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So Mark1A will have less range but be more maneuverable?
Because fuel is the same, right.. no major change in design.
LCA TEJAS MK1 & MK1A: News and Discussion
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Because fuel is the same, right.. no major change in design.
Saichand K
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There are several meausrrs to rewduce weight. Redesign of sub systems is under process. This could increase the combat radius.
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If mk1a will be 1000kg lighter....as said by hal...then I think its...range will be same as mk1
Prashant12
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HAL Ramps Up LCA Production and Looks to the Mk2
HAL displayed the air force version of the MWF/LCA Mk2 in model form at the recent Aero India show. (Photo: Neelam Mathews)
naval version of the LCA Mk2 will require an increased-thrust engine, reduced weight, an increased wing area, and a tailhook. “We have to move on towards a twin-engined deck-based CATOBAR [aatapult assisted take-off but arrested recovery] fighter,” chief of naval staff Sunil Lanba told AIN.
Beyond the LCA program, the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) is India’s fifth-generation fighter planned for production once the LCA Mk2 design is frozen. It is said to be designed for swing role, with BVR and close-combat capability, and precision strike. Madhavan said that a manufacturing partner would be sought for the AMCA.
A model of the LCA Mk1A was also on show at Aero India. This version introduces a refueling probe. (Photo: Neelam Mathews)
https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2019-03-11/hal-ramps-lca-production-and-looks-mk2
HAL displayed the air force version of the MWF/LCA Mk2 in model form at the recent Aero India show. (Photo: Neelam Mathews)
naval version of the LCA Mk2 will require an increased-thrust engine, reduced weight, an increased wing area, and a tailhook. “We have to move on towards a twin-engined deck-based CATOBAR [aatapult assisted take-off but arrested recovery] fighter,” chief of naval staff Sunil Lanba told AIN.
Beyond the LCA program, the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) is India’s fifth-generation fighter planned for production once the LCA Mk2 design is frozen. It is said to be designed for swing role, with BVR and close-combat capability, and precision strike. Madhavan said that a manufacturing partner would be sought for the AMCA.
A model of the LCA Mk1A was also on show at Aero India. This version introduces a refueling probe. (Photo: Neelam Mathews)
https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2019-03-11/hal-ramps-lca-production-and-looks-mk2
HariPrasad-1
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This was 1700 KM. When and How it increased?
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1700 km...written in wiki....
But ir from brf says 2400 km..may be with a drop tank
HariPrasad-1
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Look at the LCA Mk2. It has same wing of LCA Mk1 with almost 30% higher MTOW. So it is very clear that either LCA Mk2 or LCA mk1 design is not optimum. We have seen the penalty in terms of LCA low highest speed, and little sub optimal performance in maneuvering. I am not sure that whether it can now be ractified in Mk1 or not?
HariPrasad-1
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There are many inhearant contradictions in the DATA.
Immanuel
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Interesting observation indeed, we should already have 2-6 or more F414 engines in country since deliveries already started at a slow pace. Wouldn't be a shocker indeed if MK-1A already uses the F414. This way they can speed up the transition to LCA mk-2 since by then engine is fully tested and certified on the MK-1A.
Let them take flight: on Tejas and Kaveri projects
It is not late to declare the Tejas and Kaveri projects as ‘national missions’
At the Aero-India 2019 airshow and aviation exhibition, held in Bengaluru last month, there were two developments of significance, for India’s national security as well its moribund aeronautical industry. On February 20, the Indian Air Force and the aviation community heaved a collective sigh of relief after the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas Mark 1, received its long-awaited Final Operational Clearance; this means it is combat-ready and can be exploited to the limits of its approved ‘envelope’. However, a day later, came a rather unwelcome report: a Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) announcement at the show of its decision to shelve the Kaveri turbo-jet engine project. While one waits for this report to be confirmed or denied, given the criticality of this engine for India’s aeronautical industry, the issue deserves a close look.
Political myopia
Historically, all major aerospace powers have possessed the capability to design airframes as well as power-plants. Until India can design and produce its own aero-engines, the performance and capabilities of any indigenously designed/built aircraft will be seriously limited by the technology that we are permitted to import. India has already had two bitter experiences in this regard. The Hindustan Aeronautics Limited’s sleek and elegant HF-24 Marut fighter, of the 1960s and 1970s, failed to achieve its huge potential as a supersonic fighter for want of a suitable engine. Rather than exert itself to seek alternatives, the government of the day, with stunning myopia, closed the programme.
Similarly, many of the problems the Tejas faced emanate from lack of engine thrust. Even as the Kaveri has failed to make an appearance, U.S.-made alternatives such as the General Electric F-404 engine, or even the more powerful F-414, do not deliver adequate thrust for the Tejas Mk 1, to meet all its missions. For the Tejas Mk IA, Mk II, the LCA Navy, and other aircraft programmes such as the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft, India will need turbo-jet engines of even greater thrust. Thus, it is vital for India to develop a family of homegrown jet engines to power indigenous combat aircraft as well as re-engine imported ones.
A pivotal role
In this context, it is necessary to recognise that both the Tejas and Kaveri projects — which have seen more than their share of headwinds and uncertainty — form key components of India’s technological aspirations. Unless carefully guided, protected and nurtured, their failure could spell the end of India’s aeronautical industry, or condemn it forever to licensed production. A long production run of, say, 250-300 aircraft for the Tejas and its advanced derivatives is essential if the industry is to hone its design and production skills.
The same holds good for the Kaveri, except that the design and production of a functional turbojet engine are even more challenging. The HAL claims to have “manufactured” nearly 5,000 aero-engines of British, French and Russian design, and overhauled 18,000 of them. Since this putative “manufacturing” process involves merely the assembly of imported components, several engine divisions of the HAL have failed to imbibe aspects of design, metallurgy, thermodynamic and aerodynamic engineering as well as the complex tooling and machining process required for the design and manufacture of aero-engines, over the past 60 years — a sad commentary. In 1986, the DRDO’s decades-old Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) was tasked with developing an indigenous power plant for the LCA, which was to replace the U.S. engines being used for the development phase of the aircraft.
Having developed two experimental engines, the GTRE took up a turbofan design, designated the GTX-35VS “Kaveri”, for the LCA. Full-scale development was authorised in 1989 for 17 prototypes at a cost of $55 million. The first complete prototype Kaveri began tests in 1996, and by 2004 it had flown on a Russian flying test-bed; albeit unsuccessfully. Since then, the Kaveri has made sporadic progress and the GTRE has been struggling with serious design and performance issues which it has been unable to resolve. As the Kaveri missed successive deadlines, the U.S. import option was mindlessly and gleefully resorted to.
A series of troughs
Given the DRDO’s penchant for secrecy and misplaced optimism, the true story of the Kaveri’s halting progress has never been revealed to Parliament or the taxpayer. However, two details, available on the Internet, are revelatory of the organisation’s ‘modus operandi’. It has, at least, on two occasions, approached French and British aero-engine manufacturers for advice and consultancy in operationalising the Kaveri. Despite reportedly attractive offers of performance-enhancement and technology-transfer, the negotiations stalled reportedly on cost considerations. It is also interesting to note that in 2014, this project — of national importance — was arbitrarily shut down by the DRDO only to be revived subsequently for reasons unknown.
It is obvious that the onus for repeated setbacks in these projects must lie squarely on India’s political leadership; for its neglect as well as absence of a vision for the aeronautical industry. There are three more factors: over-estimation by the DRDO of its capabilities compounded by a reluctance to seek advice; inadequate project management and decision-making skills of its scientists; and exclusion of users — the military — from all aspects of the projects.
It is still not too late for the government to declare both these projects as ‘national missions’ and initiate urgent remedial actions. The success of both the Kaveri and Tejas programmes will transform the aerospace scene, and put India in the front ranks of aeronautical nations, perhaps even ahead of China, if the desired degree of resolve and professional rigour can be brought to the fore. If we miss this opportunity, we will remain abjectly import-dependent forever in this vital area.
Admiral Arun Prakash retired as India’s 20th Naval Chief and Chairman Chiefs of Staff in 2006
https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/let-them-take-flight/article26502547.ece/amp/
It is not late to declare the Tejas and Kaveri projects as ‘national missions’
At the Aero-India 2019 airshow and aviation exhibition, held in Bengaluru last month, there were two developments of significance, for India’s national security as well its moribund aeronautical industry. On February 20, the Indian Air Force and the aviation community heaved a collective sigh of relief after the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas Mark 1, received its long-awaited Final Operational Clearance; this means it is combat-ready and can be exploited to the limits of its approved ‘envelope’. However, a day later, came a rather unwelcome report: a Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) announcement at the show of its decision to shelve the Kaveri turbo-jet engine project. While one waits for this report to be confirmed or denied, given the criticality of this engine for India’s aeronautical industry, the issue deserves a close look.
Political myopia
Historically, all major aerospace powers have possessed the capability to design airframes as well as power-plants. Until India can design and produce its own aero-engines, the performance and capabilities of any indigenously designed/built aircraft will be seriously limited by the technology that we are permitted to import. India has already had two bitter experiences in this regard. The Hindustan Aeronautics Limited’s sleek and elegant HF-24 Marut fighter, of the 1960s and 1970s, failed to achieve its huge potential as a supersonic fighter for want of a suitable engine. Rather than exert itself to seek alternatives, the government of the day, with stunning myopia, closed the programme.
Similarly, many of the problems the Tejas faced emanate from lack of engine thrust. Even as the Kaveri has failed to make an appearance, U.S.-made alternatives such as the General Electric F-404 engine, or even the more powerful F-414, do not deliver adequate thrust for the Tejas Mk 1, to meet all its missions. For the Tejas Mk IA, Mk II, the LCA Navy, and other aircraft programmes such as the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft, India will need turbo-jet engines of even greater thrust. Thus, it is vital for India to develop a family of homegrown jet engines to power indigenous combat aircraft as well as re-engine imported ones.
A pivotal role
In this context, it is necessary to recognise that both the Tejas and Kaveri projects — which have seen more than their share of headwinds and uncertainty — form key components of India’s technological aspirations. Unless carefully guided, protected and nurtured, their failure could spell the end of India’s aeronautical industry, or condemn it forever to licensed production. A long production run of, say, 250-300 aircraft for the Tejas and its advanced derivatives is essential if the industry is to hone its design and production skills.
The same holds good for the Kaveri, except that the design and production of a functional turbojet engine are even more challenging. The HAL claims to have “manufactured” nearly 5,000 aero-engines of British, French and Russian design, and overhauled 18,000 of them. Since this putative “manufacturing” process involves merely the assembly of imported components, several engine divisions of the HAL have failed to imbibe aspects of design, metallurgy, thermodynamic and aerodynamic engineering as well as the complex tooling and machining process required for the design and manufacture of aero-engines, over the past 60 years — a sad commentary. In 1986, the DRDO’s decades-old Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) was tasked with developing an indigenous power plant for the LCA, which was to replace the U.S. engines being used for the development phase of the aircraft.
Having developed two experimental engines, the GTRE took up a turbofan design, designated the GTX-35VS “Kaveri”, for the LCA. Full-scale development was authorised in 1989 for 17 prototypes at a cost of $55 million. The first complete prototype Kaveri began tests in 1996, and by 2004 it had flown on a Russian flying test-bed; albeit unsuccessfully. Since then, the Kaveri has made sporadic progress and the GTRE has been struggling with serious design and performance issues which it has been unable to resolve. As the Kaveri missed successive deadlines, the U.S. import option was mindlessly and gleefully resorted to.
A series of troughs
Given the DRDO’s penchant for secrecy and misplaced optimism, the true story of the Kaveri’s halting progress has never been revealed to Parliament or the taxpayer. However, two details, available on the Internet, are revelatory of the organisation’s ‘modus operandi’. It has, at least, on two occasions, approached French and British aero-engine manufacturers for advice and consultancy in operationalising the Kaveri. Despite reportedly attractive offers of performance-enhancement and technology-transfer, the negotiations stalled reportedly on cost considerations. It is also interesting to note that in 2014, this project — of national importance — was arbitrarily shut down by the DRDO only to be revived subsequently for reasons unknown.
It is obvious that the onus for repeated setbacks in these projects must lie squarely on India’s political leadership; for its neglect as well as absence of a vision for the aeronautical industry. There are three more factors: over-estimation by the DRDO of its capabilities compounded by a reluctance to seek advice; inadequate project management and decision-making skills of its scientists; and exclusion of users — the military — from all aspects of the projects.
It is still not too late for the government to declare both these projects as ‘national missions’ and initiate urgent remedial actions. The success of both the Kaveri and Tejas programmes will transform the aerospace scene, and put India in the front ranks of aeronautical nations, perhaps even ahead of China, if the desired degree of resolve and professional rigour can be brought to the fore. If we miss this opportunity, we will remain abjectly import-dependent forever in this vital area.
Admiral Arun Prakash retired as India’s 20th Naval Chief and Chairman Chiefs of Staff in 2006
https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/let-them-take-flight/article26502547.ece/amp/
Shashwat
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Fuck yeah!
So that means they'll start making FOC Version Tejas now?
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May be sp15 from second line...............
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So which one of you is correct? HAL Chairman and Managing Director R Madhavan said, "The first set of 16 was in the IOC configuration."
But the model displayed at Aero India 2019 was an FOC standard one, right? It was SP-??
And is that just a mock-up? ..or FOC variant will indeed carry Uttam AESA, Brahmos-NG & new supersonic droptanks in future?
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