Oh yeah!!! Why would russia part away its technology in say a money spinning missile like Astra? When they did not do a technology transfer for T-90 how can i believe that they did for Astra?
Why would Russia help India in developing BMD when it is trying hard to sell S-300/S-400?
Why would Russia help DRDO to build Akash when it has similar systems to offer for India?
Russians did not give Brahmos for Free. They have extracted each and every penny from it.
And why is DRDO inspite of receiving all blueprints from Russia(as per you) are still taking years to go from Agni - 1 to Agni - 5? Do you understand the technological challenges which DRDO faced to develop while going from say agni -3 to agni -5?
Russia has co-operated in certain areas. That Does not make it IP owner of the Missile technology which DRDO scientist have worked hard to reach at.Respect the scientist who have given us strategic arms to defend against.
Why would they?
Geostrategy, that is why.
It maybe worth noting, just for starters, that Prithvi is a single-stage missile
with a liquid-propellant engine, made by the Soviet KB Isayev (derivative of S2.711V engine).
Now, let me answer you on Agni.
Stunted development
The problem with India's missile development programme is that there is no clear strategic policy or urgency regarding deployment. India is the only country in the world that has developed a range of missiles but which remain either on the drawing board or have got stuck at the demo stage.
In the case of virtually every Agni series missile, after a couple of tests the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) declared that development was complete. The impression conveyed was the missile was ready to be handed over to the army. But then the DRDO went in for an improved version, for the cycle to begin all over again.
Missiles need to be tested dozens of times under all sorts of operational conditions to validate their performance and reliability. Take the Agni-IV, which failed its first test in December 2010. This missile was not tested again until November 15, 2011.
It's as if the scientists are sent on a long holiday after each launch. This is not how von Braun or Sergei Korolyov worked to build strategic missiles for the US and Russia. This approach will not ensure the reliability of India's missile force, but it drives many Indians, well, ballistic.
5000 kilometre red line
Who knows, perhaps the scientists are indeed being sent on extended holidays. The chief reason why India's ICBM development has proceeded at the speed of snails is intense American pressure. According to the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi, in the late 1990s India had to postpone the Agni test flights on more than one occasion under US influence.
It is also well-known that back in 1992 the US had asked President Boris Yeltsin to stop the transfer of Russian cryogenic engines although the complex cryogenic technology is of little use in ballistic missiles.
There are two reasons why the US wants to scuttle India's ICBM plans – one, America's hopelessly inadequate (some say unworkable) missile defence systems will have the additional task of monitoring Indian ICBMs. Secondly, plain arrogance – a former Cold War opponent shouldn't be allowed to develop missiles that could target good ole American folks. America has, therefore, drawn a red line that it will not tolerate India crossing, and that line is the 5000 kilometre mark.
It is in this backdrop that the Chinese, despite their usually shrill rhetoric, were right when last week they claimed that under NATO pressure India had limited the Agni's range.
Missile impossible: why the Agni-V falls short | Russia & India Report
Some news on Indian missile development
India built the medium-range Agni missile by taking a first-stage rocket from a small space launcher and combining it with guidance technology developed by the German space agency. The effort dates from the 1960s. U.S. scientists from NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) launched the first small rocket from Indian soil - an American Nike Apache - in 1963. "We were waiting for the payload to arrive when we saw a guy on a bicycle coming up an unpaved road," recalls one NASA veteran of the launch. "He had the payload in the basket."
One of India's ablest students was A. P. J. Abdul Kalam. While training in the United States, he visited the space centers where the U.S. Scout rocket was conceived and was being flown. Kalam returned home to build India's first space rocket, the Satellite Launch Vehicle - SLV-3, a carbon copy of the Scout. NASA made Kalam's task easier by supplying unclassified technical reports on the Scout's design.
France supplied the next technology infusion. In the 1970s, its Societe Europeene de Propulsion gave India the technology for the Viking high-thrust liquid rocket motor, used on the European Space Agency's Ariane satellite launcher. The Indian version, the "Vikas," became the second stage of the large rocket India launched in October. Liquid fuel technology also helped India develop the Prithvi missile, which can reach Islamabad. Derived from a Soviet-supplied anti-aircraft missile, the Prithvi became the second stage of the Agni missile.
But aid from America and France was soon dwarfed by aid from Germany. In the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, Germany helped India with three indispensable missile technologies: guidance, rocket-testing and composite materials. Earmarked for the space program, all were equally useful for building missiles.
In 1978, Germany installed an interfero-meter on an Indian rocket to measure, from the ground, a rocket's angle of flight. Four years later, India tested its own version. From 1982 to 1989, Germany helped India build a navigation system for satellites based on a Motorola microprocessor. During the same period, and following the same steps, India developed its own navigation system for missiles and rockets based on the same microprocessor.
Germany also tested India's first large rocket in a wind tunnel at Cologne-Portz; it helped India build its own rocket test facility; and it trained Indians in glass and carbon fiber composites at Stuttgart and Braunschweig. These lightweight, heat-resistant fibers are ideal for missile nozzles and nose cones. To help India use the fibers, Germany provided the documentation for a precision filament winding machine, a sensitive item now controlled for export by other countries, including the United States.
India's quest for imports provoked a row with the United States in 1992. The Russian space agency tried to sell India advanced cryogenic engines for India's most ambitious space rocket, the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV). The United States opposed the deal, rejecting India's argument that the engines were only suitable for space launchers. "If you can do space launches, you can do ballistic missiles," a Commerce Department analyst told the Risk Report. The analyst's stance is buttressed by a CIA report declassified in 1993. It said that a space launcher "could be converted relatively quickly by technologically advanced countries ... to a surface to surface missile."
In 1993, India's procurement effort surfaced again. A Massachusetts company was charged with violating U.S. export laws by selling India components for a hot isostatic press. The press, which India obtained through the company's Scottish subsidiary, can be used to shape advanced composites for missile nose cones.
The question now is what India will do next. If it perfects a lightweight nuclear warhead, which the CIA says it is working on, the Agni missile could carry bombs to Beijing. And if India perfects an accurate long-range guidance system, its new space rocket could become an intercontinental ballistic missile. Success would change the strategic equation in Asia and make India a world nuclear power.
But India still needs crucial help. A recent Pentagon study cites composites, electronics, computers, sensors and navigation equipment as some of the technologies in which India is still weak.
http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/india/missiles.html