Urban Survivability Kit (TUSK), which adds a range of
features to enhance crew survivability in urban environments. TUSK elements include: loader's thermal weapons sight;
loader's armour gun shield; IED blast-resistant seat; tank infantry phone; Abrams reactive armour tiles; Abrams belly
armour; power distribution box; driver's vision enhancer; counter sniper/anti-material mount; and remote thermal sight (on
the M1A1 only).
"The whole premise behind that was to protect our soldiers and marines within that beast," Col Laughlin explained. "The
kit includes a series of shields that we can adapt and put on the tank for the loader's station and the commander's station,
as well as some other protection that we can put throughout the tank, and we improve the optics so that we can remotely
detect and identify targets and engage those targets without the soldier having any part of his body outside the armour.
"I'll give you an example. This was reported to us recently in an after-action review. A marine tank company last year went
through their rotation in southern Afghanistan, during which they had 19 IED strikes. Only two of those strikes required
that the tank had to go to higher echelon maintenance. Both of those tanks were then returned to the fight. During the tour
the unit only had one wounded marine, and it was from a shrapnel wound from the explosion, because the tank
commander had his arm outside the commander's hatch."
He added that continual feedback from operations is worked into upgrades for the vehicle fleet.
With US Army budget documents reflecting that the Abrams is expected to be in service through 2045, service planners
have looked at the challenges of continuing the improvement and modification process to maintain platform viability.
In the near term, the next round of Abrams enhancements will address the fact that current Heavy Brigade Combat Team
platforms like Abrams are at, or have exceeded, their limitations for space, weight and power (SWaP) at a time when the
army must continue to add to or increase capabilities through subsystems like the Counter Radio-Controlled IED
Electronic Warfare (CREW Duke 3) remote-controlled IED jammer.
Copyright © IHS 2012. All rights reserved. IHS Jane's International Defence Review Reproduced with permission.
Page 3
As a result, the army developed a series of Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs) to re-establish space, weight, power
and cooling (SWAP-C) headroom to facilitate integration of technologies being developed under existing 'programmes of
record'. Planners stress that the proposed ECPs will restore lost capability to the platforms, not to exceed operational
envelopes outlined in current requirement documents.
On 8 June 2011, an Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) approved the ECP package for Abrams, along
with another for the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle.
Representatives for the US Army Program Executive Office for Ground Combat Systems point to four critical focus areas
for the Abrams ECP: SWaP; commonality; schedule; and cost.
Within those focus areas, the approved ECP will address identified 'gaps' in the areas of network enabling, lethality,
protection, and sustainment.
In the case of the network enabled gap, the ECP technologies will enhance Abrams network compatibility, power
generation and distribution, battery monitoring, and line-replaceable modules.
As an example, network compatibility will be expanded through the integration of the government-furnished JTRS
Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS) radio and Joint Battle Command - Platform (JBC-P). JTRS-HMS replaces
the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) and Enhanced Position Location Reporting System
(EPLRS) capabilities, while JBC-P is the next iteration of the FBCB2 programme that provides integrated, on-the-move,
timely, relevant command and control (C2), and SA information to tactical combat, combat support, and combat service
support commanders, leaders, and key C2 nodes.
Additionally, JBC-P incorporates Unified Battle Command (UBC) identified upgrades including chat, email, low bandwidth
imagery, and full NetOps, and provides the ability to share imagery and integrated Tactical Ground Reporting (TiGR) data.
Power Generation/Distribution elements of the ECP include: the improved amperage alternator; modified slip ring, with
capability to pass increased radio frequency and power to the turret; upgrades to the Hull Power Distribution Unit
(HPDU)/Remote Switching Modules (RSMs), required by changes to the alternator and slip ring; and the Battery
Monitoring System (BMS), required for the user to know the current status of the batteries that are needed for starting and
maintaining silent watch capabilities.
Benefits resulting from these changes include: reduced SWaP; regaining some additional interior volume for crew and
equipment; increased energy efficiency; reduced operations and support costs; and enabling all systems/subsystems in
the vehicle to operate simultaneously, without the need to prioritise and shut down some systems so that others may
operate.
The introduction of Line Replaceable Modules (LRM) will provide benefits ranging from leveraging industry standards for
single-board computer interfaces to supporting the emerging VICTORY generic vehicle architecture.
Identified lethality gap shortfalls will be closed by an Ammunition Data Link in the ECP, while the protection gap will be
addressed by an integration kit for the CREW Duke 3 outfit and additional armour upgrade.
Finally, the key ECP efforts to fill the sustainment gap will focus on a long-awaited introduction of a minimum of a 10 kW
auxiliary power unit (APU), using conventional mature technologies (diesel/turbine) to power on-board systems with a
reduced noise signature. The unit will be integrated in the left sponson of the hull, and will be under armour, with fulloperator
interface for operation control, monitoring critical parameters, and health and fault signals.
Benefits of the unit will include: the capability to operate on-board systems with a reduced probability of detection during
main engine off or silent-watch operation; cost and fuel efficiencies over the main engine to support operation of key
Copyright © IHS 2012. All rights reserved. IHS Jane's International Defence Review Reproduced with permission.
Page 4
systems for a duration of 12 hours (threshold requirement) from a stationary tank and providing power to start the vehicle;
and extending current M1A2 SEP V2 capability to support power demands of future inbound technologies.
In addition to the currently identified ECPs, the Armor School commandant acknowledged that the army is continuing to
look towards future enhancements.
As examples of interest in greater lethality, he noted, "We are looking right now at a couple of rounds of ammunition that
are being tested quite fervently. We expect to see those, I hope, at some time in the near future. Specifically, one is a
kinetic energy round that we feel can defeat anything we face on the battlefield."
The M829E4 120 mm Advanced Kinetic Energy round noted by Col Laughlin is externally similar in appearance to the
current M829E3 Armor-Piercing Fin-Stabilized Discarding Sabot - Tracer (APFSDS-T) round. However, in announcing its
three-year contract to develop and qualify the new round in July 2011, ATK representatives credited the new E4 design
with "heavy armour defeat capabilities that allow the tank crew to engage and destroy threat main battle tanks protected
with advanced, explosive reactive armour at extended ranges as well as in Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT),
mountain, and nontraditional battlefields.
"Along with ammunition improvements we also are improving our target acquisition means through our improved FLIR,"
Col Laughlin added. "So the better refinement of identifying targets at greater distances with more clarity will prevent
damage that we don't want to have happen."
When asked about communications enhancements, Col Laughlin said, "There are three things that we continually look to
improve. One is the situational awareness for the guys who are inside the tanks. The second is to be able to perform what
we call 'Mission Command' across a wide area. And third, we want to be able to use and integrate all sensors, so that
when we get into that tank we are able to analyse and be able to capitalise on weaknesses that we see with the enemy,
while understanding where our folks are to left and right of us.'"
Translating those SA, mission command and sensor goals into tactical reality is one of the myriad issues that are being
explored during the army's semi-annual Network Integration Evaluation (NIE) events at Ft Bliss, Texas and White Sands
Missile Range, New Mexico.
As an example, representatives for the army's Program Manager, Abrams points to the implications resulting from the
recent addition of Warfighter Information Network - Tactical (WIN-T) capabilities to the Army's Infantry Brigade Combat
Teams (IBCTs) in Afghanistan, affording the IBCTs assured communication outside direct line-of-sight.
As demonstrated in the recent NIE 12.2 (May-June 2012) and soon to be fielded to eight brigade combat teams as part of
the army's 'Capability Set 13', the army is installing WIN-T Increment 2 capabilities into M-ATV mine-resistant, ambushprotected
(MRAP) vehicles, to give the unit commanders on-the-move immediate high-capacity, secure communications
for voice and data well beyond what they had previously.
While the M-ATV MRAPs are relatively new vehicle designs, the sequential enhancements that have been made to the
Abrams tanks have progressively used up most of the SWaP margin available in the original design. However, based on
lessons learned at the NIEs, integrating WIN-T or similar systems into Abrams would be complex, with multiple electronic
boxes - connected by in excess of 200 cables - and require significant power.
Upcoming NIEs will provide a likely venue to explore the utility of this type of communications capability on Abrams and to
look at proof-of-principle designs for integrating future network 'Capability Sets' onto the Abrams combat platform.
It is not just a question of simply implementing the planned ECP package or future approved enhancements; significant
challenges surround the scheduling of work at the single Abrams production facility in Lima, Ohio. Formerly known as the
Lima Tank Plant, the government-owned/contractor-operated facility is now the Joint Systems Manufacturing Center
(JSMC).
Copyright © IHS 2012. All rights reserved. IHS Jane's International Defence Review Reproduced with permission.
Page 5
Army officials have previously said that they were willing to accept a multiyear pause in the Abrams tank production cycle
at JSMC. However, recent Congressional direction and funding have provided continued production demand at the
facility.
According to Keith Deters, GDLS plant manager at the JSMC, demand has the plant currently building Abrams tanks at a
".65 rate," equaling 12-15 tanks per month. The current rate reflects a drop from the "1.0 rate" per day that was achieved
in June 2012.
"We also build the Stryker structure here, but it's different from Abrams because all we build is the structure, which we
shift to our sister facility down in Anniston, Alabama where they do assembly and integration. And right now, we're
building those Stryker structures at one per day," Deters said.
"Our workforce has dropped from the end of [20]09 to now by about 300 people," he explained. "We are now sitting here
with about 775 General Dynamics employees, 49 per cent of those people are working Abrams; 42 per cent working
Stryker; and the remainder working a Namer vehicle for the Israelis."
Under a direct sale with Israel's Ministry of Defence, GDLS is currently building five "qualifier structures" for the Namer
heavy armoured personnel carrier at JSMC, with plans to do 15 low-rate initial production structures in 2013, followed by a
rate of 60/year in 2014-19.
Deter said the biggest near-term Abrams production concern involves "about five months starting in January. Right now
we will go down in January to a .2 rate, which is only four tanks a month".
"But we plan on going back up to the .65 rate again starting around the June-July timeframe. And that's to deal with
Foreign Military Sales with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Now, it's not under contract yet, but they are speculating that it
will be, and that we will be taking tanks that we built for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia back in the early [19]90s - they were
some of the first M1A2 tanks ever built - and now they need to have upgrades. The plan is to bring a quantity of those
tanks back into this country and have us remanufacture them."
However, "the difficulty with the Abrams is that if this Saudi thing doesn't happen then we are in some real significant
trouble with the Abrams", he continued. "There has been this whole plan of the army saying that they want to take a
pause in the production cycle of the Abrams and stop building them between the 2014 and 2017 timeframe. And we were
able to go back and get funding to fill us with US Army sales that take us through the middle of 2014.
"There is currently money that was added to the defence bill through the House of Representatives - another [USD]181
million, which creates another 33 tanks to get us through 2014. And right now that is in the Senate Appropriations
Committee being reviewed. So obviously that would have to get through the Senate and then receive the President's
signature.
"The obvious concern that I have is that if something happens and we don't do that Saudi work here, we really can't easily
pause this Abrams programme and then plan to start it back up," Deter added. "I've been here since 1982 and the
technology we use and the skills we use to build these tanks "¦ to stop it and try to start it back up - I don't know how you
could possibly do that. And that goes for our vendor base as well. How do you turn vendors off for three years and then
turn them back on? They're either going to go out of business or they are going to find something else to do."
"You just can't say, 'Here's an automotive factory; let's convert it over to a tank plant.' That's not going to happen. This is a
very unique facility here," he said.
Col Laughlin offered some takeaway messages about Abrams for both industry and warfighters.
In the case of industry, for example, he said. "If they can sustain what we have got, and as we adapt and look to improve
where we can - while maintaining flexibility - that will help us all."
Copyright © IHS 2012. All rights reserved. IHS Jane's International Defence Review Reproduced with permission.
Page 6
Referencing warfighters, Col Laughlin continued, "The Abrams, in my humble opinion, fits into future warfare. In almost
every operation that we do there is a role for armour. If you ask any commander who has been on the ground, when
armour shows up, specifically the M1 Abrams, it changes the calculus of the fight. And it changes it from both a
psychological and a physical perspective. That enemy is doing a lot more moving than he was before that tank section
showed up. So, we, at the Armor School are committed to ensuring that the Abrams remains an incredible mobile
protected precision firepower platform so that it is a critical member of the combined arms team. Its versatility, lethality,
and survivability, plus that precision firepower, combined with infantry and Stryker forces, makes us unique in this world
right now. And I see that in the future as well. Armour must remain a critical piece of the combined arms team."
To illustrate his point, he offered, "When I was in Israel I spoke to the 27th Brigade Commander from the Second Lebanon
War [2006] - at the Battle of Wadi Saluki - where they got 'beat up' a little bit. His quote to me was, 'The only platforms that
could operate in the anti-tank saturated contemporary operating environment were tanks, based on their survivability, their
versatility in terms of mobility, and their ability to quickly suppress and/or defeat whatever system fired at them.'
"So his message to me was that, regardless of the fight, tanks have a prominent place on the battlefield".

These are US Armed Forces conclusions after performing at least 9 years of real warfare, and they know better than You what they need, what is effective on the battlefield and what is not. So shut up... oh better, kill yourself, You bring shame to the USA, and Your only purpose is to decrease effectiveness of US Armed Forces as well as decrease survivability of it's troops.

If someone from my country would talk the same BS like You, I would hit him in the face without hesitation.

Besides, this is very important.

Referencing warfighters, Col Laughlin continued, "The Abrams, in my humble opinion, fits into future warfare. In almost
every operation that we do there is a role for armour. If you ask any commander who has been on the ground, when
armour shows up, specifically the M1 Abrams, it changes the calculus of the fight. And it changes it from both a
psychological and a physical perspective. That enemy is doing a lot more moving than he was before that tank section
showed up. So, we, at the Armor School are committed to ensuring that the Abrams remains an incredible mobile
protected precision firepower platform so that it is a critical member of the combined arms team. Its versatility, lethality,
and survivability, plus that precision firepower, combined with infantry and Stryker forces, makes us unique in this world
right now. And I see that in the future as well. Armour must remain a critical piece of the combined arms team."
To illustrate his point, he offered, "When I was in Israel I spoke to the 27th Brigade Commander from the Second Lebanon
War [2006] - at the Battle of Wadi Saluki - where they got 'beat up' a little bit. His quote to me was, 'The only platforms that
could operate in the anti-tank saturated contemporary operating environment were tanks, based on their survivability, their
versatility in terms of mobility, and their ability to quickly suppress and/or defeat whatever system fired at them.'
"So his message to me was that, regardless of the fight, tanks have a prominent place on the battlefield".

So the Israelis, also thinks after real battlefield experience with advanced anti tank weapons, that the only platform capable to survive on such battlefield is a tank.

Oh maybe our armchair general avarage american thinks that Israelis have no real battlefield experience? Maybe he should try to lecture IDF to withdraw all of their tanks and storm Hezbollah fortifications on horses?

 

[average american]

Quote from Iraqi tanker, "During the Iraq Iran war the tank was my friend I even slept in it, but in this war I wanted to be as far away from the tank as possile because you knew you could die any second you were near the tank. Ever time we heard a plane we ran."

In my country if you hit me in the face you would get a bullet in yours.

I support the military, I dont want to see them spending money on ineffective obsolete weapons like tanks that cost 5 million each to be worth any thing, and then can be taken out by a ten thousand dollar weapon.

 

[Damian]

Quote from Iraqi tanker, "During the Iraq Iran war the tank was my friend I even slept in it, but in this war I wanted to be as far away from the tank as possile because you knew you could die any second you were near the tank. Ever time we heard a plane we ran."

I have a better one, and actually confirmed and documented in US Army ARMOR Magazine.

In my country if you hit me between the eyes you would get a bullet between yours.

This only prooves You are not a man that have balls to fight hand to hand... pussy.

I support the military, I dont want to see them spending money on ineffective obsolete weapons like tanks that cost 5 million each to be worth any thing, and then can be taken out by a ten thousand dollar weapon.

Oh really? The maybe You should resign from aircrafts, F-22A also can be take out by a missile that costs several thousands of dollars. Attack helicopters also can be taken out by a missiles... hell not even a missiles but automatic cannons that fires cheap ammunition. Submarines, aircraft carriers.

Damn man, everything is obsolete because can be taken out by a cheaper ammunition.

Oh no, even infantrymen is more expensive to be trained, equiped and provided a logistical support than a bullet from AK of some insurgent from some shit hole. We should resign from infantry because it is obsolete.

But wait, but then we should resign from military at all!

Now You see how stupid You are?

You are not supporting Your military, You are just parasite.

 

[militarysta]

Segmented penetrator has many advantages, it's improvement is based on reduced effect of single flying metal plate, howewer it is still not so reliable against more modern ERA (Relikt) where there is double interaction with frontal and back plate, and the second damages and destabilises penetrator with already lost segment, also loss of segment implies a sacrifice of penetration ability, but against reactive armour it is justified.

Against more modern developements there are another problems apart from described multiple interactions. Modern reactive armour block has significantly greater plate surface which projects well to main segment, destabilising it from the start.

First:
Kaktus ERA and Bulak turret concept was rejected in Russia due to several resons. Both: Kaktus and Burlak are ded now so talking about them is pointless. There was to many problems whit turret balance, whit paradoks between ERA size and shape and neccesery "special armour" cavity in main armour (it's imposible to have armour made ony by ERA against penetrator), and others. In fact all Burlak turret was rejected few yers ago -the same Kaktus heavy ERA.

Second:
You wrote "howewer it is still not so reliable against more modern ERA (Relikt)" I wouldn't be so sure becouse the same mehanism can be use to forced second plate in Relikt - in fact both plates in Relikt can be overpas in the same scenario. Of course APFSDS penetration will be lower, but cost will be smaller then broken on ERA penetrator.

Generally there are two "way" to overcome modern ERA (and two theory placed in books and pdfs):
1) first "super: long, thick, heavy penetrator theory". This theory is based on... M829A3 when is no possible to place longer penetrator in 120mm round in Rh120:

Inthat theory in M829A3 penetrator is so long, so thick that ERA is not able to breake it, or bent. Of course ERA will be have some influece on that penetretor but damage will by to little to stop that penetrator. In oher world: even if ERA works perfect M829A3 penetrator will be to long and to heavy so it's penetration after ERA will be enought to overcome main armour.
IMHO this theory is not very clever becouse it's not account SC mehanism in ERA (Knife, Duplet), and SLERA, and others facotrs. But maybe...?

2. second theory is based on change in the construction of the penetrator. In that theory the penetrator is no longer monolit becouse it works on more sophisticated way then only "moving foward".
In Germany&France, USA, Korea, and....Poland studies have been conducted on the phenomenon " forced segmented penetration". Ironnicly we know the most about less advanced (money...) research in Poland. Couple of quite good pdf made in WITU are avaible in the internet. In rest countres we have only patent sheets and numbers.
We know that on RHA plates penetartor using "orced segmented penetration" have 10% better perforamce then monolithic penetrator. During penetration multi-layerd target and active targets the profit is even bigger. In theory there is no limits how many parts should have penetrator. The shortest part should have lenght enought to overcome thickest RHA plate used in tanks. The bigest advantages of segmented penetrators is possibility to overcome modern ERA and multilayer targets in Burlinghton style.

And using that kind of penetrator is the logical answer for the question" Why Germnas and Francht don't increased length in newest penetrator?
In DM53 and DM63 there was obvious option to do the same as Americans in M829A3 - put the longest possible penetrator passing through the entire cartridge. In all 120mm NATo rounds is the same lengh like in M829A3: ~980mm, so penetrator can have 920-940mm lenght.
While Russian have obvious limits in dual parts ammo (750mm lenght) then there is no sucht limit in Germany, France, Korea, etc..
But DM53 and DM63 have "only" 745mm lenght penetrator (and about 650-680mm lon rod) . Like in Siniviets...
So there is other way to incarese penetration on modern targets. Forced segmented penetration is logical answer for that and other questions.

 

[hest]

First:
Kaktus ERA and Bulak turret concept was rejected in Russia due to several resons. Both: Kaktus and Burlak are ded now so talking about them is pointless.

And I can say "talk about segmented penetrator is pointless" because it is not fielded, howewer perspective projectile has to account perspective armour.

Kaktus was armour of ob 640 and it is not related with Burlak.

Multi-layered ERA was developed by NII Stali for modernisation of tanks, howewer it ceased to be offered as it required costly modifications in turret, it later evolved with KBTM and used in new production.

and There was to many problems whit turret balance, whit paradoks between ERA size and shape and neccesery "special armour" cavity in main armour (it's imposible to have armour made ony by ERA against penetrator), and others. In fact all Burlak turret was rejected few yers ago -the same Kaktus heavy ERA.

Most of what you say is made up or rumours, and from what you say it looks like you are not familiarised with this armour (your concept is completely wrong).

About rejection of Burlak, there was not given any official explanation, reasons were probably similar as with ob 195, there is no real justification to criticise from technical aspect.

Second:
You wrote "howewer it is still not so reliable against more modern ERA (Relikt)" I wouldn't be so sure becouse the same mehanism can be use to forced second plate in Relikt - in fact both plates in Relikt can be overpas in the same scenario. Of course APFSDS penetration will be lower, but cost will be smaller then broken on ERA penetrator.

If there are only 2 segments as described in patent and pdf, then it will be affected by second plate and effect will be more than if it would interact with Kontakt-5, of course it is better to sacrifice segment and interact with single plate than with whole elements, but general efficiency wouldn't be great.

Generally there are two "way" to overcome modern ERA (and two theory placed in books and pdfs):
1) first "super: long, thick, heavy penetrator theory". This theory is based on... M829A3 when is no possible to place longer penetrator in 120mm round in Rh120:

Inthat theory in M829A3 penetrator is so long, so thick that ERA is not able to breake it, or bent. Of course ERA will be have some influece on that penetretor but damage will by to little to stop that penetrator. In oher world: even if ERA works perfect M829A3 penetrator will be to long and to heavy so it's penetration after ERA will be enought to overcome main armour.
IMHO this theory is not very clever becouse it's not account SC mehanism in ERA (Knife, Duplet), and SLERA, and others facotrs. But maybe...?

There will always be lateral impulse no matter if it will not break penetrator or bend it, which is important destabilising effect.

About M829A3 all is exageration, it will bend and you forget the fact that energy is limited due to old gun (less energy than DM rounds or no more) it will hardly overcome double plate interaction of modern and semi-active composite armour, that is why it's purchase ceased in relatively limited numbers (main APFSDS is still M829A2) and currently they perform developement of new round.

2. second theory is based on change in the construction of the penetrator. In that theory the penetrator is no longer monolit becouse it works on more sophisticated way then only "moving foward".
In Germany&France, USA, Korea, and....Poland studies have been conducted on the phenomenon " forced segmented penetration". Ironnicly we know the most about less advanced (money...) research in Poland. Couple of quite good pdf made in WITU are avaible in the internet. In rest countres we have only patent sheets and numbers.
We know that on RHA plates penetartor using "orced segmented penetration" have 10% better perforamce then monolithic penetrator. During penetration multi-layerd target and active targets the profit is even bigger. In theory there is no limits how many parts should have penetrator. The shortest part should have lenght enought to overcome thickest RHA plate used in tanks. The bigest advantages of segmented penetrators is possibility to overcome modern ERA and multilayer targets in Burlinghton style.

In your drawing you represent Relikt, but you only show interaction with one plate and forget about the second.

It is possible to divide penetrator into many segments, but it would just be worthless. When it faces two flying plates in opposite directions, it will loose 2 or even 3 segments, a sacrifice of half of penetrator lenght and mass, so you will have "half projectile" left against main armour. For this reasons developement of segmented penetrator is a dead end.

And using that kind of penetrator is the logical answer for the question" Why Germnas and Francht don't increased length in newest penetrator?
In DM53 and DM63 there was obvious option to do the same as Americans in M829A3 - put the longest possible penetrator passing through the entire cartridge. In all 120mm NATo rounds is the same lengh like in M829A3: ~980mm, so penetrator can have 920-940mm lenght.
While Russian have obvious limits in dual parts ammo (750mm lenght) then there is no sucht limit in Germany, France, Korea, etc..
But DM53 and DM63 have "only" 745mm lenght penetrator (and about 650-680mm lon rod) . Like in Siniviets...
So there is other way to incarese penetration on modern targets. Forced segmented penetration is logical answer for that and other questions.

It is more complex than just increase of lenght, there also has to be an increase in energy from gun otherwise improvement is not possible.

In fact current ammunition like Svinets-1,2 and DM-53 give sufficient performance to overcome current composite armour (especially for some Western tanks with no ERA)

Actually Russia was to field new ammunition, R&D and projectile denomination "Vacuum" with penetrator lenght up to 1 meter for turret bustle autoloader of ob 189 (T-92) and later for Burlak modernisation, and that was about decades ago. Developements focus on new armament as 2A82 and 2A83, you cannot remain forever with same gun and question why it is limited.

 

[Damian]

Less Fuel, More Range: GD Has a Plan – DefenseNews.com - Breaking Defense News

It becomes more and more interesting.

------------------------------------------------------


Expanded video of WPB Anders in the LT/FSV version armed with 120mm smoothbore gun. Watch to the end, there are fragments from static firing tests.

-----------------------------------------------------


Some rare prototypes moved from Fort Knox to Fort Benning, hopefully some of them will be restored by the museum team. Among them MBT-70, XM803 and M1 TTB.

 

[Damian]

About M829A3 all is exageration, it will bend and you forget the fact that energy is limited due to old gun (less energy than DM rounds or no more) it will hardly overcome double plate interaction of modern and semi-active composite armour, that is why it's purchase ceased in relatively limited numbers (main APFSDS is still M829A2) and currently they perform developement of new round.

You are wrong. M829A3 was purchased from the beggining of ~2003 to the beggining of 2010. So main APFSDS are both M829A2 and M829A3. There were no problems with M829A3 performance, other than the fact it decreases barrel service life more than older rounds. From 2010 it is performed R&D work on AKE vel M829E4 that will be standarised as M829A4 very soon.

Maybe You should start to use official US Armed Forces sources, not some poor russian language ones.

In fact current ammunition like Svinets-1,2 and DM-53 give sufficient performance to overcome current composite armour (especially for some Western tanks with no ERA)

Haha, good joke little fanboy, and now give us a proof, especially from ballistic tests against these tanks.

Developements focus on new armament as 2A82 and 2A83, you cannot remain forever with same gun and question why it is limited.

New gun is useless without proper ammunition. Current T-xx series of tanks are unable to use decent ammunition due to size limitations. This is a fact.

 

[militarysta]

And I can say "talk about segmented penetrator is pointless" because it is not fielded,

Or it is, but we haven't offcial confirmation. And many evidence is about that solutions in modern APFSDS.

Kaktus was armour of ob 640 and it is not related with Burlak.

It's obvious.

Multi-layered ERA was developed by NII Stali for modernisation of tanks, howewer it ceased to be offered as it required costly modifications in turret, it later evolved with KBTM and used in new production.

There are at least 3 russian patent showned that solution.

Most of what you say is made up or rumours, and from what you say it looks like you are not familiarised with this armour (your concept is completely wrong).

About rejection of Burlak, there was not given any official explanation, reasons were probably similar as with ob 195, there is no real justification to criticise from technical aspect.

In polish military press was given simple answer: "turret balanse problem" it was about attempts to modernize T-80 and T-72 family turrets by using Burlak autoloader, but not changed frontal armour protection. In newest turret whit Burak module problem was lack of export orders. And russian military as I rememer say "goodbay" to manned turrets in future tanks.

If there are only 2 segments as described in patent and pdf, then it will be affected by second plate and effect will be more than if it would interact with Kontakt-5, of course it is better to sacrifice segment and interact with single plate than with whole elements, but general efficiency wouldn't be great.

Or those segments are in bigger number then two. There is that option. And egment's can work in difrent way - exampe like in PELE rounds or smth. But the simplest way is mady whole core by segments.

About M829A3 all is exageration, it will bend and you forget the fact that energy is limited due to old gun (less energy than DM rounds or no more) it will hardly overcome double plate interaction of modern and semi-active composite armour, that is why it's purchase ceased in relatively limited numbers (main APFSDS is still M829A2) and currently they perform developement of new round.

??
DM53 L-44 11,5MJ muzzle - 1650m/s
DM53 L-55 13,5MJ muzzle -1700m/s
M829A3 12,1MJ muzzle - 1555m/s
But M829A3 have:
a) 15% longer rod
b) composite sabot

In your drawing you represent Relikt, but you only show interaction with one plate and forget about the second.

Becouse generral rulle will be the same.

It is possible to divide penetrator into many segments, but it would just be worthless. When it faces two flying plates in opposite directions, it will loose 2 or even 3 segments, a sacrifice of half of penetrator lenght and mass, so you will have "half projectile" left against main armour. For this reasons developement of segmented penetrator is a dead end.

Definetly not.
Firstly - two frontal segments are able to overcome most heavy ad fast in flight part of the ERA, and becouse they are flying foward they just must hit inner ERA moving plate.
secodn -it will not be "half of the penetrator". In fact less more, and it's possible that even one-two segments are just enought to destroy ERA plates (or rather made in them big holes).

In fact current ammunition like Svinets-1,2 and DM-53 give sufficient performance to overcome current composite armour (especially for some Western tanks with no ERA)

I have doubt about that. And in most western tanks there is some kind of active NERA NxRA SLERA protection. In Leopad-2A5-A6 on turret and hull. In M1A2 turet propably it's inner active layer.

Developements focus on new armament as 2A82 and 2A83, you cannot remain forever with same gun and question why it is limited.

For all using now russian tanks penetrator lenght is limited to max 740-745mm.

 

[hest]

You are wrong. M829A3 was purchased from the beggining of ~2003 to the beggining of 2010. So main APFSDS are both M829A2 and M829A3. There were no problems with M829A3 performance, other than the fact it decreases barrel service life more than older rounds. From 2010 it is performed R&D work on AKE vel M829E4 that will be standarised as M829A4 very soon.

Maybe You should start to use official US Armed Forces sources, not some poor russian language ones.

You should check number of rounds in service and purchases.

Haha, good joke little fanboy, and now give us a proof, especially from ballistic tests against these tanks.

Your logic also works if I ask, to show proof that DM-53 will perforate M-60 in ballistic tests.

New gun is useless without proper ammunition. Current T-xx series of tanks are unable to use decent ammunition due to size limitations. This is a fact.

There is even higher logic: Whatever you do, you will not achieve increase without proper gun, because it is what really limits performance, and not ammunition.

About decent ammunition, they use penetrators with same lenght as DM-53, so what is the point ?

 

[Damian]

You should check number of rounds in service and purchases.

Oh I have proper documents from PM MAS, You provide nothing.

Your logic also works if I ask, to show proof that DM-53 will perforate M-60 in ballistic tests.

Well of course I don't know because such tank like M-60 do not exist, there was M60, but M-60 is non existing creation of Your ill mind.

There is even higher logic: Whatever you do, you will not achieve increase without proper gun, because it is what really limits performance, and not ammunition.

Oh the reality do not agree with You, US was capable to achieve increase with the same gun for 27 years, just improving ammunition.

About decent ammunition, they use penetrators with same lenght as DM-53, so what is the point ?

Oh really? Where they use "Svinets-1" or "Svinets-2"? Nowhere, this ammunition is not inducted in to service. And there are other problems, like materials quality, internal design of penetrator etc.

Deal with it, Russia is way behind West, this is a fact.

 

[hest]

Or it is, but we haven't offcial confirmation. And many evidence is about that solutions in modern APFSDS.

It is not seen in modern APFSDS.

There are at least 3 russian patent showned that solution.

I posted patents describing this armour. What do you want to say ?

In polish military press was given simple answer: "turret balanse problem" it was about attempts to modernize T-80 and T-72 family turrets by using Burlak autoloader, but not changed frontal armour protection. In newest turret whit Burak module problem was lack of export orders. And russian military as I rememer say "goodbay" to manned turrets in future tanks.

It is totally wrong and unrelated. Burlak uses new turret and programme started from official request for internal purchase, not for export.

About official decision, it is more complex subject but from technical aspect you cannot say much.

Or those segments are in bigger number then two. There is that option. And egment's can work in difrent way - exampe like in PELE rounds or smth. But the simplest way is mady whole core by segments.

That is another discussion which I answered next.

??
DM53 L-44 11,5MJ muzzle - 1650m/s
DM53 L-55 13,5MJ muzzle -1700m/s
M829A3 12,1MJ muzzle - 1555m/s
But M829A3 have:
a) 15% longer rod
b) composite sabot

So under that conditions claim that it will just overcome lateral impulse of two metal plates is far from reality, it is not much better than rest of modern rounds with similar or higher energy.

Becouse generral rulle will be the same.

How so ?

Kontakt-5: One plate, loss of segment and slight effect on main projectile

Relikt: First plate will take out initial segments, then back plate interacts with rest implying additional loss.

Definetly not.
Firstly - two frontal segments are able to overcome most heavy ad fast in flight part of the ERA, and becouse they are flying foward they just must hit inner ERA moving plate.
secodn -it will not be "half of the penetrator". In fact less more, and it's possible that even one-two segments are just enought to destroy ERA plates (or rather made in them big holes).

With 2 plates interaction time doubles. Just as first segments are taken out by first plate, next segments are taken out by second at same position. Residual segment is not relevant if there is as it will still affect the integrity.

Projectile would need to be relatively long, and after Relikt would suffer loss from 1/3 to half of it's lenght.

I have doubt about that. And in most western tanks there is some kind of active NERA NxRA SLERA protection. In Leopad-2A5-A6 on turret and hull. In M1A2 turet propably it's inner active layer.

It is contradiction as NERA on Leopard turret needs space to work and it's principle of destabilisation, essential component of protection, cannot be realised in armour cavity.

Also as compared with modern ERA, it is much more limited effect on projectile, especially modern one.

For all using now russian tanks penetrator lenght is limited to max 740-745mm.

And all Western guns are limited in chamber pressure and energic potential required to make significant improvement. Modern ammunition is equivalent for both (Svinets-1, DM-53, etc).

 

[Damian]

It is not seen in modern APFSDS.

Only because You not seen something it does not that it not exist. But what I can expect from a guy that have a very poor sources about western military technology.

So under that conditions claim that it will just overcome lateral impulse of two metal plates is far from reality, it is not much better than rest of modern rounds with similar or higher energy.

There is no better ammunition of APFSDS type than M829A2/A3 and DM53/63, and definetly such ammunition do not exist in Russia.

It is contradiction as NERA on Leopard turret needs space to work and it's principle of destabilisation, essential component of protection, cannot be realised in armour cavity.

Also as compared with modern ERA, it is much more limited effect on projectile, especially modern one.

You do not know that. And this is obvious fact that NATO countries like Germany, UK, France or USA made a significant step ahead in armor design and materials used, compared to primitive solution from Russia that stopped in development on late 1980's level. Even Ukraine surpassed Russia in technology.

And all Western guns are limited in chamber pressure and energic potential required to make significant improvement. Modern ammunition is equivalent for both (Svinets-1, DM-53, etc).

Potential of western smoothbore guns is still bigger than 2A46 family, and 2A82 is still a future tale, nobody really knows if Russia will have money and will to induct new tank with new gun, we will see, but for the most time there are only cancelled projects.

 

[militarysta]

It is not seen in modern APFSDS.

And what is seen in modern APFSDS? hmm?
It's no way to saw segmented structure of the penetrator. It can be visible only in rod cut photo. How many that photos have you seen yet?
Or draw?
DM13, DM23, DM33, PELE (DM33), DM43. M829, BM15, BM22, BM26, BM42, BM32, OLF-F1 trening, and korean clon of DM43. It's all. There is no cut-photo of more modern penetrator.
Why?

I posted patents describing this armour. What do you want to say ?

About Katktu diffrent patent -tehy are two more patent with shown modernisation T-xx concpet by cut part of turret armour (and hull) and placed i that space whole Kaktus module.

It is totally wrong and unrelated. Burlak uses new turret and programme started from official request for internal purchase, not for export.

No.
Oginally Burlak was conspet of turret bustle autoloader whit ammo store. It was fast-changed or rejected after hit. And there are RU patent about that solution fter that there was idea modernisation T-xx series by placed Burlak module like in T-72-120, or ukrinian "Kern". But it was impossible due to turret balanse problem. And agiain tehre is RU patent whit that. The third option connected whit completly new "uniwersal tank turret" simmilar to Ob.640. And you are writing ony about the last solution whit "Burlak".

So under that conditions claim that it will just overcome lateral impulse of two metal plates is far from reality, it is not much better than rest of modern rounds with similar or higher energy.

Not extly.Those valyes are for sabot+penetrator. Completly diffrent thing is how big MJ value have penetrator during free flight after relese SABOT. For example DM53 can have only 9MJ during free flight when M829A3 due to using extremly expensive ultralight composit sabot can have for example 11,5MJ. And what in that way?
Those values are for sabot + penetrator. Only penetrator take part in penetration so MJ only for it are important.

How so ?

Kontakt-5: One plate, loss of segment and slight effect on main projectile

Relikt: First plate will take out initial segments, then back plate interacts with rest implying additional loss.

With 2 plates interaction time doubles. Just as first segments are taken out by first plate, next segments are taken out by second at same position. Residual segment is not relevant if there is as it will still affect the integrity.

Rather first segment after made hole in first plate will be hit in second ones. In fact moving ~1600m/s sgment will hit first plate and second one in ERA casette. In that scenario there is no "hal lenght" lost.

Projectile would need to be relatively long, and after Relikt would suffer loss from 1/3 to half of it's lenght.

Rather first one-two segment, becuse those segments just must hit inner ERA layers too...

It is contradiction as NERA on Leopard turret needs space to work and it's principle of destabilisation, essential component of protection, cannot be realised in armour cavity.

Want german patent whit using NERA inside armour? Or US decribe inner ERA placed between armour plates?

 

[Damian]

Want german patent whit using NERA inside armour? Or US decribe inner ERA placed between armour plates?

Przezdziecki found in documents about Burlington in British archieve that in some variants, there was also tested ERA integrated inside Burlington structure. So it seems that West found a way to do this. And hey, we still do not know if they actually didn't used also this variant in production vehicles.