Jay99
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LOC, LAC & IB skirmishs
- Thread starter Martian
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airtel
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nothing on the page.
but i found on google that it means multi barel rocket launcher. 300 kms is good range.
but if you see current operators of sy300, some are failed states and some are going to be failed states.
Current operators[edit]
these chinese motherfuckers even sold it to terrorist group hamas.
Ha ha ha ha they are supplying weapons to Hamas ??
Their leadership is dumb....... They unnecessarily creating more enemies
aliyah
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hahahahaahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahaha
paki doing surgical strike..........hahahahahahahahahahahahaha
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I guess they think 1 Indian = 50 Pakis because we only lost 4 men while capturing the post.
sorcerer
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Well!! Arent they trying to do it every day via infiltrations!!???!!!
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Pakistanis doing surgical strikes is more like a joke in itself. When we did a surgical strike we employed electronic warfare systems like Samyukta to blind enemy defence. Do Pakistan have an equivalent technology to do the same ?
But Indian surgical strike was not against Pakistani establishment but rather against terrorists employed by Pakistan regime. If Pakistanis did a 'surgical strike' whom it would be against : Indian Army or Indian Sponsored terrorists ?? Both are laughable conclusions. Any type of strike against Indian establishment will be considered an act of war and aggression against India and will lead to war anyway.
Pak can only employ its 'elite' SSG units in BAT Operations and sending their terrorists in cross border militancy attacking Indian units and end up getting barbecued by Indian units here.
One of the Pak BAT Commando killed
sorcerer
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chinese barking and bitching like pakistan..its the same lying chinese bitch diplomat
Doklam standoff: China chides Japan for backing India
Read more at:
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com...ofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
If china wants to fight and is CONFIDENT to defeat ALL INVADING NATIONS at once need not worry about Japan making a relevant random comment
Japan comments or not china should not worry about a random comment.
Shows how nervous china is even about a silent burp.
Doklam standoff: China chides Japan for backing India
Read more at:
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com...ofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
If china wants to fight and is CONFIDENT to defeat ALL INVADING NATIONS at once need not worry about Japan making a relevant random comment
Japan comments or not china should not worry about a random comment.
Shows how nervous china is even about a silent burp.
Kazah
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Every BAT attack or beheading is a surgical strike from pakistan
nimo_cn
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Squeezed by an India-China Standoff, Bhutan Holds Its Breath
https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/08/....64.mobile-gws-serp..0.4.1432...0.LzJeEELP2gg
By STEVEN LEE MYERS
AUGUST 15, 2017
HAA, Bhutan — India’s main garrison in the Kingdom of Bhutan sits only 13 miles from a disputed border with China. There is a training academy, a military hospital, a golf course — all testament to India’s enduring role defending this tiny Himalayan nation.
Earlier this summer, China began extending an unpaved road in the disputed territory, and India sent troops and equipment to block the work. The incursion has resulted in a tense standoff that has lasted more than 50 days, with Indian soldiers facing Chinese troops who have dug in just a few hundred yards away.
At a time when North Korea and the United States are trading threats of war, China and India — the world’s two most populous nations — have engaged in increasingly bellicose exchanges over this remote border dispute, evoking memories of their bloody conflict in 1962 as the world’s attention was focused on the Cuban missile crisis.
There are fears that ambition and nationalism could lead them to war again, but now with more firepower at their disposal.
Caught between these two nuclear rivals seeking regional dominance is Bhutan, a mountain nation of 800,000 with a mystical reputation and a former king who popularized the concept of “gross national happiness” as a measure of a country’s well-being.
India says it is acting on Bhutan’s behalf in the standoff. But its intervention has not resulted in much gratitude here. On the contrary, many in Bhutan feel that India’s protective embrace has become suffocating.
“In the case of war between India and China, we would be the meat in the sandwich,” said Pema Gyamtsho, a leader of the opposition party in Bhutan’s National Assembly. “It shouldn’t have to be a choice,” he added, referring to his nation’s ties with India and China, “but it is at the moment.”
For decades, Bhutan has chosen India. More than a half century ago, Bhutan watched warily as China’s Communists took power and eventually occupied neighboring Tibet, with which it has close ethnic, cultural and religious ties. India offered to defend the kingdom, and Bhutan accepted.
But the latest standoff has inflamed festering resentments over India’s influence in the country. In particular, many suspect that India has sought to block Bhutan’s efforts to establish diplomatic relations and expand trade with Beijing, fearing that a rapprochement could remove the strategic buffer that Bhutan provides.
“Bhutan has every right to its sovereignty; that’s the crux of the thing,” said Wangcha Sangey, a former publisher and head of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, who has been one of the most outspoken critics of India’s interference. “We have the right to live the way we want to live and to have the foreign relations we want to have.”
On the surface, the dispute turns on 34 square miles of land claimed by both Bhutan and China. India has accused China of extending the road to expand its control of the territory, with some comparing the move to Beijing’s efforts to cement its claims in the South China Sea by transforming reefs into islands.
The disputed area is strategically significant because it slopes into a narrow Indian valley that connects central India to its landlocked northeastern states. India calls it the Chicken’s Neck and has long feared that China could seize it in a war, splitting its territory.
But when India ordered its troops across the border on June 16, it seemed to do so without a request from Bhutan. While Bhutan has condemned the Chinese road work, it has studiously avoided saying whether it asked India to intervene. The Indian government has also avoided the question.
China has been talking tough, with near-daily warnings against India. Commodore Liu Tang, a deputy commander of the South China Sea Fleet, warned last week in The People’s Liberation Army Daily that China’s restraint thus far was “not without a bottom line.” The headline declared, “China’s territory is large, but not an inch of land is redundant.”
India has put more troops on alert in recent days, suggesting that it, too, is not prepared to back down.
In Haa, a small village an arduous day’s hike from where the troops are squaring off, the dispute is like distant thunder, a warning of storms that may come but are not yet anything to worry about.
The standoff does not, so far, involve Bhutanese forces, and state television and even the independent news media have followed the government’s lead and said virtually nothing about the conflict.
One resident of Haa said that a relative had happened on Chinese soldiers digging trenches while he herded his yak along the border. But the authorities have since closed the foot trails to the disputed area.
That has shut down an informal shuttle trade with Tibetan towns on the Chinese side of the border. For years traders have traveled back and forth on foot or horseback, selling cordyceps — known as Himalayan Viagra — and other medicinal herbs from Bhutan. They return with electronic goods, carpets, silks and clothing.
In a country where per capita economic output — not the happiness index — reached a high of $2,751 last year, the trade has become a livelihood along the border.
Nima Dorji, a shopkeeper in Haa, said he had not received any shipments since the border routes were closed, and worried that he might have to look elsewhere to restock. “We do not talk much about it,” he said. “It is very sensitive.”
https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/08/....64.mobile-gws-serp..0.4.1432...0.LzJeEELP2gg
By STEVEN LEE MYERS
AUGUST 15, 2017
HAA, Bhutan — India’s main garrison in the Kingdom of Bhutan sits only 13 miles from a disputed border with China. There is a training academy, a military hospital, a golf course — all testament to India’s enduring role defending this tiny Himalayan nation.
Earlier this summer, China began extending an unpaved road in the disputed territory, and India sent troops and equipment to block the work. The incursion has resulted in a tense standoff that has lasted more than 50 days, with Indian soldiers facing Chinese troops who have dug in just a few hundred yards away.
At a time when North Korea and the United States are trading threats of war, China and India — the world’s two most populous nations — have engaged in increasingly bellicose exchanges over this remote border dispute, evoking memories of their bloody conflict in 1962 as the world’s attention was focused on the Cuban missile crisis.
There are fears that ambition and nationalism could lead them to war again, but now with more firepower at their disposal.
Caught between these two nuclear rivals seeking regional dominance is Bhutan, a mountain nation of 800,000 with a mystical reputation and a former king who popularized the concept of “gross national happiness” as a measure of a country’s well-being.
India says it is acting on Bhutan’s behalf in the standoff. But its intervention has not resulted in much gratitude here. On the contrary, many in Bhutan feel that India’s protective embrace has become suffocating.
“In the case of war between India and China, we would be the meat in the sandwich,” said Pema Gyamtsho, a leader of the opposition party in Bhutan’s National Assembly. “It shouldn’t have to be a choice,” he added, referring to his nation’s ties with India and China, “but it is at the moment.”
For decades, Bhutan has chosen India. More than a half century ago, Bhutan watched warily as China’s Communists took power and eventually occupied neighboring Tibet, with which it has close ethnic, cultural and religious ties. India offered to defend the kingdom, and Bhutan accepted.
But the latest standoff has inflamed festering resentments over India’s influence in the country. In particular, many suspect that India has sought to block Bhutan’s efforts to establish diplomatic relations and expand trade with Beijing, fearing that a rapprochement could remove the strategic buffer that Bhutan provides.
“Bhutan has every right to its sovereignty; that’s the crux of the thing,” said Wangcha Sangey, a former publisher and head of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, who has been one of the most outspoken critics of India’s interference. “We have the right to live the way we want to live and to have the foreign relations we want to have.”
On the surface, the dispute turns on 34 square miles of land claimed by both Bhutan and China. India has accused China of extending the road to expand its control of the territory, with some comparing the move to Beijing’s efforts to cement its claims in the South China Sea by transforming reefs into islands.
The disputed area is strategically significant because it slopes into a narrow Indian valley that connects central India to its landlocked northeastern states. India calls it the Chicken’s Neck and has long feared that China could seize it in a war, splitting its territory.
But when India ordered its troops across the border on June 16, it seemed to do so without a request from Bhutan. While Bhutan has condemned the Chinese road work, it has studiously avoided saying whether it asked India to intervene. The Indian government has also avoided the question.
China has been talking tough, with near-daily warnings against India. Commodore Liu Tang, a deputy commander of the South China Sea Fleet, warned last week in The People’s Liberation Army Daily that China’s restraint thus far was “not without a bottom line.” The headline declared, “China’s territory is large, but not an inch of land is redundant.”
India has put more troops on alert in recent days, suggesting that it, too, is not prepared to back down.
In Haa, a small village an arduous day’s hike from where the troops are squaring off, the dispute is like distant thunder, a warning of storms that may come but are not yet anything to worry about.
The standoff does not, so far, involve Bhutanese forces, and state television and even the independent news media have followed the government’s lead and said virtually nothing about the conflict.
One resident of Haa said that a relative had happened on Chinese soldiers digging trenches while he herded his yak along the border. But the authorities have since closed the foot trails to the disputed area.
That has shut down an informal shuttle trade with Tibetan towns on the Chinese side of the border. For years traders have traveled back and forth on foot or horseback, selling cordyceps — known as Himalayan Viagra — and other medicinal herbs from Bhutan. They return with electronic goods, carpets, silks and clothing.
In a country where per capita economic output — not the happiness index — reached a high of $2,751 last year, the trade has become a livelihood along the border.
Nima Dorji, a shopkeeper in Haa, said he had not received any shipments since the border routes were closed, and worried that he might have to look elsewhere to restock. “We do not talk much about it,” he said. “It is very sensitive.”
nimo_cn
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Bhutanese officials have maintained a pointed silence, preferring ambiguity to the risk of offending either India or China. The Foreign Ministry did not respond to requests for comment; nor did the prime minister, Tshering Tobgay. The foreign minister, Damcho Dorji, said on Friday that he hoped the situation would be resolved “peacefully and amicably.”
Many interviewed in Bhutan expressed more concern about India’s actions than China’s. Some note that one effect of India’s move — intended or not — has been to undermine border negotiations with China that could have cleared the way for closer economic ties.
There are four border areas in dispute: two in the north and two in the west, including the place where the standoff has unfolded. In 1998, China proposed ceding the northern areas to Bhutan in exchange for the western ones. And while Bhutan agreed in principle, a final agreement has not been reached.
After the latest round of talks in Beijing last year, the two sides seemed to be nearing a consensus, though prospects for a new round now seem uncertain.
Since signing a friendship treaty with India in 1949, Bhutan has relied almost exclusively on India for its defense. To this day India trains and pays the salaries of the Royal Bhutan Army, while its engineering corps builds and maintains Bhutan’s hairpin mountain roads. The exact number is not public, but India usually keeps 300 to 400 troops in Bhutan.
The relationship has evolved along with the country itself, and as fears that Bhutan could be subsumed by China have faded.
In 2006, Bhutan’s revered fourth king, Jigme Singye Wangchuck, abdicated after overseeing a democratic transition that culminated in elections for a national assembly in 2008 and 2013. The advent of parliamentary politics has generated increased debate about further opening a country that did not allow television until 1999.
And after decades of tilting almost exclusively south, Bhutan has begun looking north to China.
In 2012, the prime minister at the time met with his Chinese counterpart at a Group of 20 summit meeting in Rio de Janeiro. Not long afterward, India cut subsidies to Bhutan for cooking oil and kerosene. The move was widely seen as retaliation, and the ruling party in Bhutan lost the next election.
Part of the lure of better relations with China is money. In addition to the shuttle trade, there is tourism, one of Bhutan’s biggest industries. Indians do not need visas to travel to Bhutan, but Chinese must pay $250 a day in advance for vacation packages. Still, for the first time last year, more visitors came from China than from any other country besides India.
Chinese fascination with Bhutan bloomed after one of Hong Kong’s biggest movie stars, Tony Leung, married the actress Carina Lau here in 2008. The wedding three years later of the current king, Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, also stoked interest after footage of it went viral in China.
Pema Tashi, who manages Happiness Kingdom Travel and advertises “a sojourn in paradise,” caters to Chinese clients with eight guides who speak Mandarin. He complained that there were no direct flights between Bhutan and China, and expressed suspicion that India had worked to prevent a normalization of relations that would open up such routes.
“We try to protect the interest of our big brother,” he said, referring to India, “but they feel that if we get closer to the north, we might not be as dependent on them.”
Many interviewed in Bhutan expressed more concern about India’s actions than China’s. Some note that one effect of India’s move — intended or not — has been to undermine border negotiations with China that could have cleared the way for closer economic ties.
There are four border areas in dispute: two in the north and two in the west, including the place where the standoff has unfolded. In 1998, China proposed ceding the northern areas to Bhutan in exchange for the western ones. And while Bhutan agreed in principle, a final agreement has not been reached.
After the latest round of talks in Beijing last year, the two sides seemed to be nearing a consensus, though prospects for a new round now seem uncertain.
Since signing a friendship treaty with India in 1949, Bhutan has relied almost exclusively on India for its defense. To this day India trains and pays the salaries of the Royal Bhutan Army, while its engineering corps builds and maintains Bhutan’s hairpin mountain roads. The exact number is not public, but India usually keeps 300 to 400 troops in Bhutan.
The relationship has evolved along with the country itself, and as fears that Bhutan could be subsumed by China have faded.
In 2006, Bhutan’s revered fourth king, Jigme Singye Wangchuck, abdicated after overseeing a democratic transition that culminated in elections for a national assembly in 2008 and 2013. The advent of parliamentary politics has generated increased debate about further opening a country that did not allow television until 1999.
And after decades of tilting almost exclusively south, Bhutan has begun looking north to China.
In 2012, the prime minister at the time met with his Chinese counterpart at a Group of 20 summit meeting in Rio de Janeiro. Not long afterward, India cut subsidies to Bhutan for cooking oil and kerosene. The move was widely seen as retaliation, and the ruling party in Bhutan lost the next election.
Part of the lure of better relations with China is money. In addition to the shuttle trade, there is tourism, one of Bhutan’s biggest industries. Indians do not need visas to travel to Bhutan, but Chinese must pay $250 a day in advance for vacation packages. Still, for the first time last year, more visitors came from China than from any other country besides India.
Chinese fascination with Bhutan bloomed after one of Hong Kong’s biggest movie stars, Tony Leung, married the actress Carina Lau here in 2008. The wedding three years later of the current king, Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, also stoked interest after footage of it went viral in China.
Pema Tashi, who manages Happiness Kingdom Travel and advertises “a sojourn in paradise,” caters to Chinese clients with eight guides who speak Mandarin. He complained that there were no direct flights between Bhutan and China, and expressed suspicion that India had worked to prevent a normalization of relations that would open up such routes.
“We try to protect the interest of our big brother,” he said, referring to India, “but they feel that if we get closer to the north, we might not be as dependent on them.”
sorcerer
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If bhutan farts after holding the BREATHE for too long, china will have that fart on the face of XI or She whatever.
----------
HAA, Bhutan — India’s main garrison in the Kingdom of Bhutan sits only 13 miles from a disputed border with China. There is a training academy, a military hospital, a golf course — all testament to India’s enduring role defending this tiny Himalayan nation.
For decades, Bhutan has chosen India. More than a half century ago, Bhutan watched warily as China’s Communists took power and eventually occupied neighboring Tibet, with which it has close ethnic, cultural and religious ties. India offered to defend the kingdom, and Bhutan accepted.
--------------
That itself explains the gratitude India has shown to build this tiny Himalayan Nation.
The rest of all accusations mentioned in this article, Bhutanese diplomats have made it very clear to all the lies spread by chinese media dunces.
----------
HAA, Bhutan — India’s main garrison in the Kingdom of Bhutan sits only 13 miles from a disputed border with China. There is a training academy, a military hospital, a golf course — all testament to India’s enduring role defending this tiny Himalayan nation.
For decades, Bhutan has chosen India. More than a half century ago, Bhutan watched warily as China’s Communists took power and eventually occupied neighboring Tibet, with which it has close ethnic, cultural and religious ties. India offered to defend the kingdom, and Bhutan accepted.
--------------
That itself explains the gratitude India has shown to build this tiny Himalayan Nation.
The rest of all accusations mentioned in this article, Bhutanese diplomats have made it very clear to all the lies spread by chinese media dunces.
nimo_cn
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But when India ordered its troops across the border on June 16, it seemed to do so without a request from Bhutan. While Bhutan has condemned the Chinese road work, it has studiously avoided saying whether it asked India to intervene. The Indian government has also avoided the question.
see? India has been lying since it claimed that Bhutan invited Indian army.
see? India has been lying since it claimed that Bhutan invited Indian army.
nimo_cn
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all signs have indicated that this standoff is a good opportunity for China to establish formal diplomatic relation with Bhutan since Bhutanese are getting unhappy about India's interference which undermines Bhutan's sovereignty.
India claimed that they are protecting Bhutanese territory, but the unusual silence of Bhutanese government suggests that Bhutan is disapproving of India.
Chinese government should reach out direct to Bhutanese government, settle the border for once and for all, leaving India no excuse to stay.
India claimed that they are protecting Bhutanese territory, but the unusual silence of Bhutanese government suggests that Bhutan is disapproving of India.
Chinese government should reach out direct to Bhutanese government, settle the border for once and for all, leaving India no excuse to stay.
sorcerer
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Doklam may bring Bhutan closer to India
The Doklam standoff on the tri-junction of India, China and Bhutan is well into its second month and Beijing continues with its hardline position and refuses to negotiate on equitable terms. What it aims to gain out of this crisis has been subject to much speculation in New Delhi. Most likely, it hopes to peel Bhutan away from India’s orbit. However, perhaps it should recall the last Doklam crisis between India, China and Bhutan in 1966. That imbroglio only ended up strengthening the India-Bhutan alliance.
Sino-Bhutanese relations first took a nosedive in the late 1950s, mirroring the growing tensions between India and China over their boundary dispute. From 1958, Chinese maps began showing large swathes of Bhutanese territory as part of China. In 1959, as it suppressed the Tibetan rebellion, China also took over certain Bhutanese enclaves in Tibet. At the same time, around 4,000 Tibetan refugees entered Bhutan, straining the country’s limited economy.
Thimphu viewed these developments with alarm and responded by closing its northern border. It also moved closer to India and embarked on an ambitious project to modernize the country’s military and economy. While it had a special treaty relationship with New Delhi since 1949, the two countries did not share any formal defence arrangement until then. Fear of China changed the situation. The Indian Army began training Bhutanese forces. India also began pouring in economic aid into the country (increasing it by 1,000%), most of which went into building roads and airfields of strategic value.
The 1962 Sino-Indian war nudged Thimphu even closer to New Delhi, culminating in a formal security guarantee announced by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1963. For the rest of the decade, the threat of China always loomed over Bhutan, as the People’s Liberation Army maintained a large presence in Tibet. Accusations of border intrusions by both sides remained a common occurrence, usually followed by fiery rhetoric.
The most significant of such incidents occurred in October 1966, when Bhutan accused Chinese troops of intruding into the Doklam region. The Bhutanese trade adviser in Kolkata issued a press statement requesting India’s help. New Delhi immediately issued a note of protest to China along with the Bhutanese view that “the area was traditionally part of Bhutan and the Chinese government had not so far disputed the traditional boundaries which ran along recognizable natural features” (at the time, the Indian media misspelt the name of region, causing confusion for later historians).
The news generated an outcry in the Indian Parliament, with Balraj Madhok calling for the government to take a hard line. Atal Bihari Vajpayee even used the incident to urge India to develop a nuclear weapon. Four days after the initial statement, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi renewed India’s vow to protect Bhutan against any aggression. The minister of state for external affairs, Dinesh Singh, was immediately dispatched to Thimphu to assure the Bhutanese government of Indian commitment. China’s response, which called the news of intrusion an “out and out lie” and accused India of bullying its neighbours, stoked even further resentment in New Delhi.
***** china lying then and NOW!!!! *********************
While the Chinese troops withdrew from Doklam by the end of the month, the whole incident led to a flurry of exchanges between India and Bhutan and served to strengthen their defence ties. By 1969, 3,400 Indian military personnel were in Bhutan training its army, up from 100 a decade earlier. Hundreds more were attached to the Border Roads Organisation which was building roads in the country. A separate contingent of Indian police trained the Royal Bhutan Police.
In fact, in the mid-1960s, India and Bhutan had differences of their own. Bhutan’s internal politics was in turmoil (the Bhutanese prime minister was assassinated in 1963 by some of his own generals). More significantly, at the time, Bhutan was keen on receiving greater aid and investment from the rest of the world and joining international organizations like the UN. India was reticent on the issue, considering it “premature”. Either of these two factors could have easily derailed the bilateral relationship, had it not been for the constant Chinese threat highlighted by incidents like the Doklam intrusion.
By the end of the decade, the Chinese hostility had begun to recede, largely due to an unexpected development. From 1967, Radio Moscow began reporting Chinese troop movements on the Bhutanese border (often inaccurately). By this time, China and the Soviet Union were on the brink of war over their own boundary disputes. Russian reports were likely a menacing signal from the Soviet Union to the Chinese leadership to back off. By the beginning of the 1970s, China did soften its approach to Bhutan and many of its claims on Bhutanese territory stopped appearing on Chinese maps. However, by then the India-Bhutan alliance was stronger than ever before.
In 1966, it was believed that the Chinese intrusion into Doklam was an attempt to force Bhutan into a bilateral border negotiation, without Indian involvement. It is likely that Beijing hopes to go a step further with the current Doklam standoff. In the long run, a Sino-Bhutanese border resolution would be mutually beneficial, as would a Sino-Indian boundary agreement. However, forcing the issue by aggression is no way to go about it. If India remains firm in its commitment to Bhutan, the standoff will only serve to deepen the India-Bhutan alliance even further.
Sandeep Bhardwaj is a researcher at the Centre for Policy Research specializing in South Asian geopolitics.
http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/GXIc4NLACn5jxHv6RkkX7I/Doklam-may-bring-Bhutan-closer-to-India.html
The Doklam standoff on the tri-junction of India, China and Bhutan is well into its second month and Beijing continues with its hardline position and refuses to negotiate on equitable terms. What it aims to gain out of this crisis has been subject to much speculation in New Delhi. Most likely, it hopes to peel Bhutan away from India’s orbit. However, perhaps it should recall the last Doklam crisis between India, China and Bhutan in 1966. That imbroglio only ended up strengthening the India-Bhutan alliance.
Sino-Bhutanese relations first took a nosedive in the late 1950s, mirroring the growing tensions between India and China over their boundary dispute. From 1958, Chinese maps began showing large swathes of Bhutanese territory as part of China. In 1959, as it suppressed the Tibetan rebellion, China also took over certain Bhutanese enclaves in Tibet. At the same time, around 4,000 Tibetan refugees entered Bhutan, straining the country’s limited economy.
Thimphu viewed these developments with alarm and responded by closing its northern border. It also moved closer to India and embarked on an ambitious project to modernize the country’s military and economy. While it had a special treaty relationship with New Delhi since 1949, the two countries did not share any formal defence arrangement until then. Fear of China changed the situation. The Indian Army began training Bhutanese forces. India also began pouring in economic aid into the country (increasing it by 1,000%), most of which went into building roads and airfields of strategic value.
The 1962 Sino-Indian war nudged Thimphu even closer to New Delhi, culminating in a formal security guarantee announced by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1963. For the rest of the decade, the threat of China always loomed over Bhutan, as the People’s Liberation Army maintained a large presence in Tibet. Accusations of border intrusions by both sides remained a common occurrence, usually followed by fiery rhetoric.
The most significant of such incidents occurred in October 1966, when Bhutan accused Chinese troops of intruding into the Doklam region. The Bhutanese trade adviser in Kolkata issued a press statement requesting India’s help. New Delhi immediately issued a note of protest to China along with the Bhutanese view that “the area was traditionally part of Bhutan and the Chinese government had not so far disputed the traditional boundaries which ran along recognizable natural features” (at the time, the Indian media misspelt the name of region, causing confusion for later historians).
The news generated an outcry in the Indian Parliament, with Balraj Madhok calling for the government to take a hard line. Atal Bihari Vajpayee even used the incident to urge India to develop a nuclear weapon. Four days after the initial statement, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi renewed India’s vow to protect Bhutan against any aggression. The minister of state for external affairs, Dinesh Singh, was immediately dispatched to Thimphu to assure the Bhutanese government of Indian commitment. China’s response, which called the news of intrusion an “out and out lie” and accused India of bullying its neighbours, stoked even further resentment in New Delhi.
***** china lying then and NOW!!!! *********************
While the Chinese troops withdrew from Doklam by the end of the month, the whole incident led to a flurry of exchanges between India and Bhutan and served to strengthen their defence ties. By 1969, 3,400 Indian military personnel were in Bhutan training its army, up from 100 a decade earlier. Hundreds more were attached to the Border Roads Organisation which was building roads in the country. A separate contingent of Indian police trained the Royal Bhutan Police.
In fact, in the mid-1960s, India and Bhutan had differences of their own. Bhutan’s internal politics was in turmoil (the Bhutanese prime minister was assassinated in 1963 by some of his own generals). More significantly, at the time, Bhutan was keen on receiving greater aid and investment from the rest of the world and joining international organizations like the UN. India was reticent on the issue, considering it “premature”. Either of these two factors could have easily derailed the bilateral relationship, had it not been for the constant Chinese threat highlighted by incidents like the Doklam intrusion.
By the end of the decade, the Chinese hostility had begun to recede, largely due to an unexpected development. From 1967, Radio Moscow began reporting Chinese troop movements on the Bhutanese border (often inaccurately). By this time, China and the Soviet Union were on the brink of war over their own boundary disputes. Russian reports were likely a menacing signal from the Soviet Union to the Chinese leadership to back off. By the beginning of the 1970s, China did soften its approach to Bhutan and many of its claims on Bhutanese territory stopped appearing on Chinese maps. However, by then the India-Bhutan alliance was stronger than ever before.
In 1966, it was believed that the Chinese intrusion into Doklam was an attempt to force Bhutan into a bilateral border negotiation, without Indian involvement. It is likely that Beijing hopes to go a step further with the current Doklam standoff. In the long run, a Sino-Bhutanese border resolution would be mutually beneficial, as would a Sino-Indian boundary agreement. However, forcing the issue by aggression is no way to go about it. If India remains firm in its commitment to Bhutan, the standoff will only serve to deepen the India-Bhutan alliance even further.
Sandeep Bhardwaj is a researcher at the Centre for Policy Research specializing in South Asian geopolitics.
http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/GXIc4NLACn5jxHv6RkkX7I/Doklam-may-bring-Bhutan-closer-to-India.html
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Do you not think that China should have done this before it went crazy in the media, making racist videos and embarrassing itself? Are you saying peaceful giant did not try diplomatic means of resolution before beating the war drums? :shocked:
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It baffles me to see the Chinese acting so dumb deaf and blind even after producing a ton of documentation showing that -india and Bhutan have a defence pact of sorts and that India is responsible for bhutan's external defence the ST IND Chinese members of the forum same to suffer from broken record syndrome I do not understand under which so called historical validity does the Chinese c l a i m all the territories that they do to my dearest Chinese friends if you are in China please send this message from me Tu his Excellency the president Mr ping please concentrate on the issues that plague your country and not to make fun of my nation the racist video that you are lackeys put out on YouTube and other social media r as idiotic As Your Nation and your Communist Party which was founded by a dum idiot called Mau you will fall like the Soviet Union mark my words
sorcerer
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China’s power struggle: How strong is Xi Jinping’s hand?
The power struggle inside the CCP-state as we have often pointed out is rooted not in the personality of Xi but in a deepening crisis of the current system. The current leadership fear that the CCP faces an existential crisis unless it adopts the painful economic changes demanded by capitalism (austerity and a purging of over-indebted sectors). But Beijing’s policies are stuck in slow motion because of resistance by
local governments acting as “independent kingdoms” which defend their own capitalists and vested interests. This is a problem that has multiplied as China’s economy has grown to challenge the United States as the worlds biggest.
The regime wants the world to believe Xi is in full control: The most powerful leader since Mao, etc. There are good reasons to question if this is really the case. There are already a number of signs that a proxy war between the CCP’s factions is intensifying. The latest crackdown in the financial sector investigating several highly-leveraged companies could be about more than preventing “systemic risks” in the economy.
Similarly, we have the case of fugitive billionaire Guo Wengui. He may be no more than a self-publicist making sensational claims as part of a fight to avoid extradition from the US and to recover some of his vast fortune seized by the Chinese authorities in 2015. But it cannot be completely discounted that he is a proxy in the top-level power struggle. Guo claims to possess highly damaging information on top CCP officials – vast wealth stashed overseas and undeclared families living abroad – but he has conspicuously not produced any evidence to date.
Guo may be bluffing, but even bluffing plays a part in warfare. His main line of attack is against Wang Qishan and the illegal methods used in the anti-corruption campaign which Wang leads. Plausibly, Guo is carrying out the work of “other forces” to undermine Wang’s bid to stay on the Politburo Standing Committee, which is the apex of power in the Chinese state, until 2022 (according to tradition Wang must retire this year). A possible aim is to weaken the Xi-Wang alliance and force Xi to compromise on his plans to extend his control at the 19th Congress. Of course, one way or the other we will know soon.
The crackdown in the financial sector raises many questions. Everyone knows there is rampant corruption, illegality, and that left unchecked the rapidly growing debt burden could bring down the banking system (and in that case also the CCP). But this crackdown is almost certainly about more than just reining in financial excesses or clipping the wings of capitalists who’ve gotten too big for their own good.
Tycoons disappearing
It began in January with the kidnapping in Hong Kong of the billionaire Xiao Jianhua – a key financial middleman (these are known as ‘white gloves’) for top CCP leaders and their families. Xiao is now in detention in China and his presumed knowledge on where many of the elite keep their vast illicit fortunes could be of devastating value to any side in the power struggle. Xiao’s disappearance was followed by the dismissal and detention of some top figures in the insurance sector such as former chief regulator Xiang Junbo, placed under investigation for corruption in April, and tycoon Wu Xiaohui who was arrested in June. Wu’s Anbang Insurance has in recent years embarked on a gigantic overseas acquisition binge.
On June 22 it was announced that Anbang is under investigation by the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) along with fellow insurer Fosun International, property giant Dalian Wanda, and regional airline HNA. These four companies are aggressive buyers of overseas companies, stocks and property, mostly in the US and other advanced capitalist markets. This has fuelled suspicions that many deals are primarily a means of capital flight.
But the investigation could also suggest another front has opened in the factional proxy war under the banner of fighting “systemic financial risks” but with a subplot to target companies and tycoons with connections to top CCP figures (Wu Xiaohui and Anbang have links with the family of Zeng Qinghong, for example, a senior leader in ex-president Jiang Zemin’s faction). This could be a warning shot to Xi’s opponents not to oppose his plans to further consolidate his power at the Congress.
Selective anti-corruption
The anti-corruption campaign’s scale and aims have been overhyped by the government. Its real goal was to enable Xi to centralise power and break factional strongholds in key areas such as the military. It is the biggest anti-corruption drive in the CCP’s history but its achievements have been exaggerated to win public support and to create an aura of “strong man” around Xi.
The graft-busting bureau CCDI boasts that 1.2 million officials have been punished since the start of the anti-corruption drive in 2013, but only a small minority of cases – around 4.8 percent according to a study by the Financial Times newspaper – have resulted in criminal prosecution. Most cases are settled with a warning, demotion or transfer to another position.
In reality an unwritten agreement seems to have been struck whereby certain elite groups are “untouchable” by the anti-corruption campaign. These include the CCP elders (like Jiang and Zeng) and ‘second generation’ princelings (the heirs of founders of the CCP state). The cases against Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang – both jailed for life – are exceptions to this rule but we should remember the moves against them began under Xi’s predecessor Hu Jintao. This unwritten rule exists to prevent the power struggle going too far and triggering an all-out conflict that could endanger the CCP’s grip on power.
If the factional struggle sharpens in coming months – and the signs of a proxy war suggest this is at least a possibility – then the delicate internal balance can be overthrown, forcing each camp to raise the stakes. This is what Xi Jinping is hoping to avoid and shows the limits of his political dominance.
http://chinaworker.info/en/2017/06/24/15098/
The power struggle inside the CCP-state as we have often pointed out is rooted not in the personality of Xi but in a deepening crisis of the current system. The current leadership fear that the CCP faces an existential crisis unless it adopts the painful economic changes demanded by capitalism (austerity and a purging of over-indebted sectors). But Beijing’s policies are stuck in slow motion because of resistance by
local governments acting as “independent kingdoms” which defend their own capitalists and vested interests. This is a problem that has multiplied as China’s economy has grown to challenge the United States as the worlds biggest.The regime wants the world to believe Xi is in full control: The most powerful leader since Mao, etc. There are good reasons to question if this is really the case. There are already a number of signs that a proxy war between the CCP’s factions is intensifying. The latest crackdown in the financial sector investigating several highly-leveraged companies could be about more than preventing “systemic risks” in the economy.
Similarly, we have the case of fugitive billionaire Guo Wengui. He may be no more than a self-publicist making sensational claims as part of a fight to avoid extradition from the US and to recover some of his vast fortune seized by the Chinese authorities in 2015. But it cannot be completely discounted that he is a proxy in the top-level power struggle. Guo claims to possess highly damaging information on top CCP officials – vast wealth stashed overseas and undeclared families living abroad – but he has conspicuously not produced any evidence to date.
Guo may be bluffing, but even bluffing plays a part in warfare. His main line of attack is against Wang Qishan and the illegal methods used in the anti-corruption campaign which Wang leads. Plausibly, Guo is carrying out the work of “other forces” to undermine Wang’s bid to stay on the Politburo Standing Committee, which is the apex of power in the Chinese state, until 2022 (according to tradition Wang must retire this year). A possible aim is to weaken the Xi-Wang alliance and force Xi to compromise on his plans to extend his control at the 19th Congress. Of course, one way or the other we will know soon.
The crackdown in the financial sector raises many questions. Everyone knows there is rampant corruption, illegality, and that left unchecked the rapidly growing debt burden could bring down the banking system (and in that case also the CCP). But this crackdown is almost certainly about more than just reining in financial excesses or clipping the wings of capitalists who’ve gotten too big for their own good.
Tycoons disappearing
It began in January with the kidnapping in Hong Kong of the billionaire Xiao Jianhua – a key financial middleman (these are known as ‘white gloves’) for top CCP leaders and their families. Xiao is now in detention in China and his presumed knowledge on where many of the elite keep their vast illicit fortunes could be of devastating value to any side in the power struggle. Xiao’s disappearance was followed by the dismissal and detention of some top figures in the insurance sector such as former chief regulator Xiang Junbo, placed under investigation for corruption in April, and tycoon Wu Xiaohui who was arrested in June. Wu’s Anbang Insurance has in recent years embarked on a gigantic overseas acquisition binge.
On June 22 it was announced that Anbang is under investigation by the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) along with fellow insurer Fosun International, property giant Dalian Wanda, and regional airline HNA. These four companies are aggressive buyers of overseas companies, stocks and property, mostly in the US and other advanced capitalist markets. This has fuelled suspicions that many deals are primarily a means of capital flight.
But the investigation could also suggest another front has opened in the factional proxy war under the banner of fighting “systemic financial risks” but with a subplot to target companies and tycoons with connections to top CCP figures (Wu Xiaohui and Anbang have links with the family of Zeng Qinghong, for example, a senior leader in ex-president Jiang Zemin’s faction). This could be a warning shot to Xi’s opponents not to oppose his plans to further consolidate his power at the Congress.
Selective anti-corruption
The anti-corruption campaign’s scale and aims have been overhyped by the government. Its real goal was to enable Xi to centralise power and break factional strongholds in key areas such as the military. It is the biggest anti-corruption drive in the CCP’s history but its achievements have been exaggerated to win public support and to create an aura of “strong man” around Xi.
The graft-busting bureau CCDI boasts that 1.2 million officials have been punished since the start of the anti-corruption drive in 2013, but only a small minority of cases – around 4.8 percent according to a study by the Financial Times newspaper – have resulted in criminal prosecution. Most cases are settled with a warning, demotion or transfer to another position.
In reality an unwritten agreement seems to have been struck whereby certain elite groups are “untouchable” by the anti-corruption campaign. These include the CCP elders (like Jiang and Zeng) and ‘second generation’ princelings (the heirs of founders of the CCP state). The cases against Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang – both jailed for life – are exceptions to this rule but we should remember the moves against them began under Xi’s predecessor Hu Jintao. This unwritten rule exists to prevent the power struggle going too far and triggering an all-out conflict that could endanger the CCP’s grip on power.
If the factional struggle sharpens in coming months – and the signs of a proxy war suggest this is at least a possibility – then the delicate internal balance can be overthrown, forcing each camp to raise the stakes. This is what Xi Jinping is hoping to avoid and shows the limits of his political dominance.
http://chinaworker.info/en/2017/06/24/15098/
thethinker
Senior Member
- Joined
- Dec 18, 2013
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What Do the Bhutanese People Think About Doklam?
http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/what-do-the-bhutanese-people-think-about-doklam/
Indian and Chinese forces have been locked in a standoff over the Doklam plateau, a territory disputed between China and Bhutan, since June. The disputed territory is located at the Doka La pass, a tri-junction where Bhutan borders the Indian state of Sikkim and the Tibet Autonomous Region of China. India, which enjoys a close relationship with Bhutan, is concerned about Chinese encroachment in Doklam because it would bring Chinese forces closer to its vulnerable “Chicken’s Neck” – the narrow Siliguri Corridor that connects India’s northeast to the rest of the country.
In 2005, Bhutan considered yielding territory in the Doklam region to China in order to regain land in northern Bhutan – at least twice the size of the Doklam plateau. However, Bhutan acquiesced to India’s wishes to cancel the deal, demonstrating the power of the bilateral relationship between the two countries, which has been strengthened by years of close cooperation after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) cracked down on dissent in Tibet in 1959.
Despite China’s geopolitical and economic rise in recent decades, and their shared border, Bhutan remains guarded against its northern neighbor, forestalling the development of any diplomatic relationship. Such behavior is often questioned – after all, the argument goes that Bhutan would only have to give up a minuscule piece of land in order to normalize relations with a neighbor whose investment potential far exceeds that of India’s. Recently, some Bhutanese analysts have even suggested that Bhutan lacks a strong claim to the disputed portion of the Doklam region.
Bhutan first began holding democratic elections in 2008. Given its small population of only around 800,000 people, public sentiment is a key factor in understanding what policies the Bhutanese government ultimately chooses to pursue. Moreover, unease within Bhutanese society is indicative of the country’s fear over the strength of a neighbor that utterly dwarfs it in size, resources, and military capabilities. In order to ascertain whether the Bhutanese population is open to a resolution with China that involves a territorial exchange, or if it is more amenable to the Indian position that Bhutan hold firm against Chinese incursions, we consulted the data.
ENODO, a risk management firm that conducts population-centric analysis, applied its “population-centric methodology and data analytics tools to conduct a real-time analysis of the ongoing crisis” by examining Twitter hashtags, Facebook Live videos, blogs, and political cartoons. ENODO examined a dataset comprised of over 25,000 Tweets, 351 political cartoons from Indian and Bhutanese media, 127 Facebook Live videos, 20 blogs, and 12 magazine covers of leading Indian and Bhutanese periodicals.
ENODO’s analysis revealed that approximately 76 percent of Twitter and 65 percent of Facebook Bhutanese social media users questioned Bhutan’s over-reliance on India’s diplomatic channels to broker a deal with China. Messages on Bhutanese news websites, blogs, and Facebook reveal anxiety regarding the absence of a direct dialogue between Bhutan and China. For example, a cartoon on Facebook group “Bhutanese Forum” (Figure 1) indicates the scale of China’s incursion, while the associated hashtags #bullyingNeighbor and #China demonstrate the pervasiveness of Bhutanese frustration and a sense of abandonment by India.
Analysis has also uncovered the crisis’ strengthening of Bhutanese resolve. The people of Bhutan do not want to be seen as pushovers, which is reinforced by the Bhutanese people’s sense of identity and nationalism. This is illustrated by the large number of tweets, including #WarClouds, #Thunder, #Dragon that center on pride in Bhutanese culture and values. Moreover, The Bhutanese, a nationally prominent newspaper in Bhutan, published an op-ed noting that “Bhutan is neither a ‘vassal’ nor a ‘protectorate.’” Commenting on Facebook about the Chinese incursion in Doklam, the author Tenzing Lamsang said, “Bhutan has successfully defended its sovereign borders against its much bigger neighbors, and even made territorial conquests in some cases,” a message to both India and China.
Moreover, evolving public sentiment in response to specific events are profoundly influencing the standoff. In less than 24 hours after Indian boxing champion Vijender Singh forfeited his title in exchange for India-China peace, thousands took to Twitter to support India’s might, which ultimately supports Bhutan. New hashtags emerged every hour including: #BattleGroundAsia, #IndiaProud, #BoycottChineseProducts, #DoklamHisaabBarabar, and #PeaceIsPossible. The fluid nature of the conflict, compounded by continuously evolving public sentiments, which is instantaneously amplified over social media, make it increasingly difficult for traditional negotiation to occur.
However, despite the changes in public sentiment, there remains the constant uncomfortable fact that any war between India and China over Bhutan would utterly devastate Bhutan. According to ENODO’s analysis, Bhutanese fear of conflict is closely tied to China’s occupation of Tibet in 1951. The Doklam crisis is exacerbating fears of annexation and erodes the public’s trust in a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Twitter hashtags #ChinaIndiaStandoff, #China, and #India illustrate the belief that China may annex Bhutan, in a repeat of the PLA’s march into Tibet.
Nonetheless, the Bhutanese government has so far not strayed from the Indian position and pursued a resolution to the border conflict independently of India. The crisis seems to be at a stalemate. The Indian government has been emphasizing the need for a diplomatic resolution, meaning there is little incentive for the Bhutanese government to do anything other than continue to incrementally increase its engagement with China, as it did before the crisis. The Indian government, too, probably realize that it stretched the crisis out long enough to gain credibility, but not so long as to play into a possible Chinese strategy to drive a wedge between Bhutan and India.
It is highly unlikely that the current boundary dispute between Bhutan and China will be settled anytime soon, as the stakes have been raised in both India and China. The Bhutanese government may also calculate, that despite the risks of escalation with China, as long as risks are managed, it gains more from its special relationship with India. After all, as long as the border dispute is unresolved, there is a chance that Bhutan may be able to bide its time for a more favorable resolution, while getting special perks from India. If Bhutan chooses to stray, both its territory and a privileged relation with India would be lost. Regardless of Bhutan’s choice, given the influence of public opinion on the outcome of the standoff, understanding public sentiments on all sides through a population-centric approach can aid in the creation of a path towards a strategic deescalation of the conflict.
http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/what-do-the-bhutanese-people-think-about-doklam/
Indian and Chinese forces have been locked in a standoff over the Doklam plateau, a territory disputed between China and Bhutan, since June. The disputed territory is located at the Doka La pass, a tri-junction where Bhutan borders the Indian state of Sikkim and the Tibet Autonomous Region of China. India, which enjoys a close relationship with Bhutan, is concerned about Chinese encroachment in Doklam because it would bring Chinese forces closer to its vulnerable “Chicken’s Neck” – the narrow Siliguri Corridor that connects India’s northeast to the rest of the country.
In 2005, Bhutan considered yielding territory in the Doklam region to China in order to regain land in northern Bhutan – at least twice the size of the Doklam plateau. However, Bhutan acquiesced to India’s wishes to cancel the deal, demonstrating the power of the bilateral relationship between the two countries, which has been strengthened by years of close cooperation after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) cracked down on dissent in Tibet in 1959.
Despite China’s geopolitical and economic rise in recent decades, and their shared border, Bhutan remains guarded against its northern neighbor, forestalling the development of any diplomatic relationship. Such behavior is often questioned – after all, the argument goes that Bhutan would only have to give up a minuscule piece of land in order to normalize relations with a neighbor whose investment potential far exceeds that of India’s. Recently, some Bhutanese analysts have even suggested that Bhutan lacks a strong claim to the disputed portion of the Doklam region.
Bhutan first began holding democratic elections in 2008. Given its small population of only around 800,000 people, public sentiment is a key factor in understanding what policies the Bhutanese government ultimately chooses to pursue. Moreover, unease within Bhutanese society is indicative of the country’s fear over the strength of a neighbor that utterly dwarfs it in size, resources, and military capabilities. In order to ascertain whether the Bhutanese population is open to a resolution with China that involves a territorial exchange, or if it is more amenable to the Indian position that Bhutan hold firm against Chinese incursions, we consulted the data.
ENODO, a risk management firm that conducts population-centric analysis, applied its “population-centric methodology and data analytics tools to conduct a real-time analysis of the ongoing crisis” by examining Twitter hashtags, Facebook Live videos, blogs, and political cartoons. ENODO examined a dataset comprised of over 25,000 Tweets, 351 political cartoons from Indian and Bhutanese media, 127 Facebook Live videos, 20 blogs, and 12 magazine covers of leading Indian and Bhutanese periodicals.
ENODO’s analysis revealed that approximately 76 percent of Twitter and 65 percent of Facebook Bhutanese social media users questioned Bhutan’s over-reliance on India’s diplomatic channels to broker a deal with China. Messages on Bhutanese news websites, blogs, and Facebook reveal anxiety regarding the absence of a direct dialogue between Bhutan and China. For example, a cartoon on Facebook group “Bhutanese Forum” (Figure 1) indicates the scale of China’s incursion, while the associated hashtags #bullyingNeighbor and #China demonstrate the pervasiveness of Bhutanese frustration and a sense of abandonment by India.
Analysis has also uncovered the crisis’ strengthening of Bhutanese resolve. The people of Bhutan do not want to be seen as pushovers, which is reinforced by the Bhutanese people’s sense of identity and nationalism. This is illustrated by the large number of tweets, including #WarClouds, #Thunder, #Dragon that center on pride in Bhutanese culture and values. Moreover, The Bhutanese, a nationally prominent newspaper in Bhutan, published an op-ed noting that “Bhutan is neither a ‘vassal’ nor a ‘protectorate.’” Commenting on Facebook about the Chinese incursion in Doklam, the author Tenzing Lamsang said, “Bhutan has successfully defended its sovereign borders against its much bigger neighbors, and even made territorial conquests in some cases,” a message to both India and China.
Moreover, evolving public sentiment in response to specific events are profoundly influencing the standoff. In less than 24 hours after Indian boxing champion Vijender Singh forfeited his title in exchange for India-China peace, thousands took to Twitter to support India’s might, which ultimately supports Bhutan. New hashtags emerged every hour including: #BattleGroundAsia, #IndiaProud, #BoycottChineseProducts, #DoklamHisaabBarabar, and #PeaceIsPossible. The fluid nature of the conflict, compounded by continuously evolving public sentiments, which is instantaneously amplified over social media, make it increasingly difficult for traditional negotiation to occur.
However, despite the changes in public sentiment, there remains the constant uncomfortable fact that any war between India and China over Bhutan would utterly devastate Bhutan. According to ENODO’s analysis, Bhutanese fear of conflict is closely tied to China’s occupation of Tibet in 1951. The Doklam crisis is exacerbating fears of annexation and erodes the public’s trust in a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Twitter hashtags #ChinaIndiaStandoff, #China, and #India illustrate the belief that China may annex Bhutan, in a repeat of the PLA’s march into Tibet.
Nonetheless, the Bhutanese government has so far not strayed from the Indian position and pursued a resolution to the border conflict independently of India. The crisis seems to be at a stalemate. The Indian government has been emphasizing the need for a diplomatic resolution, meaning there is little incentive for the Bhutanese government to do anything other than continue to incrementally increase its engagement with China, as it did before the crisis. The Indian government, too, probably realize that it stretched the crisis out long enough to gain credibility, but not so long as to play into a possible Chinese strategy to drive a wedge between Bhutan and India.
It is highly unlikely that the current boundary dispute between Bhutan and China will be settled anytime soon, as the stakes have been raised in both India and China. The Bhutanese government may also calculate, that despite the risks of escalation with China, as long as risks are managed, it gains more from its special relationship with India. After all, as long as the border dispute is unresolved, there is a chance that Bhutan may be able to bide its time for a more favorable resolution, while getting special perks from India. If Bhutan chooses to stray, both its territory and a privileged relation with India would be lost. Regardless of Bhutan’s choice, given the influence of public opinion on the outcome of the standoff, understanding public sentiments on all sides through a population-centric approach can aid in the creation of a path towards a strategic deescalation of the conflict.
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what you quoted are the users of weishi rockets 1-2, a100, a200 not sy300nothing on the page.
but i found on google that it means multi barel rocket launcher. 300 kms is good range.
but if you see current operators of sy300, some are failed states and some are going to be failed states.
Current operators[edit]
these chinese motherfuckers even sold it to terrorist group hamas.
while Pak has cm400AKG which has a range of 240kms , it's a missile , (anti ship) air launched, derivative of sy400 and with reduced range.
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